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This compelling reading of the Canterbury 
Tales is new in three important respects: It 
goes beyond the critical truism that Chaucer 
was fond of Ovid to discover, in medieval 
analyses of the form of the Metamorphoses as a 
collection, basic guidance for understanding 
the form of Chaucer's own aggregation of 
tales. It proposes, in light of this evidence, a 
new order or sequence for the tales that is 
based neither on the mute witness of some 
single "good" manuscript or group of manu­
scripts, nor on the geography between Lon­
don and Canterbury. And, instructed by the 
inconclusive results of merely internal evi­
dence, it establishes an ordering grounded 
primarily in external evidence — in medieval 
literary commentaries and manuals and in 
the Metamorphoses itself, which defined 
medieval principles of literary organization. 
By reading the Canterbury Tales as a norma­
tive array of exempla in four groups, which 
exploit the literal and analogical significance 
of the structure of marriage in order to arrive 
at a definition of social order, Allen and 
Moritz are able to posit a medieval unity for 
Chaucer's fair chain of narratives. The first of 
the four exhibits a clearly logical coherence 
that is Chaucer's own creation and an obvious 
adumbration of his intention for the whole. 
The succeeding three are the heuristic con­
structs of Allen and Moritz, who, while re­
specting the integrity of each of Chaucer's 
fragments, reorder them according to the ex­
ample provided by his own medieval editors. 
The classification of Chaucer's tales into the 
four Ovidian categories — natural, magical, 
moral, and spiritual — obeys both the method 
and the specific content of medieval literary 
criticism. 
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Preface

Collaboration is rare in literary criticism; whether because of the van­
ity of critics or the confidentiality of poetry, we cannot say. When it 
does happen, there is usually some easy division of credits. In our 
case, this division is quite impossible. Our collaboration is the result of 
a discovery, made at the beginning of a number of years of talk about 
Chaucer, that we were finishing each other's sentences, and finding 
both pleasure and profit in so doing. 
In its present form, our reading of Chaucer's Canterbury Tales is 
new in three ways. In the first place, we go beyond the truism of 
criticism that Chaucer was fond of Ovid to find in medieval analyses 
of the form of the Metamorphoses as a collection basic guidance for our 
understanding of the form of Chaucer's own collection of tales. In the 
second place, and under this guidance, we propose a new order for 
the tales, based neither on the witness of some single "good" manu­
script or group of manuscripts, nor on the geography between Lon­
don and Canterbury. This order, indeed, is not the result or conclu­
sion of any study of merely internal evidence; rather, it is a heuristic 
proposal guided by the external evidence of Metamorphoses commen­
tary, and of other commentaries and manuals which define medieval 
procedures of literary organization. That this order, in the use of it, 
greatly facilitated our reading is gratifying. Nevertheless, what we 
wish ultimately to claim is not that our ordering is the only correct 
one, but rather that our method of reading, which takes the tales as an 
ordered series and reads them in terms of each other, is both medie­
val and permanently profitable. Dispositio, for the medieval sensibility, 
was a rhetorical strategy with discursive ends. Its purpose was to 
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evoke in the reader or hearer that understanding of analogies existing 
between part and part which a heightened sense of the order of the 
parts produces. Hence the medieval emphasis on artificial orders; 
only for the most elementary of writers and speakers was the basis of 
dispositio required to be anything, such as geography, merely natural 
to the material being treated. 
In the third place, we are quite conscious that Chaucer's stories, as 
we read them, have turned out to be not quite the same things as had 
been conventionally thought. In medieval terms, their quidditas is dif­
ferent. For us Chaucer's stories are not, except trivially, speeches or 
dramatic monologues. Neither are they, essentially, narrative plots, 
though most of them do, as stories, contain descriptions of completed 
actions. Rather, under the guidance of medieval critics and their 
theories, we have been led to see Chaucer's stories as examples— 
exempla. Seeing thus, we are obviously led to the thematic question, 
Examples of what? In answer to this question, we make a reading 
which is in part overtly thematic and find that Chaucer is, among 
other things, a superb political scientist. But we are also led to another 
and more subtle question: Examples in what way? An example is 
always properly particular; that which it exemplifies is universal or 
general. We thus confront the problem of the relation between uni­
versal and particular, under the mode of exemplification, in a way 
which permits value to be given to fictions, and which, in an age which 
some Chaucer critics accuse of being skeptically nominalist, permits us 
to discuss with some confidence both Chaucer's belief in definition 
and his method of making one. In this discussion we are interested 
both in method and in theme—or, in medieval terms, both in modus 
and in sententia. But we put modus first, and with a confidence autho­
rized by the medieval critics, who made forma tractatus dependent on 
forma tractandi. Thus we have relatively more to say about relation­
ships among stories, or among parts of stories, and relatively less to 
say about the thematic topics traditional among Chaucer critics as 
occasion for set-piece display. Respectful of Kittredge and Donaldson, 
for instance, we essay no effictio of the Wife of Bath. But we believe 
that we have made both clear and important a number of features of 
Chaucer's art whose existence has been previously obscured by too 
modern critical expectations. 
What Chaucer is doing, we think, is making a normative definition 
of human society. Central to this definition is the structure of mar­
riage. By the power of his strategy of exemplification, he uses this 
structure of marriage paradigmatically rather than merely as an exer­
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cise of sociological or psychological realism. In architectonically 
repeated stories of various marriages, Chaucer defines the norms of 
all types of properly conducted human relationships. In working to 
explain this definition, and Chaucer's concerns with it, we are per­
force expressing concerns which are broadly ethical and political 
rather than narrowly aesthetic or literary. In this we have no dis­
comfort, because here again we act under the authority of the medie­
val critics. Further, and in universal human terms, we hope also to 
affirm that great literature can be rhetorical in the classical moral 
sense without having any of its essential greatness compromised. 
As is customary, we are happy to acknowledge our debt to previous 
critics, whose specifics are recorded in our notes. Especially where we 
differ or diverge from precedent, we are conscious of the great extent 
to which precedent permits us to take another step. Among these 
critics, however, we should take special note of some whose work 
cannot here be fully or even adequately acknowledged—the medieval 
authors of commentaries, glosses, manuals, and outlines, still largely 
unpublished, on whose work we ground our a priori assumptions. 
Full treatment of this material is another book, and cannot be in­
cluded in this one. We cite sufficient preliminary studies of this mate­
rial to make our presumptions clear, if not yet unarguable. At the 
same time we know that the true value of an apriority is its usefulness, 
not merely its historicity. Of that value we here make Chaucer's Can­
terbury Tales the judge. 
In addition, we are happy to thank a number of friends and col­
leagues, who have read our work at some stage or other in its making, 
for their suggestions and criticism: John Alford, John McCabe, 
Charles Owen, Rossell Hope Robbins, R. A. Shoaf, and Paul Theiner. 
They have moderated our excesses, labeled our digressions, saved us 
from errors of fact and style, even while they encouraged us to believe 
that we were right about important matters. For the making of the 
bibliography, we thank Carol Briggs; for verification, proofreading, 
and the index, Judith Jablonski. Carol S. Sykes, of the Ohio State 
University Press, has transformed manuscript into book with an ideally 
helpful rigor. Finally, in our dedication we not only obey the pre­
occupation of the Canterbury Tales, but also honor and appreciate 
two particular people with whom, in the living form of our marriages, 
we discover our truth. 

PART ONE 
Definitions and Structures 

Axioms of Unity 
and Their Consequences 
In the beginning of his Les mots et les choses, Michel Foucault quotes a 
cautionary joke which might well be recommended as the proper 
place of beginning for any critic who seeks to understand the litera­
ture of the past. The quotation is of Borges's encyclopedic Chinese 
classification of animals: belonging to the emperor, embalmed, tame, 
sucking pigs, sirens, fabulous, stray dogs, included in the present 
classifications, frenzied, innumerable, drawn with a very fine camel­
hair brush, et cetera, having just broken the water pitcher, and 
that from a long way off look like flies.1 It is a classification which, to 
Western minds, and perhaps to real Eastern ones as well, makes very 
little sense. Still, its matter-of-fact presentation makes a claim to truth 
which, even as it amuses us by its incongruity, also causes us to reex­
amine our cherished modes of formulating and classifying reality. 
Every system is equally arbitrary, until one considers what each is for; 
Borges's Chinese encyclopedia makes us realize how largely it is habit 
which accustoms us to find one such system a natural deposit from the 
way the world actually is, and another the fantasy of deluded persons 
made foreign to us by time, space, genius, or all three. 
The problem to which Borges's irony addresses itself is peculiarly 
vivid for the literary critic because the critic's business is to account 
for something at once alien and contemporary. We deal with poems 
and stories which must be classified, analyzed, and assimilated as if 
they were a part of our own world, as indeed they are. At the same 
time we know that they survive from a possibly inscrutable past, 
and curiosity if not academic responsibility ensures that we try to 
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deal with them in their own terms, even if those terms turn out to 
be as strange as Borges's classification of animals. 
We have a number of methods for classifying the materials con­
tained in Chaucer's Canterbury Tales. References to times and places 
in the links suggest that Chaucer would have arranged tales and 
interludes of conversation according to the geography of the pil­
grimage route. The Parson's objections to storytelling, and the mat­
ter of his sermon, have led us to find in him a dramatic reversal of the 
worldly wandering represented by the story contest and its partici­
pants. Other methods for drawing together the diverse contents of 
the text have also been proposed. For example, the stories provide a 
representative collection of literary genres, from epic (at least in the 
opinion of some readers) to romance to fabliau to sermon. On the 
other hand, one may find in the poem descriptions of a number of 
fascinating people—some of them the pilgrims themselves, others 
characters in the tales which the pilgrims tell. Again, it is obvious that 
tales have tellers, and therefore the dramatic principle has concen­
trated on the psychological revelations of the pilgrims, whether in 
telling a tale or in talking together, as the unifying interest in all that 
Chaucer included in the poem. Finally, from manuscript evidence we 
have the witness of Chaucer's near contemporaries that the stories 
were arranged in groups, and these groups presented in a variety of 
orders. 
All of these methods, with the exception of the last, are modern 
attempts to reconstruct Chaucer's irretrievably lost plan for the poem. 
The witness of manuscripts, which we preserve in editing the text, is 
still suspected of obscuring, rather than illuminating, authorial inten­
tions. Using modern methods for classifying the contents of the 
poem, we have found much of interest in Chaucer, but the unity of his 
great collection eludes us. Nevertheless, there is a good deal of critical 
talk about the unity of the Canterbury Tales, which, although it is more 
often frustrated than not, does claim that we find the subject impor­
tant, and that at an as yet inarticulate level we find a satisfaction in the 
poem, answering to our sense of the wholeness of things. 
What we need is the right Chinese encyclopedia, that is, a naming of 
the poem's parts which not only identifies them properly as individual 
objects of interest but also reveals their character as units of an or­
dered, coherent presentation of a subject. We have determined to 
raise again the troublesome problem of the unity of the Canterbury 
Tales because our researches into medieval poetics and the medieval 
literary form, the story collection, have convinced us that organiza­
Axioms of Unity and Their Consequences I 5 
tional principles recognized and used in the Middle Ages have not 
been taken into account in modern efforts to understand the plan of 
Chaucer's story array. It seems surprising that, after thirty years and 
more of historical criticism, an aspect of medieval thought, especially 
one which we wish to argue is fundamental for understanding much 
of that age's poetry, should have eluded scholarly notice. We can only 
suggest that the range of historical method has been limited both by 
its own nature, as a fact-gathering procedure, and by an unwillingness 
to ask questions which cast doubt upon the preconceptions with which 
twentieth century readers approach the material. 
The problem with historical criticism is that it has not yet gone 
far enough. Thus far, in our attempt to understand Chaucer's world 
and work, we have done extremely well in assembling the great body 
of facts which is the context of that world and its attitudes. We know 
a great deal about astrology and theology and mythology and medicine 
and many other things. We know the salient facts about most of the 
wars and diplomatic marriages, many of the crimes, and a fair num­
ber of the people, important and not so important. We know what 
books were available and where, and in many cases who read which 
ones. We have ourselves read a great many of these books and have 
puzzled over the fact that many of the ones which were most popular 
then are most boring now, even while we correlated the doctrinal or 
taxonomic facts which those books contained with the more allusive 
versions of the facts as found in our medieval poems. All of these 
things, which we have researched thoroughly and well, have to do 
with those aspects of the medieval culture which, from the modern 
point of view, we could call facts. We must be grateful for knowing 
them; our understanding of medieval art would be far poorer if we 
lacked them. 
In the long run, however, facts are worse than useless if we do not 
know their proper relationships. It is a presumption of historical criti­
cism that, since it is especially qualified to discover and establish the 
existence of facts, there will indeed be facts, and that facts can prop­
erly be the basis of profitable analysis. At one level, this is simply a 
truism. But it conceals a subtle danger of error. Critical history de­
pends on verification, and is more interested in what can be verified; 
therefore, it is most concerned necessarily with concrete entities— 
rather than, or at least prior to, the organizing relationships which 
obtained among those entities. Facts are facts, delimited, separable, 
and whole. A battle is a battle, a manuscript is a manuscript, a state­
ment of doctrine is there in a datable text. Either may have causes, or 
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results, or both, and since we are a priori interested in causes and 
results, we will probably relate our facts in terms of them.2 Thus, 
though we can record Laurence de Premierfait's statement that the 
Divine Comedy, like the Romance of the Rose, was a "vraye map­
pemond,"3 we tend to be disqualified from following de Premierfait's 
example to make similar analogies between medieval books on our 
own. We need a new method which aims at classifying facts and dis­
covering the structures which relate them meaningfully to one 
another. 
As our starting point, then, we have assumed that all the materials 
which Chaucer left behind to be included in the Canterbury Tales must 
be taken seriously as functioning elements in his final design. Because 
they have played so small a part in previous explanations of the 
poem's structure, we have paid special attention to the tales. We have 
attempted to discover medieval literary theory, or practice, which 
might suggest the manner in which Chaucer expected all the various 
parts of the poem to work together. The search for medieval pre­
sumptions about how literary works were to be organized has led us to 
the age's assumptions about where the divisions and classifications of 
the world are to be made and what relations exist among those di­
visions once they are made.4 The ordering principles which we will 
recommend attempt to take advantage of such medieval habits of 
mind as analogy and allegory, the distinctio, the use of exempla, and 
the willingness to consider important such questions as the reality of 
universals. Even though to do so feels at first as strange as repeating 
the classes of Borges's Chinese animals with a sincere attempt at con­
viction, we have attempted to follow medieval practice in trusting to 
the wholeness of the picture composed by the tales. 
Previous efforts to explain the poem's unity are unsatisfactory for 
two reasons. First, they do not make all the pieces of Chaucer's grand 
project, particularly the tales, fit comfortably together; and, second, 
the unifying principles they propose are not well attuned to the me­
dieval character of the work. Robert Jordan's proposal, which is the 
most rigorously medieval in its reference to "homologous parts and 
parts of parts," has been helpful in arguing against a dramatic reading 
of a linearly structured journey to Canterbury. But the nonorganic 
relationship among the parts of the poem he describes comes close to 
meaning nothing more than nonrelational.5 Though he insists on the 
division of the text into parts, Jordan provides no convincing explana­
tion for why these particular parts have been brought together into a 
single work. Other critics dealing with the subject have, in one way or 
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another, begun by proposing a principle of unity they believe to be 
universally valid, under which they have tried to fit the Canterbury 
Tales.6 Two such organizing principles have tended to dominate—the 
first is Aristotelian plot, and the second the drama of the human 
comedy, with its implied procedures of character analysis and the 
treatment of the tales as speeches. Neither of them is medieval;7 
nevertheless, because they are true of large tracts of human experi­
ence, they have given many helpful, if only partial, insights into 
Chaucer. 
Some critics have found a plot for the poem in the action of the 
Canterbury journey; others have looked to the thematic significance 
of a spiritual pilgrimage in order to discover the plan of the poem.8 
On the one hand, the actual pilgrimage to Canterbury is seen as 
something which begins in London, goes along the way in the middle, 
and ends in Canterbury—or alternatively, and with more correctness, 
back in London again.9 Such a plot is founded on the progress of the 
pilgrims, taking into account allusions to the familiar stopping points 
on the road to Canterbury; but the events outside the flow of time are 
more difficult to place inside the structure. They remain an unex­
plained middle suspended between the clear-cut beginning set forth 
in the General Prologue and the apparent conclusion provided by the 
Parson's Prologue.10 The other, more popular plot joins the end of 
the pilgrimage in Canterbury with the thematic climax of the Parson's 
Tale and structures the plot in terms of a journey from London to, or 
toward, heaven. The most significant study of this spiritual pilgrim­
age is Ralph Baldwin's, whose initial presentation was taken up by 
many other critics.11 Interpretations of the spiritual pilgrimage at­
tempt to establish a structure which is worked out not only in the 
physical details of the journey but also in the thematic development of 
the alternative values for life expressed by the pilgrims, climaxing in 
the judgment of the Parson. 
The axiom of these plot approaches to the Canterbury Tales is, of 
course, Aristotelian. The analysis of narratives in terms of beginnings, 
middles, and ends is a commonplace of modern criticism. In the Mid­
dle Ages, however, both theory and practice call this axiom of plot 
into question. The Averroistic version in which medieval critics knew 
Aristotle's Poetics makes it quite clear that the beginnings, middles, 
and ends of which poetry was to be composed were discursive or 
logical features, and not causally ordered narrative ones; and 
Chaucer's rhetorical strategy with the Parson's Tale in fact probably 
undercuts the sense of climax which its final place encourages us to 
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see in it.12 Medieval treatments of dispositio have a far better developed 
doctrine of beginnings than of endings,13 and it is probably safe to 
presume that medieval sensibility would therefore expect the most 
important element in any writing to come first, rather than last. 
The human comedy approach to the Canterbury Tales prizes the 
poem for its faithfulness to individualizing details of description and 
its accurate reflections of real life.14 Homage to Chaucer's camera eye 
has even prompted researches into possible originals of the fictional pil­
grims among the artist's acquaintances.15 The modern impulse to em­
pirical realism has led critics to suppose that the surface of Chaucer's 
poem glitters with the unadorned face of the poet's time; by logical 
extension, Chaucer becomes for many no more than the man who 
holds the mirror. His self-portrait as a well-meaning but innocent 
reporter of his age has been taken seriously. Within the last twenty 
years, students of medieval learning have offered valuable correctives 
to the excesses of this reverence for Chaucer's unsullied realism by 
showing how habitually medieval people saw in the real world forms 
and processes defined by traditional ideas rather than close personal 
observation.16 For medieval art particular representational figures 
tended regularly to be exemplars of typical ideas or states; golden 
ribbons of written speech connected painted figures with their mes­
sage; this connection with the typical or allegorical persisted, even 
heightened, as verisimilitude reached virtuoso levels in late medieval 
and Renaissance painting in Flanders. One may properly generalize 
from Averroes's remark about the poetry of praise to all art: 
"Tragedia etenim non est ars representativa ipsorummet hominum 
prout sunt individua cadentia in sensum, sed est representativa con­
suetudinum eorum honestarum et actionum laudabilium et cre­
dulitatum beatificantium . . . et ars scientialis que montrat [sic] sive 
docet ex quibus et qualiter componuntur poemata principalior et per­
fectior est quam ipsa operatio poematum."17 This is not of course to 
say that particulars occurring in medieval art should be reduced to, or 
dismissed in favor of, the general or the typical, after the fashion 
recommended by critics who allegorize in the manner of C. S. Lewis. 
It is to say that overtones of widely accepted definitions of the human 
condition are an element in all of Chaucer's very particular figures, 
such as the Wife of Bath or the Tabard's Host. Behind the concrete 
details of story always stood the consuetudines and credulitates whose 
truth or moral value remained of primary value and interest. 
Throughout the Middle Ages the fit relationship between such gen­
eral truths and their physical, particular counterparts was discussed. 
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We shall return to these discussions when we consider Chaucer's at­
titudes on the authority of poetry; it is enough to say here that as a 
poet of the later Middle Ages, Chaucer's belief in these traditional 
associations was refined by his awareness of growing challenges, in an 
era not fully confident of analogy, to its philosophical validity. 
Formulations of the marriage group are an important corollary of 
the human comedy view. It might be objected that Kittredge's pro­
posal should not be grouped with human comedy readings because it 
is aimed at defining something typical in the poem, that is, the institu­
tion of marriage. But Kittredge's article, as well as most work of this 
kind, falls short precisely because of the same assumptions we charac­
terized as basic to the human comedy approach.18 These critics 
evaluate the pilgrims as realistically drawn characters, with limited 
points of view and personal prejudices interesting in themselves, and 
not existing as typical of anything. Critics of the marriage group are 
really claiming that the discussion is not so much of marriage as of 
marriages—of personal options open to real people, modern as well 
as medieval (with Archie Bunker's and Andy Capp's wives as reason­
able modern analogues). Such common ground as critics find in the 
marriage group as a whole tends to be dramatic rather than typical— 
dictated by the interaction of the pilgrims more than by the interac­
tion of themes. Because the critics are concerned above all with 
people, in all their bare forked variety, they tend to minimize the 
importance of what these people say as having any validity beyond the 
immediate and psychological. The marriage group is an important 
test case for our hypothesis that, for Chaucer as for the Middle Ages, 
particular figures were offered as exemplary of general truths. Me­
dieval marriage evokes a wide-ranging series of associations with 
other relationships, including that of Christ and the church, of the 
higher and lower reason, of the mind and body, and of ruler and 
subjects.19 Robertsonian formulations push this evocation too far, by 
tending to take the allegory and leave the letter.20 But most critics who 
discuss the marriage group do so literally, and lose the full and proper 
medieval context by presuming that the stories involved are merely 
realistic in the nineteenth-century sense and contain nothing but the 
ordinary human behavior they recount. They ignore the allegorical 
dimension—admittedly in proper opposition to letting it displace, or 
replace, the story—but in so doing they fail to appreciate how the 
allegorical overtones of stories containing marriages satisfy the me­
dieval fondness for the typical. A notable instance of this problem is in 
readings of the Clerk's Tale.21 Efforts to explain the tale's plot in terms 
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of dramatic and personal principles, such as Walter's hubris, cannot 
account for the complex game Chaucer plays with the literal and 
allegorical levels of this traditional exemplum of Christian patience. 
Without taking into account the extended senses of marriage, with 
which the Middle Ages was accustomed to invest its literal occurrence, 
Chaucer's manipulation of his source in order to heighten the issue of 
Griselda's obedience and his subsequent ironic commentary in the 
Envoi are lost, and the tale threatens to become, for the modern 
reader, a scandalous proof of the need for women's liberation. We will 
deal with these matters, in focus on the Clerk's Tale, later.22 What is 
important here is that discussions of the marriage group, and other 
analogous discussions of Chaucer's characters as merely charming, 
real people, leave out half of what Chaucer wrote. What is lacking is 
awareness of the tendency of medieval particulars toward dependable 
associations23—which can be trusted as the ground of structure in 
which those particulars relate to meaning and to each other. This lack 
of interest, as we have implied, is axiomatically based; it results from 
too univocal an interest in something else—in this case, people, in all 
their simple humanity. 
Recently, however, a growing number of critics seem to be seeing 
that no univocal approach will work with Chaucer; they have there­
fore been able to discover richer and richer ironies in his work. The 
basic ground of their work is still the presumption that the plot which 
leads to heaven and the people whose particular individuality seems 
so obvious actually exist, but now both instead of one, side by side in 
the Canterbury Tales. The point of their existence, however, is not 
ultimate but instrumental; Chaucer is not choosing between them or 
commenting on one by subtly preferring the other, but rather is in­
dulging in a "double vision," which is the "ironical essence" of his 
art.24 Arthur W. Hoffman puts the polarities involved in this fashion: 
"The Prologue begins, then, by presenting a double view of the Can­
terbury pilgrims: the pilgrimage is one tiny manifestation of a huge 
tide of life, but then, too, the tide of life ebbs and flows in response to 
the power which the pilgrimage acknowledges, the power symbolized 
by 'the hooly blisful martir.'"25 An analogous doubleness, that be­
tween the typical and the individual, is proposed by Jill Mann as the 
basis for Chaucer's moral ambiguity.26 
The doubleness is certainly there—between earth and heaven, be­
tween Chaucer the pilgrim and Chaucer the poet (though this one 
probably has been overdone), between the particular and the typical, 
between the literal and the allegorical, bet: een the thing and the 
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word that names it.27 To call this an ironic vision suggests to the 
modern reader that Chaucer has decided wisely not to choose be­
tween two aspects of life, but simply to hold them in suspension as 
both truly present in man.28 But irony, for the Middle Ages, is simply 
one of the forms of allegory, that is, not a denial of meaning but an 
affirmation of it.29 This double vision is structually persistent in 
Chaucer's collection because he proposes to gauge the relationship 
between these two components of life and establish from these ele­
ments a coherent picture of the human condition. The medieval 
strategy of assimilatio is an alternative to the crucial Aristotelian term 
mimesis.30 The Canterbury Tales is constructed from contradictory ma­
terials of life, not in order to witness to a confusion beyond human 
understanding, but rather to draw the contradictions into a pattern 
revealing their true harmony. 
We have said that the various unifying principles surveyed here are 
nonmedieval and have suggested briefly how they have obscured, or 
distorted, our understanding of what they were intended to explain. 
One aspect of the modern search for the poem's unity deserves special 
comment. With few exceptions, critics treat the tales and the links in 
different ways; the stories are read individually or in small groups, 
whereas the links are treated as if they constituted a dramatic whole, a 
continuous narrative of character development and interaction. The 
"real life" of the pilgrims is distinguished from the "fictions" they 
present. Modern readers interested in plot and characterization have 
found the links susceptible to analysis in such terms; they have pre­
sumed that Chaucer, too, was more interested in, or more willing to 
trust the reality of, the "real life" of the frame than the "fictions" it 
encloses. As a result, the stories are subordinated to their tellers, and 
in explanations of the poem's design, are treated either as "beautiful 
lies" which are exposed by the truth of life or as dramatic monologues 
in which the pilgrims expose their own psychological complexities.31 
This dramatic principle is so powerful in the minds of modern 
critics that it operates, not just as a conscious tool of criticism, but as an 
unconscious axiom determining what the critic might expect as he 
begins his work. Because it is thus so insidious, it needs especially to be 
put down, lest in the rest of the book we be misunderstood as failing 
to say what we never intended to say, or as saying badly in dramatic 
terms what in fact we are saying well in medieval ones. 
The most significant effect of post-Cartesian philosophy has been 
to focus attention on epistemology rather than metaphysics; by now 
this attention has generated a host of attitudes and cultural interests, 
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all presuming, in one way or another, individual point of view as a 
point of departure for knowledge and action. The dramatic 
monologues of Browning, the subtle treatment of point of view by 
Henry James, the structuralist surrender to individual acts of reading, 
phenomenologist thinking, the theory of relativity, the Heisenberg 
principle of indeterminacy, and even opinion-poll evidence—all trace 
to the essentially modern conviction that statements are relative to 
their speakers, experiences to their sufferers or enjoyers. Nothing is 
except as it is witnessed or endured. Thus our modern critical interest 
in Chaucer's tales as dramatic utterances, and in him as a layered 
series of personae beneath which the "real" author-civil servant, him­
self a point of view, ironically hides himself, is ultimately more an 
interest in ourselves and our own phenomenological predicament 
than it is in anything authentically medieval or Chaucerian. 
Both drama and testimony existed in the Middle Ages, of course, 
And considerable attention was paid to distinctions among roles. But 
these facts give no special support to the dramatic principle as 
modern critics of Chaucer have practiced it. Literary criticism pro­
duced in the Middle Ages provides us with slight evidence bearing on 
point of view; such as there is, when properly understood, leads us 
more toward a taxonomy of types than to an epistemology of indi­
vidualized witnesses. Chaucer's northern dialect students in the 
Reeve's Tale are, according to John Fisher, the first in English litera­
ture;32 as a kind of ethnic humor, this usage obviously shows no re­
spect for an individual point of view, but just the reverse, as oppo­
nents of ethnic slurs have always known. It reduces the individual to 
something merely typical. A gloss on the speech of Tideus in book 2 
of the Thebiad evaluates this kind of "realistic" writing with the proper 
medieval emphasis: "Nota Stacium valde rethoricum in hac oratione 
esse, cum non faciat Tideum loqui rethorice. Digna est enim persona 
tali locutione."33 Statius, in making Tideus speak as Tideus should, 
underlines not Tideus but his own rhetorical presence as author. 
Ultimately, and by analogy, Chaucer is the only speaker in the Canter­
bury Tales; his rhetoric tells it all.34 What makes even this persuasive, 
however, is not Chaucer's personal witness as author or speaker—not 
his speech as his—but his speech as speech. The dramatic principle 
does indeed hold for law oratory, but it is not properly exercised in 
poetry: "Argumentatio seu probatio rectitudinis credulitatis aut oper­
ationis non per sermonem persuasivum (hoc enim non pertinet huic 
arti neque est conveniens ei) sed per sermonem representativum . . . 
ideoque non utitur carmen laudativum arte gesticulationis neque vul­
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tuum acceptione sicut utitur hiis rethorica."35 What this sermo repre­
sentativus presents may indeed be personae, but they are made credible 
by it, and not it by them. Thus Thomas Waleys, commenting on 
Boethius's Consolation, says: "Causa autem formalis tractandi est 
modus agendi Boetii, et est dialogus, idest sermo duorum. Introducit 
enim Boetius in hoc libro duas personas, scilicet seipsum suam 
miseriam deplangentem, et philosophiam sibi condolentem, et ipsum 
super suam miseriam consolantem."36 What is fundamental here 
is the form, dialogue. The personae are the result of the exis­
tence of this genre, not its cause. Both philosophy and the persona 
of Boethius are aspects of that temporarily depressed instance of 
humanitas named Boethius, who must achieve his true selfhood 
in the knowledge of the highest good. There is nothing here that 
is even remotely phenomenological; the psychomachic dialogue 
does not constitute an individual so much as deliver a self from its 
improper individuality. What is true of these Platonist personifica­
tions of Boethius is equally true, mutatis mutandis, of Chaucer's 
nominalist exempla. In fit array they may exemplify the truth, but 
their witness does not constitute it. The fact that Chaucer's collection 
is divisible into frame and stories was probably less vivid to Chaucer 
than it is to us. Commentaries on the Metamorphoses contemporary 
with Chaucer, for example, ignore distinctions between framelike 
stories and enclosed stories; instead, they allegorize them all alike, as a 
collection of morally instructive exemplary actions. Furthermore, 
when Chaucer introduces the question of the relative authority of art 
and life, or experience and authority, he comes to conclusions oppo­
site to those most twentieth-century readers have attributed to him. 
Chaucer and his first audiences regarded the Canterbury Tales as at 
least as interesting and significant as the Canterbury journey during 
which they were told. With all this in mind, we are convinced that an 
avenue of approach to the text, via the tales rather than the links, 
remains unexplored. It is there that we propose to begin. 
The most promising place to look in a piece of writing for clues to 
its unity, from the medieval point of view, is its beginning; if clues are 
not unambiguously clear at this level, then the second most promising 
place to look is in analogous cases—sources or models to which one's 
book can be unquestionably related. Of the many things we learn 
from Chaucer's beginning, the most emphatic is that the Knight and 
his tale have unusual authority. The Knight is the first pilgrim de­
scribed; his tale is the first tale. Rank tells, and the dramatic device of 
submitting to the luck of the draw only reinforces the inevitability of 
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the Knight's position. The easiest next step is to suppose that the 
General Prologue will define the order of all that is to follow—but this 
is not true. Neither the Host nor the Miller wants to hear the Squire 
speak after his father. In terms of ordering, then, the Prologue pre­
dicts only the Knight's Tale, and otherwise contributes to the whole­
ness of the poem in different ways, as we shall later suggest. 
Empirically, and without recourse to theory, it is obvious that the 
tales of the first fragment are unified. They present a complex and 
witty interweaving of characters and ideas; they all treat the same 
basic love triangle; and they show a common concern for order and 
justice, even though each tale's action is more vulgar and disorderly 
than the one before.37 One might therefore suppose that this kind of 
unity, defined by the precedent and example of the first and most 
carefully worked out fragment, might operate throughout the whole. 
Yet this promise of order also seems to break down, following the 
Cook's Tale, much as the arrangements the General Prologue seems to 
promise, whether in its list of pilgrims or in the casting of lots, collapse 
after the Knight's Tale. Discoveries of analogous interrelationships 
among other small groups of tales indicate that the unity of the first 
fragment may not be coincidental, but no overall scheme of this type 
has been expanded to include the entire collection.38 
The only unambiguous certainty in Chaucer's beginning is the 
Knight's Tale. Given the Prologue and the Miller's interruption, which 
are structurally contradictory, we have in the emphatic and defining 
position as prescribed by medieval manuals only the Knight's Tale.39 It 
is a tale weighty in matter and rich in "solaas," whose subject matter of 
young love and brotherly combat seems to echo throughout the re­
maining stories. As the first tale it is in this collection more determina­
tive a prologue than all the mere transitions which come later and 
which, for medieval sensibilities, must be taken more as gloss than as 
determining frame. Therefore, both because of pride of place and 
because of significance of content, the Knight's Tale should be ex­
pected to forecast an orderly unity for the collection it introduces. In 
order to explain how the tale functions in this way, we must see it in 
terms of correctly medieval structuring principles. For these we need 
the guidance of Chaucer's models. 
The search for a medieval precedent to explain Chaucer's method 
and interest in story collections has extended beyond Boccaccio and 
Sercambi, even as far as Mandeville and de Guileville, but with results 
that are at best unprofitable and often misleading.40 In fact, the pre­
cedent for Chaucer's collection of tales in a frame is one which is most 
Axioms of Unity and Their Consequences I 15 
prominent in medieval culture, most widely known and respected, as 
itself a morally normative array of tales, that is, Ovid's Metamorphoses. 
Ovid's possible or probable influence on Chaucer in this regard has 
been often enough noticed.41 But the investigation of Ovid, and even 
of Ovid as he was known in the Middle Ages, has lacked proper 
grounding in the medieval commentaries and has therefore failed to 
understand the Metamorphoses in a way which makes sense of Chaucer. 
This we propose to do. 
In absolute terms, it might well be fair to say that we are not so 
much drawing a parallel between Chaucer's Tales and Ovid's 
Metamorphoses as between the tales and a body of medieval commen­
tary on stories, which in the Middle Ages circulated with the 
Metamorphoses without saying anything much of permanent interest 
about Ovid's poem. We do indeed depend for our guidance in read­
ing Chaucer as much on commentaries as on the Ovidian text itself, if 
not more. Since these commentaries are neither widely known nor 
indeed more than very partially published, we are very conscious that 
this relation which we intend to argue between Chaucer's Canterbury 
Tales and a very medievalized understanding of Ovid's Metamorphoses 
is far more self-evident to us than it is to readers who know both 
poems entirely or substantially by virtue of having read them for 
themselves, in modern editions and translations, as literature. We are 
not claiming that the medieval commentators were right about the 
Metamorphoses, but only that they wrote what they wrote, and that 
Chaucer read it and found it fitting. Obviously we are not claiming 
that sensitive readers of Ovid have been perversely blind for nearly 
five hundred years in failing to see that the Canterbury Tales and the 
Metamorphoses were identical to one another. Unless read through a 
certain medieval filter of commentary, they are not. A sensitive 
modern reader of Ovid might well find, as John Fyler does, that the 
greatest similarity between the two poets was a certain ironic tone.42 In 
seeing this similarity, the modern reader has correctly noticed certain 
features of the experience of reading these poems. But it is crucial to 
realize that he is set up to do so—that he is also reading through a 
filter. Modern readers are interested in point of view. Because we are 
incorrigibly self-conscious, we are persistently curious about, and sen­
sitive to, the self-consciousness of others. Further, we have learned 
from Wayne Booth, if not from Conrad's Marlow, to expect, and to 
appreciate with understanding, a certain irony as the ground of our 
relation with the authors we read. 
We must put aside for the moment all these attitudes, if we are to 
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appreciate, under the guidance of the medieval commentaries, that 
Ovid's Metamorphoses is the formal precedent for Chaucer's Canterbury 
Tales. The analogy which makes this precedent true is, admittedly, a 
difficult one—one in which the "alterity" of medieval literature is 
especially insistent.43 The disappearance of the commentary of Peter 
Lavinius from editions of the Metamorphoses after about 1530 is evi­
dence that this analogy might already have been less than obvious in 
the Renaissance. But what we are attempting in this book is historical 
criticism, against which no modern or merely synchronic attitude is 
privileged. In historical terms, the only Ovid that matters to Chaucer 
is the medieval Ovid, and for that one, given the passage of time, we 
must perforce trust the medieval commentators even more than our 
own reading of the book they glossed. 
We have already mentioned Laurence de Premierfait's willingness 
to equate the Romance of the Rose and the Divine Comedy as examples of 
a "vraye mappemond"; his analogy is very much the kind we are 
making between Ovid and Chaucer. It is not an analogy based on 
style, tone, or plot; rather, it is an analogy based on a medieval sense 
of the logic, meaning, and application possible in a text which is an 
assembly of stories. It is an analogy which is only possible for us 
because the medieval text of Ovid survived with commentary. 
There is not room in this book to include another book on the 
literary theory of the medieval commentators.44 Some things must 
therefore be merely asserted here, in confidence that they have been 
proved elsewhere. As far as commentary on the Metamorphoses is con­
cerned, the edited texts which we cite do fairly represent the charac­
ter, if not all the variation of detail, of what manuscripts preserve.45 
With regard to the strategy of classification of metamorphoses, in 
terms of which Ovid commentary is specifically relevant to Chaucer, 
we are necessarily concerned with full detail, and so we quote from 
manuscripts as well as from edited commentary texts. To be con­
vinced that this commentary material would have been unavoidable, 
one has only to look randomly at any dozen manuscripts of the 
Metamorphoses early enough to have been used by Chaucer. Fully 
blank margins and flyleaves are rare. 
Once one is willing, to trust the medieval commentators, including 
those whose texts are still unedited, one cannot avoid seeing that the 
Metamorphoses provides not only the obvious precedent for the genre 
of the framed story collection but also, and more important, the im­
plicit explanation of the unity of any such collection. The commen­
taries make all this explicit. They preserve elaborate medieval analysis 
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of structural and classificatory principles and categories which name 
parts and in so doing define wholes. These principles tend to occur 
most explicitly in the commentary accessus which circulated with the 
Metamorphoses. Of these commentaries, the one by Arnulf of Orleans, 
with its variants, was the most influential. But substantial evidence 
also comes from incidental glosses, divisiones, and allegories on spe­
cific tales. From this evidence several generalizations are possible. 
First, the commentaries conventionally identify the material of the 
Metamorphoses as changes whose purpose is to exemplify the range of 
possibilities of moral action. Second, this material—changes—is 
classified into a few major types according to one or another of two 
complementary systems. Third, in the actual process of glossing, no 
distinction is made between frame and framed—the Minyades are 
allegorized in their turn, in a series with the stories they tell. 
The ethical interpretation of the Metamorphoses is to be expected. 
Arnulf s language, however, deserves to be examined in some detail: 
Intencio est de mutacione dicere, ut non intelligamus de mutacione que fit 
extrinsecus tantum in rebus corporeis bonis vel malis sed etiam de 
mutacione que fit intrinsecus ut in anima, ut reducat nos ab errore ad 
cognitionem veri creatoris. Duo sunt motus in anima unus rationalis alter 
irrationalis: rationalis est qui imitatur motumfirmamenti, qui fit ab oriente 
in occidentem, et e contrario irrationalis est qui imitatur motum 
planetarum qui moventur contra firmamentum. Dedit enim deus anime 
rationem per quam reprimeret sensualitatem, sicut motus irrationalis VII 
planetarum per motum firmamenti reprimitur. Nos vero rationabilem 
motum more planetarum negligentes contra creatorem nostrum rapimur. 
Quod Ovidius videns vult nobis ostendere per fabulosam narrationem 
motum anime qui fit intrinsecus. Ideo dicitur Yo mutata in vaccam quia 
corruit in vicia, ideo pristinam formam dicitur recepisse quod emersit a 
viciis. Vel intencio sua est nos ab amore temporalium immoderato revocare 
et adhortari ad unicum cultum nostri creatoris, ostendendo stabilitatem 
celestium et varietatem temporalium. Ethice supponitur quia docet nos ista 
temporalia, que transitoria et mutabilia, contempnere, quod pertinet ad 
moralitatem. 
The most significant feature of this piece of literary criticism, which 
continued to be copied into the fifteenth century, is its trust of analog­
ical thinking. Stories of corporeal changes parallel cosmic motions, in 
two opposite ways. Both of the rival cosmic motions, and analogously 
both of the rival psychic motions, are part of the same system—one 
"reprimitur" by the other. Throughout, the critic's presumption that 
his material will be of some practical ethical use is obvious. Under­
standing, then, comes as a result of the fit perception of parallels and, 
when it is achieved, makes possible an improved state of the ethical 
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self. The structure of parallelism internal to the work must also be 
understood to be rhetorical; it includes the reader, who is supposed to 
inform his own life by the experience of the book. 
We know that this particular sense of the formal structure of ethical 
behavior is really intended because in another place the commentator 
specified the four kinds of mutationes as from animate to inanimate, 
from inanimate to animate, from animate to animate, and from in­
animate to inanimate.47 Since this same fourfold schema is also used 
from Donatus to John Balbus as the classification of the kinds of 
metaphor, it is obvious that for these critics the formalities of 
metaphor and the formalities of ethics were the same.48 That is, the 
same relationship which obtains between tenor and vehicle, or be­
tween the two halves of a simile in the operation of assimilatio,4a also 
obtains between quidam homo and the example, rule, divine command, 
or human counsel by which he orders his ethical behavior. Therefore, 
for this reason also, the reader of any given piece becomes, as we shall 
see in chapter 2 more fully, that piece's tropological level—parallel to 
it, its rhetorical object, and its ethical result. 
This analysis in terms of changes from animate to inanimate, and so 
on, is one of the two systems the commentaries use. Its primary critical 
use, as far as we are concerned, is to demonstrate the real analogy that 
informs the operation of poetry and ethics as parallel systems. The 
second system, on the other hand, will prove of more use as we seek to 
rationalize the coherence and unity of specific medieval poems such 
as the Canterbury Tales. 
This second system has been less than clear because the printed 
evidence is misleading. Ghisalberti's editions of the accessus of both 
Arnulf of Orleans and Giovanni del Virgilio present texts in which the 
kinds of metamorphoses are specified as natural, magical, and 
spiritual.50 The commentary of William of Theigiis, preserved in MS 
Paris, B.M. lat. 8010, agrees; after listing and illustrating them, he 
says, "Istis tribus modis dicitur mutatio, et non pluribus" ("Change is 
defined in these three modes, and not in more"). But in the same 
accessus he also gives an alternate version: "Sciendum est quod quad­
ruplex assignatur mutatio scilicet naturalis, moralis, spiritualis et 
magica. Naturalis quam actor innuit in divisione elementorum, 
moralis que attenditur in Lycaone mutato in lupum, et ideo dicitur 
quia prius benignus postea factus predo et improbus. Spiritualis sicut 
de Agave que primo discreta mutata fuit in insanam. Magica est de 
ymagine Pymalionis in virginem mutata, et est magica sicut apparet in 
Circe que per incantacionem mutabat homines in porcos."51 Other 
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manuscripts tend to confirm the tradition as one wavering between 
three and four changes. MS B.N. lat. 15136, a thirteenth-century 
book from St. Victor, specifies three, but a different set: "Videndum 
est quot sint modi mutationis tres scilicet. Est enim ethica mutatio et 
theorica et magica. Ethica de animali rationali ad irrationale [sic] ut 
mutatio licaonis in lupum. Theorica est spiritualis ut deificatio her­
culis. Magica ut de re inanimata ad rem inanimata [sic] sicut mutatio 
ymaginis quam fecit prometheus" (fol. 198r). ("What may be the 
modes of change must be specified—they are three. For there is ethi­
cal change and theoretical and magical. The ethical, from a rational 
animal to an irrational, such as the change of Lycaon into a wolf. The 
theoretical is spiritual, such as the deification of Hercules. The magi­
cal, from an inanimate thing to an animate [cod. inanimate], such as 
the change of the image which Prometheus made.") Still another set 
of three, the artificial, the natural, and the "mistica et magica," occurs 
in a fourteenth-century French manuscript, now MS Vat. lat. 1479.52 
Otherwise, in the Arnulf-Giovanni tradition, the three specified omit 
the ethical, even though in Giovanni's commentary interpretations for 
Hermaphroditus are specified as both "naturaliter" and "moraliter."53 
The mutatio of the person turned to stone in book 10 is similarly 
labeled in MS Vat. lat. 1598: "Item moralis est ista mutatio. Allegoria 
talis est. Philosophus quidam fuit qui cognita subtilitate herculis qui 
docuit terram esse tripartitam quam dedit intelligi per cerberum. 
Unde fingitur cerberum traxisse ab inferis desperavit post herculem 
nichil philosophicum dicere et stupore percussus destitit a sensu. 
Unde in lapidem fingitur esse mutatus" (fol. lOlr). ("This change is 
moral. Its allegory is thus: he was a certain philosopher who under­
stood the subtlety of Hercules (Hercules taught that the earth was 
tripartite and let this be understood by Cerberus, and so it is imagined 
that he dragged Cerberus out of Hell) and after Hercules despaired 
of saying anything philosophical and became depressed and out of 
touch with reality. When it is imagined that he was changed into a 
stone.") It is probably only natural, therefore, that the list triplex— 
natural, magical, and spiritual—should have often become the list 
quadruplex. The fullest explanation of this scheme we have encoun­
tered is in MS Vat. lat. 2781: 
In nova fert animus: Notandum est quod quadruplex est mutatio, scilicet 
naturalis, moralis, magica et spiritualis. Naturalis est que fit per con­
texionem elementorum. Vel retexionem vel mediante semine vel sine. Per 
contexionem enim conveniunt elementa. Ut cum de spermate nascitur 
puer, et de ovo pullus, et de semine herba vel arbor et sic de similibus, et 
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hec mediante semine. Per retexionem vero sicut fit dissolutio in quolibet 
corpore et hoc sine semine, et hec quantum ad elementa et ad yle. Yle est 
nature vultus antiquissimus generationis virtus indefessus formarum 
prima subiectio materia corporum substantie fundamentum. Elementa 
sicut fit quando terra rarescit in aquam, aqua levificatur in aera, aer sub­
tiliatur in ignem. Item ignis spissatur in aera, aer grossificatur in aquam, 
aqua conglobatur in terra. Et hinc mutatio est naturalis de qua facit men­
tionem pictagoras dicens: quattuor etternus genitalia corpora mundus 
continet, etc. Moralis est ilia mutatio que attenditur circa mores scilicet cum 
mores mutantur. Ut de licaone in lupum quidem dicere de benigne in 
asperum vel econtra et raptorem vel econtrario, et sic de similibus que 
attenduntur circa mores. Magica autem mutatio est que circa artem 
magicam attenditur. Et fit tandem (cod tm) in corpore quando videlicet 
magici aliquid alterius essentie quam sit per artem magicam faciunt appa­
rere, ut de sociis ulixis a circe mutatis in porcos. Hec autem ars scilicet 
magicam olim extitit in valorem. Spiritualis mutatio est que attenditur in 
corpore et spiritu, scilicet quando corpus sanum efficitur morbidum, et 
inde vexatur spiritus et sic spiritus cum corpore pariter mutatur. Ut ap­
paret in illis qui habent febres acutas, in spiritu quidem tandem ut de sano 
fit infirmus, scilicet insanus sicut de horeste legitur et de agave que prop­
rium filium laceravit, sicut etiam quotidie videtur de patientibus frenesim 
qui mactarent patrem, matrem, et alios nisi libarentur. De quibus 
hominibus in hoc opere agit autor. [Fol. 186v-187r]54 
According to at least some authorities, therefore, the Ovidian 
changes which inform right human behavior are classified as natural, 
moral, magical, and spiritual. By medieval standards we should ex­
pect that this schema would have some Tightness of its own, indepen­
dent of or prior to an empirical examination of the Metamorphoses; 
medieval schemata of classification, of which the most famous is the 
four causes, tend to be imposed from authority rather than discov­
ered in the course of investigation. This habit, of course, is natural to 
an age which believed seriously in the possibility of definition and 
therefore in practice tended to adapt existing forms and procedures 
rather than to invent new ones. 
There are in fact other fourfold schemata which are closely analo­
gous to this Ovidian one and inform it in ways which sharpen, refine, 
and make more effective its usefulness as an instrument of Chaucer 
criticism. These analogous systems occur in discussions of hell and 
classify the kinds of descent into hell, which, apparently, could cover 
all cases.55 The schemata occur in the commentary of Bernardus Syl­
vestris on the Aeneid, the commentary of Dante's son on the Commedia, 
and the De laboribus Herculis of Coluccio Salutati. In these 
classifications terminology is not absolutely consistent, but the illus­
Axioms of Unity and Their Consequences I 21 
trations and definitions which go with the terms make it clear that all 
three authors are fundamentally talking about the same thing. 
For Bernardus, "descensus autem ad inferos quadrifarius est: est 
autem unus naturae, alius virtutis, tertius vitii, quartus artificii" ("the 
descent into hell is fourfold, for there is one of nature, another of 
virtue, a third of vice, and a fourth of artifice"). One descends natur­
ally by being born into a human condition which has hell as its possible 
future and vice its possible present. One descends virtuously by notic­
ing how fragile and unworthy the things of this world are. One de­
scends viciously by being totally preoccupied with "temporalia." One 
descends artificially by necromancy.56 All of these descents are figura­
tive, or symbolic. All of them are moral. For one of them, the virtuous, 
Bernardus's explanation repeats much the same medieval com­
monplace which Arnulf uses to justify attention to the material and 
temporal "changes" of the Ovidian story: "Est autem alius virtutis qui 
fit dum sapiens aliquis ad mundana per considerationem descendit, 
non ut in eis intentionem ponat sed ut eorum cognita fragilitate eis 
abiectis ad invisibilia penitus se convertat et creaturarum cognitione 
creatorem evidentius agnoscat."57 The artificial, from Bernardus's 
comment, is obviously the same as the Ovidian "magical." 
In the commentary of Dante's son, Pietro, the descent is also "qua­
druplex... scilicet, naturalis, virtuosus, vitiosus, artificialis et nig­
romanticus" ("fourfold .. . that is, natural, virtuous, vicious, artificial 
and black magical"). "Artificialis" and "nigromanticus" are apparently 
synonyms. Otherwise, the categories are the same as those of Bernar­
dus. Pietro illustrates the descent of vice with the victims of Circe who 
were companions of Ulysses and Aeneas, and who in the Ovidian 
tradition were the subjects of magical change.58 
Salutati's treatment is the longest and most elegant, but it amounts 
to much the same thing. The natural descent is "anime rationalis 
descensum in corpora" ("the descent of the rational soul into bodies"). 
The magical is accomplished by the invocation of spirits or demons, or 
by the shedding of human blood, or by diabolic arts. The descent of 
vice is made by those "qui relictis celestibus in terrena descenderint" 
("who having left celestial things descend into earthly"). The moral 
and virtuous descent is made "cum ad mundana ista et ad ipsorum 
falsitatem contemplandam descendimus . . . ut superiora melius per 
hec intelligenda cognoscat, et ad ilia desideranda per hec animetur 
intellectus" ("when we descend into these worldly matters and into the 
contemplation of their falsity... that by this understanding the in­
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tellect may better understand higher things, and be animated to de­
sire them").59 Richard Green explains this fourth descent in a most 
illuminating way: "It is the imaginary journey into the underworld to 
contemplate the consequences of vice in order to ascend again to the 
practice of virtue. Some variation of this mode of interpretation was 
applied to the fables of Orpheus, Theseus, Amphiarius, Hercules, 
and Aeneas. And it was used by Dante's commentators to explain the 
pilgrim's journey through hell as the necessary condition of his ascent 
to Paradise."60 
Because this scheme defined by natural, magical, moral, and 
spiritual has four parts, and because we propose to use it to interpret 
the Canterbury Tales, it may seem obligatory that we relate it to that 
fourfold system of analysis by which medieval biblical interpretations 
were classified. Two parallels are obvious: the natural with the literal, 
and the moral with the tropological. We can easily go further, and say 
that anagogy is the category under which the earthly is interpreted as 
a way of understanding and loving the spiritual. Allegory, on the 
other hand, is not magical, since allegorical meanings of the Bible 
usually have to do with Christ, and magic is the category for false 
miracles, false appearances, and deceptions. If there is a relationship 
here, it is a relationship between opposites. 
These relationships are far from perfect and consistent; we suspect 
they are merely accidental and insignificant.61 If there is a significant 
relation, it arises out of the fact that the four-level system of biblical 
meaning defines, in general terms, a semiotic array of the ways in 
which a given text or deed or word may be meaningful. In practice 
the exegetes found meanings which were Christian in content, as of 
course they should. But if one analyzes the structure of their inter­
preting, one finds meaning in four, and only four, significant kinds, 
which as kinds define the medieval semiotic possibilities for texts 
which have no necessarily Christian meaning.62 Thus a given story 
may illustrate some abstract universal, such as justice; it may inspire us 
to some specific moral act; or it may be, in addition to an actual report 
of an event, a text which we may receive epideictically as symbol or 
myth. These possibilities may, from time to time, occur for the 
natural, magical, moral, or spiritual metamorphoses of Ovid, or the 
tales of Chaucer; when they do, there is obviously a relation between 
the fact that some tale has a particular kind of meaning and the 
scheme of possible meanings, but this relation is neither mechanical 
nor dependent upon the fact that both the scheme for classifying tales 
and the scheme for classifying meanings have four parts. 
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The crucial difference between the fourfold method of the exe­
getes and the fourfold scheme of categories which we propose here is 
that in any given instance the exegete has only one text or story and 
up to four meanings for it, whereas we have many stories, all different 
from one another, which we classify into four categories in order to 
see that they present different aspects of some single subject.63 
Classifying the tales thus, we can define among them a unity of moral 
purpose and of general subject, which fits because it has, as such, a 
variety of parts, subtopics, and themes which corresponds to the tales 
as arrayed. Thus, a classification which names exhaustively the parts 
of a subject is transferred to a literary classification, which names 
kinds of stories treating of the subject in all its parts. For the 
Metamorphoses, the subject of the work is defined as changes, both in 
matter and in men, and the moral purpose is to reveal the varieties of 
ethical behavior which these changes exemplify. The four kinds of 
changes often used for classification are simple or natural actions; 
apparent changes in the natural order achieved by deception or 
magic; moral actions, in which man consciously attempts to live up to 
the truth which he should exemplify; and spiritual or anagogic or 
virtuous actions, by which the correct, heaven-centered sense of life is 
brought into contact with the world and the world below. These 
changes become the means of distinguishing between the various 
kinds of tales in the collection, as they treat the different kinds of 
changes possible. The value of such a method of discussing stories is 
that it enables the reader to relate them in a number of ways, through 
the moral lesson they teach or through the subject they have in com­
mon, while remaining sensitive to the differences which distinguish 
them from each other, especially details of situation and character, 
and to the individual contributions they make to the whole of the 
work's statement. 
Such a classification enables the commentator to explain why the 
work's parts go together, in the sense that they relate to a common 
subject. But it does not specify an arrangement of the parts necessary 
to a proper exposition. In fact, medieval commentators on Ovid ex­
plain the parts of the work in two ways: one is the classification accord­
ing to the parts of the work's subject which we have been discussing, 
and the other is in terms of organization, both into books and also as a 
progression in chronological order, from creation to Ovid's time.64 
Whereas modern readers seize on a familiar structural device for 
narrative, such as chronology, in order to explain the structure of the 
Metamorphoses, the medieval practice was to mention such a progres­
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sion and then to concentrate, instead, on the stories as they related to 
their common subject, and the parts of that subject.65 A similar logic is 
at work in biblical exegesis; the book is sacred history and encom­
passes a movement in time, but time is often ignored in explaining the 
true sense of an event. Time is drawn together in the single defining 
moment of Christ, and in him all events become repetitions of a single 
subject, salvation. The Biblia Pauperum is an example of a literary 
arrangement which accommodates, in its structure, both the principle 
of chronology and also a principle of arrangement, the grouping of 
New Testament events with their Old Testament parallels, dictated by 
the parts of the subject. We shall return in chapter 3 to consider 
medieval ideas of structure more thoroughly. Before discussing the 
organization of the Knight's Tale, in the terminology of changes we 
have derived from Ovidian commentary, however, it was necessary to 
make clear the important distinction between a unity by subject and a 
unity by arrangement. 
The reading of the Knight's Tale which follows attempts to practice a 
medieval procedure for discovering the unity of a story, by defining, 
first, its subject, and then the parts of that subject. The classification 
into parts which we apply to the tale, and will go on to apply to the 
entire collection, is the division of changes into natural, magical, 
moral, and spiritual, the division we have analyzed at work in com­
mentaries of the Metamorphoses. In following such a procedure, we are 
suggesting that Chaucer may have developed a method of composi­
tion from a medieval way of reading. There is, of course, no way of 
verifying this, nor do we intend to commit the intentional fallacy. The 
suggestion that a poet would learn how to write from the way he had 
learned how to read is not so strange, however, for an age whose 
commentators regularly did commit the intentional fallacy, claiming 
in every allegorization that they were presenting the author's true 
meaning.66 The practice is certainly questionable, but it would lend 
itself readily to taking the commentaries as lessons in writing as well as 
in reading. By adapting the medieval methods of reading Ovid to 
reading Chaucer, however, we do not claim to find a uniformity of 
meaning or method between the two writers. The congruence be­
tween the parts of Ovid's subject and the parts of Chaucer's is not 
perfect; but the similarity is strong enough, we believe, to justify using 
the categories of Ovidian changes, natural, magical, moral, and 
spiritual, as a starting point for defining the unity of the tales in the 
Canterbury collection. Our test case is the tale in the defining first 
position, the Knight's Tale. 
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The Knight's Tale presents Theseus's successful efforts to maintain 
the peace of Athens. The disturbance which receives most attention is 
the tangled romantic triangle of the warring brothers-in-arms Pala­
mon and Arcite and the unwilling Emelye. However, Theseus's part 
in this personal struggle, as the guardian of Emelye, and the 
emblematic significance of the three lovers' places of birth invest the 
love problem with implications for the order of family, society, and 
even man's place in creation. The many-layered significance of the 
tale's events has been noted often enough, but the weight that 
Chaucer gives the story, as a situation which encompasses the essential 
problem of human existence, merits further consideration. Leaving 
aside the particulars of the struggle for a moment, we find in the four 
parts of the poem four ways of attempting to deal with a problem. In 
part 1 Theseus's force of arms establishes order from chaos— 
included in that order, however, is the unhappy pair of former com­
rades, Palamon and Arcite, neither of whom has any hopes of win­
ning Emelye; in the second part both young men, by changes in their 
situation caused by their love, are free in Athens and at the point of 
fighting to the death; in part 3 the lovers' requests to the gods lead to 
a solution of the dilemma that their contrary desires have established; 
and in part 4 the foregone conclusion is made visible to human eyes. 
The four parts, in some ways, answer to the modern sense of dramatic 
action, in that they follow a series of struggles for a particular goal, 
which is finally won. But they also isolate from the ongoing progress 
of seeking a goal four particular moments as especially significant; 
they are moments in which changes, created by force or love or 
prayer, have introduced new possibilities for action. The four kinds of 
changes into which Chaucer divides his subject have much in common 
with the four changes identified in Ovidian commentary. 
The first kind of change, exemplified by part 1 of the tale, is the 
simple or natural action, controlled by human effort. The Knight's 
Tale begins with an achieved order. Theseus has married the Amazon 
Hippolyta, has made Emelye his ward, and is returning home in 
triumph. In his progress he meets the ladies of Thebes. The scene is 
very like the one in which Dante idealizes Trajan as an exemplum of 
royal humility,67 and there is every likelihood that Chaucer meant the 
compliment, since the pagan Theseus is so perfectly a model ruler. In 
being presented with the problem of Thebes, Theseus meets the su­
preme test. Thebes is, for the Middle Ages, the generic bad city, as the 
Rome of Aeneas is the generic good city. Thebes is the city of pat­
ricide, bad marriage, fratricide, civil war, and sacrilege; from the 
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example of Thebes mankind is instructed in every possible disorder. 
Theseus apparently meets the test, as he and his army conquer 
Thebes, permit the obsequies of the dead, and arrange for the cus­
tody of Palamon and Arcite. Thus, as ruler of Athens, husband of 
Hippolyta, and conqueror of Thebes, Theseus has ordered his world. 
His situation has been allegorized as the achievement of a fit relation 
between the rational soul (Theseus in Athens), the concupiscible soul 
(his marriage), and the irascible soul (Thebes).68 As long as we do not 
lose Theseus himself, Athens, Thebes, or the two ladies in all this, 
such analogy-making is both permissible and informative; Plato's Re­
public, which the Middle Ages knew indirectly through the Timaeus, is 
powerfully based on just such an analogical instrument of analysis. 
Theseus is at peace in his family, in his kingdom, and in himself; such 
orders are properly mutual and mutually reinforcing; and as king, 
husband, and human being, Theseus has done as well as a mortal can 
be expected to do. Aegidius Romanus, in fact, in his De regimine prin­
cipum, analyzes the nature and duty of the sovereign in terms of right 
rule of himself, his family, and his realm, and Chaucer, in including 
the elements of the story as he did, could not but underline the typical 
and definitional force of this king of Athens. 
Both Emelye and the two Theban princes, however, are principles 
of disorder. Emelye is an unawarded virgin and an Amazon. Unmar­
ried, she represents all those problems which Theseus solved, at 
another level, by conquering and marrying Hippolyta.69 Even more, 
Palamon and Arcite are a problem, which Theseus recognizes by con­
demning them to eternal imprisonment. In a manner, all these people 
can be seen as emblematic and, as such, unavoidable. Every city, every 
civilization, faced the temptation to become a Thebes. John Lydgate 
saw this very clearly, when he inserted his story of Thebes as another, 
and final, Canterbury tale. He reminds us that Thebes will not go 
away but must be dealt with, even though, as Theseus finds, the 
children of its sisters must be imprisoned within one's own society. In 
his additional Canterbury tale, Lydgate analyzes troth, marriage, and 
true and false rule in a manner profoundly relevant to Chaucer's 
great themes. The whole matter deserves additional and separate 
study;70 here it is sufficient to note that, in the Middle Ages, an addi­
tion to an inherited story is the profoundest kind of interpretation, 
and that the addition of Thebes confirms the focus on civil and fami­
lial strife with which Chaucer lets his Knight begin. 
Although the complications of life may be unavoidable, for 
Theseus, the lesson must be learned. Under the appearance of his 
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total victories—first, the wedding of Hippolyta, and second, the con­
quest of Thebes—there remain the disorderly elements of Amazonian 
independence and Theban fraternal discord which Theseus has taken 
into his kingdom, unreconstructed, in the persons of Emelye, Pala­
mon, and Arcite. The three young people form a romantic triangle, 
whose sorting out promises to be no easy matter. A sworn virgin is the 
unknowing object of the fierce longing—rendered by Chaucer here, 
ironically, as courtly love—71 of two young men, whose brotherly ac­
cord is turned by rivalry in love into a bitter hatred. Eventually the 
whole city will be concerned with the love affair's resolution. For 
Theseus the struggles faced in the external world of war must be 
faced again, in his own city and his own household.72 Here in part 1, 
however, we see only the beginnings of this struggle with disorder. 
Emelye remains unaware of what her mere existence as an un­
awarded virgin is doing to the two aging young men; and their rivalry 
in love, though sufficiently bitter at one level fitly to evoke the rivalry 
of Eteocles and Polynices, is comically futile and completely harm­
less.73 Even when Arcite is delivered from prison and sent home, 
exiled from a lady love whom he has presumably never once met, 
order is preserved, and Chaucer underlines the comic security of the 
situation by posing, in formal courtly fashion, the lovers' question, 
"Who hath the worse, Arcite or Palamoun?" (I [A] 1348). 
In terms of the four-part distinctio of metamorphoses which Ovid­
ian commentary defines for us, this first part of the Knight's Tale 
presents the order of the natural. In the Ovidian tradition, natural 
changes were those resulting "per contextionem elementorum." In 
the descent-into-hell tradition, the natural descent meant being in­
volved in the normal human condition, whose possible future is hell 
and whose possible present is vice. Adapting and combining, we have 
the first part of the Knight's Tale as the level of the normally human— 
the best that can be done with the natural man. Order exists, but in 
the presence of potential for disorder; Theseus rules, but his subjects 
include Palamon, Arcite, and Emelye. Order exists, but it is an order 
which has not yet been tested by all the various changes which the 
world may bring against it. 
The second part of the Knight's Tale begins with what can only be 
called a magical metamorphosis, in which a person changes his ap­
pearance but remains really the same, this time under the influence of 
love. The action is dictated by a reversal of the natural order of the 
human sexual hierarchy; while Theseus has achieved domestic order 
and civil peace in conquering Hippolyta, Palamon and Arcite remain 
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in the disorderly chaos of allowing themselves to be ruled by Emelye. 
In this section the advice of women (as opposed to their supplication) 
is given and heeded, and on the key issue of allowing the knights to 
contend for Emelye—in the medieval tradition, of course, such advice 
traces to Eve and is frequently an invitation to disaster. The events of 
this section, in Theseus's own judgment, are the "myracles" of the god 
of love (I [A] 1788). As such, they obey no law but love's; they are, for 
the government of Theseus, intrusive chaos. The whole section is full 
of disguises, deceptions, changes of identity; the most persistent im­
agery of animals as descriptions of human actions is in part 2. This is 
the most disorderly section of the whole tale.74 
The third section is the moral one—in terms of the descent-into­
hell tradition, the descent into vice. Here devotion to the things of this 
world is most elaborately and devoutly professed, with all the trap­
pings of shrines and pagan gods. Here, in ritual lists which underline 
their exemplary quality, are the deeds and fortunes of worldly men. 
The atmosphere throughout is one of calamity, framed by the sover­
eignties of rival and malevolent gods. The fact that Palamon, Arcite, 
and Emelye express, in this section and to these gods, what they desire 
of the world underlines the worldliness of their desire. Chaucer does 
not, like Lydgate, call these devotions pagan or devilish, but his pre­
sentation has similar overtones.75 Most of the exempla—Ydelnesse, 
Narcissus, Salamon, Ercules, or, more impersonally, "the smylere with 
the knyf under the cloke" (I [A] 1099) or "the stranglyng and hang­
yng by the throte" (I [A] 2458)—are clear enough. One, however, 
deserves a pause, because it is an implicit evaluation of one of 
Chaucer's characters, and because it underlines the atmosphere of 
worldliness appropriate to the mode, which is merely moral. 
Among other things, Saturn says, "I slow Sampsoun, shakynge the 
piler" (I [A] 2466), less than fifty lines after Arcite, praying to Mars, 
offers in exchange for victory the sacrifice of 
My beerd, myn heer, that hongeth long adoun, 
That nevere yet ne felte offensioun 
Of rasour nor of shere. 
(I [A] 2415-17) 
In general, in the exegetes, the loss of Samson's hair figures a com­
mitment to carnality. Bersuire's statement is the clearest, and the 
nearest to Chaucer: 
Hie habetur quod postquam Samson mediante mala muliere Dalila fuit 
caesarie tonsus, et per consequens fortitudine privatus, statim Philistaei 
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ipsum ceperunt, et captum excoecaverunt, et excoecatum in carcere 
posuerunt, et incarceratum molere, et coram se ludere fecerunt, sed tamen 
post hoc factum est, quod Samson a Philistaeis excoecatus qui ipsum ex­
coecaverunt, simul in domo sui convivii ruina domicilii facta super eum, 
omnes perierunt. Sic vere quando Samson, idest aliquis fortis et virtuosus 
homo mediante mala muliere, scilicet came propria, caesariem virtutum, 
et per consequens resistendi fortitudine [sic] perdit, statim a Philistaeis, 
idest a daemonibus per diversa peccata capitur, et oculis discretionis or­
batur, et sic excoecatus, obstinatus, et hebetatus in carcere malae con­
suetudinis includitur, et tandem molere, idest ad mundi labores et negotia 
circumire compellitur, et sic coram Philistaeis, idest demonibus ipsarum 
voluntati obediens, ludere et ludos diversorum peccatorum facere com­
probatur. Finaliter tamen in eorum convivio, scilicet in inferno, una cum 
ipsis moritur et damnatur, et sic homo per fraudulentiam mulieris qua[m] 
amabat, idest proprie carnis, non solum excoecatur, imo etiam vita spiritu­
ali et aeterna privatur.76 
Arcite puts himself in Samson's place, and has by this time already 
paid Samson's allegorical penalty literally, to be compelled "ad mundi 
labores et negotia circumire." And his ultimate deprivation, of Emelye 
and of life, is as pathetic and hopeless as anything in Chaucer. 
The last section of the Knight's Tale represents the spiritual mode. 
Explicitly, it corresponds most closely to the mode of the virtuous, as 
defined in the descent-into-hell tradition, which is made "cum ad 
mundana ista et ad ipsorum falsitatem contemplandam descen­
dimus . . . ut superiora melius per hec intelligenda cognoscat" ("when 
we descend into these worldly matters and into the contemplation of 
their falsity... that by this understanding [the intellect] may better 
understand higher things"). But just as clearly it depends on the 
whole enterprise of Ovidian commentary, whose existence affirms 
that these stories are of use only if and as they are properly under­
stood, by seeing in their real surfaces the veritatem which they contain 
and represent. As the third section treats human efforts to arrange 
their own destinies, in consort with the gods who symbolize the forces 
of merely human and natural energy and calamity—love, hate, selfish 
self-preoccupation, and chaos—so the fourth deals with what actually 
happens when those arrangements go awry. The unexpected irony 
involved in the fact that both combatants, Palamon and Arcite, actu­
ally get what they have prayed for only underscores the point that 
merely human wisdom is not enough, and that finally there must 
come a Boethian recognition that within and beneath the events 
which fortune brings to pass there is truth not of human making. 
The action of the Knight's Tale, then, part by part as Chaucer has 
divided it for us, is structured in terms of four great modes of order­
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ing: the initial achievement of merely natural order in the givenness 
of the human condition; the intrusion of disorder, deception, and 
chaos; the human attempt to achieve order in terms of private wishes 
and worldly struggles; and the final reassertion of order based on the 
right interpretation of such events as have, under Providence or For­
tune, actually occurred. The tale is a moderately hopeful definition of 
human experience as the achievement of actions which are in har­
mony with the purposes of the universe, even if man's intentions for 
what he does prove to be in error. The parts of the tale divide human 
activity into four kinds; although the arrangement of these parts cor­
responds, in some ways, to the logic of a plot, the parts are also 
offered as a number of alternative activities simultaneously present 
and being done by men. The story's arrangement answers more than 
the needs of a dramatic action. In addition, the historical sequence is 
adorned and clarified by structuring the poem in order to reveal the 
parallelism and mutual completion achieved by the four parts. 
Charles Muscatine characterized the structure of the Knight's Tale as a 
pageant, ordered in symmetrical harmony, rather than as a linear 
plot.77 The pattern uniting the four parts has been suggested in pre­
vious analyses of the poem's formal elements.78 The four parts might 
be imagined as being arranged in a square, with parts 1 and 2 the 
upper quadrants and parts 3 and 4 placed below them. In this way, 
the various parallelisms established by similar events in different parts 
of the poem would be clarified: for example, parts 2 and 4 both end 
with combats for Emelye, which are concluded by surprising rever­
sals, in part 2 by Theseus's promise that one of them may wed Emelye, 
and in part 4 by the overturning of the apparent decision of the 
combat. At the same time, parts 1 and 4 and parts 2 and 3 also share 
important actions: in part 1 a royal wedding is followed by a bloody 
combat involving Palamon and Arcite, and in part 4 their confronta­
tion is followed by another royal wedding. The harmony of four 
parts, maintaining one another in a balance requiring the interaction 
of all the parts on each other, is a structural feature of the poem 
intimately related to the divisions of its subject matter. It is an echo of 
that "fair cheyne of love" which Theseus discerns as the sustainer of 
the universe and uses to bind up the confusion in his realm.79 
The Knight's Tale begins the Canterbury collection by defining the 
kinds of human experience and promising that man may find among 
them a way of life which harmonizes with the providential order of 
creation. The tale's arrangement forecasts the relationships which 
Chaucer will use to bind together the many stories he tells; it is an 
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arrangement which reflects the dual aspects of the order of history, 
both sequential and yet simultaneously present in the single event of 
Christ. But the Knight's Tale is only the beginning; like any one part of 
itself, it is not all the truth of the whole of which it is a part. The 
challenges which will assault the integrity of Theseus's discovery of 
universal harmony begin immediately. The happy ending of the 
struggle to wed is overturned, not only in the Miller's Tale but 
throughout the collection, with stories of unhappy marriage. Doing 
what comes naturally, the highest goal of the Golden Age in which 
Theseus lives, is suddenly revealed to be insufficient as, in the Miller's 
Tale, we enter the time after Christ. In order to understand how the 
Knight's Tale functions as one of the many parts of the story collection, 
and how that collection, together, presents a unified picture of the 
human condition, it will be necessary to inquire, first, how the Middle 
Ages understood the category "fiction" and, second, how medieval 
poets adapted from their materials the techniques of arrangement 
which unified their works. Once these questions of the nature of 
fiction and the proper disposition of its parts are answered, we can 
begin to read the Canterbury Tales. 
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Other critics in substantial agreement with Baldwin include Robert Jordan, 
Chaucer and the Shape of Creation; D. W. Robertson, A Preface to Chaucer 
(Princeton, 1962); and Ruggiers, The Art of the Canterbury Tales. An excellent 
survey of the various approaches to unity is provided by Charles A. Owen, Jr., 
"The Design of the Canterbury Tales," in Companion to Chaucer Studies, ed. 
Beryl Rowland (Oxford, 1968), pp. 192-207. 
12. For an extended presentation of the evidence on which these generali­
zations are based, see Judson B. Allen, "The Old Way and the Parson's Way: 
Axioms of Unity and Their Consequences I 33 
An Ironic Reading of the Parson's Tale," Journal of Medieval and Renaissance 
Studies 3 (1973): 255-71. 
13. Baldwin notes these doctrines of the manuals but is still fundamentally 
dominated by modern notions of narrative; in the same paragraph he says 
that the conclusion "should summarize or reflect aphoristically the word at 
hand," and that "it is fitting for Chaucer in this climactic place in the story, in 
the pilgrimage, to make the Parson the spokesman, the mediator, the scourge, 
and the ender of it all" (The Unity of the Canterbury Tales, pp. 89-90). 
14. The psychological authenticity of Chaucer's creation is vital to many 
studies; perhaps the most elaborate working out of the theory of the tales as 
character revelation is in R. M. Lumiansky, OfSondry Folk: The Dramatic Prin­
ciple in the Canterbury Tales (Austin, 1955). 
15. In this tradition are John M. Manly's Some New Light on Chaucer (New 
York, 1926) and Muriel Bowden's A Commentary on the General Prologue of the 
Canterbury Tales (New York, 1948). 
16. The spiritual pilgrimage approach is a result of the growing apprecia­
tion of the importance in medieval art of its Christian cultural values. As we 
shall see in discussing the faults of a dramatically constituted Marriage Group, 
the allegorical dimensions of marriage, which contemporary evidence 
suggests would have been in Chaucer's mind when writing a tale like the 
Clerk's, are lost in the psychological combat proposed by G. L. Kittredge. 
Martin Stevens, in "Chaucer and Modernism: An Essay in Criticism," pub­
lished in Chaucer at Albany, ed. Rossell Hope Robbins (Albany, 1975), pp. 
193-216, argues that D. W. Robertson's allegorical method was formulated in 
opposition to critical "realism." Stevens goes on to question the relevance of 
Robertson's position to contemporary criticism. On Robertson, see n. 20 below. 
17. Boggess, "Averrois Cordubensis," pp. 20, 23. "Tragedy indeed [and by 
extension poetry] is not an art representative of men themselves, just as they 
are, as individual things falling into perception, but it is the art representative 
of virtuous customs and praiseworthy actions and beliefs of holy peo­
ple. . . and the art of understanding, which shows or teaches from which things 
and how poems are composed, is more important and more perfect than the 
composition of poems itself." This and all other translations from Latin are 
our own. 
18. G. L. Kittredge, "Chaucer's Discussion of Marriage," in Chaucer: 
Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. Edward Wagenknecht (New York, 1959), pp. 
188-215. This essay has spawned numerous progeny, of which one of the 
latest and most medieval is R. E. Kaske, "Chaucer's Marriage Group," in 
Chaucer the Love Poet, ed. Jerome Mitchell and William Provost (Athens, Ga., 
1973), pp. 45-65, who reads the four tales as a chiastic analysis of the relation 
between authority and sexuality, with marriage as the context. 
19. The medieval understanding of marriage as a background for 
Chaucer's tales has been discussed by Robertson, A Preface to Chaucer; Henry 
Ansgar Kelly, Love and Marriage in the Age of Chaucer (Ithaca, 1975); and 
Patricia M. Kean, Chaucer and the Making of English Poetry (London and Bos­
ton, 1972), among others. 
20. Robertson offers as proof that marriage is the theme of all the tales that 
the allegorical dimensions of marriage were in fact the subject, whether the 
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story itself treated real human marriage, the Christian's relationship with 
God, or the priest's particular status as bride of Christ. Robertson's work has 
been an immense contribution to literary medieval studies, but more in spite 
of than because of the creedal orthodoxy which he attempts to impose. Both 
the exegetical tradition and the related analogizing through which physical 
and moral facts were viewed have left for us a body of evidence whose impor­
tance he rightly defends, and about which he has published much pioneering 
and useful information. However, since our use of some of this evidence may 
suggest the too hasty conclusion that we are "Robertsonian," we would like to 
state bluntly and categorically that we are not. The enterprise of this book is to 
value Chaucer's literal sense, his fictions themselves, and in them the sub­
limely lively and subtly moral facts which idealists might label "merely" hu­
man. Chaucer knew about allegory and commentaries and glossing with a 
comfortable familiarity which permitted him to play games with them and use 
them for his own ironic high comedy. If we follow his ironies for the moment 
into Latin, even the glosa, it is only in order to return more convinced than 
ever that it is the fiction that is true, the act that generates the definition. 
21. Many critics have faulted Chaucer or his age for the tale, on the 
grounds that to accept Griselda's submission and Walter's domination is im­
possible for modern readers. Cf. Bertrand H. Bronson, In Search of Chaucer 
(Toronto, 1960), pp. 103-12; Jordan, Chaucer and the Shape of Creation, p. 200; 
Raymond Preston, Chaucer (London and New York, 1952). The defense of 
Chaucer's manipulation of the tension between the allegorical and literal 
dimensions of his story comes from James Sledd, "The Clerk's Tale: The 
Monsters and the Critics," in Chaucer Criticism, ed. R. J. Schoeck and J. Taylor 
(Notre Dame, 1960), 1:160-74. 
22. See below, in chapter 6's treatment of the tale. 
23. Eventually we wish to use, instead of the word association, an array of 
the medieval words associated with allegory—especially typology. But these 
words are still widely misunderstood and will be used only after they have 
been properly defined. 
24. E. Talbot Donaldson, "Chaucer the Pilgrim," PMLA 69 (1954): 933. 
We must here acknowledge a very great debt to Professor Donaldson, even 
though we disagree with a few of his conclusions and more of his emphases, 
because in his wit and in the affectionate irony which he addresses to his 
subject, he more resembles Chaucer than does any other practicing critic. One 
of the things that makes our new critical enterprise necessary is that he has in 
many areas, such as "Chaucer the Pilgrim," said so well the last word. 
25. Arthur W. Hoffman, "Chaucer's Prologue to Pilgrimage: The Two 
Voices," ELH 21 (1954): 4. 
26. Mann, Chaucer and Medieval Estates Satire, pp. 187-202. 
27. A preliminary theoretical working out of this understanding can be 
found in Judson B. Allen and Patrick Gallacher, "Alisoun through the Look­
ing Glass: or Every Man His Own Midas," Chaucer Review 4 (1970): 99-105. 
28. In such a modern view, Chaucer becomes a sympathetic admirer of all 
the ways of life represented by his pilgrims. See Donaldson, "Chaucer the 
Pilgrim," p. 933, and Hoffman, "Chaucer's Prologue," pp. 4, 14. 
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29. Isidore of Seville Etymologiarum 1. 37. 22. It is more than coincidental, 
we think, that Wayne C. Booth's theory of irony, whose fundamental focus 
is with much more modern literature, recognizes as one of the chief fea­
tures of irony that it presumes, and creates, sympathies and, ideally, uni­
ties between properly disparate elements. That is, when irony is properly 
understood, an intimacy is created between the ironist and his audience which 
overcomes the otherwise literal meaning of the communication. This sym­
pathy or unity is in modern times largely a feature of subjectivity; the rela­
tionship between medieval irony and medieval allegory implies that then it 
was more largely influential and related things and events as well as subjec­
tivities. Cf. Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetoric of Irony (Chicago, 1974). 
30. This point will be discussed more elaborately below. See also Judson B. 
Allen, "Hermann the German's Averroistic Aristotle and Medieval Poetic 
Theory," Mosaic 9 (Spring 1976): 67-81. 
31. Frederick Tupper's classification of tales and tellers by means of the 
seven deadly sins has the flavor of Jordan's juxtaposition of the Parson's Tale 
to the remainder of the poem and has been taken into the construct of the 
spiritual pilgrimage as an expression of the doctrinal answer to the pilgrims' 
excesses, which may cure their failings. See his "Chaucer and the Seven 
Deadly Sins," PMLA 29 (1914): pp. 93-128. Interest in the tales as psychological 
self-revelations is best exemplified by the scholarship of the Pardoner's Tale. 
See the summary offered in John Halverson, "Chaucer's Pardoner and the 
Progress of Criticism," Chaucer Review 4 (1970): 184-202. 
32. John H. Fisher, ed., The Complete Poetry and Prose of Geoffrey Chaucer 
(New York, 1977), p. 8. 
33. Oxford University, Magdalen College Library MS lat. 18, fol. 16v. 
"Note that Statius is very rhetorical in this speech, when he lets Tideus speak 
without using rhetoric. Such speech is appropriate to his character." 
34. This rhetorical principle does not deny, of course, that legitimate in­
sight may be gained from comparing or contrasting the character of any given 
Canterbury pilgrim with an associated tale, or with any other pilgrim or tale. 
Whether positively or ironically, such an analogy can have a good deal of 
medieval force and significance; many such analogies will be dealt with in part 
2. The undoubted practical success of some modern criticism which presumes 
the dramatic principle traces to this medieval practice of multiple exemplifica­
tion; comparisons between teller and tale are informative as comparisons, 
even when our motivation for making them is nonmedieval. 
35. Boggess, "Averrois cordubensis," p. 23. "Argument or proof of the 
correctness of belief or practice is not [achieved] by persuasive speech (for this 
kind of speech does not pertain to the art of poetry nor does it suit it) but by 
description . . . and therefore poetry does not use the art of gestures nor of 
facial expressiveness as rhetoric does." This passage is a part of Averroes's 
definition of consideratio, a term which displaces, but is not equivalent to, the 
genuine Aristotelian "spectacle." It is an extremely complex concept, for 
which the best single English equivalent is probably "credibility." For a discus­
sion of this important text, and a justification of less literal elements of this 
translation, see Judson B. Allen, "Hermann the German's Averroistic Ar­
istotle." 
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36. Boetius de consolatione . .. novissime cum Sancti Thomae philosophi profundis­
simi commentariis (Venice, 1524), fol. bb5v. "The formal cause of the treatment 
is Boethius's manner of doing [i.e. genre], and this is dialogue, that is, the 
speech of two. For Boethius introduces in this book two characters, himself 
complaining of his misery, and Philosophy sympathizing with him, and by 
consolation helping him overcome his misery." The attribution of this com­
mentary to Thomas Aquinas is mistaken. 
37. William C. Stokoe, Jr., "Structure and Intention in the First Fragment 
of the Canterbury Tales," University of Toronto Quarterly 21 (1952): 120-27. 
Cf., also, William Frost, "An Interpretation of Chaucer's Knight's Tale," in 
Chaucer Criticism, 1:112-15; Gerhard Joseph, "Chaucerian 'Game'—'Earnest' 
and the 'Argument of Herbergage' in the Canterbury Tales," Chaucer Review 5 
(1970): 83-96; and John Leyerle, "The Heart and the Chain," in The Learned 
and the hewed: Studies in Chaucer and Medieval Literature, ed. Larry D. Benson, 
Harvard English Studies, no. 5 (1974), pp. 113^15. 
38. Organizations of other schemes are proposed by Paull F. Baum, 
Chaucer: A Critical Appreciation (Durham, N.C., 1958), who defines group B2 as 
a "surprise group" (p. 74). Bruce Rosenberg, "The Contrary Tales of the 
Second Nun and the Canon's Yeoman," Chaucer Review 2 (1967): 278-91, and 
Penn R. Szittya, "The Green Yeoman as Loathly Lady: The Friar's Parody of 
the Wife of Bath's Tale," PMLA 90 (1975): 386-94, suggest that patterns of 
contrast function to relate the tales in group H and group D, respectively. 
Alan T. Gaylord, "Sentence and Solaas in Fragment VII of the Canterbury 
Tales: Harry Bailly as Horseback Editor," PMLA 82 (1967): 226-35, and 
several other authors, who will be mentioned in part 2 of this study, have 
examined the themes and imagery uniting the tales in specific fragments, as 
well. Cf. Howard, The Idea of the Canterbury Tales, chap. 5, pp. 210-36. Kean, 
Chaucer and the Making ofEnglish Poetry, 2:75, voices the common reservation, 
however, that such a method of interrelationships would have been too con­
stricting. 
39. Geoffrey of Vinsauf, in the Poetria Nova, describes the first place in a 
composition as the "apex operis . .. dignior hospes et tanquam dominus." Cf. 
the edition of Edmond Faral, Les Arts poetiques duXIIe et duXIH€ siecle (Paris, 
1923), pp. 200-201, lines 112-20. See also the helpful translation of the text 
by Margaret F. Nims, Poetria Nova of Geoffrey of Vinsauf (Toronto, 1967), pp. 
19-20. 
40. This is not to say that among these authors there are not helpful indi­
cations of the tradition of framing story collections which might have influ­
enced Chaucer's design of the Canterbury Tales. Robert A. Pratt and Karl 
Young attach much importance in their article "The Literary Framework of 
the Canterbury Tales," in Sources and Analogues of Chaucer's Canterbury Tales, 
ed. W. F. Bryan and Germaine Dempster (London, 1941; reissued 1958), pp. 
1-81, to the similarity between Chaucer's frame and the frame journey in 
Sercambi's collection. Kean presents an excellent summary of sources for the 
frame journey; she rightly expands the search for sources beyond story collec­
tions whose frame is a journey of a large group of storytellers to consider the 
possible influence of such allegorical journeys as are found in de Guileville 
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and Mandeville, as well as in Dante. See Chaucer and the Making of English 
Poetry, 2:72. But the fact that Chaucer resembles Sercambi does not of itself 
explain the unity of either work, and the journey motif inevitably makes the 
frame too important at the expense of the tales themselves. 
41. Most elaborately by Richard L. Hoffman, Ovid and the Canterbury Tales 
(Philadelphia, 1966), pp. 3-20, who limits his analysis of the relationship to 
facts at the "sources and analogues" level. More typical is Charles Muscatine's 
remark, "There is in literature, besides the framed collection, a tradition of 
the intercalation of short tales in longer works, evidenced for instance by 
Ovid's Metamorphoses, The Romance of the Rose, etc." (Chaucer and the French 
Tradition, p. 167). 
42. John M. Fyler, Chaucer and Ovid (New Haven, 1979). 
43. For the latest brief statement of H. R. Jauss's position, see his "The 
Alterity and Modernity of Medieval Literature," New Literary History 10 
(Winter 1979): 181-229. 
44. For full treatment of this theory, see Judson B. Allen, The Ethical Poetic 
of the Later Middle Ages: A Decorum of Convenient Distinction (forthcoming). 
45. For fuller bibliography, see Judson B. Allen, The Friar as Critic, pp.

162-63.

46. Arnulf of Orleans, in Fausto Ghisalberti, "Arnolfo d'Orleans, un cul­
tore di Ovidio nel secolo XII," Memorie del Reale Istituto Lombardo di Scienze e 
Lettere, Classe di Lettere, science morali et storiche, vol. 24 (15 of series 3), 
fasc. 4 (Milan, 1932), p. 181. "Ovid's intention is to deal with change, not 
chiefly that we might understand the extrinsic changes which affect physical 
things, good or bad, but more importantly that we might understand intrinsic 
changes, such as those which affect the soul, so that he might lead us from 
error toward knowledge of the true creator. There are two motions in the 
soul, one rational, the other irrational. Rational is that which imitates the mo­
tion of the heavens, which go from east to west, and on the other hand the 
irrational is that which imitates the motion of the planets, which move against 
the heavens. For God gave the soul reason through which it might restrain 
sensuality, just as the irrational motion of the seven planets is restrained 
through the motion of the firmament. But we, neglecting rational motion in 
the manner of the planets, are led away from our creator. Ovid, seeing this, 
wishes to show us through the narration of the fables the motion of the soul, 
which is within. Therefore it is said that Io was changed into a cow because 
she fell into vice, and that she regained her lovely human form because she 
put away vice. Or, Ovid's intention is to call us back from an immoderate love 
of temporal things and to urge us to the single devotion of our creator, by 
showing the stability of the heavens and the variation of temporal things. It is 
classified as ethics because it teaches us to hate those temporal things, which 
are passing and changing, because this belongs to morality." 
47. Ibid. 
48. Judson B. Allen, "Commentary as Criticism: Formal Cause, Discursive 
Form, and the Later Medieval Accessus," Ada Conventus Neo-Latini Lovanien­
sis, ed. J. Ijsewijn and E. Kessler (Munich, 1973), pp. 33-39. 
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49. For a further discussion of this extremely rich term, Averroes's sub­
stitution of Aristotle's term mimesis, see Judson B. Allen, "Hermann the Ger­
man's Averroistic Aristotle," pp. 75-79. 
50. Ghisalberti, "Arnolfo," p. 181: "de mutacione enim agit tripliciter sci­
licet de naturali, de magica, et de spirituali" ("he treats change as threefold, 
that is, natural, magical, and spiritual"). Giovanni says: "triplex est trans­
mutatio, naturalis, spiritualis, et magica" ("transformation is triple: natural, 
spiritual, and magical"), in Ghisalberti, "Giovanni del Virgilio, espositore delle 
'Metamorfosi,'" II Giornale Dantesco 34 (1933): 17. 
51. William is quoted by Fausto Ghisalberti, in "Medieval Biographies of 
Ovid," Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 9 (1946): 55. "It should be 
known that change is considered fourfold, that is, natural, moral, spiritual, 
and magical. The natural change is implied when the author discusses the 
division of the elements [in Creation]; the moral change is the one we see 
when Lycaon is changed into a wolf—it is a moral change because Lycaon, 
who was at first a gracious man, became a robber and a scoundrel. 
Spiritual—as in the case of Agave, who was at first dignified and then went 
insane. The magical change happened to the statue of Pygmalion, which was 
changed into a maiden; another example of magical change occurs in connec­
tion with Circe, who by spells changed men into pigs." Ghisalberti prints two 
more accessus bearing on this problem. From the fourteenth-century MS Paris 
B.M. lat. 8253: "Plures enim mutationes esse assignantur. Est autem mutatio 
naturalis sicut ilia de elementis.. .. Et est mutatio spiritualis sicuti fuit de 
Agave que facta est insana. Et est mutatio moralis et magica mutatio sicuti de 
Pigmalione qui fecit virginem" (p. 52). "Several changes are to be marked out, 
for there is natural change such as that having to do with elements.... And 
there is spiritual change such as happened to Agave who became insane. And 
there is moral change and magical change such as of Pygmalion who made a 
virgin." 
52. The text is printed in B. Nogara, "Di alcune vite e commend mediovali 
di Ovidio," Miscellanea Ceriani (Milan, 1910), p. 417. 
53. Ghisalberti, "Giovanni," pp. 56-57. 
54. "My mind is turned to new forms: It should be noted that change is four­
fold, that is, natural, moral, magic and spiritual. That change is natural which 
happens through the combination of the elements. Or the dissolution, either 
with seed bringing the change about or without. For the elements come to­
gether through combination. As when a boy is born from sperm, and a 
chicken from an egg, or plants or a tree from seed and thus various things 
from similar sources, with seed bringing the change about. But dissolution 
happens through separation as in any body, in this without seed, and these 
things happen for the elements and for hyle. Hyle is the most ancient face of 
nature, the untiring power of generation, the first laying under of forms, the 
matter of bodies, the foundation of substance. It makes the elements as when 
earth thins into water, water lightens into air, air is dispersed into the ether. 
Then the ether is thickened into air, air is made heavier into water, and water 
is formed into earth. And thus it is natural change concerning which 
Pythagoras makes mention: 'The eternal world contains four elemental sub­
stances, etc' That change is moral which takes notice concerning customs or 
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morals, that is, when customs are changed. As indeed they say from Lycaon 
into a wolf, from good into harsh or in the other way, and into a plunderer or 
in the other way, and thus concerning similar things which concern customs. 
Then, the magic change is the one which concerns the magic art. And it 
occurs in the body when magicians make something appear of a different 
essence than it is through magic art, as in the case of the companions of 
Ulysses changed into pigs by Circe. However, this art occurred once in magic 
power. Spiritual change is that which is observed in the spirit and the body, 
that is when a healthy body is made ill, and thus the spirit is troubled, so that 
the spirit, equally with the body, is changed. And this appears in those who 
have acute fevers, indeed as he becomes infirm from healthy, thus insane in 
the spirit, just as it is read concerning Orestes and concerning Agave who 
maimed her own son, so also it seems daily in those suffering people who 
would slay father, mother, and others unless they be freed from their sick­
ness. The author writes concerning such men in this work." The list quadru­
plex also occurs in MS Ambrosiana 18 inf. (ca. 1420), fol. (iii)v. 
55. The value of the descent is attested to by William of St. Thierry in his 
Golden Epistle, written to the Carthusians. See Un Traite de la vie solitaire: 
Epistola ad Fratres de Monte-Dei par Guillaume de Saint-Thierry, ed. M.-M. Davy 
(Paris, 1940), p. 79; PL 184, col. 314; The Golden Epistle: A Letter to the Brethren 
at Mont Dieu, trans. Theodore Berkeley (Spencer, Mass., 1971), p. 21. 
56. Commentum Bernardi Silvestris super sex libros Eneidos Virgilii, ed. William 
Riedel (Gryphiswald, 1824), p. 30. 
57. Ibid., p. 30. "Another is the descent of virtue, which happens when 
someone wise descends to earthly things through thought, not so that he may 
place his intention in them but so that, with their fragility known and earthly 
things put aside, he may convert himself inwardly to invisible things and may 
know the creator more fully through the knowledge of creatures." 
58. Petri Allegherii super Dantis ipsius genitoris comoediam commentarium, ed. 
Vincentio Mannucci (Florence, 1845), pp. 11-17. 
59. Colucii Salutati de laboribus Herculis, ed. B. L. Ullman (Zurich, n.d.), 
2:483-86. 
60. R. H. Green, "Classical Fable and English Poetry in the Fourteenth 
Century," in Critical Approaches to Medieval Literature, ed. Dorothy Bethurum 
(New York, 1960), p. 127. 
61. More work remains to be done both on the historical development of 
the exegetical method and of its relationship to secular schemata resembling 
it, such as those we have singled out here for comment. On the history of 
biblical exegesis, see Beryl Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages, 2d 
ed. (Notre Dame, 1964), pp. 1-36; on the background of the four-part expli­
cation of the descent into hell, see Green, "Classical Fable and English Poetry 
in the Fourteenth Century," p. 127. Because we ourselves are singling out one 
particular pattern of explication, a four-part schema, from a tradition which 
included other patterns as well, it is worthwhile to note that the four-part 
allegorization of Scripture, although widespread, was by no means the only 
system of allegorical levels in use during the Middle Ages, nor was its use in 
the hands of all commentators uniform. See Smalley, The Study of the Bible in 
the Middle Ages, pp. 97-105, on Hugh of St. Victor. 
40 / A Distinction of Stories 
62. For a fuller discussion of this semiotic understanding of the fourfold 
procedure of the medieval exegetes, see Judson B. Allen, "The Grand Chant 
Courtois and the Wholeness of the Poem: The Medieval Assimilatio of Text, 
Audience, and Commentary," L'Esprit Createur 18 (Fall 1978): 5-17, esp. pp. 
8-10. 
63. Cf. above, notes 46, 51, 54, for instances of medieval commentaries on 
Ovid. Allegorizations of Scripture took many forms, of course, ranging from 
the verse-by-verse gloss, in which each line of the text might be given a 
four-level reading, to sermons or expositions developing particular levels for 
a brief text. See Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages, pp. 281 -307. 
64. Medieval commentators conventionally relate a work's division into 
books and parts to its forma tractatus. Giovanni del Virgilio, commenting on 
the forma tractatus of the Metamorphoses, says, "Forma tractatus est compositio 
et ordinatio 15 librorum in hoc volumine et capitulorum in dictos libros et 
partium in capitulis descendendo usque ad partes minutas que per se senten­
tiam aliquam important" (Ghisalberti, "Giovanni," p. 18). "The forma tractatus 
is the composition and ordering of the fifteen books in this volume, and of the 
chapters in the said books, and of the parts in the chapters, descending to the 
smallest parts which contain distinct meanings." "Ordinatio" is corrected from 
Oxford, Bodleian MS 457, fol. 2r. Another commentator on Ovid, whose 
work is preserved in a thirteenth-century French manuscript, makes the 
chronological point: "Videndum est qualiter agat. Agit enim heroyco metro 
colligens mutationes diversas a prima creacione mundi usque ad suum tem­
pus, quod signat sua invocatio ubi dicit primaque ab origine mundi" (Leiden 
University Library, MS BPL 95, fol. lv). "We must see what is the genre of 
the book. Generically, it is in the heroic meter; it is a collection of diverse 
changes from the first creation of the world up to its own time. This its 
invocation indicates where it says 'and first from the origin of the world.'" 
65. Brooks Otis, in Ovid as an Epic Poet (Cambridge, 1970), acknowledges 
the presence in the poem of a chronological motion but finds the fundamen­
tal principle operating in the poem's structure to be not chronology but rather 
the grouping of stories according to thematic links. For a fuller discussion, see 
chapter 3 below. 
66. The medieval formula for talking about the meaning of a passage in 
the Metamorphoses is, apparently, "vult Ovidius." For a discussion, see Allen, 
The Friar as Critic, pp. 59-60. 
67. The House of Fame is sufficient witness that Chaucer knew the Corn-
media; the story also occurs in the Legenda Aurea, in the life of St. Gregory. 
Such resemblances as this between Theseus and Trajan, both of whom stop in 
the midst of triumph to deal with suppliants, the medieval critics would have 
taken most seriously. 
68. See Robert S. Haller, "The Knight's Tale and the Epic Tradition," 
Chaucer Review 1 (1966): 80-81. 
69. Chaucer makes no special point of the fact that Emelye is an Amazon, 
and he permits her desire to remain unmarried an overtone of virtue which 
his own very different Christian world had to be alert to see as ironic. But the 
ironies are unavoidable, and they lead us to the conclusion that, in a manner, 
Theseus has brought his troubles on himself. The problem of Emelye is 
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perhaps the most striking image in the collection of the observation, de­
veloped at length below, that the events of married life grow directly from the 
manner in which marriage is first constituted. This element of irony has, 
however, gone largely unnoticed among the critics; for reasons different 
from ours, Frederick Turner has seen that Emelye is a problem. See his "A 
Structural Analysis of the Knight's Tale," Chaucer Review 8 (1973): 279-96. 
70. Lydgate's Canterbury story might be analyzed profitably for informa­
tion on a variety of questions: his testimony on the plan of the Canterbury 
journey, which he assumes to have reached Canterbury and to be on the point 
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was deprived of his hair, and as a result deprived of his strength, immediately 
the Philistines captured him, and blinded the captive, and put the blind man 
in jail, and made the jailed man to work in the mill and to play the fool before 
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harmony of four, was Macrobius (Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, trans. 
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perhaps most evident in the works of John Scotus Eriugena, whose desire to 
discover the world's shape led him to postulate a wide range of classifications 
for its elements, especially in groups of four. For a treatment of the number 
as a basis for both imagery and narrative organization, see Alastair Fowler, 
Spenser and the Numbers of Time (London, 1964), pp. 24-33. Fowler's study is an 
excellent example of a properly balanced evaluation of the place of number 
theory in poetry; his work on Renaissance poets, especially Spenser, might be 
profitably adapted to medieval writers. By placing such special emphasis on 
the range of meanings associated with the number four, we are not suggesting 
that every group of things in the tales must number four, nor that Chaucer 
had forced an artificial scheme on his material; further, we believe that the 
evidence of Chaucer's poem shows that we are not forcing an artificial scheme 
on his material, either. Rather, it is helpful to consider the backgrounds of 
such ordering schemes as the four elements in analyzing the art of an era such 
as the Middle Ages, whose belief in world order caused men to place greater 
trust than our own times might in such systems of classification. 

Medieval Notions 
of Story 
In the most obvious and literal sense, the Canterbury Tales is the record 
of a storytelling contest. The question which the work intends to pose 
and answer is not any question of salvation after Canterbury. Rather, 
a judgment is promised, which will specify the best story and honor its 
teller at a feast. Chaucer never dramatizes the expected judgment, 
because his own project is not to single out one story but to use many. 
Rather he uses this contest, within the drama of his competing pilgrim 
raconteurs, to conduct a serious and quite conclusive discussion of the 
nature and value of story—of the quality of exemplary fiction which 
makes it for him a trustworthy and significant medium for expressing 
his ideas. 
Chaucer's discussion of his art of story is complicated both by the 
fact that it is dramatic—that is, its text consists of an array of 
speeches—and by the fact that it consists both logically and by rubrica­
tion of prologues. Its dramatic character requires us to read through 
it to its definition with a certain allowance for irony and dramatic 
relativity; its quality as prologue material requires us to read it with a 
confident expectation of logical procedure in discursive statement, 
and further requires us to take it as introductory to the stories, and 
therefore as dependent on them rather than as the enclosure on 
which they depend. These qualities might seem to contradict one 
another, in that on the one hand there is the uncertainty of shifting 
points of view and the dramatic possession of tale by teller, and on the 
other both the ultimate certainty and the discursive organization of 
extended statements whose essential character is logical and exposi­
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tory. But both, as we shall see, are proper parts of that strategy of 
exemplification which Chaucer achieves. 
In taking the frame of the Canterbury Tales as Chaucer's discussion 
of the art of story, we do not in any sense intend to claim that Chaucer 
is, after the modern fashion, merely writing poetry about poetry. The 
text which he makes is an expository text, a discursive text. It is for­
mally and rhetorically very complex, but its complexity is not what its 
author substitutes for meaning; rather, it is the strategy which permits 
him to be both clear and definite. Chaucer is, of course, an artist, as 
his work attests, and one may find in many places in his work expres­
sion of quite conscious concern for the craft of words as such, the 
value of literary precedent, the strategy of symbol.1 But there is a 
difference between discussion of verbal art and discussion of some 
valid result of its use. What we intend in this chapter is an exposition 
of Chaucer's sense of proper use—specifically, of Chaucer's notion of 
the relation between telling a story and telling the truth.2 Our discus­
sion deals with two complementary kinds of evidence: Chaucer's own 
explanation of storytelling, conducted in the prologues which his pil­
grims speak, and the definitions stated in, and implied by, the literary 
commentaries and manuals known in his time. On the basis of these 
two kinds of evidence, we can know clearly the theoretical possibilities 
within which Chaucer's stories exist. 
We begin by examining Chaucer's prologues as his dramatization of 
the human difficulties with which storytellers must cope as they try to 
understand and appreciate the fiction they present. At the same time, 
we admit the logical and rhetorical force of the word prologue and 
argue that the drama does not exist for its own sake, but merely as an 
unusually subtle expression of something discursive. Essentially, the 
prologue material is Chaucer's introduction to his discourse in story; 
seen as such, the prologue material tells us what kind of discourse to 
expect, as well as what material will be discussed, and thus defines for 
us Chaucer's doctrine of story. 
We then go to external evidence—to medieval literary commentary 
and to manuals related to poetry—and find there both confirmation 
and elaboration of the definitions which Chaucer implies for himself. 
In all this we establish clearly Chaucer's sense of priorities. We estab­
lish, as it were, the logic of a discourse which takes the form of general 
prologue, prologues, and tales. On the basis of this logical expecta­
tion, we then know what to read first, what to take most literally, and 
what to take as properly conclusive. Reading thus, we see that logical 
discourse and storytelling are for Chaucer the same thing, under an 
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identity which in no way compromises either the validity of discourse 
or the art of fiction. Then we can see that his doctrine of story is a 
vital, indeed a fundamental, element in his description of a perfected 
way of life, in which honest speech and properly made promises form 
the basis of a good human society. 
Once again we must enter the historian's caveat. Chaucer's doctrine 
of story is a medieval doctrine, not the modern Aristotelian one rooted 
in notions of plot. As we shall show, Chaucer's doctrine is one under 
which his tales have, as a collection, both moral and architectonic 
beauty—under which, in fact, his tales have with even greater clarity 
and attractiveness most of the beauties which we have seen in some 
fashion in the light of other theories and other approaches. If we 
seem to be getting to these beauties by a strange route—that is, by 
means of a doctrine of story as something exemplary, expository, and 
discursive rather than as something plotted—it is because only by such 
medieval means will some values be reached at all. 
Both in Chaucer's Canterbury Tales and in the larger presumptions 
of the medieval critics in general, the distinction between prologue 
and what follows is partly logical and partly rhetorical—logical in that 
prologues introduce or summarize, often, what the subsequent 
treatise discusses at length; and rhetorical in that prologues are sup­
posed to get readers, or hearers, in a mood to be persuaded by what 
follows. Prologues are not, to modern taste, literary at all—one of the 
first rules of modern fiction is that necessary exposition must be 
sugarcoated by action, so that right from the beginning one is showing 
rather than telling. But for Chaucer prologues are logical, rhetorical, 
and literary.3 They serve the usual discursive purposes, and in addi­
tion they demarcate the preliminary ground which the reader must 
pass through in order to enter the world of fiction from that world of 
fiction proper. Given the modern sensibility, it is curious that the 
word prologue, which is constantly on the lips of Chaucer teachers and 
in the running heads of their editions, should have been repeated so 
often without giving offense for its blatantly logical and rhetorical, or 
in a sense antiliterary, connotations. We have indeed correctly labeled 
our material. But we have been quick to go off and talk of other 
things—of characterization, of dramatic interest or propriety, or of 
geographical allusions on the London-Canterbury road. Chaucer's 
transformation of the framing events from an artificial excuse for 
storytelling, its conventional use in the medieval genre, to a vital ele­
ment in his poem has convinced many readers that the prologues, as a 
representation of reality, interest Chaucer more than the tales, even 
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to the extreme that the Parson's condemnation of all storytelling is 
taken seriously. 
All the materials from which readers of the poem have tended to 
build a realistic portrayal of Chaucer's time—the descriptions of the 
pilgrims and their "condiciouns"—along with the exemplary anec­
dotes and proverbs which introduce particular tales are, in medieval 
terms, prologues. That is, they introduce the tales to which they are 
attached. Their relationship to the stories and to each other is deter­
mined by the rhetoric of fiction, rather than by the logic of real life. 
Chaucer ironically invites his readers, and has convinced many of 
them, to read this relationship between story and life backwards, both 
by the vividness of the prologue action and also by allowing his 
storytellers to suggest and demonstrate many wrong ways to present 
and interpret fiction. Guided by the dramatic principle, modern 
readers have concluded that the uses to which the pilgrims put their 
stories, as escape or insult or weapon, are for Chaucer either legiti­
mate or, as the Parson suggests, the best that can be expected of 
fiction, and, further, that such uses exhaust the significance of the 
tales. 
The classification of the Canterbury Tales into prologues and tales, 
on the other hand, unifies the poem in the service of the tales; it 
enables us to preserve and appreciate the real charm of the prologues 
while we discover in the frame of the stories a preparation for reading 
which praises, rather than discredits, fiction. A reevaluation of the 
prologue material, beginning with the assumption that the prologues 
serve the tales as helpful introductions, will affect both our under­
standing of the general concerns which unite all the prologues—that 
is, the idea of pilgrimage, the storytelling contest, the debates and 
rivalries of the pilgrims—and also our analysis of specific prologue-
tale pairs. Guided by the example of Ovidian commentary, we intend 
to read the prologues in series with the tales they introduce, as 
exemplary units in Chaucer's story collection, rather than relating the 
prologues primarily to one another, as if they composed together a 
continuous narrative action. Not only what the storyteller actually says 
about his tale but also what the prologue says, whether discursively or 
dramatically, prepares the way for the tale. An example for this pro­
cedure, which we will follow in our reading of the tales below, may be 
seen in the Miller's Prologue and Tale. What are they about? Literally, 
and also sententiously, the prologue is about a drunken man who 
disobeys the rules to take another man's place and to perform another 
man's function. From the Miller-Reeve controversy, we might con­
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elude that the usurpation is punished, but not very severely, and 
certainly not in terms which relate the punishment to the intrusion. 
Considered in the same general terms, the Miller's Tale is about a 
clever man who disobeys the rules to take another man's place and to 
perform another man's function and who, because he is not alone in 
this wicked kind of disobedience, is punished for what he does.4 In the 
prologue the rules being violated are the Host's rules for a storytelling 
contest, and in the tale they are the rules of matrimony, but this is a 
difference at the level of the merely particular. Both the exemplum of 
the prologue, in which the Miller intrudes himself as storyteller, and 
the exemplum of the tale, in which "hende" Nicholas intrudes himself 
as bedpartner, illustrate the typical or sententious pattern of action 
which can be labeled intrusion against the rule. We shall define this 
sort of pattern later in the chapter by using the medieval term con­
suetudo; both Chaucer's prologues and his fictions define such con­
suetudines. In the Miller's Prologue and Tale, the same consuetudo is 
presented twice—once as an introduction, within the rules of an ad 
hoc and temporary social cosmos constituted in order to organize 
storytelling; once substantially, within the rules of a real social cosmos 
whose rules define marriage. The prologue is an unresolved illustra­
tion, in that it does not answer the moral question of the proper 
punishment of intruders against the rule; both the tale and the array 
of material which follows provide resolution of the question and thus 
fulfill the promise of the prologue. 
The prologues are related not only to their specific tales but also to 
each other. They define the framing situation in which the stories are 
told, they share a group of characters, and they treat a number of 
general subjects. First, as Jill Mann has shown, they are a satire on the 
estates of society, presented with a rhetorical ambivalence which casts 
real doubts upon the proper moral response of the audience. Second, 
they are frequently preoccupied with sex, and with estimates of sexual 
potency. The first of these subjects is not limited to the prologues, but 
rather is to be found in links and tales alike. The prologue combat 
among representatives of rival occupations and ways of life 
exemplifies Chaucer's pervasive concern with the typical features of 
the human condition, and with the relations which he can, in his array 
of fictions, construct between human particulars and typical princi­
ples which, in medieval terms, grant particulars true existence. The 
second subject, sexuality, is at one level too obvious to require 
comment—there has rarely been great art which did not reflect this 
aspect of life, from the Canticle of Canticles to Freud. But the sexual 
50 / A Distinction of Stories 
preoccupations of Chaucer's pilgrims specifically function to relate 
their conversations to their tales, which, following the example of the 
Knight's Tale, treat courtship and marriage more than any other sub­
jects. The pilgrims' exuberant interest in sex probably also echoes the 
complex symbolism of sexual fecundity that reached Chaucer from 
Alanus de Insulis, by way of a wonderful detour through the Romance 
of the Rose, and so faults them for their failure to perceive behind the 
natural goodness of sexuality its spiritual dimensions, particularly as a 
visible symbol of productivity in virtue and good works. 
A third subject the prologues share is the nature and proper use of 
fiction. Although the links say many specific things directed to the 
reasons for telling stories and the ways to appreciate them, the nature 
of fiction has not been identified as the focus of these remarks, be­
cause they have been either treated as locally dramatic events involv­
ing pilgrims' personality clashes or dismissed as morally empty be­
cause of the Parson's attack on fiction. It is certainly true that most of 
what the pilgrims say about stories is wrong, limited, harmful; but the 
doctrines they present ironically direct us to a proper respect for the 
materials of fiction. Once the errors of storytelling are defined, the 
reason for Chaucer's juxtaposition of the pilgrimage with his story 
collection may be reconsidered, in order to show how the idea of the 
journey, expressed in the links, functions, along with all the prologue 
material, to introduce and prepare us properly for the stories. 
The ways of telling and interpreting stories offered in the links may 
be categorized according to whether they treat stories as "ernest" or 
"game," a proverbial contrast mentioned frequently by the pilgrims.5 
The Host's definition of the prize-winning tale, as "of best sentence 
and moost solaas," assigns stories to neither category, as earnest or 
game alone, but suggests that the best stories partake of both moral 
seriousness and delight. Throughout his administration of the 
storytelling contest, the Host remains the champion of the game and a 
searcher after moral lessons in the tales which he can apply to his 
personal life. Still his principles fail him continually: he neither main­
tains the peace and good humor of the game against drunkards and 
quiters nor allegorizes very acutely. More than this, he sets the 
storytelling contest against the pilgrimage journey, characterizing the 
stories as fun and the pilgrimage as spiritually efficacious but dull. 
Ye goon to Caunterbury—God yow speede,

The blisful martir quite yow youre meede!

And wel I woot, as ye goon by the weye,

Ye shapen yow to talen and to pleye;
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For trewely, confort ne myrthe is noon 
To ride by the weye doumb as a stoon; 
And therfore wol I maken yow disport, 
As I sayde erst, and doon yow som confort. 
And if yow liketh alle by oon assent 
For to stonden at my juggement, 
And for to werken as I shal yow seye, 
To-morwe, whan ye riden by the weye, 
Now, by my fader soule that is deed, 
But ye be myrie, I wol yeve yow myn heed! 
(I [A] 769-82) 
Although he demands stories of "best sentence" and often finds moral 
truths in the tales, as they are presented, still he perceives no connec­
tion between this earnest dimension of the tales and the earnest sig­
nificance of the pilgrimage. He establishes a distinction between the 
spiritual goals of the pilgrims, an earnest intent, and the immediate 
desire for entertainment of the contest, a game. In doing this he 
prepares the way for the Parson's attack on fiction, Chaucer's Retrac­
tion, and the modern conviction that the stories are morally inferior. 
We believe that the Host has committed an error in critical judgment, 
which functions, along with all the other critical errors in the links, 
ironically to place stories beyond the control of men too foolish to 
perceive their integrity and to reveal the power of fiction, even if we 
see this power wasted by the pilgrims. To suggest that the Retraction 
and the Parson's Prologue share the shortcomings of the prologue 
material is a controversial proposal which requires careful explana­
tion; as a preparation for this, we will consider more clear-cut exam­
ples of faulty literary judgment in the links. 
Most of the pilgrims fail to appreciate stories because they cannot 
preserve the game in their desire to discover an "earnest" value in 
fiction which they may use for their own purposes. The most striking 
example of such a misappropriation of story is the Pardoner. The 
Pardoner's intention for his story is to deceive—he conceals his own 
avaricious reasons for preaching behind an attack on the avarice of his 
listeners. He is so confident in his control over the story that he 
reveals the apparatus of his illusion to the other pilgrims: 
Thus kan I preche agayn that same vice 
Which that I use, and that is avarice. 
But though myself be gilty in that synne, 
Yet kan I maken oother folk to twynne 
From avarice, and soore to repente. 
(VI [C] 427-31) 
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The Pardoner fails to impress his pilgrim audience6—and Chaucer, 
by the dramatic interplay between the Host and the Pardoner, under­
lines this failure. Yet the pilgrims outsmart themselves by supposing 
that when they see through the Pardoner's trick, they also understand 
the story; modern audiences outsmart themselves in much the same 
way, by supposing that the story is important only as the tool of the 
Pardoner's intended deception and, dramatically, the occasion of his 
self-revelation. What pilgrims and many readers fail to realize is that 
the story, no matter what the Pardoner thinks of it, is a consummate 
production and a powerful teacher of the dangers of avarice. The 
Knight's suggestion that the game of the pilgrimage be restored re­
proves the Pardoner's effort to manipulate his fellow travelers and the 
Host's rude objections to being duped: 
Namoore of this, for it is right ynough! 
Sire Pardoner, be glad and myrie of cheere; 
And ye, sire Hoost, that been to me so deere, 
I prey yow that ye kisse the Pardoner. 
And Pardoner, I prey thee, drawe thee neer, 
And, as we diden, lat us laughe and pleye. 
(VI [C] 962-67) 
But it also directs us back to the storytelling contest, the game in 
search of tales "of best sentence and moost solaas," in which the Par­
doner's Tale is one of the most distinguished entries. The controversy 
between the Pardoner and the Host, and his plan to dupe the pil­
grims, is an important element of the poem, but it is more properly 
read, when we realize that it ironically calls attention to the story's 
particular power and significance, by showing how the pilgrims fail to 
benefit from it. 
Many pilgrims lose the stories in their pursuit of other pleasures, 
including drink and exchange of insults. Their uses of stories, as dirty 
jokes or character assassinations, do not exhaust the significance of 
the stories, although this fact is sometimes lost in the appreciation of 
the quarrels in the links. The Miller's Tale, and the Reeve's, for that 
matter, are respected as literary creations, with their own internal 
logic, when they are read independently; this respect for them often is 
forgotten, however, when the relationship between the tales and their 
tellers is discussed, because of the long-standing fascination with the 
drama of the pilgrims. Jordan rightly says of the quiting storytellers: 
"The Reeve's impulse and violent protest against what he takes to be 
public charges of cuckoldry and adultery reveals his own churlish 
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inability to distinguish between actual instance and Fictional generali­
zation. In this exchange the Miller gains superiority not through his 
knowledge of the Reeve's past experience of matrimony—as main­
tained by dramatically oriented criticism—but by the immediate dem­
onstration of a higher quality of mind."7 Even the Host, who on most 
occasions objects to the disruptions of the quiters—he asks the Friar, 
for example, not to insult the Summoner (III [D] 1286-89)—yields to 
the temptation to make cruel fun, within the relaxation of formality 
permitted by the contest, and receives, in return, a quiting tale from 
the Cook about an innkeeper. Chaucer phrases the Host's defense of 
such insults in the terms of earnest and game, for the Host excuses his 
ridicule of the Cook by saying that even the truth is permitted, when 
stated playfully. "But yet I pray thee, be nat wroth for game;/A man 
may seye ful sooth in game and pley" (I [A] 4354-55). By naming this 
kind of speech "sooth," Chaucer calls to mind other sorts of truth that 
tales may tell and underscores the inadequacy of the pilgrims' expec­
tations for their game of stories. 
Chaucer's attitude toward the drunkards and the quiters is ex­
pressed through the Host's invocation to Bacchus as an appropriate 
god for the pilgrimage; the Host's optimistic assertion that drink will 
bind the wounds of the pilgrims' disputes is disappointed in the con­
duct of the pilgrims who disrupt the contest while they are drunk. In 
the Manciple's Prologue the Host praises Bacchus: "O thou Bacus, 
yblessed be thy name,/That so kanst turnen ernest into game!" (IX 
[H] 99-100). Previously he has said, 
"I se wel it is necessarie, 
Where that we goon, good drynke with us carie; 
For that wol turne rancour and disese 
T'acord and love, and many a wrong apese." 
(IX [H] 95-98) 
He makes this statement at the end of a scene in which the Cook's 
drunkenness has made him unfit for storytelling, the game which is, 
after all, the focus of the Host's efforts; the Cook and Manciple have 
quarreled over the Cook's incapacity; and the Host himself pro­
nounces on the debilitating effects of drink. The praise of drink here, 
as necessary to the good-humored conduct of the journey, is con­
tradicted by the Host's angry reaction to the Miller's drunken inter­
ruption of the contest in order to tell his story. Of course, the pilgrims 
have also raised friendly glasses together. The journey begins with a 
toast to confirm the Host as leader of the contest.8 The Host's invoca­
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tion of "merry" Bacchus implicitly rebukes the pilgrims who allow 
drink to turn the contest into an earnest argument. 
Chaucer's allusion to Bacchus, especially because it appears in the 
prologue of the tale he borrows from the Metamorphoses, calls to mind 
another aspect of the god's activity, relevant not only to those who 
drink but also to those who tell stories. The Host invokes a friendly 
god of mirth, but Bacchus, in book 4 of the Metamorphoses, is the 
"new" god of madness and violence, who punishes all those who will 
not accept his authority. Among these are the Minyades, who reject 
the new festival of Bacchus and stay at their work. Like the Canter­
bury pilgrims, they agree to tell stories as a diversion: 
utile opus manuum vario sermone levemus

perque vices aliquid, quod tempora longa videri

non sinat, in medium vacuas referamus ad aures.

(4. 39-41)9 
For their irreverence Bacchus transforms their weaving into vine and 
ivy, and the sisters themselves into bats. With this punishment of 
stories which insult his dignity, Bacchus becomes the god of all quit­
ers. Bacchus's anger is repeated in the fury of the Reeve and the 
Summoner, who forget the pleasure of the storytelling because they 
think it is somehow directed against their dignity. According to Ar­
nulf of Orleans, these storytelling defiers of the powers of Bacchus 
are alcoholics, whose wasteful indulgence finally ruins them.10 The 
Ovide moralise repeats this interpretation and adds two more, which 
complicate our response to the Ovidian context in just the right ways. 
In malo, the three sisters are "trois diversitez de pechiez,"11 specifi­
cally, "charnel concupissance," "concupissance d'ieulz," and "orgeulz 
de vie" (4. 2532-44). In bono, they are "trois estas de perfection," 
"continence," "l'ordre de mariage," and "l'estas de prelacion" (4. 
2634-2703). The storytellers of Ovid are allegorized in formulas 
which comprehend the human condition: sin is divided according to 
the domains in which it may occur—lust of the flesh, lust of the eyes, 
and pride of life—and perfection is named not by virtues but by 
conditions within which virtuous behavior is possible. Chaucer's evo­
cation of the Minyades' disastrous storytelling contest is intended, in 
the case of the angry, spiteful, or drunken storytellers, to link them 
with the destructive, and undesirable, aspects of Bacchus. More gen­
erally, because the pilgrims resemble the Minyades in many ways— 
both groups are telling stories in a context of religious observance, 
which they put aside for the sake of other interests—they may be 
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identified with the sort of treatment the Minyades received in com­
mentaries. That is, they are characters who exist, in bono and in malo, 
to exemplify the sins and states which constitute society. They be­
come, in sum, humanity, sponsoring stories which, although their 
value is complex and often ambivalent, are socially exemplary. 
Thus, the stories exist separate from the uses the pilgrims would 
make of them and tend to rebuke the foolishness of selfish preachers, 
crude drunkards, and spiteful rivals, who suppose they control the 
tales that they hurl at one another. The errors of the pilgrims are 
often interpreted as allowing themselves to have too much morally 
irresponsible fun in the contest; in fact, they are not having the game 
that the stories themselves would have provided them at all. Their 
willingness to take a meaning, or reason, for the story as its signifi­
cance, and to let the story go, is also the fundamental attitude of 
Chaucer the pilgrim—not only in the Retraction, but also throughout 
the book. The Retraction is read by many critics, as we shall see, as 
Chaucer's literal last word as author; Chaucer is supposed to be re­
tracting all those stories which do not actually enforce a good moral. It 
would be more precisely accurate to say that Chaucer is really retract­
ing those stories which are really about some sinful or bawdy action, 
or which contain gross language, and that in so doing he falls into the 
eternally persisting error of taking content for meaning. It is true, 
after all, that some of Chaucer's bawdiest stories do punish the guilty 
parties and so suggest the danger of their errors. Though they sound 
like sin, they actually reprove it. 
To take the Retraction seriously, as the last word of Chaucer the 
civil servant, moralist, and human being with a soul to save, violates 
the integrity of the work in which it is dramatically integral and ig­
nores the fact that Chaucer the pilgrim has been making statements of 
a similar character throughout his work. Chaucer the pilgrim is con­
cerned for the actual content of his stories. He defends himself from 
charges of immorality or poor writing on the grounds that he is re­
porting accurately what really happened: 
For this ye knowen al so wel as I,

Whoso shal telle a tale after a man,

He moot reherce as ny as evere he kan

Everich a word,12 if it be in his charge,

Al speke he never so rudeliche and large,

Or ellis he moot telle his tale untrewe,

Of feyne thyng, or fynde wordes newe.

He may nat spare, althogh he were his brother;
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He moot as wel seye o word as another. 
Crist spak hymself ful brode in hooly writ, 
And wel ye woot no vileyne is it. 
Eek Plato seith, whoso that kan hym rede, 
The wordes moote be cosyn to the dede. 
Also I prey yow to foryeve it me, 
Al have I nat set folk in hir degree 
Heere in this tale, as that they sholde stonde. 
My wit is short, ye may wel understonde. 
(I [A] 730-46) 
Chaucer the pilgrim finds the same virtue of accuracy a sufficient 
defense for any immorality or bad language his tales report, in the 
Miller's Prologue. 
For Goddes love, demeth nat that I seye 
Of yvel entente, but for I moot reherce 
Hir tales alle, be they bettre or werse, 
Or elles falsen som of my mateere. 
And therfore, whoso list it nat yheere, 
Turne over the leef and chese another tale; 
For he shal fynde ynowe, grete and smale, 
Of storial thyng that toucheth gentillesse, 
And eek moralitee and hoolynesse. 
Blameth nat me if that ye chese amys. 
The Millere is a cherl, ye knowe wel this; 
So was the Reve eek and othere mo, 
And harlotrie they tolden bothe two. 
Avyseth yow, and put me out of blame; 
And eek men shal nat maken ernest of game. 
(I [A] 3172-86) 
The Retraction's advice to disregard all the tales that "sownen into 
synne," for the sake of those with holy subjects, resembles the Miller's 
Prologue passage closely. Both manuscript and internal evidence de­
mand that we take the Retraction as an integral part of the whole, and 
not as a death bed testament.13 
When the Retraction is drawn firmly into the remainder of the 
poem and identified as the statement of a character in that poem, it 
becomes possible to explain its puzzling aspects—the apparent con­
tradiction it offers to the remainder of the poem, and its curiously 
ambiguous explanation of why Chaucer decided to take back as many 
of his works as he says he must. Olive Sayce, in an article on the 
medieval literary tradition of closing apologies, demonstrates that 
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Chaucer's Retraction, as an avowal of sinfulness and a request to be 
excused for scandalous works, draws on the traditional vocabulary of 
medieval conclusions. This is "the part of the work when apparently 
autobiographical statements are most likely to occur. It must be re­
membered, however, that the reason for their introduction is not 
personal but aesthetic."14 Sayce convincingly argues that the personal 
note struck in the Retraction does not require that Chaucer the au­
thor be speaking in his own voice. The conventionality of the terms 
used, the faithfulness to medieval formulas, suggest, rather, that the 
passage should be attributed to Chaucer the pilgrim. 
The Retraction is ambiguous, as well. Chaucer first seems to argue 
that all he wrote was written to a good end; he echoes Saint Paul's 
statement that "al that is writen is writen for oure doctrine"15 and 
explicitly assures us that he has followed this rule. Then he decides 
that some things could not have been written "to oure doctrine," be­
cause they literally "sownen into synne." The error that the Retraction 
makes resembles the mistaken defenses of art that Chaucer the pil­
grim offers both in the General Prologue and the Miller's Prologue. 
There, Chaucer the pilgrim has defined the truth of stories to be the 
accuracy with which they report an actual event; the artist is excused 
from moral responsibility because he did not commit the sins he re­
ports, but only records them. The Retraction does not permit this 
defense; Chaucer the pilgrim, undoubtedly swayed by the Parson's 
grim rejection of the redeeming "solaas" of stories, decides that the 
record of an immorality is an immorality. Again, an "earnest" value of 
story, which does not perceive fiction as "game," fails to distinguish 
between life and its representation in fiction, and so loses the aspect of 
story which gives it authority to teach. The Averroistic poetics of 
Aristotle speaks to this point when it repeats the commonplace that 
"homo inter cetera animalia delectatur in assimilatione rerum quas 
iam in sensu percepit et in earum representatione seu imitatione. Et 
signum huius scilicet quod homo naturaliter letatur et gaudet ex as­
similatione est quod delectamur et gaudemus in representatione 
aliquarum rerum in quarum sensu non delectamur."16 In fact, the 
moral nature of poetry requires that its material "assumitur interdum 
ad ostensionem decentie valde exprimendo ipsam et interdum per­
mutatur ad ostensionem alicuius turpitudinis similiter valde ex­
primendo illam."17 Consonant with this doctrine, Sayce concludes 
about Chaucer that the ambiguity of the Retraction does permit one 
to value poetry, but only by recognizing the shallowness of the pil­
grim's apologies.18 The ethical measure of a story is not to be taken 
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solely from the incidence of words or actions that would be called 
good or bad when performed in real life; rather, the stories that do 
not "sownen into synne" do so precisely because whether describing 
good men or bad they draw ethically appropriate conclusions about 
human life and exercise their rhetorical power toward convincing 
men to behave well. 
But these two critical positions—that stories can be reduced to dra­
matic insults, and that their moral value equals the moral character of 
the specific incidents they contain—are not the only positions that 
Chaucer defines and defends in his prologue material. More impor­
tant than these explicit mistakes is the pervasive implicit attitude that 
fiction is different from experience in some way, that it is game, that it 
is "solaas." This attitude is clear in a number of passing comments, 
concentrated in the prologue material, in which several of the pil­
grims affirm the value and importance of fiction and recognize its 
place in the cultural tradition of the Middle Ages. 
The majority of the pilgrims are concerned that they may not be 
equal to the task of telling a story well. In the dialectic of the work as 
such, they are of course right, because, as pilgrim storytellers, they are 
not stories but prologues. Their own lives are a boring pilgrimage, 
which they agree must be enlivened with stories. In other terms, the 
pilgrims are lesser fictions who frame further and greater fictions, 
which are rhetorically, as things framed, more fictional than the pil­
grims. They achieve story by telling stories, more than by enacting 
one; thus they are outside story, and therefore by definition in­
adequate to story.19 Their game with story too often reduces itself to a 
too easy and too trivial earnest; their morality oscillates between an 
impossible penitential rejection of the world they are (for the nonce) 
given and a too easy acceptance of its simply drunken aspects. 
First of all, then, the pilgrims confess various insecurities in the face 
of fiction. The Man of Law rehearses Chaucer's work, saying that 
there is no story remaining for him to tell, and incidentally betraying 
his ignorance of the medieval fact that stories are to be repeated, or 
recelebrated, rather than invented ex nihilo. He says that he fears the 
fate of the Pierides, the sisters of the Metamorphoses who challenge the 
Muses to a singing contest and lose, becoming magpies because of 
their impudence and impiety: 
"Me were looth be likned, doutelees,

To Muses that men clepe Pierides—

Methamorphosios woot what I mene;
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I speke in prose, and lat him rymes make." 
(II [B1] 91-93, 96) 
The Franklin apologizes for his lack of rhetorical skill: 
But, sires, by cause I am a burel man,

At my bigynnyng first I yow biseche,

Have me excused of my rude speche.

(V [F] 716-18) 
The Prioress fears that she will be unequal to her task of telling a holy 
story, and prays: 
My konnyng is so wayk, o blisful Queene,

For to declare thy grete worthynesse

That I ne may the weighte nat susteene.

(VII 481-83 [B2 1671-73]) 
The Monk apologizes for his problems of organization: 
"Though I by ordre telle nat thise thynges, 
But tellen hem som bifore and som bihynde,

As it now comth unto my remembraunce,

Have me escused of myn ignoraunce."

(VII 1985, 1988-90 [B2 3175, 3178-80]) 
Others, by referring to the tradition and learning of the Middle Ages, 
establish the fundamental importance for fiction of its ties to au­
thorities. Even the Wife of Bath, who claims that experience is a 
sufficient teacher, trusts a good deal to biblical authorities as she tries 
to prove her skill as an exegete. The Clerk offers a story he learned 
from 
Fraunceys Petrak, the lauriat poete,

Highte this clerk, whos rethorike sweete

Enlumyned al Ytaille of poetrie,

(IV [E] 31-33) 
and Chaucer the pilgrim likens his own efforts in telling a new story of 
the Melibeus to the work of the Evangelists: 
For somme of hem seyn moore, and somme seyn lesse,

Whan they his pitous passioun expresse—

I meene of Mark, Mathew, Luc, and John—

But doutelees hir sentence is al oon.

(VII 949-52 [B2 2139-42]) 
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The Pardoner's sincerest reverence is for the technique of perfor­
mance and practical rhetoric: 
I peyne me to han an hauteyn speche, 
And rynge it out as round as gooth a belle, 
For I kan al by rote that I telle. 
(VI [C] 330-32) 
Still others, with timely interruptions, bring telling commentary to 
bear on tales that are disorderly, dreary, or bumbling. The Franklin 
interrupts the Squire with flattery, saying 
"In feith, Squier, thow hast thee wel yquit 
And gentilly. I preise wel thy wit, 
So feelyngly thou spekest, sire, I allow the!" 
(V [F] 673-74, 676) 
The Host interrupts the tale of Sir Thopas: 
. .. thou makest me 
So wery of thy verray lewednesse 
That, also wisly God my soule blesse, 
Myne eres aken of thy drasty speche. 
(VII 920-23 [B2 2110-13]) 
The continually repeated emphasis here is on learning and skill—the 
faults are those of rudeness, uncunning, drastiness of speech, igno­
rance. Three principles of criticism emerge here, all calculated to 
affirm the importance and value of the stories which the pilgrims 
introduce. First, the storyteller is necessarily humble before his mate­
rial, which requires excellence in presentation to fulfill its potential. 
Second, it is recognized that stories participate in the tradition of 
learning which the Middle Ages so much respected—they are auctori­
tates. Third, it is dramatically affirmed that bad stories should be 
challenged or stopped. It is important to notice that nothing in these 
principles depends either on the good intentions of the pilgrims or on 
the moral weight of the events in their stories. Rather, there is "re­
thorike sweete." The respect of the pilgrims points to the integrity of 
stories. Chaucer effectively cuts off the possibility of valuing his fic­
tions as jokes, insults, or sermons only, and yet leaves us with the 
stories, somehow both instructive and entertaining, standing solidly in 
the realm of truth and high seriousness and yet in sympathy with the 
world of mistake and error which men inhabit. 
Of all the members of the party, the Knight comes closest to read­
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ing a story correctly. The Knight, who is the character most in har­
mony with the poem's largest patterns of meaning and who, through­
out the links, defends the principle of the contest as a game, is given 
the task of questioning the Monk's array of tragedies as being out of 
harmony with fiction, not because it is too serious for the "game" of 
stories, which is the Host's objection, but because it has not fulfilled its 
serious obligations to make sense and order from life.20 The Host 
rejects a repetition of these tragic instances, because the task is of no 
use: 
. . . and pardee, no remedie 
It is for to biwaille ne compleyne 
That that is doon. 
(VII 2784-86 [B2 3974-76]) 
Ironically he opposes here the medieval reverence for exempla, par­
ticularly the tragic tales of falls from fortune, as valued teachers of 
man's true place in creation. The Knight recognizes the exemplary 
tone of the Monk's tragedies, because he sees that their force is di­
rected at his own particular experience. 
I seye for me, it is a greet disese, 
Whereas men han been in greet welthe and ese, 
To heeren of hire sodeyn fal, alias! 
And the contrarie is joye and greet solas, 
As whan a man hath been in povre estaat, 
And clymbeth up and wexeth fortunat, 
And there abideth in prosperitee. 
(VII 2771-77 [B2 3961-67]) 
The Knight reveals his own limitation as a critic, a dislike for sad 
endings, especially ones that come close to home, but he has read the 
story in appreciation of its sententious character and with the courage 
to apply its lesson to himself.21 Among the pilgrims, who tend either 
to the quiters' error of reacting angrily to tales they imagine insult 
them or to the Host's smug application of moralizations to the faults 
of others, the Knight reads the story for what it may teach him. 
Chaucer permits such a careful reading of the Monk's Tale, perhaps, 
because it is, like his own Tales, a collection rather than a single story. 
He suggests that for life to be captured in a manner suited to his own 
age a poem must encompass the multiplicity of experience; the Monk's 
Tale does so and is the tale whose separate treatment may come closest 
to the type of reading which Chaucer finds appropriate to poetry. 
In sum, the prologues portray the pilgrims as storytellers, 
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Chaucer's auctoritates, whose comments on fiction present an elabo­
rate sic et non on the validity of fictional communication. The answers 
they come up with are faulty, but their stories are not. The "earnest" 
and "game" they find in the journey's events, and in the uses they 
have for their tales, are not the "best sentence and moost solaas" the 
Host promises the best stories will provide. This is intentional, we 
think, because Chaucer places the true blending of earnest and game 
where he believes it to exist, in the stories themselves. And our ap­
preciation for the individual tales is proof that the stories do have 
validity and impact beyond the distortions the pilgrims attempt to 
practice on them. 
The relationship between the ideal of pilgrimage and the storytell­
ing contest is not the easy distinction between earnest and game 
which the Host or the Parson would make, because the stories demon­
strate throughout a capacity for speaking the true, the "best sen­
tence," even while they entertain and delight. Chaucer's framing def­
initions of the stories, the pilgrimage, and the contest rather function 
together: the Canterbury Tales is both Chaucer's truth about life and 
the entertainment he offers to his readers. By turning attention away 
from the journey's end to its progress along the way, Chaucer iden­
tifies the subject of his work as this life, and the morality appropriate 
to its conduct. The Host is fit patron and guide for such a journey, 
because he is the director of the homeless, men in a state of transition. 
The pilgrims' decision to accept his direction affirms their concern for 
this life. The Host is the viaticum of this community,22 but he conducts 
the pilgrims along no heavenly way. Yet the stories, to which he would 
direct our attention, are Chaucer's Eucharist, in which the flesh of life 
is transfigured by the truth which it should exemplify. This life, by 
means of the tales, makes contact with other times and even with 
eternity, not only as an eventual end but also as a saving grace con­
tinually present. The transcendent truth, which the Parson presumes 
to hold in his sermon, and which the repentant Chaucer the pilgrim 
thinks about only in the shadow of Canterbury, Chaucer places in our 
hands, in his story of the tales told on the way. 
In all this we have attempted to establish that the prologues, and all 
the linking material, are to be considered as prologues in fact as well 
as in name, and that they depend on, and logically derive from, the 
fictions they introduce. We have offered an approximate definition of 
story, as a combination of "ernest" and "game," derived from 
Chaucer's prologues. But since Chaucer's introductory techniques in­
volve elements of irony, and since the traditions of Chaucer criticism 
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with which our work must exist have not put the stories first, we 
cannot presume too easily that we know what stories are. There have 
been radical changes in literary definition since the Middle Ages— 
changes which the critic is often, axiomatically and unconsciously, 
tempted to ignore by dealing with "literature" in the absolute sense. 
We must therefore be very careful in this enterprise of definition, first 
by seeing that we do not presume about the Middle Ages anything 
which in fact is not there, and second by coming to terms with the 
external evidence surviving from the Middle Ages, other than stories 
themselves, which points to definition. 
At the outset we are faced with the puzzling problem of classifica­
tion. As modern critics, we tend to value very much the distinction 
between art and experience, and to make of art something very spe­
cial and unique. Such a distinction is puzzlingly unimportant, as we 
shall see, to medieval criticsv We know perfectly well what we mean 
when we make a category that includes the Divine Comedy, the Canter­
bury Tales, the Beowulf, a number of canonical lyrics and romances, 
and perhaps the Consolation of Philosophy. We are equally clear in 
presuming that this category does not include the Summa Theologiae, 
the Historica Scholastica, the Etymologies of Isidore, or (except for ut­
terly unreconstructed philologists) the Ancrene Riwle. Medieval critics 
would probably not understand these presumptions—the precise cat­
egory which we mean by literature, or belles lettres, did not exist for 
them. The Middle Ages did have classes for such verbal things as 
auctores,23 or the tripartite historia, fabula, argumentum, mentioned in 
various commentaries,24 but none of these exactly corresponds. It 
simply will not do, in any critically responsible historical sense, to 
import and impose the modern word literature, without very careful 
qualification, on the array of material constituted by the books medie­
val people read. But it is no real loss to give up the word literature. 
Dante's Divine Comedy, no matter what word we use to name its cate­
gory, continues to have a self-authenticating power which we 
gratefully acknowledge and to which we submit in reading it, and 
Chaucer remains as wise an observer of human nature as he ever was. 
In giving up, for the moment, the word literature, we indulge the 
expectation that the medieval categories and definitions, once we 
understand them, will enhance and enrich our appropriation of these 
texts in ways beyond the power of our modern category. 
The word literature, in modern usage, presumes for poetry two 
characteristics which we must be very careful not to impose on medie­
val literature—careful primarily because they are characteristics so 
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deeply rooted in our axiom system as to be almost unavoidable. The 
first of these has to do with the definition of poetic sentences; the 
second with epistemology. The debate over the fit definition of poetic 
sentences has vexed medieval studies primarily since the advent of 
D. W. Robertson's "historical" criticism, which, though it suggests quite 
properly that a number of formerly neglected medieval Latin texts 
were obligatory scholarly reading, seeks to impose on medieval poems 
a far from medieval structure of symbolic sentence construction. 
There has, thus, been much controversy over whether or not Beowulf 
"is" Christ, or the Wife of Bath "is" a grotesque figure of Luxuria, or 
the Pearl-maiden "is" spiritual dryness, or Jean de Meun's Rose "is" 
"le bien infini et vraye gloire celeste."25 All the arguments, it seems, 
seek to establish whether or not the term on the left-hand side of these 
phrases in fact does or does not symbolize the term on the right-hand 
side. Common to all debaters is the presumption that such sentences 
are symbolic, and so describe mental operations seeking insight.26 
The sentence "Beowulf is Christ" is clearly not empirical or tautolo­
gous; it must be symbolic. Some critics find it of no use at all in under­
standing Beowulf, or satisfy themselves that the Beowulf poet was 
discussing Beowulf only, and not Christ in a cryptic manner. Others, 
for what they consider good reasons, find that using Beowulf as a 
symbolic word referring to Christ is a fit thing to do, and call the 
sentence true. 
What has gone wrong here is that critics on both sides of the argu­
ment share, at the level of uncritical presumption, an essentially 
eighteenth-century theory of language, utterly alien to the 
etymology-trusting, Logos-and-creation-based theory of language of 
the Middle Ages. Allegorical statements in the Middle Ages were not, 
in our terms, either referential or symbolic, even though the forms of 
the sentences in which they expressed their allegories are the same as 
those which we now understand as symbolic. Therefore the array of 
terms, usually religious, which tended frequently to appear on the 
right-hand side of their allegorical statements were not by their loca­
tion endorsed as "right meanings." Much more than this, these state­
ments were simple descriptions, all participating hierarchically in a 
class of statements whose highest members were probably "This is my 
body" and "The Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one." 
The whole class of statements depended, as descriptions, on the pre­
sumption of a relationship of analogous parallelism between the level 
of reality to which the left-hand term belonged and that to which the 
right-hand term belonged. Allegorical statements in the Middle Ages 
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were not so much referential, or even linguistic, as cosmological. They 
presumed and reflected and constituted by their existence a particu­
lar classification and relational arrangement of all that was. Further, 
because medieval language regularly presumed so, the cosmos which 
it described was presumed literally to include realities which we would 
now call mental, and therefore by our terms positivistically unreal.27 
Our importing of modern presumptions about language into our 
discussion of medieval sentences and possible sentences has, in short, 
gone wrong about what the Middle Ages meant because we forgot to 
begin by asking how they meant—or whether meaning as such was a 
category appropriate to the medieval sensibility at all. 
A further presumption which we must avoid is rooted in the very 
method of historical criticism itself. It traces to our quite valid suspi­
cion that medieval people were not quite like ourselves—the axiom of 
cultural relativism is the axiom which makes critical historical studies 
both necessary and possible. But to be interested in defining the point 
of view of people of the past tempts us to presume that naturally they 
had a point of view, and then by natural leaps to presume that they 
were therefore capable of mental states which we define by such terms 
as phenomenology and subject-object relationship. A world which could 
take the notion of the unity of the intellect seriously,28 however, or 
which continued to debate the question of nominalism and by its very 
debating admitted that there could be two sides to the question, would 
have great difficulties conceiving the phenomenological and existen­
tial relativisms which ground our sense of point of view and impel us 
to allow for it by being critical of our histories. Thus, when we analyze 
the confession of the Pardoner or the persona of Chaucer the poet, 
we must take care to recognize that the first is more akin to the Vices 
of Prudentius than to Holden Caulfield and Jean Genet, and the 
second more in keeping with the fit behavior of a bishop than with the 
poses of a modern actor. There are indeed ironies in Chaucer, and 
they are based, as are all ironies, on the disparity between appearance 
and reality, but appearance is not necessarily the same as pose, nor 
reality the same as sincerity. A "sincere" human being may well be, in 
medieval terms, a mere pose or parody of truth, and reality is always 
something grounded in philosophical or theological, rather than per­
sonalist, definition. 
The starting point of our investigation must be, then, a new way of 
framing the question of the nature of story, or, begging no questions, 
poetry, which would be acceptable to medieval commentators, writers, 
and readers. Medieval critics put the question by asking, To what part 
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of philosophy does the text under discussion belong? The answer, 
with a few exceptions which only prove the rule, is, uniformly, 
ethics.29 The formula of the commentaries is, "Ethica subponitur quia 
de moribus tractat."30 What this formula means, we think, is not that 
medieval critics had a merely pedestrian and moralizing use for 
poetry, but rather that the category they called ethics and the category 
we call literature are remarkably similar, indeed congruent. Life be­
comes ethical as it rises to decorums which one finds most clearly in 
story; story therefore is naturally and necessarily ethics.31 
If literature is to be classified as a part of ethics, then its own parts 
and features must obviously be ones which can fitly constitute, or 
reflect, an ethical system. The medieval analysis in which this fitness is 
most clearly and elaborately expressed is the Averroistic Poetics of 
Aristotle, as translated into Latin by Hermann the German.32 A full 
treatment of the doctrine of this treatise, and its substantial agree­
ment with what is otherwise known about late medieval literary 
theory, is beyond the scope of this book.33 In the first place, Averroes 
defines poetry not as making, nor tragedy (and comedy) as imitations 
of action. Rather, tragedy is ars laudandi, and comedy is ars 
vituperandi. In the second place, Averroes substitutes for Aristotle's 
plot and character, in the six parts of tragedy, much more abstract 
entities, which he designates credulitates and consuetudines. Praise and 
blame, obviously, are activities which lead to essentially ethical conclu­
sions; credulitates and consuetudines are abstractions to which indi­
vidual persons are referred in ethical descriptions. 
Averroes's discussion of the six parts of tragedy is quite complex. 
There are two lists of the parts in his own text, which do not absolutely 
correspond with each other and correspond even less clearly to the 
authentic Aristotelian six. It is clear at least that Averroes's fundamen­
tal distinction is between matter and means: three of the six parts— 
customs, beliefs, and meanings—are represented by the other 
three—description, verbal formalism, and expressive power. This dis­
tinction reflects the customary medieval procedure, in rhetoric, of 
assuming a material to be treated, and an array of rhetorical resources 
by means of which treatment can be accomplished.34 
The material to be treated is ethical—in Averroes's terms, it is cre­
dulitates and consuetudines. An accessus on Ovid's Heroides, probably 
from the fourteenth century, puts the matter more concretely: 
"Materia libri sunt mores et vicia dominarum"; it then goes on to say 
that one of the features which makes the book worth reading is the 
"pulchritudo conditionum que sunt in hoc libro."35 Conditio is a rea­
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sonable equivalent of the sum of consuetudo and credulitas. It is also the 
fundamental and initial concern of Chaucer's art, in his picture gal­
lery of pilgrims: 
Me thynketh it acordaunt to resoun 
To telle yow al the condicioun 
Of ech of hem, so as it semed me. 
(I [A] 37-39) 
That it is conditiones, and not pilgrims as existential individuals 
merely, from which Chaucer derives this prologue, Jill Mann has 
demonstrated with great learning and convincing detail. Moreover, 
she accounts for Chaucer's apparent realism in moral terms which 
precisely reflect Averroes's concern for the artes laudandi vituper­
andique: "Chaucer's general aim of complicating the reader's emo­
tional responses... is more comprehensive as a development from 
descriptio when described in medieval terms 'for praise or blame' 
than when it is anachronistically analysed in terms of the 'artificial' 
and the 'real.' "36 The same concern for the general or universal in­
stead of the particular also appears in Dante's theory of language, as 
Dragonetti explains it in connection with a discussion of the myth of 
Babel.37 By the time of Malory this polarity between the typical and 
the individual had become a conscious moral problem, instead of an 
epistemological one, and received explicit thematic emphasis.38 Aver-
roes's emphasis on consuetudo and credulitas, thus, finds reflection in 
the implicit and explicit concerns of both commentators and poets. 
Of what, then, does medieval poetry consist? According to Averroes 
it consists of manners and customs, presented in mannered verbal 
descriptions which have the power to move and convince the hearer. 
In any given poem, therefore, we must expect an array of examples of 
behavior and concomitant belief, which can be taken in sum as a 
normative array corresponding to some "signatio rationis Univer­
salis"39 in the reader or hearer who is the appropriate audience. 
Poetry, that is, is "about" exempla of ethical existence: its rhetorical 
effect is achieved by its being taken as analogous to its audience, and 
the unity and coherence of its particulars, that is, its exempla, both 
among themselves and in their rhetorical effect, are based on those 
relationships that exist between the individual and the typical. 
The full meaning of these abstract statements will only be made 
clear by the elaborate practical analysis of the Canterbury Tales which 
follows. Here, however, it may help to pause for the sake of contrast­
ing this medieval Aristotelian (and, to some extent, nominalist) defini­
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tion of the content of poetry with the Platonist definition current in 
the twelfth century and before. Winthrop Wetherbee, in his definitive 
study of this theory, distinguishes between a rationalist and a sym­
bolist use of the concrete particulars of this world, but in both cases 
the object and ultimate content of poetry are God, transcendence, and 
(particularly for the symbolist) a reality ultimately and essentially in­
effable and beyond poetry altogether.40 There is therefore in 
twelfth-century poetry much use of figures of prosopopoeia, of de­
scriptions of astronomical ascent, of discussion of ideas and ideals 
whose existence is philosophical or theological.41 By contrast, in later 
poetry we find La Vielle, the Wife of Bath, and the "faire feeld ful of 
folke." But this is no transition from dull allegory to the predecessors 
of Hemingway. The central philosophical problem of the Middle 
Ages, whether one was realist, conceptualist, or nominalist, was the 
problem of universals, and the central theological problem, after such 
obviously crucial personal matters as sin and salvation had been seen 
to, was the nature of valid language purporting to describe the deity. 
It is possible to speculate that the difference between the poetry of 
Alanus de Insulis and the poetry of Chaucer, to which we now refer 
by talking about Chaucer's "realism," is simply the difference between 
a philosophically realist willingness to reify theological universals by 
means of prosopopoeia and a nominalist desire to exemplify ethical 
ones by means of particulars. Until we know more about the writings 
of late medieval nominalists, and particularly about those among their 
casual and practical writings which might especially betray their 
philosophical posture, as distinguished from their philosophical doc­
trine, such speculation must remain unverified. But it should at least 
be beyond question that Averroes's emphasis on manners and cus­
toms, on the one hand, and on language which is explicitly both 
mannered and rhetorically effective, on the other, betrays a focus of 
interest on a kind of poetry different both in manner and in ultimate 
content from that of the twelfth century. It is therefore inappropriate 
to expect, in late medieval poetry, the same kind of referential energy, 
requiring allegorical readings in terms of divine truths, which is nor­
mal in the twelfth century. The energy of late medieval poetry is 
exerted, not between the letter of the poem and the transcendent to 
which it, and the reader, aspire, but rather within the narrower world 
of ethics, which encompasses an array of particulars, including the 
reader or hearer, who relate to each other in terms of some typical but 
still human set of definitions. Thus the actual words of Dante's Comedy 
describe heaven, but this anagogy is about "homo prout merendo et 
Medieval Notions of Story I 69 
demerendo per arbitrii libertatem iustitiae praemiandi et puniendi 
obnoxius est."42 And the referential energy of his poem, which in 
Alanus would be exerted toward pointing to the ineffable tran­
scendent, is in Dante directed to the architectonic relationships of 
parallel incident which compose the poem. Thus the Canterbury Tales 
is about the conditiones of men; as an array, the poem contains "God's 
plenty" and is sufficient. The effect of this dialectic between the par­
ticular and the typical, however, is just the opposite of what we per­
ceive in the eighteenth-century comedy of manners. There, the man­
ners ironically collapse when confronted by some incorruptibly true 
particular—in the presence of the finally revealed innocence and pur­
ity of the ingenue, all mere rakes, fops, and sophisticates stand con­
victed of having been mannered rather than real. In Chaucer, on the 
other hand, failed particulars, in sum, exist themselves ironically, and 
the cumulative power of the ironies, operating in the sum, deposits a 
definition around which, as failed or fallible or mortal, they cluster. 
Particular exempla of consuetudines and credulitates, then, are the 
matter of late medieval poetry: they and ethics, in sum, are what late 
medieval poetry is about. Already, in talking of normative arrays of 
exempla, we have implied in this discussion of the nature and content 
of story certain formal definitions. An array has a form, or structure; 
its best presentation tends to be a series in parallel, and not something 
so linear and sequential as, in modern terms, a plot. The whole of the 
next chapter will be devoted to an analysis of those aspects of medie­
val doctrines of structure and ordering which particularly illuminate 
the Canterbury Tales. But, though form does mean arrangement, it 
also is defined by the whole constructed by the sum of an arranged set 
of parts. One may discuss form by discussing possible arrangements 
of parts, as we shall do in the next chapter. But one must also consider 
what whole, or wholes, certain kinds of formal procedures are capable 
of constructing. With this consideration we conclude our medieval 
definition of story. 
Theorists such as Geoffrey of Vinsauf recommend a rhetorical or­
ganization for poetry, and commentators reflect this recommendation 
when they divide their poems into prohemium and tractatus. But or­
ganization is not quite the same as form; modern critics have been 
misled in trying to deduce formal principles of coherence and unity 
from recommendations of rhetorical organization, which presume a 
material already unified on its own formal grounds, and therefore 
capable of being presented artificially by means of beginnings in 
medias res and digressions to parts not in the natural order.43 Organi­
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zation is not, therefore, the same as form or unity, but often exists in 
counterpoint to it. Form itself medieval critics discussed in their 
commentary accessus under the topic of formal cause. The subject has 
been dealt with extensively elsewhere; here we summarize only as 
much material as will make clear the critical point.44 
Medieval accessus occur in two primary forms: an earlier one, deriv­
ing from Servius, in which such subjects as title, author, purpose, and 
so on are discussed, and a later one in which most of the same subjects 
were included under schemata derived from the four Aristotelian 
causes. One Servian topic was the modus agendi; in the Aristotelian 
accessus the equivalent is the forma tractandi, one of the two subheads 
under formal cause. It is here that late medieval critics defined their 
doctrine of literary form. Conventionally, formal cause included two 
subtopics, the forma tractatus and the forma tractandi, sometimes 
explicitly equated with the modus agendi. The forma tractatus was usu­
ally explained as the formal divisions of the work under 
consideration—for Ovid's Metamorphoses, the forma tractatus would be 
the division of the work into fifteen books, and within them into the 
mutationes which were the concern of individual stories.45 The forma 
tractandi was conventionally defined in terms of five modi, with which 
modern scholarship is chiefly familiar because of the listing of them in 
Dante's letter to Can Grande (along with another anomalous group of 
five). They are as follows: "definitivus, divisivus, probativus, impro­
bativus, et exemplorum positivus."46 This list of five modi occurs over 
and over again. Even where there is variation, it is often more ter­
minological than substantial, as when collectivus or inferential is substi­
tuted for probativus and improbativus47 
What this analysis means is that medieval commentators under­
stood poetry in essentially discursive terms. The definition in terms of 
hypothetical verbal constructs with which modern criticism is familiar 
would not have made sense to them. The words of poetry, like all 
other words, conveyed information related to truth, and the for­
malities which defined their integrity were the same ones which de­
fined the valid discourse of logic. The metaphors and comparisons 
and analogous or associative relationships which poetry has always 
asserted, therefore, must not have been seen as anything special, or 
foreign to the normal operations of reality; this terminology of the 
commentators makes clear that these features, which we would call 
the habits of poetry, were received, like everything else in what was 
read, as the conveyors of information, as descriptions of what was. 
If poetry is a valid discursive description of the real world, capable 
Medieval Notions of Story / 71 
of being received as proof, refutation, division,48 definition, and 
example, then obviously the world which it describes is not the same 
as ours. The chief differences have been defined in many ways, all 
tending toward the same meaning—for our purposes here, we define 
them as, for the Middle Ages, a fundamental trust of analogy as an 
organizing principle for reality, and a willingness to believe that the 
material facts of things are ontologically implicated in the inten­
tionalities of God and man, and therefore operate rhetorically as well 
as in themselves. 
According to Sheila Delany, the medieval trust of analogy came 
under substantial attack in the fourteenth century.49 This is certainly 
true, both from the standpoint of professional philosophy and as a 
characteristic of polemic, willing to use whatever weapon came to 
hand. Nevertheless, the presentation of an array of conflicting au­
thorities, arguments, or examples is not necessarily an admission that 
there is no possibility of judgment among them. Taken ironically, 
such an array may well define by analogy profound and seriously held 
doctrine. Robert Holkot, certainly a skeptic50 and by most accounts 
some kind of nominalist,51 nevertheless depends constantly on the 
kind of analogizing which trusts exempla, and even allegorizes them, 
as a way of making a point both clear and admissible. In her analysis 
of the problem, Delany is dealing basically with professed doctrine, 
and rather advanced doctrine at that, whereas we are trying to deal 
with the more fundamental level of posture or habit of mind. Thus 
medieval philosophers who believe themselves opposed to analogical 
thinking—and indeed by twelfth-century standards believe so 
correctly—nevertheless still make analogies far more readily and 
trustingly than we do now. 
This habit of mind can be broadly defined by an example. The Vita 
Edwardi Secundi, a typical aristocratic chronicle, ignores a clearly 
causal pattern of explanation for a historical event in favor of an 
analogy-based one: "Perhaps a hidden cause, not immediate but re­
mote, punished the earl. The Earl of Lancaster at one time bore off 
the head of Peter of Gaveston, and now by the command of the king, 
the Earl of Lancaster has lost his head. Thus, perhaps not unjustly, 
the Earl received measure for measure, as it is written in Holy Scrip­
ture: 'For with the same measure that yet mete withal it shall be 
measured to you again.' Thus Abner killed Asahel, striking him 
under the fifth rib, but Abner did not escape, for he afterwards per­
ished by a similar wound."52 English history, in short, operates as it 
does in this case because there exists an ethical pattern, defining mea­
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sures meted and received, which events can be expected to fit. One 
proves the fit by citing an analogous case, and such citing is a suffi­
cient explanation of "causality." William J. Brandt explains the proce­
dure in this way: "History, for the author of the Vita, provided not 
examples but analogies of a most elementary sort. The link between 
the historical incident and the one being commented upon was some 
sort of aphorism at loose in the world and prior to both of them. 
Hence meaning was not implicit in an action sequence, it was implicit 
in the relationship between one sort of incident and another."53 Trust 
of analogies of this kind is obvious in Chaucer, as in his use of the 
Midas story as a comment on the Wife of Bath, Pygmalion and 
Jephthah as analogies to the predicament of Virginia, and Echo as 
conclusion to the Clerk's Tale. Chaucer's case is complicated by the 
frequent trust of medieval glosses to govern the full ironic signifi­
cance of his analogizing exempla—we shall return to this feature of 
his work in some detail later. Here it is sufficient to note the simple 
fact of analogy itself—which persisted, of course, to validate the dou­
ble plots of Renaissance drama. 
A slightly more complex example is Gawain and the Green Knight, 
where the fact that Sir Bercilak and the Green Knight are the same 
person asserts within the poem a fundamental analogy, from which 
further analogies develop which interpret the poem's structure and 
meaning. Formally, the basic analogy is exactly like the complex res­
onating relationship established and defined by biblical exegesis; the 
only difference between its operation in exegesis and its operation in 
the Gawain is that the primary relational energy is contained within 
the poem itself, whereas in exegesis only the allegorical level, which 
focuses upon Christ, stays within Holy Writ, and the other two—the 
tropology and the anagogy—assert relationships outside the text, with 
its hearer and with his potential and proper spiritual destination.54 
Exegesis, then, defines the sort of relationship which gives funda­
mental coherence to events and objects in the real universe, and 
therefore naturally to the parts and particulars of the fictional ones in 
poems. Generically, it is a relationship of analogy; specifically, as de­
fined by the practice of medieval Bible study, it is a relationship oper­
ating on only certain kinds of particulars and within a certain 
classification of levels. Exegesis, and its derived structural principles, 
are not simply naively pious parallel-mongering, nor the result of the 
willingness to find religious meaning everywhere. The Middle Ages 
did so, and thus tempt those who read exegetical texts for their mean­
ings instead of the forms of their procedure to find similar pieties 
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over again. But the system as such requires no such results. In order 
to see it properly, as the general formal understanding which can 
permit us to find a medieval unity in the weltering and apparently 
incoherent parts of medieval poems, finished and unfinished, we 
must understand that, though medieval habits of reasoning from 
analogy often generated explicitly Christian meanings, they could 
generate other kinds of meanings as well. In the largest sense, analog­
ical thinking simply presumes that full explanation of any given sub­
ject is accomplished in terms of an ordered array of parallel narratives 
and figures and propositions, each resonating in terms of all the oth­
ers, and all properly dealt with and analyzed by a conscious elabora­
tion of one-to-one parallels. Full explanation is achieved by assent to 
the asserted parallels. It is historically true, of course, that medieval 
thinkers elaborated these parallels most fully as they explained the 
Bible. But the same procedures worked in other contexts; none of the 
parallel narratives, propositions, or figures is required, formally, to be 
Christian. Structurally, it is the relationship which matters: structur­
ally and formally, the relation between the Green Knight and Sir 
Bercilak, or between (for instance) the Wife of Bath and the loathly 
lady, or between Constance, Griselda, and May, can be best under­
stood by knowing the form and character of the typological relation 
between David and Christ—not for the sake of Christ, but merely be­
cause this was the normal medieval illustration or defining example of 
the procedure. In other words, typology can generate relationships 
without also being required to generate pregiven meanings. 
In summary, then, poetry is ethics, its parts are customs and beliefs 
and the examples which define them, its formal principles are the 
same as those of all valid discourse, and its relational principles are 
based on the great structural system of typology. This is a set of 
definitions which has no need for the validation of aesthetics, though 
it has a certain profound beauty of its own. It is a set of definitions 
which probably would yield interesting results if applied to any litera­
ture, and not just the medieval—its probable ability to make sense of 
such disparate writers as Faulkner, Joyce, and Durrell is a fascinating 
speculation.55 But its best power lies in its own time, because it can 
define for us the coherence of works like the Canterbury Tales, which 
have no satisfactory unity except a medieval one. 
It is in the light of these definitions that we are able to claim for 
Chaucer's stories, and for the doctrine of story which they exemplify, 
such a high place. The prologue and link material of the Canterbury 
Tales frames fiction with a discussion of stories—of their possible ethi­
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cal application, of their rhetorical quality, of their sources and author­
ity, of their local and universal fitness. This discussion, though it is 
persistently ironic, and carried on by imperfect voices, invokes as a 
whole the high doctrine of fiction as ethical exemplar, and, even 
though ironic, permits an understanding of true doctrine. Behind it 
all is the concept of spiritual pilgrimage, which is itself ironically mis­
appropriated, but which nevertheless is necessary to the enterprise as 
an informing presence, because it is ultimately that pilgrimage which 
Chaucer's stories of human truth will constitute, define, and make 
possible. Just as Dante's characters, in Hell, Purgatory, and Heaven, 
get to be for all eternity what their stories on earth achieved of defini­
tion, so Chaucer's stories, in accumulating sum, define a human con­
dition subject both to spiritual definition and to spiritual destiny. To 
say this, however, is not in any sense to admit that we are trying to 
reach Baldwin's conclusion by a different route. We do not insist on 
the ethical character of stories, so that Chaucer's tales may serve as the 
signposts of the Parson's journey to heaven. Rather, we note the 
heavenly background, in order to add ultimate weight to our claim 
that the stories themselves are important. Chaucer's purpose is not to 
affirm the heavenly destination of mankind—rather, he assumes it, 
and having done so, he turns to the enterprise of defining in ethical 
and very specific terms his norms for the good human society. 
To return to the Knight's Tale, which we have offered as Chaucer's 
central statement both of structure and of subject, we find that the 
central interest of the Canterbury Tales is defined there in human 
terms. The Knight's Tale is outside the New Testament dispensation. 
By choosing a story of pagan antiquity, Chaucer makes his purpose 
clear: he is concerned above all with earthly conduct. Fundamentally, 
the Knight's Tale is about three things: the efforts of Theseus to bring 
order to Thebes, to settle the struggle between Palamon and Arcite by 
the fit awarding of Emelye, and to reconcile himself through an act of 
understanding to the ironic but orderly ending of his problem, which 
is furnished him by the action of Saturn. In brief, the Knight's Tale is 
about order—order in the kingdom, in the family, and in the person. 
More than anything else, it is this ordering, on its parallel and mutu­
ally interpreting levels, which is the central subject and material of the 
Canterbury Tales. The human condition as something at once personal 
and social, and when social, both marital and civic, and under all 
conditions as something capable of being blessed by definition—this is 
Chaucer's subject. The Knight's Tale defines the climax of human 
experience in Theseus's arrival at a human understanding of events; 
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by implication, we expect that the Canterbury Tales as well, in its final 
act, will infer God's truth, but from a position which is in this world 
and this world alone. 
The subject of the Canterbury Tales, then, is not a theological subject, 
really. At any rate, it is certainly not the pious subject which the 
dramatic speaker of the Retraction had in mind. The Canterbury Tales 
is a worldly collection, in the best sense of that word—its tales focus 
the attention of a profound moralist upon the world in which morals 
and mores are enacted. As we shall see, Chaucer's view of society is 
one which bases itself on marriage—real marriage, and not the dis­
posable verbal integument of Bernard's meditations, though the al­
legorical overtones of marriage are admitted to enrich, or comment 
upon, its literal existence as the central structure of society. When 
interpreted by the focus of attention of the stories told, the pilgrimage 
is not really on its way to heaven—even though some of its members 
will doubtless eventually get there. Even the Parson's recom­
mendations are fundamentally a way of dealing with the events of this 
worldly life—his negations are pointed to and focused upon this life.56 
If Chaucer's framing of ethical standards has overtones of theologi­
cal terminology, it is because his culture provided only one context in 
which definitions of the human condition could be stated seriously, 
that is, a Christian one. The context of definition in which he places 
his tales draws on the assumptions about the order of the universe 
which Christian philosophy had taught him. The definition he 
achieves is not by overt statement, and above all not by some reduc­
tionist departure, on the wings of allegory, from any discardable letter 
of story or experience. Rather, he adopts the exemplary language of 
storytelling, in which the dialectic between ideal and real, definition 
and fact, role and person, intention and act, are embraced and ap­
preciated, as well as resolved. The theological flavor of his ultimate 
reference points does not make him unusually pious, but rather a 
man of his own time. The evidence of his life and works really implies 
that he was happily skeptical, possessed of a faith which is partly 
worldly wisdom and partly the sophisticated invulnerability of one not 
easily committed or involved. 
At the same time, he was a man who still held out hope that truth 
could be spoken with some exactness. Chaucer's strategy is nominalist, 
not Platonist, as would be expected of a person of his time and nation, 
but it is still capable of achieving reasonable certainty, and it certainly 
must not be mistaken for too open-ended a skepticism.57 The irony of 
this life for Chaucer holds the promise of the ideal truth of the next; 
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the relentless exposure of the hollow promises and foolish actions 
which fail to organize men into proper hierarchies and orders 
suggests his belief that such hierarchies must be discovered and 
adopted. Moreover, the range and variety of his exempla of comic 
failure and occasional saintly or exemplary success suggest that be­
hind these particulars there can be found the universal that is true. 
The discovery of that universal awaits, now, the principle on which his 
particular cases are to be related to one another. This is the subject of 
the next chapter. 
1. Chaucer's medieval self-consciousness as an artist is obscured for us by 
our own various modern notions of art and the aesthetic, and especially by 
some critics' desire to read all poetry as essentially about poetry. These critics, 
in an atmosphere of uncertainty about the meaning and ground of discourse 
as such, take all poetry as in a sense only about itself, engaged ultimately in 
that deconstructive autonomy which is its only possible validation. Such 
thoroughgoing pessimism is not to be found in Chaucer, not even in the 
House of Fame; nor is it to be found in medieval nominalism. A failure to be 
Platonist is not necessarily a surrender to nihilism, nor even, in any radical 
sense, skepticism. Gabriel Josipovici's essay "Chaucer: The Teller and the 
Tale," in his The World and the Book: A Study of Modern Fiction (Stanford, 1971), 
pp. 52-99, is, we think, the most brilliant appropriation of Chaucer for the 
modern poetic that has been written to date; its instructiveness exists in a 
mode to which its historical incorrectness does not relate. But the possibility 
that such an essay can be written makes historically responsible description of 
Chaucer's medieval sense of himself as a poet extremely difficult. Aspects of 
this description are achieved by Eugene Vance in "Mervelous Signals: Poetics, 
Sign Theory, and Politics in Chaucer's Troilus," New Literary History 10 (Winter 
1979): 293-337, paradoxically in the context of relating medieval literature to 
contemporary literary theory. The best full study of Chaucer's theoretical 
attitude toward poetry is a dissertation by R. A. Shoaf, "Mutatio Amoris: Revi­
sion and Penitence in Chaucer's The Book of the Duchess," (Cornell University, 
1977), but it deals more with the poetic that Chaucer rejects than with the one 
he achieves. 
2. Because our focus is on Chaucer and on the statement which his story 
collection achieves, we have no scope for treating any but the nearest of his 
antecedents. On the relation between fiction and truth we must at least cite 
Wesley Trimpi's closely reasoned and already classic studies "The Ancient 
Hypothesis of Fiction: An Essay on the Origins of Literary Theory," Traditio 
27 (1971): 1-78, and "The Quality of Fiction: The Rhetorical Transmission of 
Literary Theory," Traditio 30 (1974): 1-118. Chaucer's literary attitudes fall 
near the end, but definitely within, the rhetorical tradition that Trimpi de­
fines. 
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3. The strength of the medieval belief in prologues, as something as obvi­
ously a proper part of literary discourse as, today, lead paragraphs are of the 
writings of journalists, is proved by Chaucer's medieval editors. J. S. P. Tat-
lock, in "The Canterbury Tales in 1400," PMLA 50 (1935): 119, notes that the 
text is more complete in presenting prologues for the tales than in providing 
endlinks. The first editors of the poem, in providing spurious materials in­
tended to disguise the incompleteness of Chaucer's work, regularly added 
prologues. Their practice with endings is less attentive and reflects medieval 
rhetorical manuals, whose doctrines of conclusion were brief and 
inconclusive—one finished a work by stopping. 
4. Chaucer's own conclusion agrees with the consensus of criticism in find­
ing the ending of the Miller's Tale an ostentatious example of poetic and real 
justice. Neither Chaucer nor modern critics seem disturbed by the fact Ali­
soun gets off scot free, though she has presumably been as much enveloped in 
sin as Nicholas. Alisoun functions more as occasion than person, as do the 
other "awardable" women in the first fragment; the failure of novelistic 
realism which this function enacts is concealed by Chaucer's exuberantly cir­
cumstantial narrative, but it is a failure nevertheless. We should probably take 
it as evidence that Chaucer was interested in something else—in this case, in 
rules and intrusions against them. His focus is therefore on the intrusive male 
and his supposedly sovereign adversary, and the story is, as an example, 
discursively complete, even if we have a character left over. Cf. Morton W. 
Bloomfield, "The Miller's Tale—An UnBoethian Interpretation," Medieval 
Literature and Folklore Studies: Essays in Honor of Francis Lee Utley, pp. 205-11. 
5. Just what constitutes the "ernest" and the "game" of the pilgrimage and 
of the tales has been discussed recently by a number of scholars: Owen, 
Pilgrimage and Storytelling in the Canterbury Tales, pp. 3-6; Joseph, "Chaucerian 
'Game'—'Earnest' and the 'Argument of Herbergage' in the Canterbury Tales," 
pp. 83-96; and William J. Brown, "Chaucer's Double Apology for the Miller's 
Tale," University of Colorado Studies: Series in Language and Literature 10 (1966): 
15-22. The issue of earnest-game is related by Owen, in particular, to the 
general question of Chaucer's attitude toward poetry, as recorded in the 
Parson's Tale and Retraction; it is linked, as well, to the specific defense of 
poetry as accurate reporting, to be found in the General Prologue and the 
Miller's Prologue, by Brown. 
6. But not his later scholarly ones, as all who have seen in him a 
"momentary conversion" betray. See the survey of criticism offered by Hal­
verson, "Chaucer's Pardoner," pp. 184-202. 
7. Chaucer and the Shape of Creation, p. 127. 
8. " . . . and thus by oon assent/We been acorded to his juggement./And 
thereupon the wyn was fet anon;/We dronken, and to reste went echon" (I 
[A] 817-20). The Host also confirms his authority by a kind of oath on drink: 
"As evere mote I drynke wyn or ale,/Whoso be rebel to myjuggement" (I [A] 
832-33). 
9. "Let us lighten the useful work of our hands by varied speech and let us 
in turn say something for our empty ears, in order that the time does not 
seem long." 
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10. "re vera fuerunt [Mineides] optime potatrices, que spernebant Bachum 
dicentes Bachum minime posse nocere. Unde Bachus contemptus telas earum 
in vineas id est pro vino et vineis vendi fecit. Vel quia hedere ad modum 
vinearum serpunt, dicuntur mutate esse in hederas. Ipse vero in aves, quia 
venditis omnibus que habebant, a patria sua exulantes auffugerunt. Sed in 
vespertiliones pocius quam in alias aves mutate sunt quia de nocte pocius 
quam de die vacatur potationi, sicut et aves ille pocius de nocte quam de die 
volant" (Ghisalberti, "Arnolfo," p. 211). "Truly the Minyades were above all 
drunkards, who spurned Bacchus, saying Bacchus was wholly powerless to be 
harmful. Wherefore Bacchus, contemptuous, made their weaving into vines, 
that is, to be sold for wine and vines. Or since ivy creeps in the manner of 
vines, the Minyades are said to be changed into ivy. But they, changed into 
birds, since all the things they had were sold, and exiled from their own 
country, fled. But they were changed into bats rather than other birds be­
cause in the night rather than the day they are given up to drink, so also those 
birds fly in the night rather than in the day." Bersuire and Giovanni del 
Virgilio have substantially the same interpretation. 
11. "Selonc que la fable devise/M'est avis que Bacchus desprise/Cil qui 
vins boit outre mesure / Et cil qui dou boivre n'a cure. / Ces trois serours le 
desprisoient. / Quar a outrage le buvoient" (4. 2488-53) (Ovide moralise, ed. 
C. De Boer, [rpt., Wiesbaden, 1966], 2:63-69). 
12. This obligation to verbatim reporting of one's materia, of course, is not 
to be found in medieval manuals of poetic, nor in Chaucer's handling of his 
own known sources. To profess it is merely one more profession of depen­
dence on individualized exempla, whose eventual complex interrelationships, 
and not their actual language or intentions, will define the truth. Cf. Brown, 
"Chaucer's Double Apology for the Miller's Tale, " pp. 15-19, which links the 
appeal to accuracy with the statements on poetry's value in the Retraction, 
particularly with the phrase, "al that is writen is writen for oure doctrine," 
from St. Paul. See below, note 15. Chaucer makes use of this argument from 
verbatim reporting in the Manciple's Tale, as well; the place of the question in 
the tale is discussed by Britton J. Harwood, "Language and the Real: 
Chaucer's Manciple," Chaucer Review 6 (1972): 268-79. 
13. Robinson, Works, p. 772. 
14. Olive Sayce, "Chaucer's 'Retracciouns': The Conclusion of the Can­
terbury Tales and Its Place in Literary Tradition," Medium Aevum 40 (1971): 
235. Judson B. Allen, in "The Old Way and the Parson's Way," pp. 255-71, 
also suggests the Retraction's conventionality and the necessity for its dra­
matic inclusion in the Tales, and further undercuts the Baldwin position by 
suggesting that Chaucer intended ironic overtones for the Parson's sugges­
tion of penance as the right end of pilgrimage. R. K. Root, in "Chaucer and 
the Decameron," English Studies 44 (1912): 1-7, rightly notes that both Boc­
caccio and Chaucer offer comparable apologies for coarse tales, while justify­
ing them on the grounds of their admissibility in a game. Most important, 
however, Root identifies the Retraction and the prologue of the Miller's Tale 
as two presentations of the same "formal apology." See also W. H. Clawson, 
"The Framework of the Canterbury Tales," in Wagenknecht, ed., Chaucer, 
pp. 3-23; and Hubertis M. Cummings, The Indebtedness of Chaucer's Works to the 
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Italian Works ofBoccaccio (1916; rpt., New York, 1965), pp. 177-178. Of course, 
the argument that the Retraction is an integral part of the Canterbury Tales does 
not end in itself the controversy over the rejection of Chaucer's art which the 
brief conclusion provides. Some scholars have argued that it is, indeed, con­
ceived as an integral part of the Canterbury Tales, and a judgment offered on its 
artistic merits. This is true of Owen, Pilgrimage and Storytelling in the Canterbury 
Tales, p. 6; Alfred David, The Strumpet Muse: Art and Morals in Chaucer's Poetry 
(Bloomington, 1976), p. 240; and others. 
15. Caxton, one of Chaucer's first editors, echoes this phrase, in a refer­
ence to a specifically literary product, in his preface to Malory's Le Morte 
Darthur. See The Works of Thomas Malory, ed. Eugene Vinaver (London, New 
York, Toronto, 1954), p. xvii: "But al is wryton for our doctryne, and for to 
beware that we falle not to vice . . .  " We find the phrase as well, of course, in 
the Nun's Priest's Tale (VII 3442 [B2 4632]). For a discussion of Chaucer's 
understanding of the phrase, see Brown, "Chaucer's Double Apology for the 
Millers Tale," pp. 21-22; and Paul Ruggiers, "Some Theoretical Considera­
tionsof Comedy in the Middle Ages," in his Versions of Medieval Comedy (Norman, 
Okla., 1977), p. 15. 
16. Boggess, " Averrois Cordubensis," p. 11. "Man among the other animals 
is delighted in the understanding of things which he perceives now in the 
senses and also in their representation or imitation. And the sign of this, that 
is, that man is naturally pleased and delights in this understanding, is that we 
are delighted and we rejoice in the representation of some things in whose 
sense impression we are not delighted." 
17. Ibid., p. 9. ". . . is sometimes chosen to present the decent, expressing it 
strongly, and sometimes it is changed so as to present something shameful, 
similarly expressing it strongly." 
18. Sayce, "Chaucer's 'Retracciouns,'" p. 245. 
19. This is the reason why the "dramatic principle" yields limited and 
misleading results. The dramatic principle makes the stories relative to the 
speakers, rather than the speakers relative to the stories, less real than the 
stories and under the judgment of the stories. Thus the dramatic principle 
reads the Canterbury Tales backwards, as one might do who relished ice cream 
cones but threw the ice cream away. 
20. The best full presentation of this point of view is R. E. Kaske, "The 
Knight's Interruption of the Monk's Tale" ELH 24 (1957): 249-68. He pairs 
the knight and the monk, and shows how the Monk's Tale is " philosophically 
incomplete" (p. 261) in the light of a proper understanding of Boethian 
fortune. In comparing the Canterbury Tales with the Monk's Tale as tale collec­
tions, we presume substantially the incompleteness which Kaske argues. 
21. The Knight seems to have a taste for comedy, that is, stories of rising 
fortune that end in success and happiness; it is a taste appropriate, of course, 
to the Canterbury Tales. On the medieval categories of comedy and tragedy, 
see Ruggiers, "Some Theoretical Considerations of Comedy in the Middle 
Ages," pp. 2-5; and the discussion that follows below, in this chapter. 
22. We are happy to thank John Leyerle for this notion, as developed in a 
seminar meeting at Yale University, and later presented in a paper, "Some 
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'Subtile Knyttynges' in the Canterbury Tales," at the Chaucer session of the 
Medieval Academy, 11 May 1974. The Eucharistic overtones that this identifi­
cation gives to the supper that the pilgrims eat together, in preparation for 
pilgrimage, suggest that Chaucer may have had in mind a parallel between his 
pilgrimage and one of the most important pilgrimage paradigms in medieval 
art, the story of the disciples traveling to Emmaus. For the history of the story 
and its impact on medieval religious drama, see F. C. Gardiner, The Pilgrimage 
of Desire: A Study of Theme and Genre in Medieval Literature (Leiden, 1971). 
23. For the Middle Ages the auctores were the books of pagan antiquity 
recognized as culturally valid and, by derivation, medieval books other than 
the Bible and theology, narrowly conceived, which had authority. They are 
not the equivalent of what we call literature because, though most of them are 
by our terms literary, their medieval validation is different from the aesthetic 
one we would recognize and validates, in sum, a different array of books. 
24. The classical source is probably Servius: "Et sciendum est, inter 
fabulam et argumentum, hoc est historiam, hoc interesse, quod fabula est 
dicta res contra naturam, sive facta sive non facta, ut de Pasiphae, historia est 
quicquid secundum naturam dicitur, sive factum sive non factum, ut de Phae­
dra," commenting on Aen. 1. 235; see G. Thilo and H. Hagen, eds., Servii 
Grammatici quiferuntur in Vergilii Carmina Commentarii (Leipzig, 1881), 1:89. "It 
must be understood that the difference between fable and argument, that is, 
history, is that fable is called a thing contrary to nature, whether it happened 
or not, such as the story of Pasiphae, [and] history is anything according to 
nature, whether it happened or not, such as the story of Phaedra." A French 
fourteenth-century commentary on the Metamorphoses elaborates: "Differen­
tia est inter argumentum et historiam, fabulam et comediam. Argumentum 
est quando nos loquimur de veritate sub specie falsitatis ut apparet in de­
nominatione athenarum, fabula quando nos loquimur de falsitate sub specie 
falsitatis ut per totum hunc librum apparet. Hystoria de veritate sub specie 
veritatis ut per evangelia et ecclesiasticum. Comedia de falsitate sub specie 
veritatis ut de mutatione nabugudonosor et Yo" (Bibliotheca Apostolica Vat­
icana MS Vat. lat. 1479, fol. 96). "There is a difference among argument and 
history, fable and comedy. Argument exists when we speak of truth under the 
appearance of the false, as appears in the naming of Athens; fable, when we 
speak of the false under the appearance of the false, as appears in this whole 
book. History [presents] the true under the appearance of the true, as in the 
Gospels and Ecclesiasticus. Comedy [presents] the false under the appearance 
of the true, as in the transformation of Nebuchadnezzar and Io." 
25. Clement Marot, Le Roman de la Rose (Milan, 1957), 1:92. 
26. Cf. Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. 294-322. 
27. In making this generalization, we mean in no way to slight or ignore 
the late medieval development of nominalism, which denies, in various ways, 
the real existence of these mental "things." At the same time, it is most impor­
tant to note that, in the whole history of philosophy, the playing field does not 
always remain in the same place. In a period such as our own, when 
metaphysics has been seriously out of fashion for some time, it helps to re­
member that we are not covering the whole field, and that therefore the 
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whole range of medieval argument, realist or nominalist, exists from our 
point of view in an area of philosophy more "realist" than ours. In a word, the 
modern existentialist is far more nominalist than any medieval nominalist. 
Robert Holkot would consider himself very far from being a Platonist, in his 
own times and terms, but he would almost certainly find himself saying rather 
Platonist things if he were called upon to deal with Jean-Paul Sartre. 
28. This was one of the Averroistic doctrines condemned by Bishop 
Stephen Tempier in 1270. The fact that it was eventually judged heretical 
should not mislead us; it is not the conclusion, but the more fundamental fact 
that the question was debated, that betrays the parameters within which the 
medieval point of view must be defined. 
29. For illustrations of this commonplace, see Allen, The Friar as Critic, pp. 
40-11. 
30. "It is put under ethics because it deals with behavior." R. B. C. 
Huygens, ed., Accessus ad auctores, Bernard d'Utrecht, Conrad d'Hirsau, Dialogus 
super auctores (Leiden, 1970), p. 25; see also pp. 20, 21, 22, 26, 27, 33 and 
others. 
31. The classic description of this life of high-style decorum is, of course, 
John Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages (London, 1924). 
32. For discussion of the importance and influence of this work, see O. B. 
Hardison, "The Place of Averroes' Commentary on the Poetics in the History 
of Medieval Criticism," in Medieval and Renaissance Studies: Proceedings of the 
Southeastern Institute of Medieval and Renaissance Studies, Summer 1968, ed. 
John L. Lievsay (Durham, N.C., 1970), pp. 57-81; and William F. Boggess, 
"Aristotle's Poetics in the Fourteenth Century," Studies in Philology 67 (1970): 
278-94. 
33. Such a study is presently in progress. For a preliminary treatment, see 
Allen, "Hermann the German's Averroistic Aristotle," pp. 67-81. 
34. Geoffrey assumes that a poet's materia will have its own order, which 
the artist may rearrange. Cf. Faral, Les artspoetiques, lines 87-100, p. 200; and 
Nims, Poetria Nova, pp. 18-19. 
35. Assisi Bib. Com. MS 302, fol. 138v. "The behavior and vices of ladies 
are the material of the book"; "the beauty of the conditions [of humanity] 
which are in the book." For the full text of this accessus, with more extended 
analysis, see Allen, "Hermann the German's Averroistic Aristotle." 
36. Jill Mann, Chaucer and Medieval Estates Satire, p. 184. That "science 
deals with the universal and the necessary" is an Aristotelian commonplace 
(Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages [New York, 
1955], p. 502); the significance of this commonplace for poetic theory needs 
emphasis, lest it be ignored by modernists on the one hand and abused by 
allegorical reductionists on the other. 
37. R. Dragonetti, "Aux frontieres du langage poetique," Romanica ganden­
sw 9 (Ghent, 1961): 23 ff. 
38. This point is made with a correctly nuanced allowance for medieval 
sensibility by Elizabeth T. Pochoda in Arthurian Propaganda: "Le Mort Darthur" 
as an Historical Ideal of Life (Chapel Hill, 1971), pp. 28-29 and passim. 
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39. This phrase is from Aegidius Romanus, who uses it to account for the 
possibility of having scientia from the particulars treated in the Bible. See his 
In epistolam B. Pauli Apostoli ad Romanos commentarii (Rome, 1555), fol. lr. 
40. Winthrop Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century: The 
Literary Influence of the School of Chartres (Princeton, 1972). 
41. It is therefore most appropriate that one of the very few commentaries 
which assigns a medieval poem to some part of philosophy other than ethics 
should be that made by Robert of Sorbona on the Anticlaudianus of Alanus de 
Insulis: "Nota quod liber iste supponitur toti philosophic et non alicui parti 
per se quia communiter agit de septem artibus liberalibus. Modus agendi 
triplex est: aliquando procedit rationaliter scilicet quantum ad naturalem 
proprie dictam et trivium, quandoque disciplinaliter quantum ad quadrivium, 
quandoque intelligibiliter quantum ad metaphysicam" (Bibliotheque Na­
tionale, MS lat. 8300, fol. 9v). "Note that this book is classified under all 
philosophy and not under any part as such, because it deals commonly 
with the seven liberal arts. Its mode of procedure is threefold: sometimes 
it proceeds rationally with regard to the natural properly so called and the 
trivium, sometimes in terms of the disciplines in dealing with the quadrivium, 
and sometimes cognitively with regard to metaphysics." 
42. Epistola X (to Can Grande) in Dantis Alagherii Epistolae, ed. Paget 
Toynbee with C. G. Hardie, 2d ed. (Oxford, 1966), p. 174 ("man, according as 
he is liable to the reward and punishment of justice through free will in 
deserving and being guilty"). 
43. The question is discussed by Robert Jordan, both in the book-length 
study Chaucer and the Shape of Creation, mentioned above, and in "The Ques­
tion of Genre: Five Chaucerian Romances," in Chaucer at Albany, pp. 77-79; 
and by Donald Howard, The Idea of the Canterbury Tales, especially pp. 1-20 
and 210-26. We would distinguish between their comments and our own 
discussion primarily by our efforts to go outside the area of specifically "for­
mal" or "technical" aspects of composition to search out principles of artistic 
organization and unity drawn from the artist's perception of the coherence of 
his subject matter. 
44. The classic treatment of the accessus in its late classical and earlier 
medieval forms is E. A. Quain, S.J., "The Medieval Accessus ad Auctores," 
Traditio 3 (1945): 215-64. For Dante in particular (his own letter to Can 
Grande is a conventional accessus plus a dictamenal exordium) see Bruno 
Nardi, "Osservazioni sul medievale 'Accessus ad Auctores' in rapporto 
all'Epistola a Cangrande," in Saggi Note di Critica Dantesca (Milan, 1966), pp. 
268-305; and Bruno Sandkiihler, Diefru'hen Dantekommentare undihr Verhdltnis 
zur mittelalterlichen Kommentartradition (Munich, 1967). An analysis of accessus 
terminology as evidence for medieval literary theory is Allen, "Commentary 
as Criticism." 
45. This is, in fact, the manner in which Ovidian commentators treated the 
poem, honoring the book divisions and then treating each separate mutatio in 
order. 
46. Epistola X. Dantis Alagherii Epistolae, p. 175 ("defining, dividing, prov­
ing, disproving, and giving examples"). 
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47. Where there is variation, the conventionality of the list is proved by the 
commentator's reference to it, as in an Ovid commentary in Florence: "Causa 
formalis est duplex, forma tractatus et forma tractandi. Est autem modus 
quintuplex, scilicet divisivus [cod. divisius, and similarly for the other 
schemata] diffinitivus, exemplorum positivus, probativus, et reprobativus et 
collectivus. In hoc libro triplex, scilicet divisivus, diffinitivus, et exemplativus" 
(Biblioteca Laurenziana MS Plut. 36.3, fol. 1 lr). "The formal cause is double, 
the form of the treatise and the form of the treatment. This is a fivefold 
mode: dividing, defining, giving examples, proving, reproving, and infer­
ring. In this book it is threefold: dividing, defining, and giving examples." 
Thomas Waley's Boethius commentary is similar; after elaborately defining 
the form of the Consolation in terms of dialogue, Thomas says: "Vel potest dici 
secundum communiter loquentes, quod causa formalis tractandi est quintu­
plex: diffinitiva, divisiva, probativa, improbativa, exemplorum positiva, sicut 
videbitur in libro" (Boetius de consolatione, fol. bb5v). "Or one can say following 
convention that the formal cause of the treatment is fivefold: defining, divid­
ing, proving, disproving, giving examples, as will be seen in the book." 
48. Emphasis upon division betrays a medieval habit of mind which is often 
satisfied, for a definition of something, with the enumeration of its parts. This 
satisfaction even affects medieval usage—"dividere" may mean the same 
thing as "tractare," as when Bartholomew of Bruges, in his commentary on 
the Averroistic Poetics, says "primo dividit contextionem poeticam penes 
finem eius, secundo penes formam" (Paris, MS B.N. lat. 16089, fol. 146v; 
emphasis ours). "First he divides poetic composition with regard to its end, 
second with regard to its form." 
49. Sheila Delany, "Undoing Substantial Connection: The Late Medieval 
Attack on Analogical Thought," Mosaic 5 (1972): 31-52. Se also her Chaucer's 
House of Fame: The Poetics of Skeptical Fideism (Chicago, 1972). 
50. Beryl Smalley, English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century 
(Oxford, 1960), p. 133. 
51. Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 
500-502, treats Holkot in his connection with William of Ockham. 
52. Quoted in Brandt, The Shape of Medieval History, pp. 102-3. 
53. Ibid., p. 102. 
54. This interpretation is worked out in some detail in Allen, The Friar as 
Critic, pp. 145-49. 
55. For the opposite enterprise, rooted in structuralism and its continu­
ings, see Gabriel Josipovici, The World and the Book. 
56. For further discussion of this view of the Parson's Tale, see Allen, "The 
Old Way and the Parson's Way." On the pagan, worldly character of the 
Knight's Tale, cf. Joseph Westlund, "The Knight's Tale as an Impetus for Pil­
grimage," Philological Quarterly 43 (1964): 526-27. 
57. For a brief statement of the difference between Chaucer's nominalism 
and the skepticism which the modern critic is tempted to read into it, see the 
review of Robert Burlin's Chaucerian Fiction by Judson B. Allen, Speculum 54 
(January 1979): 116-18. 

Medieval Notions 
of Structure 
The manuscripts which Chaucer's medieval audiences read and col­
lected were very different from our own books; they always lacked title 
pages, sometimes were without date and attribution, and frequently 
seem to us to have no coherence other than that of a very loose anthol­
ogy. The rule would almost seem to be that whatever is put together, 
belongs together, even if its arrangement and organization seem to 
have been determined only by the availability of exemplars or by the 
changing interests of the man making or ordering the volume. The 
extreme situation is met in the manuscript in which one man or a 
group of men over a span of years recorded treatises, poems, docu­
ments, even personal notes which were important to them. Unless we 
recognize that medieval principles of organization are different from 
our own, however, some medieval works planned as unified and or­
ganized statements might look to us like such random collections of 
materials drawn together only by the author's interest. Treatises col­
lecting exempla, word lists presenting the various scriptural uses of a 
particular image, bestiaries, letter collections, even romance cycles— 
all have rules of selection which may not be evident immediately to the 
modern reader schooled by novels and the scientific method. The 
medieval fondness for collections, of all sorts, must be examined and 
appreciated in dealing with Chaucer's collection of stories, because 
the Canterbury Tales has at least as much in common with a distinctio or 
the Golden Legend as it does with either novels or a modern book of 
travels. 
Collections usually have, either stated explicitly or concealed in 
their preparation, an idea or theme that the author uses as his stan­
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dard for selecting materials appropriate for the work. The medieval 
principle of typology, for example, permits a number of different 
things, such as historical events or saints' legends, to be collected in 
order to assert that in fact they resemble and interpret one central fact 
or idea. The normative array or distinctio is essentially the same, but 
procedurally just the opposite; under this principle a single idea or 
thing is examined by subdividing it into its kinds, or parts, presumably 
exhaustively. Both typology and the distinctio are associative in their 
logic, and each tends to generate the other. A group of typologically 
related things, once related and named, forms a distinctio; the parts of 
a distinctio, once assembled and listed, are very often typologically 
related. Whether we are furnished with the governing rule for the 
collection or must discover it by naming the common denominator for 
the materials collected, still the work itself is unified by the author's 
effort to gather a set of significant cases, exemplifying some general 
idea. The unity of such a work depends not only on structure or 
arrangement, but also on the principle of selection which guided the 
author's choice of materials. 
Actual commentaries have very little to say about unity as such, not 
because no such thing existed, but rather because it was so obvious 
that it could be presumed. They are always quite able to name the 
materia of the work under discussion, and its end or purpose, as single 
or very closely related multiple things. The materia exists; what may 
vary is the treatment. The subject matter gives the work the unity 
which we have described above as relating, not to arrangement, but 
rather to the author's selection of his material. In his treatment of that 
material, a poet might introduce artificialities in the form of manip­
ulated beginnings, fit digressions, and all the ornaments of grammar 
and rhetoric, but these artificialities are not the essence of the piece; 
instead they are strategies with a rhetorical function, which can be 
used at all only because the material on which they are imposed 
is definite and clear enough to sustain a dialectic with them. The 
medieval poet's first technique for creating a unified work of art was 
to treat his materia fully, because, in this way, he ensured that the 
unity of the materia would be reproduced in his poem. 
We shall see, in examining some medieval poems, that searching for 
the presumed unity brought to the work by its subject matter is very 
helpful. In itself, however, this sort of unity does not explain the 
relationship of the work's parts to one another, either in terms of 
arrangement or in the sense of logical connections between them. On 
the first point, arrangement, medieval poetic manuals are not very 
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helpful. They provide us with the principle of beginning, middle, and 
end, but in a conventional and rhetorically oriented manner with expec­
tations far different from modern concerns for dramatic exposition. 
One may begin at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end, and one 
may in addition do any of these things in combination with a proverb 
or exemplum—altogether, there are nine ways to begin, eight of 
which are artificial and therefore preferable.1 Past this point one is 
left rather on one's own—one may condense or amplify, but the 
material itself is itself, and has its own natural coherence. From dicta­
men, and ultimately from the Rhetorica ad Herennium, we have the 
outline of exordium, narratio, conclusio.2 But here, as well, we are 
thrown back upon the material itself, which, being a discursive thing,3 
constitutes the entire content of the work—thus, its narratio—and 
leaves the other two parts of the work only the task of introducing and 
summarizing, rather than treating some essential part of the work's 
content. Both these divisions, therefore, represent an artistic and 
rhetorical adornment directed at engaging and convincing an audi­
ence, of a material with its own parts and its own logic of connection 
between those parts. 
Medieval commentaries usually mention the parts of a work in their 
analysis, but go on from the enumeration to discuss each part indi­
vidually.4 They seem to presume that the wholeness of the material is 
explained fully by their explanations of all the individual parts. The 
kinds of connections which we would call image patterns, relating and 
enriching the meaning of various details of the poem, exist and may 
be explained in terms of a variety of relational strategies, irony, or 
other conventional allegorical patterns of association.5 In order to 
understand this process of association, we must examine it at work. 
Still, commentaries, in their discussion of introductory material, shed 
some light on the medieval sense of the way parts related to one 
another, although their primary focus was on the rhetoric of audience 
response. 
The commentary analysis of beginnings is conventional. A particu­
larly elaborate version of this convention occurs in a Venice commen­
tary on Statius: 
Et notandum quod satis ydonee quasi quadam prefatione prescribitur bre­
viter partiendo in tria, scilicet in propositionem, invocationem, et nar­
rationem, prohemiorum officia eleganter exequendo. Nam lectores be­
nivolos, dociles, et attentos facit. Proponit ubi dicit Fraternas acies et ibi 
reddit dociles. Invocat ubi dicit Unde iubetis etc. et tune attentos facit. Nar­
rat ibi Impia iam merita et ibi facit benivolos. Vel ibi proponit de qua re 
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dicturus est. Ibi attentos, ubi invocat, benivolos. Nam tune quoddammodo 
manifestatur modus tractandi, et in modo tractandi sunt semper lectores 
benivoli. In narratione vero dociles.6 
Giovanni del Virgilio says more simply: "Hiis visis veniamus breviter 
ad libri divisionem. Dico ergo quod liber iste more poetico dividitur in 
partes tres, quia primo proponit, secundo invocat, tercio narrat."7 
Another Statius commentary explicitly uses the word prologue: 
Unde sciendum est quod auctor iste more poetarum facit prologus in quo 
proponit et materiam dicendorum [sic]. Secundo invocat et auctor, primo 
in generali ibi Unde iubetis ire dee, secundo specialiter ibi Quern prius heroum 
dio dabis. In invocatione generali movet duas questiones sive inter­
rogationes: prima est an debeat incipere a remotis antecesoribus [sic] 
Thebanorum et primis fundatoribus enumerando antiquas antiquitates 
que precesserant propositum quod intendit describere, et hanc solvit ibi 
longa retro series. Secunda questio est a quo debet incipere. Multi fuerunt 
proximi et confines huic materie an debeat incipere a pio an a crudeli et 
hanc solvens incipit ab impio scilicet Edipo idest a domo et familia Edipi.8 
The invocation, as the commentator makes clear, is more than simply 
a request for aid of the inspiring gods; rather, it is a request for aid in 
a project which is explicitly defined, or (as here) for which alternative 
definitions are given. Thus the invocation functions as summary ex­
position and would naturally render the audience "attentos." 
The prologue is further defined in a commentary on the Poetria 
Nova of Geoffrey of Vinsauf, now in Assisi.9 
Dividitur ergo liber iste prima divisione in duas partes, scilicet in prologum 
et tractatum, quia incipit si quis habet fundare domum, et quia in prologis 
solent poete invocare et proponere, in tractatu vero narrare quod inten­
dunt. Ideo prologus iste dividitur in duas partes. Et nota proprie dixi in 
prologum et non in prohennium et tractatum quia sicut dicit Aristoteles 3o 
Rhetoricorum prohennium est principium orationis sicut in poesi prologus 
et in fistulationem preludium, ex quo patet quod cum autor iste deter­
minet de poesi sive de arte poetica et utamur poemate pro illo quod premit­
tit proprie debet dici prologus quamvis etiam communiter loquendo possit 
dici prohennium quia hec idem sunt substantia et non differunt nisi 
ratione.10 
Generic distinctions, in other words, are not substantial but merely 
analytical. There is a terminology appropriate to each of the various 
kinds of act which relate performer or communicator to audience, but 
the kinds themselves are substantially the same. In each case there is a 
beginning, which introduces rather than causes; a middle, which 
treats or narrates or presents rather than continues; and a conclusion, 
which stops or summarizes rather than provides a climax. All this is 
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implied in the rhetorical basis of medieval organizations of communi­
cation. 
We have already seen that the links collectively are about story­
telling and the proper and improper uses of fiction. In addition, of 
course, they are opinions, and therefore necessarily opinions of 
people. In order fully to understand what Chaucer means by giving 
us this kind of prologue for his Tales, and in what way he intends to 
render us attentive, docile, and benevolent, we must consider the 
General Prologue from the viewpoint of its rhetorical, rather than its 
sententious, function. 
In 1970, at the Modern Language Association convention, Donald 
R. Howard made the brilliant suggestion that the General Prologue 
was a memory system in which the pilgrim portraits correspond to the 
grotesque images in places of classical theory, and the exemplary ones 
of medieval practice. In this light, the seemingly haphazard materials 
of the General Prologue make ordered sense: 
If you take the description of the Prioress and her followers and that of the 
Guildsmen and their cook as single descriptions (which they are), and if 
you count the description of the Host, the portraits of the General Pro­
logue can then be seen arranged symmetrically into three groups of seven, 
each headed by an ideal portrait: 
Knight: Squire, Yeoman, Prioress, Monk, Friar, Merchant 
Clerk: Man of Law, Franklyn, Guildsmen, Shipman, Physician, Wife 
Parson & Plowman: Miller, Manciple, Reve, Summoner, Pardoner, Host11 
Howard goes on to admire the "mixture of particularities and abstrac­
tions" in the General Prologue and relates these to the emblematic or 
typical significance of the characters, as well as to their individuality. 
The General Prologue then, "is not just the beginning of the work, 
but its heart or backbone."12 
Howard does not develop the emblematic or abstraction-oriented 
implications of his insight. It is, however, both possible and instructive 
to do so, as a way of seeing just what the General Prologue is about, 
and therefore as a way of discovering just what and how it introduces. 
In the first place, all these people are estates, or types, even though 
their portraits are individualized into a certain moral ambiguity and 
the point of the usual satire is blunted. Second, the groups, which we 
think Howard has correctly identified, can be usefully distinguished. 
The three ideal types—Knight, Clerk, and Parson-Plowman—are 
ideal for slightly different reasons: the Knight for what he is, the 
Clerk for what he knows, and the Parson and Plowman for what they 
do. The same distinction can be applied to the groups these ideal 
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types head. The first are, with the Knight, the classes of society, lack­
ing only nobility and serf, top and bottom. The second group are all, 
in one way or another, characterized by their expertise—both be­
cause, in most cases, their trade or occupation is one defined by hav­
ing knowledge and because Chaucer is careful to emphasize this as­
pect of their characters in his descriptions of them. The third group 
are people primarily characterized by what they do; further, what 
they do is in every case something done for, in the name of, or as a 
steward of another person or authority. 
The effectiveness of Chaucer's catalogue of pilgrims used to be 
attributed to his keen "camera eye"; more recently we have praised his 
deftness in choosing descriptive details which conjure up, a la Dick­
ens, the wealth of human types. But Chaucer's directory of pilgrims, 
both its individual entries and in its schema of categories, gains espe­
cially from Chaucer's evident skill in the medieval art of list-making. 
The multitude of lists that come down to us from the period include 
many that call to mind Borges's Chinese encyclopedia: they are of­
fered to us as normative and complete, yet the principle of their 
coherence eludes us and they may appear simply arbitrary. There are 
the obvious seven sins and seven virtues, five joys, four levels of 
meaning—but far beyond this it is impossible to avoid noticing the 
habit, probably homiletic, of casting one's outlines and one's dis­
cussions into this form. In its most elaborate manifestation, which 
occurs in the context of allegorical exegesis, this habit of schematiza­
tion through lists produces the distinctio.13 The distinctio, most simply, 
is a list of the allegorical meanings of a thing. More elaborately, it is a 
list of the characteristics of a thing whose allegorical meanings all 
refer to the same object. Most broadly, in the use reflected in the 
practice of Hugh of St. Cher, the distinctio becomes any classification 
of kinds considered as a meaningful and normative array. Though of 
course most lists are never complete in the absolute sense, medieval 
distinctiones indulge a rhetoric of completeness. Things exist in bono 
three ways, in malo five. God rules in seven ways; there are five kinds 
of sleep, six fears, and three obediences. 
It is by analogy with the distinctio that the list of pilgrims in 
Chaucer's Canterbury prologue can be understood most profitably. 
These people are a normative array, sufficient for the definition of 
the category "man." Men can be distinguished in three ways— 
according to their types, according to their learning, and according to 
their actions of stewardship. More simply and obviously, man is soul,14 
mind, and body. The types of men are seven: knight, squire, yeoman, 
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and so forth. The types of learning are also seven: five in bono and two 
in malo. The good ones are logical, legal, manual, geographical, and 
medicinal; the bad ones are gluttony and lust. The men of action are 
more simply various; what makes them a normative array, sufficient 
for definition, is that each of them, whether honest or dishonest, does 
his work in stewardship, and thus by responsibility to other people 
implies the social interconnections which constitute human society in 
its wholeness. The list is framed, ironically enough, by the pastor of the 
church and the viaticum of the pilgrimage, the one responsible for the 
cure of souls and the other responsible for the care of bored souls. 
It is this normative array of human beings, who are the auctoritates 
of Chaucer's summa narrativa and at the same time the prologue 
exempla, who, sometimes with and sometimes without proverbs as 
well, introduce Chaucer's tales individually and collectively. To call 
them this, and to classify them in terms of abstractions, should in no 
way imply that they are not particulars. In this nominalist world they 
must be that, of course. We mean merely to claim that additively they 
can constitute universals as well as exist in themselves. In this function 
they are different both from the poetic figures which preceded them, 
who tended to evoke universals by their individual power as con­
structed allegorical figures, and from later figures such as Hamlet 
and—at the other extreme—Gatsby, who claim universality by the very 
virtue of their particular concreteness. 
Chaucer's own beginning, for the whole book, is a proverb, or 
rather, a variant of a proverb. In its usual form, it is "In the spring, a 
young man's fancy lightly turns to thoughts of love."15 Chaucer's var­
iant, in the spring "than longen folke to goon on pilgrimage," is com­
plexly ironic. The Easter evocations which Baldwin finds in this pas­
sage are there, but only in absence. The fact is that these pilgrims are 
not penitential, not serious, not even very religious—pilgrimaging, 
more than Canterbury, is their goal. Proverb plus pilgrims gives us a 
world very much in medias res, and determined to stay that way. This 
world, as prologue, introduces a collection of stories which comment 
on, evaluate, and give ethical definition to those middle things, those 
things of this life, with which the estates satire types of the prologue 
have, as we first meet them, such a morally ambivalent relation. In a 
way, Chaucer gives us not six characters in search of an author but 
thirty plus in search of definition, fortunately at a time and place 
where story, as such, had the power to furnish such a definition, be­
cause both story and definition had been at that time and place so 
fortunately understood. 
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We have thus far explained how various medieval formal 
principles—the principle of prologue and narration, the principle of 
the distinctio or normative array, and the specific principle of fourfold 
classification (itself a kind of distinctio) defined by the usage of Ovid 
and descent-into-hell stories—are medieval principles of literary criti­
cism suitable for application to Chaucer. It remains to try to define 
the connectedness itself. That is, once we know where, by medieval 
standards, to define the borders between the parts of Chaucer's work, 
and once we know how to classify these parts by fit medieval 
categories, it remains to define the principle by which these parts, as 
such, can be presumed to be related into a whole. That principle, in 
the broadest terms, is analogy. The parts of a whole signify their 
common and single theme by being, in some way, like that theme, and 
therefore also like one another. The most complex and most influen­
tial example of this analogical unity which the parts of a text may 
achieve is, of course, the unity for the Bible achieved by typological 
exegesis. By the end of the Middle Ages, typological exegesis had 
engendered habits of reading and writing which achieved this same 
kind of unity for most texts and even most events, even for materials 
which signified no explicitly Christian theme, or which had no actual 
Christ at their centers. We have already alluded to the suggestion that 
the relation between the Green Knight and Sir Bercilak, which we 
mean when we say that the one "is" the other, is a typological 
relationship—that is, an analogical, allegorically one-to-one relation­
ship between two independently existing entities of the sort defined 
by a thousand years of biblical exegesis. The same analogizing rela­
tionship seems to obtain quite generally in late medieval structures. 
Of literary examples, Dante's Commedia is the one most notably 
exegetical. In the letter to Can Grande, Dante himself claims for his 
poem a typological organization.16 Much of the burden of Charles 
Singleton's great work on the Commedia has concerned itself with 
elucidating relationships and meanings which are typological,17 and 
he himself argues specifically to this point in "The Irreducible Dove," 
claiming that the fiction of the poem is that it is not a fiction.18 Robert 
Hollander, in Allegory in Dante's Commedia, not only defends the 
typological approach theoretically but, more important still, exem­
plifies it by showing how much of Dante's meaning is carried by 
patterns of recurring figures, whose relationship to another and to 
the contexts in which they occur is figural. He speaks, for instance, of 
the "extraordinary use of figural techniques that intertwine through 
the discussions of love, the dreams, and the encounters with Matelda 
Medieval Notions of Structure I 93 
and Beatrice in the Purgatorio."19 He goes on to discuss the various 
voyage images which Dante draws together: "Historically, the images 
make an imposing string: the ill-fated ships in Aeneid I, which are 
answered by the shipwrecked but safe Aeneas; the damned voyage of 
Ulysses; the voyage that is Dante's poem; the pilgrim ship that arrives 
safely at the shores of Purgatory, an angel on its poop; and now also 
on a poop, Admiral Beatrice, who is Supreme Commander of the 
fleet of which Dante's bark is one."20 
Ovid uses parallel stories and figures to construct, by simple anal­
ogy, a pattern of meaning which evaluates and relates the respective 
divinities and men; his patterns are of course not typological, though 
the medieval commentators eventually claimed that they were. For 
Dante, on the other hand, the long tradition of biblical exegesis gave 
rich definition to his method. Hollander puts it precisely: "The func­
tion of the allegorical sense [what we are calling typological] is to 
relate two historical events or things or persons, each of which has a 
discrete and particular historical reality in time, so that the relation­
ship between them may express spiritual significance."21 Hollander 
finds that Dante wishes the incidents of his poem to function in a 
similar way with other parts of the work. Thus, the various voyages he 
mentions above are all linked together, all sharing a spiritual signifi­
cance. Noting that Dante's poem includes figures from both the 
mythological history of pagan antiquity and the biblical history of 
Chrisianity, Hollander argues that Dante may have believed both to 
operate on a historical plane, which the text of his own poem may also 
reach. "All that must be understood is that for Dante the events re­
corded in the literature of pagan antiquity have, for the purposes of 
his fiction, as much historical validity as do the events recorded in the 
Bible. The latter may be more "true" in his eyes, but the situations of 
Aeneas or Jason are as significant for Dante's theory of the "true 
lie" . . . Again Charles Singleton's phrase comes to mind: the fiction of 
the Divine Comedy is that it is not fiction. I believe Dante treats other 
poems, myths, and stories in the same way in the Commedia. "22 
Thus, the people and places mentioned in the Commedia, whether 
they come from myths, from the Bible or from Dante's own contempo­
rary situation,23 all share a unity as part of "universal history" and so are 
all interrelated, and meaningfully connected with one another. "Seen 
with the eye of historical figuralism, each act in universal history has 
its part or future counterparts in other facts. It allows a polysemous 
interpretation that is both multitudinous and precise."24 
Dante's literary application of biblical typology, of course, is Chris­
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tian. This is natural, since the desire to find ties which unite disparate 
parts relates naturally to the great providential desire which has al­
ready related all parts of creation, in ideal at least, to the fact of 
Incarnation, which is the center and consummation of creation. Thus 
writing about the world, and even the world of fiction, may be a 
celebration of God's plan, in a world already too well informed to 
need simple explanation. The fondness of the Middle Ages for elabo­
rate and repetitious exempla is an implicit testimony of their belief in 
the unity grounded in the underlying presence of God. In Dante this 
testimony is explicit in his story, as well as implicit in the forms and 
structures by which he gave his multifarious story its divine unity. 
But the same structures may be formally present without at the 
same time containing the explicitly Christian content. We have al­
ready analyzed the exegetical four levels as a purely formal principle; it 
remains here to see how this formal principle—the principle of unity 
through resonating parallelism between two or more already existing 
and organized things—may operate to unify books, and traditions of 
books, whose subject is something other than Christ or the creed or 
the Christian life as such. In order to make clear both this formal 
principle and the unity it achieves, we must conduct, under medieval 
rules, a thematic analysis. The rest of this chapter will be devoted 
primarily to setting up this analysis for the case of the Canterbury Tales. 
Before doing so, however, we think it instructive to mention briefly a 
few other examples. 
Gower's Confessio Amantis is an obvious instance. The eight books 
are arrayed under the titles of the seven capital sins, to which is 
added, in seventh place, the education of the prince; in each book the 
collection of stories told is coherent because all the stories share a 
thematic likeness. It is not always easy to explain precisely and simply 
the relevance of a given story to its asserted theme, but this critical 
problem only proves that an analogy may be powerful without being 
univocal or simple. 
A more complex example is the Romance of the Rose, whose unity is 
founded on both internal and external analogies.25 The Romance, like 
the Canterbury Tales and the Metamorphoses, contains an assembly of 
storytellers who tell a great many tales, digressively strung on an 
inconsequential plot. Internally, tales actually repeated or repeatedly 
evoked, or tales placed in ostentatious parallel, are the key to the 
Romance's thematic structure. Thus Narcissus parallels Pygmalion, 
and there is repeated reference to the Golden Age, the castration of 
Saturn, the birth of Venus, and the adultery of Mars and Venus. 
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Externally, and in a way which gives explicit thematic definition, the 
Romance mirrors, in combination, the Consolation ofPhilosophy and the 
Complaint of Nature. 
The precise nature of the reflection has not been properly ap­
preciated because it is negative and ironic. Thus critics have been 
misled into looking for things that the Romance of the Rose did say, 
which were clearly borrowed or adapted from the Consolation or the 
Complaint, rather than looking for the things which the Romance did 
not say, or got wrong, which one might expect Jean de Meun to cor­
rect had he wished to. Once we see that he must have made these 
errors and omissions deliberately, and that we therefore must expect 
the parallel between the Romance and its predecessors to explicate 
ironically or inversely, everything becomes much clearer. 
Two facts are immediately obvious. One is that Jean de Meun has 
taken over all the sexuality of the Complaint, has made it the basis of 
his plot as well as the content of a good deal of discourse, and has at 
the same time explicitly denied to this sexuality the allegorical refer­
ence to ethical and philosophical truths which are, in the Complaint, its 
reason for being. The second point is that, though Jean includes in his 
poem the central character of the Consolation, Reason herself, and 
though in his part of the poem he discusses most of the various topics 
of the Consolation, from the goods of fortune analyzed by Reason to the 
problem of predestination and free will analyzed by Nature, he 
nowhere includes the great climactic doctrine of the meter, "O qui 
perpetua." For this crucial middle point, on which the whole doctrine 
of the Consolation depends, Jean substitutes the ironic middle of more 
and more cynical advice from Friend, False-Seeming, and the Vekke. 
In order to begin to read the Romance correctly, we must trust this 
external analogy and see the poem as one which advertises itself as 
having omitted something—as having omitted the climactic doctrine 
which would make Reason worth listening to, and having omitted the 
allegorical reference which would make what the Lover does, in the 
end, worth doing. This seen, we know what the poem is—not a narra­
tive of a love story wildly padded out with digressions, but a coherent 
series of six discourses, each containing an array of exemplary stories, 
delivered by Reason and Friend, False-Seeming and the Vekke, and 
Nature and Genius. The frame—the love story allegory—is not the 
cause or structure of these discourses, but rather their result. Amant 
takes all the advice given him (Reason, after all, sends him to Friend 
by defining her highest potential self as a friend) and, as a result, 
goes, not from good to bad, but from bad to worse.26 His progress 
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exemplifies what the discourses, with great subtlety and ironic clarity, 
define. 
In order to appreciate this clarity, this coherence, and this defini­
tion, we must as it were invert the poem—put aside the plot, take the 
digressions as the essence, and read in obedience to the logic of 
analogically ordered discourse rather than the logic of causally or­
dered action. In just this way, we propose, one understands the Can­
terbury Tales by inverting it, by putting aside the plot in order to read 
an array of stories. Our reading is made easier because for Chaucer, 
as for the Romance, we have external evidence—we have an informing 
analogy. It is, as we have repeatedly said, Ovid's Metamorphoses. 
The medieval critics clearly saw Ovid's work as a story collection 
which could be taken as coherent on the basis of precisely this 
analogizing, thematic anaylsis which we have been defining here. In 
our own day, their understanding has received powerful confirma­
tion by the reading of Brooks Otis, who has made what can justly be 
called independent modern discovery of precisely the same character 
for the poem. Otis recognizes, of course, the pattern which the critical 
tradition has always found—that of a chronological carmen perpetuum, 
extending from creation to the emperor, offering a miscellany of 
stories intended to praise the emperor. But in addition to, and more 
important than, this pattern, Otis describes the Metamorphoses as just 
that: an intricate series of transformations, arranged into four great 
parts, each with a central panel story surrounded by other similar 
stories which repeat with significant variation what they frame. These 
parts move from an exclusive concern with the gods to an ever-increas­
ing and finally almost exclusive concern with men; the transformations 
move from the arbitrary and often comically undignified tricks of the 
immortal gods to the tragic calamities of men, with the transformation 
often acting as a literally enacted metaphor. Between the first and 
second editions of his book, Otis changed his mind about the ultimate 
meaning of the Metamorphoses and decided that the praise of the em­
peror was ironic or satiric rather than serious. But his view of the 
method remained the same. The essence of the Metamorphoses is not 
chronology, or praise, or frame, but stories—stories of transforma­
tion. As a concatenated series, they accumulate a meaning which is a 
definition of the nobility of human nature, and of the relation be­
tween the gods, men, and nature. They do so by an intricate and 
long-sustained pattern of parallelism and repetition, with incremental 
variations, clustered around the four great stories which constitute 
the centers of the four great sections of the poem.27 
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What Brooks Otis does for our day the medieval commentators did 
for theirs. They properly said that the material of the Metamorphoses 
was changes (mutationes); they divided the poem for purposes of 
analysis into separate stories of changes, without regard for levels of 
frame story and included story; and they analyzed the whole in terms 
of large categories of changes, all directed at a definition of the 
human condition in relation to man's material circumstances and his 
divine destiny. We must not let differences in terminology obscure for 
us the similarity of method, intent, and content which marks these two 
critical enterprises, one medieval, one modern. Together they make it 
clear that Ovid's Metamorphoses must join the Commedia, the Romance 
of the Rose, and, as we shall see, the Canterbury Tales as a work whose 
unity the principle of stories in parallel best explains. 
We have already begun our analysis of the Canterbury Tales along 
the lines of investigation we have been outlining in this chapter. First, 
we named the parts of the poem as stories, whose elaborate prologue 
framework defined the poem's subject as ethical standards of con­
duct, presented in a form accessible and intelligible to man. The 
stories have in common a limited number of narrative situations, 
more than half of them describing an intrusion by an outsider into the 
harmony of a marriage, and most of the rest devoted to brotherhoods 
among men, usually including a clergyman, and difficulties which 
threaten to destroy the fraternal relationship. From the Knight's Tale 
and the tradition of Ovidian commentary, we found a division into 
kinds of moral activity which was helpful in distinguishing the kinds 
of stories into categories smaller and more specific than a division 
based only on the marital status of the characters could offer. Our 
classification of four changes enables us to identify four groups of 
stories, with each group exemplifying a particular kind of change and 
a particular kind of moral activity. We have identified four sorts of 
stories in the Canterbury Tales—tales of natural changes, whose preoc­
cupation is with the nature and exercise of human authority; tales of 
magic, which furnish a normative array of disorders, illusions, decep­
tions, and mistakes; tales of worldly moral struggle, in which merely 
human solutions to the problem of orderly living succeed and fail; 
and tales of spiritual interpretation, which furnish a normative array 
of human postures within which given events may be confronted, 
lived with, and understood.28 Together the tales constitute a norma­
tive array of exempla, classified and defined according to their place 
in a fourfold distinctio of moral activity, whose common subject and 
final goal is a definition of just order in human affairs, and of the 
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human acts and human communities which constitute that ordered 
way of life. 
In order to show all this meaning at work in the Canterbury Tales, we 
must obviously deal with each tale. To do so, we must arrange for the 
tales to occur in some appropriate order. As a framework for reading 
the tales, we have reordered the accepted fragments of the poem in a 
sequence reflecting the four kinds of Ovidian change, so as to make 
four groups of stories. Our purpose in this reordering, and this 
classification of stories into four groups, is essentially logical. The 
sequence which we propose is one which makes the significance of 
Chaucer's stories for a definition of human society clearly obvious and 
permits us to make a seriatim reading of stories in which the various 
parts and aspects of Chaucer's definition are logical, ordered, and 
coherent. 
Since, in making this reordering, we respect the integrity of estab­
lished fragments, we take advantage of as much of Chaucer's inten­
tion for the ordering of his collection as can be known. In so doing we 
have obeyed the critic's obligation to read the text as history has given 
it to him. But beyond this obligation we have felt not only free but 
obliged to order our discussion of Chaucer's tales in a way permitting 
greatest possible clarity to our argument. For the ordering of tales, 
and their classification into four groups, which supports this discus­
sion, we wish to make one major and utterly serious claim, and several 
much more speculative ones. Our major claim is that this ordering is 
heuristically correct. It works. It grounds our reading. It was, in fact, a 
considerable catalyst for it. We found, as we worked, that having the 
tales in juxtapositions different from those familiar from the Elles­
mere often stimulated insight. The tales responded well to having 
been classified, under the four Ovidian categories, into four quite 
speculative groups, and illuminated one another under the logic of 
the whole in precisely the way which medieval literary theory pre­
dicted. Therefore, on the grounds both of our a priori medieval defi­
nitions and of an experience of successful critical reading, we claim 
that our proposed order for Chaucer's Canterbury Tales is true in the 
only way which ultimately matters: it helps to make the work clear, 
both as a whole and in its parts. 
Beyond this claim, there are several more speculative ones which we 
should make, because the order of the Canterbury Tales has been a 
much discussed topic whose bearing on our own proposal we cannot 
legitimately ignore. We are well aware that our order is not just a new 
one, but a new kind of one, whose proposal does not really enter into 
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previous discussion, but rather dismisses it as an enterprise wrongly 
grounded, and therefore unlikely to produce interesting results. The 
point at issue is basically this: one can order the surviving fragments of 
the Canterbury Tales in terms of some perception of the logical or 
thematic demands of the tales themselves, as we have done, or one can 
order the tales in such a way as to make as verisimilar as possible the 
plot of the Canterbury journey, including, of course, Chaucer's inci­
dental geographical allusions. One can, in short, order by ordering 
the tales, or one can order by serving the frame. Given the condition 
of surviving manuscript evidence, one cannot really do both at once. 
As it happens, we do not find arguments about the order of 
Chaucer's tales based on the map order of the towns between London 
and Canterbury very interesting. They are not medievally grounded, 
and they do not enrich our understanding of the tales.29 But we do 
not intend to be merely negative. Rather, we wish to suggest that 
asking a new kind of question generates the possibility of a rich new 
array of answers—we wish to suggest that in proposing a new kind of 
ordering for Chaucer's tales, based on considerations that have noth­
ing to do with English geography, we are in consequence permitted to 
see the surviving manuscripts of the Canterbury Tales in a new and 
fruitful light. Fifteenth-century scribes of these manuscripts ordered 
the tales in a variety of ways; we should take this variety as an oppor­
tunity to take seriously the work of a number of late medieval editors 
in reconstructing, as best they could, groupings of the tales in terms of 
which they would make a coherent whole. The standard presumption 
that the order must be geographical blinded scholars to the likelihood 
that these scribes were serious editors, because they manifesdy took 
no interest in such evidence. Realizing that the tales, as exempla, may 
have a logical order permits us to realize that the scribes seemed to 
have operated under similar assumptions. Work based on such a 
realization has not even begun; surviving manuscripts must eventu­
ally be the basis of numbers of specialist studies, on the basis of whose 
accumulated speculations and analyses this whole question of order­
ing can be answered on much firmer medieval grounds. Meanwhile, 
our speculative leap forward to an experimental final answer will be, 
at worst, methodologically instructive and, at best, a possible achieve­
ment of what further study will confirm. We have not, ourselves made 
exhaustive study of the manuscripts, but we are encouraged to have 
found, for each of the joinings of two fragments which our reorder­
ing requires, at least one medieval editor who agrees.30 
More important than these specific correspondences, however, is 
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the fact, clearly proved by the manuscripts, that the medieval editors 
tried to present their material in coherent groups of tales. Modern 
scholarly discussion of these groupings and their rationale was con­
ducted primarily at the time of the publication of Manly and Rickert's 
Text of the Canterbury Tales and tended to discount the importance of 
these groupings because of reservations about the editorial capabili­
ties of the scribes preparing the manuscripts. Although we differ 
from their conclusions in many ways, we are indebted to Tatlock, 
Dempster, and other interpreters of the Manly and Rickert text for 
much valuable insight into the procedures of manuscript prepara­
tion. Although they disagree with the wisdom of medieval editors of 
the text, Demster and Tatlock acknowledge that the manuscripts were 
produced by men conscious of their responsibility to give the poem an 
arrangement.31 Though the principles of editorial judgment at work 
in these manuscript orders are not approved of by either critic, still 
their analysis of the early history of text helps us to recover some 
medieval attitudes toward the poem, which we believe bear a different 
interpretation from that proposed by Dempster or by Tatlock. The 
scribes generally are interested in making their text as complete as 
possible and in giving the pieces they have the appearance of con­
stituting the whole of the poem.32 Before we condemn the principle, 
we should bear in mind that the same desire to discover an arrange­
ment revealing the wholeness of the Canterbury Tales lies behind most 
of the critical enterprises devoted to the poem and is certainly an 
important element in the selection process which lies behind even the 
most exhaustive of critical editions. Robinson's Chaucer, for example, 
acknowledges the existence of contradictory evidence of arrangement 
and of prologue links, buy presents as a final text the best solution 
available to him to all the work's difficult passages. Another scribal 
practice that Dempster records, although she does not approve of it, is 
the conservatism with which scribes regard any testimony to manu­
script arrangement they receive along with the tales.33 Such conser­
vatism may be suspect, if we demand that scribes care as much about 
the geography of the journey as modern readers often do, but it is in 
keeping with the desire to retain any vestiges of the author's intention, 
which, in the absence of absolute evidence to the contrary, is under­
standably sought in any version of the text closer in time to the author 
than the scribe is himself. The transmission of certain variations from 
Chaucer's clear intentions for the fragments, particularly in the order 
of fragments E and F, may seem culpable, when modern searches for 
manuscripts reveal that other lines of transmission knew E and F in 
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their proper form. However, scribes appear to have been limited in 
their exemplars, a situation which they acknowledge in various ways 
and which often disappoints the hopes we see, preserved in spaces left 
for tales never received, to complete the whole text.34 In the absence 
of better information, their decision to remain faithful to the orders 
they have is understandable and acceptable; Dempster's rejection of 
their editorial choices, by suggesting only their desire to publish 
quickly and to make a profit, does not do justice to the difficulties 
faced by scribal editors and their achievement in disseminating the 
Canterbury Tales. 
If we return to the manuscript order, we find that some groupings 
of tales, which violate no final judgment of Chaucer except the doubt­
ful case of geography, suggest patterns of associations at work in the 
text which are not evident in the familiar Ellesmere Order. For exam­
ple, three of the four textual traditions identified by Manly and Rick­
ert place group G, that is, the tales of the second Nun and the 
Canon's Yeoman, after the Franklin's Tale and before the Physician's 
Tale. Many manuscripts preserve a provisional ordering of the tales of 
groups E and F, that is, the tales of Squire, Franklin, Clerk, and 
Merchant, made in early manuscripts before the authoritative forms 
of the links became available. Without exhausting the subject, we may 
suggest here the valuable new perspectives on the Canterbury stories 
which these alternative combinations of tales, familiar to many 
fifteenth-century readers, provide.35 
The position of the tales of Cecilia and the avaricious priest between 
the tales of Franklin and Physician provides a focus of theme and 
imagery which bridges the gap between, on the one hand, the tales of 
marriage commonly supposed to reach their culmination with the 
Franklin and, on the other, the tales on a variety of subjects compris­
ing groups C and the lengthy B2. The tales of group G juxtapose the 
pursuit of a virgin and the pursuit of gold, suggesting a contrast 
between the two activities. The same juxtaposition occurs in group C; 
the Physician narrates the sorrows of Virginia, the beset virgin child, 
and the Pardoner tells the story of the three gamblers in pursuit of 
gold. The two themes of winning a woman's love and pursuing wealth 
are combined in the next tale, the Shipman's account of a woman's 
success at equating the goods of marriage and the golden goods of 
buying and selling. Finally, the Prioress's Tale becomes the third tale 
of virgin children beset by public dangers in a series of six stories, with 
the alternating tales treating the theme of the avaricious pursuit of 
gold and its death-dealing power. The similarity between the stories 
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of Cecilia and the little clergeoun, and the possible significance of 
Chaucer's inclusion of the two saints' legends, is obscured in the 
Ellesmere Order because they are separated by the lengthy group B2. 
In sum, it seems probable that the placement of group G before the 
Physician's Tale was prompted by a recognition on the manuscript 
editor's part that such positioning revealed the thematic unity draw­
ing these tales together. It may be noted, as well, that a juxtapositional 
connection between the amorous pursuits of women and the avari­
cious pursuit of gold, suggested by group G, might be helpful in ex­
plaining the appearance of the tales of the Friar and Summoner 
among the tales of marriage in groups D and E. 
Another very frequent variation from the familiar Ellesmere Order 
occurs with the splitting and rearrangement of groups E and F 
around group D. The order of the tales becomes Man of Law, Squire, 
Merchant, Wife of Bath, Friar, Summoner, Clerk, and Franklin. One 
benefit of this rearrangement is that the Wife ofBath's Tale, rather than 
her prologue, is given new prominence as the third story in which 
magical occurrences surround courtship and marriage. The magical 
tools of perception in the Squire's Tale give the heroine the means of 
learning the tercelet's sad lesson of trusting too much to a lover's 
promises; both in the fairyland atmosphere and in its theme of being 
able to see rightly the true desires and intentions of the opposite sex, 
the Squire's Tale is closely related to the Wife of Bath's, a connection 
hidden by the Ellesmere Order. The Merchant's Tale prepares both 
for the magical story of the Wife and her own lusty career with its 
narrative of May's treetop romance preserved by the intercession of 
the magical Pluto and Proserpina. Placing the Squire's Tale closer to 
the tale of the Wife of Bath brings to light the significance of her 
story, generally neglected in the studies of the marriage group in 
favor of the Wife herself and her experiences. It also serves to em­
phasize the themes of magical seeing and deception in love, which link 
together the stories of the Squire, the Merchant, the Wife of Bath, 
and the Franklin. Another benefit of the arrangement is to force the 
reader to weigh the various points of view on marriage against one 
another more carefully: a juxtaposition of the tales of the Clerk and 
the Franklin makes a total acceptance or rejection of either Walter's 
authoritarianism or Arveragus's surrender impossible. 
These two medieval proposals for reordering and grouping certain 
of the Canterbury Tales are but examples of a great many which the 
manuscripts preserve. Another, clearly Chaucer's own, is the first 
fragment itself, whose series of Knight's, Miller's, Reeve's, and Cook's 
Medieval Notions of Structure / 103 
tales is universally recognized as thematically coherent and logically 
ordered. Efforts to discover similar clusters of tales grouped about a 
common subject have yielded important readings, as in Bruce Rosen­
berg's discussion of the tales of group G and Penn Szittya's discussion 
of structural similarities linking the tales of the Wife of Bath and the 
Friar.36 Such an approach to understanding the arrangement of the 
tales places primary emphasis on content, on what is being discussed; 
each section of the poem—tale, prologue, enclosed digression, or 
whatever—is examined for its mutually informing relations with the 
material around it. This approach, in the light both of medieval edito­
rial procedure and of the clear intention of Chaucer's first fragment, 
is historically correct. 
By contrast, the importance of geography as a clue to the final 
intended arrangement of the Canterbury Tales is questionable for a 
number of reasons. First, the evidence from geography is limited; 
references to time and place on the journey occur only rarely in the 
links and seem to be there more as local color than as direction of the 
storytellings.37 Second, the evidence from geography admits a 
number of contradictory constructions. Efforts to explain the tales as 
making up a trip to Canterbury cannot resolve the evidence, remain­
ing in the text, that Chaucer was still considering the possibility of 
giving every pilgrim more than one tale (IX [H] 9-29). Some time 
conflicts, such as the juxtaposition of the Manciple's brief morning 
tale followed immediately by the Parson's afternoon tale (X [I] 2-5), 
remain, even after group B2 is relocated in accordance with the Brad­
shaw Shift. The evidence of geography has permitted other scholars 
to argue that we have in the tales the remnants of a two-way journey. 
The principal challenge to this theory in the text is Chaucer's elabo­
rate endpiece of the Parson's Tale, clearly identified with the coming 
to Canterbury. The drawback of arguing from geography, common 
to both the Bradshaw Shift and to proposals of a two-way journey, is 
that geography does not answer all the questions of arrangement 
which remain after the evidence of a geographical reference is fully 
correlated.38 The placement of some fragments remains the work of 
editorial hypothesis, rather than the determination of Chaucer's de­
scription of the journey. Third, geography is suspect because early 
editors take so little notice of it; we realize here that we are reversing 
the usual direction of this relationship, but we think with good reason. 
To modern readers, accustomed to think of Chaucer as a genius 
unappreciated in his own time, the geographical references have be­
come a proof of a narrative plot, structured by the realistic material of 
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the actual road to Canterbury, and almost lost to us because of the 
blunted sensibilities of Chaucer's first readers. It is argued that 
Chaucer never would have permitted errors in geography, because he 
knew the geography so well; yet Chaucer's contemporaries surely 
were equally well acquainted with the road to Canterbury from Lon­
don and would have been more disturbed than we are by inaccuracies 
of this kind, if such inaccuracies were really to be judged important. 
Both J. S. P. Tatlock and Germaine Dempster argue that early scribal 
editors willingly sacrificed accurate transmission of the poem for the 
sake of better sales;39 scribes frequently departed from their exem­
plars for the purpose of giving the text a surface appearance of com­
pleteness. Several manuscripts manufacture links to connect tales 
which are not joined, or to introduce tales without prologue material 
naming and introducing the speaker. Yet, in both alterations of links 
and manufacture of links, no medieval editor of the poem improved 
geography to give the poem an appearance of being finished, despite 
the fact that their readers obviously were closer than modern readers 
to the geographical facts, and more likely to be sensitive to them if 
they had been important.40 For all these reasons we would explain the 
geographical references in the links as merely realistic details, in­
serted provisionally to flesh out Chaucer's frame story, and perhaps 
to be polished in a final revision which never took place. With Manly 
and Rickert, then, we would call it a probability that "in making allu­
sions to time and place he [Chaucer] may have been guided by the 
needs of the moment, as Shakespeare was in his allusions to time, and 
not have considered carefully whether these allusions would fit into his 
general plan or would harmonize with one another."41 
In absolute terms, moreover, the sequence of place names between 
London and Canterbury forms no plausible mnemonic series, either 
for medieval or for modern sensibilities. The art of memory practiced 
in the Middle Ages, and derived substantially from the Rhetorica ad 
Herennium, specifies images in places, not times; and universal human 
experience confirms the fact that it is far easier to remember a 
number of items in correct order if they are composed in a single 
visual space than if they are ordered in time. The geographical order­
ing of the Canterbury Tales is not so much based on any temporal 
experience of the journey, medieval or modern, as it is on the modern 
scholar's access to reliable maps—that is, to a visual mnemonic for his 
material. One may make a journey many times, and may know every 
town along the way, and still not be able to name them in order42— 
the senior author remains to this day uncertain whether Cookeville or 
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Crossville, Tennessee, comes first on the way from Nashville to 
Asheville, and that after having made the preinterstate round trip 
once a year for twenty-five years, and with the aid of maps. We there­
fore conclude that any ordering of the Canterbury Tales based on 
allusions to place names is implausible both on medieval and on abso­
lute grounds, and we therefore do not consult geographical refer­
ences as evidence for the proper sequence of tales. 
The order of tales which we propose is set forth in the following 
table, which includes also, for contrast, the Ellesmere Order, and, 
opposite each juxtaposition of fragments which we propose, the name 
of the manuscript or manuscripts which agree with it.43 In the rest of 
this chapter, we will consider the four groups which this order gener­
ates, their relation to one another, and their significance, in the light 
of Ovid's carmen perpetuum, as an ordered set of groups. In part 2 of 
this study, we will make a detailed reading of all the tales, following 
this new order. 
With the tales thus ordered, we can begin to see the full complexity 
of the unity they achieve. The fundamental movement is one which 
begins in order, meets challenge by struggle, and finally reinstates 
order and understands it; this pattern receives full and stately defini­
tion in the Knight's Tale, to whose parts the four groups serially corre­
spond. Then, echoing Ovid's chronological carmen perpetuum, the in­
cipit tales of each of the four groups, taken as a series, define a 
pagan-to-Christian chronology, from pagan Athens to the early 
Christian St. Cecilia and the established imperial Christianity of Con­
stance to the high medieval child saint of the Prioress's Tale. More 
important, the four kinds of metamorphoses of the commentators are 
adapted to the four steps of the action, and to the four groups which 
reflect and repeat them. In the first great section, fragment A, 
Chaucer examines social orders resting on a variety of systems of 
justice from high to low; the transformations in the section are all 
natural, wrought by men on men. In the section following Chaucer 
adopts the medieval formula for magical changes, under which 
"Things appear to be different, but are really the same."44 Some of the 
magic is the true marvel of saintly life, some of it is the fraud of 
alchemist and magician, and some of it is from faerie—in all of the 
stories Chaucer ties together the problem of true and false sight with 
the problem of a collapse of order through misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation. In the third section Chaucer is concerned with 
moral transformation, and here most strongly he concentrates his 
attention on the image of marriage as the figure of moral combat, 
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both within a person and between persons. Finally, the last tales in 
the Canterbury trip reflect, along with Theseus's speech on order, the 
human effort to regain control of the world through interpreting 
events; this action is linked clearly with the fourth kind of transforma­
tion, the spiritual, with the virtuous descent into hell and, most impor­
tant, with the admonition to interpret earthly changes in terms of 
heavenly truths, which is the burden of the whole of the medieval 
Metamorphoses. 
Thus, Chaucer does not stumble or ramble for lack of structure, as 
many critics have argued when stopped short by the question of the 
whole Canterbury collection. Rather, working from a traditional 
model, he has adapted the moralistic interpretation of the transfor­
mations of Ovid to the problem of the Christian's inability to remain 
constant before God and his neighbors. To underline the relationship 
to the model, and undoubtly because he saw that the manner of 
telling was intimately bound up with Ovid's meaning, he took from 
the Metamorphoses a logic of both large-scale and small-scale design. 
Most significant of all, Chaucer, like Ovid, built his world of trans­
formations on stories. Like Ovid he constructed a history of civiliza­
tion built on its literature, on its great stories. We shall return to the 
significance of such a choice in the Epilogue. Here it is enough to say 
that by such a choice Chaucer was identifying literature with man's 
ability to reorganize his universe again successfully, after sin and 
error had repeatedly thrown it into confusion. In making this choice, 
Chaucer affirms both the ethical significance of story and the story 
quality of ethics. He places a higher value on story than can anyone 
whose categories are merely aesthetic, because he involves them di­
rectly in the real ordering of the moral universe. At the same time, 
because he puts stories at the center of his ethical enterprise, he as­
serts for reality all the decorous qualities which the stories in fact do 
have, and for which readers now tend to have only aesthetic apprecia­
tions. 
In order to show how this structure works, we propose to analyze it 
in two stages. The rest of this chapter will be devoted to the sections as 
such, and to the contrapuntal chronology asserted by their four open­
ing stories. Part 2 of this study will, presuming this larger order, focus 
on the more particular exempla of consuetudo and credulitas with 
which Chaucer accumulates his definitions of human nature and so­
cial order. 
The tales which begin the four sections—that is, the Knight's Tale, 
the Second Nun's Tale, the Man of Law's Tale, and the Prioress's Tale— 
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cover, as we have said, the chronological range which extends from 
pagan times to high medieval Christianity. That is, the tales cover the 
range of history which constitutes the medieval sense of the past. 
Theseus, the virtuous pagan, achieves in story the same predictive order 
for which the Middle Ages prized Virgil and the literally pagan Consola­
tion of Boethius. Like them, he qualifies as one of John of Salisbury's 
giants, on whose shoulders the Christians of a later age achieve their 
vision. As a pagan, he is preliminary, but assimilable; possessed of 
incomplete truth, he is yet one of the foundations on which later 
providential history could be built. The Second Nun's Tale of St. Cecilia 
deals with the era of primitive Christianity, and therefore with the 
saintly paradigm which defines the ideal of individual life. Within the 
social order governed by the pagan successors of Theseus, she inserts 
a dialectic of personal holiness before which it is by definition incom­
plete, and in confrontation with which it falls into sin and eventual 
defeat. Here, more than anywhere else in the Canterbury Tales, we 
have the intrusive presence of the transcendental ideal; here, and not 
in the Parson's Tale, is the heavenly presence. It is here, we think, in 
order to confront the social order—that is, it is here, representing its 
crucial point in salvation history, in order to set in motion an interac­
tion between heavenly definition and earthly particular fact, which 
the Tales as a whole collection will apply to the definition of earthly 
and provisional orders. Following up this interaction, the Man of Law's 
Tale presents a Christian emperor's daughter, born into a social order 
now imperially Christian, in confrontation with the pagan borders. 
Once she fails and once she succeeds; the eventual result, with the help 
of Providence, is the expansion of the Christian social order. Finally, 
the Prioress's Tale presents the Christian social order in conflict with an 
internal alien.45 In all three of these Christian situations, the burden 
of the definition is carried by an individual—in two cases they are true 
saints, and in the third, an exemplary, saintly person. Two are women, 
and the third is a child—all, in a sense, are innocents. All are more acted 
upon than active; all represent that ideal of Christian patience amid the 
circumstances of a less-than-perfect world which is the truest posture 
of any individual. 
Cumulatively, they define a progress which defines the social order 
as well. The order of Theseus is pagan, but noble; subject to attack, 
but ultimately in a Boethian posture which is immune to absolute 
disaster. Under the onslaught of personal holiness, this order at first 
falls into opposition, but finally achieves affirmation, in the cult of 
the little clergeoun. Here it is important to avoid being misled, on the 
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one hand, by a too modern and too sentimental revulsion at an anti-
Semitic pogrom, and too naively historicist a willingness to accept the 
slaughter in the ghetto as an ideological convention indulged by a 
society which was not living with real Jews at the time anyway. The 
truth is something in between, in a society which is Christian, but 
imperfect; which desires to praise the Virgin, but does not know the 
meaning of the words; which sustains an alien presence in its midst 
for the sake of "foule usure and lucre of vileynye," (VII 491 [B21681]) 
but which must then deal with those aliens "with torment and with 
shameful deeth" (VII 628 [B2 1818]). It is, in short, a society which 
needs, and gets, the benefit of occasional miracles, such as this child­
ish postmortem singing, which both remind people of the mercies of 
God and provide a sainted means of obtaining them. Thus, the social 
ordering which began under the rule of Saturn, whose results were 
neat but ironic and beyond the calculation of even noble men, ends 
here in an ordinary, compromised but working society disordered by 
simple greed and reordered, provisionally, by a pious child and an in­
trusive miracle. The conclusion which these four incipit tales implies is 
that society is only a provisional good, but one to be taken seriously; 
not heaven, but something for the sake of which heaven exerts itself 
and its powers. This conclusion, as we shall see, is one which the whole 
series of tales both confirms and richly defines. 
1. Nims, Poetria Nova, pp. 18 ff.; Faral, Les arts poetiques, pp. 200 ff. Com­
mentary treatment is consonant; for example, the material of the Thebaid is 
analysed as follows: "Notandum quod ordo alius naturalis, alius artificialis. 
Ordo naturalis est rerum gestarum expositio, secundum eundem ordinem 
quo geste sunt, ut quod primum fit, primo loco narretur, quod statim post, 
secundo loco, et ita deinceps. Artificialis ordo est quando rerum gestarum fit 
prepostera expositio, quando quod primum fit, secundo narratur loco, quod 
secundo, primo exponitur, et hoc ordine hie utitur autor. Nam incipit ubi 
Edippus precatum suum recognovit de patre interfecto, de matre violata, et 
sibi ipsi oculos excecavit. Unde ait: Impia iam merita scrutatus lumina dextra. 
Ibi, inquam, incepit cum multa precessissent que summatim et satis oratorie 
declarat autor. Vere multa precesserunt. Nam primum rapta fuit Europa a 
love mutato in speciem tauri. Deinde Cadmus exulavit responsum in parnaso 
accepit, vaccam videns Thebas condidit, in serpentem vertit. Filii sui scilicet 
athamas et pentheus regnaverunt usque ad Layum. Hunc Edippus eius filius 
occidit, matrem eius Iocastam nomine in uxorem duxit, ex qua pignora susce­
pit, quo comperto sibi oculos excecavit, et ab hoc puncto Statius incipit, quod 
fere ultimo loco gestum erat" (Venice, Biblioteca Marciana MS lat XII. 61 (4097), 
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fols. lv-2r). "It must be understood that there is one order which is natural and 
another which is artificial. The natural order is the presentation of events, ac­
cording to the same order in which they were done, so that what was first, is nar­
rated in the first place, what happened immediately after, in the second place, 
and so on in order. The artificial order of events is inverted, when what was first 
is narrated in the second place, what was second is placed first, and the author 
uses this order here. For the story begins when Oedipus ended his search with 
father dead, mother violated, and he blinded himself. Thus, he said: 'He 
probed his sinful eyes with an avenging hand.' There, I say, the author began 
although many things had gone before which he declares briefly as sufficient 
for its statement. Truly many things had happened before. For first Europa 
was carried off by Jove changed into the shape of a bull. Then Cadmus was 
banished, accepted the command from Parnassus, seeing the cow founded 
Thebes, and turned into a snake. His sons, that is, Athamas and Pentheus, 
reigned until Laius. Oedipus, his son, killed him, took his own mother, Iocasta 
by name, in marriage, from whom he received pledges of love. When he discov­
ered these things, he blinded his own eyes, and from this point Statius begins, 
which happened almost last." It is most significant that the commentator 
should feel it necessary to begin the story so far back, with Cadmus; obviously, 
the material itself is seen as having a canonical shape and content, which any 
given poet may adapt, but only by deliberate "artificiality." 
2. Traugott Lawler, trans., The Parisiana Poetria of John of Garland (Yale, 
1974), pp. 58-59. 
3. Allen, "Commentary as Criticism." 
4. The commentator's attitude is clearly betrayed in this gloss on a section 
of book 1 of the Thebaid: "Hoc est capitulum quintum huius primi libri in quo 
continentur narrationes adrasti et primo facit suam narrationem ad istos, 
secundo interrogationem sive directionem sermonis. postquam: Modo incipit 
narrare et dividitur hec pars in tot quot sunt ea que narrat sive quot sunt 
membra huius narracionis." "This is the fifth chapter of this first book in 
which are contained the narratives of Adrastus; first he tells his narrative, 
second he [poses] the question or point of the speech. Postquam; Now [i.e., at 
this lemma] he begins to narrate and this part is divided into as many things as 
there are things he tells—the narrative is divided into as many members as it 
is." Such language ceases to be circular as soon as one grants that the narra­
tion really does have an essence, intrinsically divisible into so many parts. The 
commentator's job is not hermeneutic, but simply reporting, even though 
what the medieval commentator in fact does often seems to us exegesis. 
5. The difference is that working with medieval patterns, it is almost always 
unwise to trust to unconscious, archetypal, personalist, or other modern as­
socjations of one's own. Formally and structurally, medieval handling of 
meanings and the associations which meaning made possible was quite similar 
to the forms and structures now relegated to the unconscious and its 
"nonscientific" relations; but the specific associations which were in fact made 
had an explicit conscious statement and were thought at the time to have 
been made rationally and reasonably, on a true ontological base. We must 
therefore proceed in terms of associations which they actually made, as well as 
in terms of their associative logic. 
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6. Venice, Biblioteca Marciana MS lat. XII. 61 (4097), fol. 2r. "It must be 
noted that it is laid down sufficiently as in a certain preface, by dividing briefly 
into three parts, that is, into a proposition, invocation, and narrative, by 
following elegantly the duties of the beginnings. For a preface makes readers 
well disposed, docile, and attentive. He proposes where he says, 'Fraternal 
battlegrounds,' and then he makes them there docile. He invokes where he 
says, 'Whence you will judge, etc.,' and there he make them attentive. He 
narrates there, 'Unworthy ones now with a righteous [hand],' and 
there he make them well disposed. Or he proposes there concerning what 
thing he is about to say. There, where he invokes, they are attentive as they 
are well disposed. For then, in that way, the manner of treating is shown, and 
in the manner of treating the readers are always well disposed. But in the 
narration they are docile." The reference to modus tractandi in this context is 
most unusual; it probably means that a reader would be expected to be most 
receptive to a book after he knew its discursive genre—i.e., whether it in­
tended to prove, refute, define, or whatever. 
7. Ghisalberti, "Giovanni," p. 19. "After these things let us come briefly to 
the division of the book. I say therefore that this book is divided after the 
manner of poetry into three parts, because first it proposes, then it makes an 
invocation, and third it narrates." 
8. Assisi, Biblioteca Communale MS 302, fol. 6r. "It should be known that 
the author in the manner of the poets makes a prologue in which he proposes 
also the material he will present. Second, the author also invokes, first in 
general there, 'Whence you will judge of the wrath of the goddess,' and 
second particularly there, 'Which of the heroes will you give first, Clio?' In the 
general invocation he raises two questions or inquiries: the first is whether he 
ought to begin from the remote ancestors of the Thebans and the city's first 
founders by setting out its ancient history which preceded the point the au­
thor intends to describe, and this question he resolves there: 'a long sequence 
backwards.' The second question is with whom he ought to begin. There were 
many who were related to this subject, and he asks whether he should begin 
with the pious or with the cruel. Resolving this question he begins from the 
impious, that is, with Oedipus, that is, the house and family of Oedipus." 
9. Two studies of Geoffrey's rhetorical works now in progress at the Uni­
versity of Toronto promise to contribute significantly to our understanding of 
medieval poetic theory. Margaret F. Nims is editing a new, and lengthier, 
version of the Documentum de modo et arte dictandi et versificandi. One version of 
this work is included in Faral, Les arts poetiques. Marjorie Curry Woods's 
editing of the versions of the earliest known commentary on Poetria Nova for 
her dissertation is "The In principio huius libri Type A Commentary on Geof­
frey of Vinsauf s Poetria Nova: Text and Analysis" (University of Toronto, 
1977). She will follow this with a study of the commentary tradition as a 
whole. Half of the two hundred manuscripts of the Poetria Nova have com­
mentaries and marginal notes. 
10. Assisi, Biblioteca Communale MS 309, fol. 2r. "By a first division the 
book, therefore, is divided into two parts, that is, a prologue and a treatise, 
that begins 'If someone has to found a house,' because in prologues poets are 
accustomed to invoke and propose, but in the treatise to narrate what they are 
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setting out. Next the prologue is divided into two parts. And note that I have 
said 'prologue,' and not into a 'prohennium' and treatise, because as Aristotle 
says in the third book of the Rhetoric, 'prohennium' is the beginning of a 
speech just as a prologue is the beginning in poetry and a prelude in a song, 
from which it is apparent that when the author draws on poetry or on poetic 
art and we are treating poetry, on account of what has already been said, the 
part of the discourse should rightly be called a 'prologue,' although it is 
possible to be called a 'prohennium,' when speaking colloquially, since these 
things are the same with respect to substance and are not different except by 
mental distinction." This manuscript is the fullest commentary on the Poetria 
Nova yet identified; it seems to have two accessus, not quite duplicates of one 
another—one at the beginning and the other at the end. 
11. Donald R. Howard, "The Canterbury Tales: Memory and Form," ELH 
38 (1971): 319-28. The work which makes all this possible, of course, is 
Frances Yates's The Art of Memory (Penguin, 1969). 
12. Howard, "Memory and Form," pp. 323-25. 
13. For further discussion see Beryl Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the 
Middle Ages, p. 246, and the bibliography there listed. Cf. also Lynn 
Thorndike, "Unde Versus," Traditio 11 (1955): 163-92. 
14. Among the things which "anima dicitur" in Hugh's distinctio on the 
topic are "vita hominis," "totus homo," and, most useful for our purposes 
here, "status hominis" {Opera Omnia [Venice, 1732], vol. 2, fol. 82rb). 
15. A medieval form of the proverb is listed in Proverbs, Sentences, and 
Proverbial Phrases, ed. B. J. Whiting (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), p. 61: "When 
the clot klyngueth, and the cucko synguth and the brome sprynguth, then his 
time a youngelyng for to go a wowying." For a discussion of the problem of the 
literary origins of the General Prologue's springtime setting, see Rosemond 
Tuve, "Spring in Chaucer and Before Him," Modern Language Notes 52 
(1937): 9-16. 
16. For a summary of the controversy over the attribution of this letter—a 
controversy which seems to us to exist only because certain critics are so 
opposed on various a priori grounds to what the letter says that they are 
forced to deny Dante's authorship—see Robert Hollander, Allegory in Dante's 
Commedia (Princeton, 1966), pp. 40^11. 
17. The title of Dante Studies I, Commedia: Elements of Structure (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1965), is indicative of Singleton's principal interest in discovering the 
manner in which Dante constructed his poem. See, in particular, the final 
chapter, "The Two Kinds of Allegory," pp. 84-98. 
18. Charles Singleton, "The Irreducible Dove," Comparative Literature 9 
(1957): 129-35. See also the discussion of the complex definition of allegory 
underlying the action of the Commedia, in Hollander, Allegory, passim. 
19. Hollander, Allegory, p. 191. 
20. Ibid., p. 123. 
21. Ibid., p. 59n. 
22. Ibid., pp. 75-76. It is also true that during the period of Dante's own 
life the traditional insistence that figural meanings be applied only to true 
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events, and the related insistence that true or pious exempla were more valid 
than fictional and secular ones, were both beginning to break down, so that by 
mid fourteenth century all kinds of fantasies and marvels were being admit­
ted into sermons and other religious contexts, eventually breaking down en­
tirely the earlier distinction between the allegory of the poets and the allegory 
of the theologians. For documentation and discussion on this point, see Allen, 
The Friar as Critic. 
23. A similar but more pedestrian example of this syncretism is Peter 
Comestor's Historia Scholastica, which interpolates episodes of pagan mythol­
ogy into biblical history (see P.L. 198, cols. 1054-1722). 
24. Hollander, Allegory, p. 74. 
25. The reading which follows was presented by Theresa Moritz in an 
address to the Medieval French section of the Medieval Institute, Kalamazoo, 
Mich., May 1973, "'Nothing Comes from Nothing': The Structure of Jean de 
Meun's Roman de la Rose." 
26. Rosemund Tuve, in Allegorical Imagery (Princeton, 1966), comes closest 
to this perception of Jean de Meun's ironic evocation of the truth through a 
miscellany of erroneous attitudes. We are less convinced by the interpretation 
presented by D. W. Robertson, A Preface to Chaucer (Princeton, 1962), pp. 
361-65, which is followed closely by that of Charles Dahlberg in his introduc­
tion to a translation of the poem, The Romance of the Rose (Princeton, 1971), 
pp. 12-21. An alternative view appears in Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry in 
the Twelfth Century. 
27. Otis, Ovid as an Epic Poet, passim. 
28. For a fuller discussion of the symbolic dimensions of Chaucer's choice 
of four parts, see above, chap. 1, esp. n. 79. 
29. On the superiority of the text as an argument, see Robinson, Works, p. 
xxxvii; for the view that Hengwrt is in many instances textually superior, see 
Germaine Dempster, "Manly's Conception of the Early History of the Canter­
bury Tales," PMLA 61 (1946): 394, and Charles A. Owen, Jr., "The Transfor­
mation of a Frame Story: The Dynamics of Fiction," in Chaucer at Albany, p. 
146. On the widespread adoption of the Ellesmere Order in the a group of 
manuscripts, see John M. Manly and Edith Rickert, The Text of the Canterbury 
Tales (Chicago, 1949), 2:475-95, and Dempster, "Manly's Conception," p. 
396; the Ellesmere Order is discussed with reference to a geographical read­
ing in Donaldson, "The Ordering of the Canterbury Tales," pp. 201-4. On the 
argument from theme, see John Gardner, "The Case Against the Bradshaw 
Shift; or, The Mystery of the Manuscript in the Trunk," Papers in Language 
and Literature 3, supplement (1967): 80-106. 
30. Since no single manuscript contains the order we propose, as a whole, 
it may well be that these partial correspondences are merely accident. But 
they do exist, and so we mention them, well aware that their full significance 
cannot be known until the manuscript evidence has been reconsidered under 
new assumptions. 
31. Both acknowledge, for example, the intelligence and care of the Elles­
mere scribe (Dempster, "Manly's Conception," p. 396). At the same time, 
Dempster customarily finds scribal editors careless and hasty ("A Chapter in the 
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Manuscript History of the Canterbury Tales," PMLA 63 [1948]: 482). Tatlock, 
"The Canterbury Tales in 1400," p. 136, defends the authenticity of the 
Hengwrt arrangement but criticizes the "wit" of the editor who put it together 
by a logic of grouping similar stories. 
32. Dempster, "A Chapter," pp. 472-73; Tatlock, "The Canterbury Tales in 
1400," p. 111. 
33. Manly and Rickert describe and provide charts of these groups in The 
Text, 2:475-95. In addition to the articles already cited, Dempster discusses 
these various orders, with an eye to their ancestry, in "A Period in the De­
velopment of the Canterbury Tales Marriage Group and of Blocks B2 and C," 
PMLA 68 (1953): 1142-59; and "The Problem of Tale Order in the Canter­
bury Tales," PMLA 64 (1949): 1123-42. 
34. Tatlock, "The Canterbury Tales in 1400," pp. 110-12, is generally kind­
er than Dempster in his characterization of the efforts of early scribal editors 
to produce good texts; he mentions a number of cases in which blanks are left 
for tales not at the time available, or in which words that cannot be made out 
in exemplars are omitted in the copying of new manuscripts. 
35. Several manuscripts, including some of the groups c and d, preserve 
the early tradition of grouping these tales, and providing appropriate links, in 
a manner different from Chaucer's final plan for the tales, clearly indicated 
by their pairings through linking material. The problem of this sequence is 
discussed by Dempster, "Manly's Conception," p. 394. 
36. Rosenberg, "The Contrary Tales of the Second Nun and the Canon's 
Yeoman," pp. 278-91; Szittya, "The Green Yeoman as Loathly Lady,"pp. 
386-94; and several other studies of similar type devoted to various frag­
ments: for a partial list, see above, chap. 1, n. 38. To the same end, but with 
more self-conscious use of medieval critical structures, Glending Olson's 
"Fragment VIII of the Canterbury Tales," presented to the Kalamazoo me­
dieval conference of 1979, shows that the fragment is a unit illustrating what 
can properly be called a single medieval distinctio. 
37. Many tales begin without even an identification of the speaker, in the 
conversational style familiar from the Monk's Prologue; others have only a 
reference to time, as in the important case of the Man ofLaw's Tale. Still others 
depend not on any reference to geography, or time, but on some interruption 
or controversy arising during the journey, as in the Franklin's succession to 
the Squire, or the logic by which the Friar and the Summoner follow the Wife 
of Bath. 
38. C. Robert Kase, "Observations of the Shifting Position of Groups G and 
DE in the Manuscripts of the Canterbury Tales," Three Canterbury Studies (New 
York, 1932), pp. 3-89; cf. also Charles A. Owen, Jr., "The Plan of the Canter­
bury Pilgrimage,"PLMA 66 (1951): 820-26, who combines the evidence of 
geography with an argument by thematic appropriateness. 
39. Dempster, "A Chapter," pp. 472-73, and elsewhere in her many arti­
cles on the subject; Tatlock, "The Canterbury Tales in 1400,"p. 129. 
40. Sir William McCormick and Janet E. Heseltine, The Manuscripts of 
Chaucer's "Canterbury Tales": A Critical Description of Their Contents (Oxford, 
1933), pp. xxv-xxviii, give a list of the spurious links, and their texts are 
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available by manuscript in the body of the book. None of these spurious links 
introduces any geographical allusion to pinpoint a story or to give a sense of 
completing an essential aspect of the original work; the majority of them 
perform the task of introducing the speaker by name, a conventional rhetori­
cal device for a prologue, and on occasion refer to a possible subject for a 
story. 
41. Manly and Rickert, The Text, 2:491. 
42. One may of course memorize any arbitrary series of names, as Sunday 
school children learn the books of the Bible, and as commuters may learn to 
repeat the conductor's singsong of stations. But such series are learned as 
unified patterns of sound, not as a set of discrete experiences in time. Had 
Chaucer let the Host name all the towns along the way in one batch, then 
subsequent allusion to them might have been significant. But he did not. 
43. The table presents, in brief, a comparison between the order we pro­
pose and the most familiar arrangement of tales, the Ellesmere Order. The 
right-hand column mentions some of the principal manuscript justifications 
for the new connections between the established fragments. See the following 
discussion, along with notes, for a fuller treatment of each of these significant 
connections in the proposed order. To summarize the changes we propose: 
the Man of Law's Tale moves down to a position before the Clerk's Tale, to 
open a group of stories on marriage. Groups III, IV, V, and VI are rear­
ranged, with IV moving down along with the Man of Law's Tale to form a 
marriage sequence. Group VIII (G) becomes the new source of a serious 
theme following the Cook's Tale, followed by groups V, III, and VI, in that 
order. These changes are completed by moving the Manciple's Tale into the 
marriage group, which leaves group B2 immediately before the Parson's Tale. 
44. See above, chapter 1. 
45. It may have been noted that in our ordering, all the proposed major 
groups begin a fragment except the last. Here, Chaucer has provided what 
seems to us an internal clue: in the epilogue of the Shipman's Tale, the Host 
says: "But now passe over, and lat us seke aboute,/Who shal now telle first of 
al this route/Another tale" (VII 443-15 [B2 1633-35]). In so doing, with 
explicit reference to "first of al this route," Chaucer underlines in stronger 
terms than anywhere else in the links an impression of new beginning. 
Doubtless there would have been more such hints of large structure had all 
the fragments received their final editorial joining; here, at least, the under­
lining of a major division happily reinforces what seems apparent from the 
stories themselves. 
PART TWO 
A Reading of the Tales 

The Natural Group 
In this chapter we shall begin to present the tales of Chaucer's Can­
terbury collection as a normative array of exempla, which accumulate 
a definition of the good human society. Both their plots and the 
society they define are founded, maintained, and informed by 
words—founded on a responsible exchange of vows or promises, 
maintained by faithful adherence to those promises, and informed by 
the memory of past moral action, preserved as narrative. The power 
of words to interpret and direct life is therefore implicitly the focal 
interest of the Canterbury Tales, both in its exploration of the validity 
of fiction and in its preoccupation with marriage as the representative 
human situation. Stories bring the past under man's control by pre­
senting it in a form which both preserves and values the experiences 
of the race, and so makes it possible to learn from them. Promises 
share with stories their ability to describe and determine the future, 
because they establish the intentional limits within which action is to 
be performed and judged. We have seen, in part, what can happen 
when these stories and promises are misunderstood or misappro­
priated, because we have confronted the literary misunderstandings 
of Chaucer's pilgrims. In this part we will deal with further misun­
derstandings, misappropriations, and misbehaviors, along with much 
that is actually good and right, as we read the entire series of pro­
logues and tales as an ordered array of exempla. In this array the 
quality which Chaucer prizes in both stories and promises is the power 
they hold over the future; bad beginnings, he shows us repeatedly, 
make bad, or absurdly and ironically good, ends, but good begin­
nings, whether they come from reading a story or making a promise, 
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are a foundation for good conclusions. His stories enact promises, and 
their consequences, and so help us both to formulate and to enact our 
own. 
The reading which follows differs visibly from previous analyses, 
both in its unconventional ordering and in its linear method. The 
ordering is intended to emphasize the unifying associations which 
relate tale to tale. The linear procedure, which reads tales and pro­
logues in order at the same level, as parts in series of the same moral 
discourse, not only has the pragmatic value of permitting richer in­
sights into the meaning of Chaucer's text, but also has the advantage 
of following both the example of medieval commentary and the rec­
ommendation of medieval writing manuals. Necessarily, therefore, 
our reading differs from previous ones also in its results. Trusting 
one tale to inform the next leads us to emphasize details previously 
passed over and to differ from precedent in many details of inter­
pretation. We challenge traditional readings of a number of tales 
previously taken as Chaucer's straightforward statements on many sub­
jects, including marriage, courtly love, prudential wisdom, and Chris­
tian repentance. 
On the other hand, a text may mean more than one thing. Medieval 
commentators regularly react to their sense of the richness of a text by 
making several different and mutually complementary allegoriza­
tions. We do not attempt to exhaust the meaning of every tale, or even 
of any tale, but rather wish to present those aspects of each tale's 
meaning made obvious by the fact of that tale's presence in a collec­
tion, an array. We therefore intend that our reading should be taken 
more often as supplement than as contradiction. But however it is 
taken, it is the only ultimate justification of the method which makes it 
possible. The reading itself, and its ability to offer new insights and 
depths of meaning in the tales and in the whole poem, proves itself by 
its own value. To the extent that it has value, both our medieval 
method and our selection of the particular details which we discuss 
are vindicated. 
We offer no apology for dealing with what stories have in common, 
rather than with stories in isolation; we find no medieval justification 
either for the isolation implied by a story's being taken as a dramatic 
speech with a Jamesian or Browningesque point of view, or for the 
isolation required for a story by Aristotelian or new critical notions of 
aesthetic integrity. In Chaucer's nominalist age, concrete particulars 
are not universalized by virtue of any close aesthetic attention, but 
rather relate to and define universals by having been assembled and 
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arrayed for conceptualization. Chaucer therefore uses his largely bor­
rowed plots, and their various styles and genres, in multiple, testing 
one against the other in the belief that all stories relate to and make 
possible truthful statements about proper moral conduct. His irony is 
not the unstable irony of modern fiction, but rather that medieval 
irony which is one of the kinds of allegory, and one possible expres­
sion of clear moral commitment. His irony is pervasive, not because 
the universe makes no sense, but rather because the predicament of 
all particulars, in themselves, is ironic. Only in groups can particulars 
become true. The very variety of Chaucer's tales helps constitute 
their unity, because this variety arrays them, distinguishes them, in an 
association which can be taken as a whole. 
In the variety of Chaucer's tales, the first group is the one beyond 
all question he designed himself: the tales of the first fragment. We 
have already shown how the Knight's Tale, in its four parts, defines 
Chaucer's whole collection. In addition, of course, it also belongs to 
and begins the first fragment, and thus belongs in the first group, the 
nature group, as well as being paradigm and introduction to the 
whole. In this group we have in social and human terms an analysis of 
contextio elementorum1—the elements, of course, being those human 
beings whose condition is a present potentially liable to vice and a 
future potentially liable to hell. What Chaucer does in this group 
synthesizes the formulas of the Ovidian and the descent-into-hell tra­
dition; he is concerned with defining the authority—or rather 
authorities—by which the social contextio hominum is to be achieved. 
The humanity involved is in a state of nature, not grace. The Athe­
nians and Thebans are literally before Christ; the Miller's carpenter, 
at least, thinks he lives just before the flood; the Reeve's miller defines 
his life by the lawless state most vividly described later by Thomas 
Hobbes; the Cook's pimps are riot. 
Nevertheless, this group of tales also exemplifies, perhaps more 
explicitly than anywhere else in Chaucer's work, the operation of 
justice. We have already seen that Theseus is a just ruler because he 
wisely rules himself, his family, and his state. The authority he im­
poses does not control Saturn, of course, but can make orderly and 
just sense of what Saturn does. The poetic justice of the fact that 
Palamon and Arcite each gets precisely what he has prayed for is 
ironic, but nevertheless neat. With Theseus so firmly and responsibly 
in control of what man can control of society, the work of providence 
seems mere work of fortune, as it often does to pagan eyes. Beyond 
the Knight's Tale the operation of poetic justice becomes more and 
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more obviously fair and less and less merely ironic. As a group, the 
tales become a complex and contrapuntal examination of the relation 
between absolute justice, on the one hand, and the human laws and 
human authorities through which, or in spite of which, it is achieved. 
In these terms one may see the four tales as concerned with, respec­
tively, the imposition of law and justice, the unjust intrusion against 
the law, the imposition of unjust law, and the abolition of law al­
together. In each case there is an authority figure who defines the law, 
or his posture toward it, in a way which makes claims on society: 
Theseus rules, both Nicholas and his carpenter host expect to intrude 
into higher places than they own, the dishonest miller affirms theft as 
the law of his life, and the master of apprentices and the husband of 
the swyving wife both abdicate their obligation to make law and order. 
The Cook's Take is unfinished; to this point the operation of poetic 
justice and ordinary human selfishness and self-protection compen­
sates as the law degenerates. It is as if Chaucer is telling us that nature 
cannot endure too much disorder; if man will not rule properly, then 
God will dispose fortune into the balance. 
Saturn, the god of nature, rules the events of the Knight's Tale; it is 
his decision which disposes of the relative claims of Arcite and Pala­
mon and foresees an eventual reconciliation of the quarreling Mars 
and Venus. His presence places the tale in an ambiguous a-Christian 
time, on the one hand a Golden Age of innocence and on the other 
the fallen age after the Garden and before the saving intervention of 
Christ. Saturn's complex double aspect, as, on the one hand, the god 
of human perfection and human justice and, on the other, the god of 
fortune and of wealth—the most pernicious of fortune's weapons—is 
expressed clearly in the tale.2 Chaucer skillfully uses this seemingly 
contradictory figure to express mankind's complex longing for the 
ability to perfect himself, without divine intervention. Saturn presides 
over an age of courtly sentiment and human greatness which seems 
always at the point of achieving perfection—Theseus has settled his 
borders and established an age of peace, administered with justice 
and compassion, from his seat at Athens. He seems to promise, in his 
thirst for the orderly disposition of love and justice, the very Golden 
Age which, for the Middle Ages, had been Saturn's realm.3 On the 
other hand, in practice, Saturn's justice is rude and peremptory; Ar­
cite will win but will not receive the prize; Palamon will be shamed by 
defeat and receive a winner's portion only by default. Saturn's iden­
tification of his activities with the darkest deeds of human life has led 
some critics to think that he is exclusively the evil god of bad fortune.4 
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In fact, Chaucer has struck a traditional balance, weighing the prob­
lem of man's perfectibility against what is his present lot and what he 
might have been had he not sinned. Much as Boethius praises 
Saturn's Golden Age in the midst of his attacks on the tricks of For­
tune,5 so Chaucer presents a two-sided god of nature in Saturn. 
Saturn rules a society which is in the state of nature, whose homely 
and earthly virtues are an enticing end in themselves for most 
readers. There is struggle, but it is in the cause of wedding justice and 
love, as Jean de Meun had said the Golden Age also achieved. But, on 
closer examination, this social order is not perfect, because it lacks the 
divinely given perspective of salvation history. Human justice, without 
Christ, is the imperfect institution which Jean de Meun found ruling 
the world and which Chaucer ridicules more and more evidently as 
the first fragment develops. Theseus takes the first step outside the 
Garden of Saturn when he appeals to Jupiter as the order-giver and 
planner of the universe, whose schemes are outside the control or 
comprehension of man, but still to be trusted. In doing so, he lays the 
groundwork for the search to understand which will occupy the re­
mainder of the tales, and particularly the final great section devoted 
to interpretation. It is only a more perfect interpretation of the world 
which can draw back Saturn's golden mask and reveal behind it the 
ugly face of Fortune.6 
The Knight's Tale ends with a marriage; Theseus calls the arrange­
ment his "accord" (I [A] 3081). The Knight's final judgment is ap­
proving: 
For now is Palamon in alle wele, 
Lyvynge in blisse, in richesse, and in heele, 
And Emelye hym loveth so tendrely, 
And he hire serveth al so gentilly, 
That nevere was ther no word him betwene 
Of jalousie or any oother teene. 
(I [A] 3101-6) 
But there will be both words of jealousy and other "teene," at least as 
far as this social institution is concerned. Chaucer gives us a marriage 
as the fundamental social arrangement of mankind—as the result of 
the rule of Theseus—not because it is perfect, but because marriage is 
the example through which Chaucer will examine social order in 
general. 
Tberefore, all the rest of the stories of the natural group emphasize 
a challenge to a householder's authority over his family. Weddings 
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make households, and the conventional phrase "and they lived hap­
pily ever after" covers all the more interesting possibilities for trouble 
and success in human life. Nowhere outside these first tales of the 
Miller, Reeve, and Cook is the pattern of conflict established in the 
Knight's Tale so thoroughly reproduced.7 Just as the kingdom of 
Theseus is disturbed by the presence of Palamon and Arcite, so the 
households of John and Symkyn are each shaken by the intrusions of 
two young men whose efforts to undermine the authority of the head 
of the house include sexual conquests of the family's female member 
or members. The proper dominance of husband and father in each 
story following the Knight's is compromised by the cunning of young 
lovers; in each, the father figure is discomfited. Throughout the 
group, even in the fragment of the Cook's Tale, a man in authority 
takes into his house potentially disruptive forces, trusting to his own 
presence and power to keep order.8 Theseus succeeds; the others, 
whose bases for authority are progressively lower than his, fail. But 
whether the authority figure succeeds, fails, or makes disorder his 
order, the tales as such are about the variety of human attacks on this 
authority—various efforts to overturn human organizations, thus 
exemplifying the natural changes which are the subject of the first in 
the four groups. 
The stories of the first fragment concentrate on the ramifications of 
the situation which opens the Knight's Tale: that is, Theseus's conquest 
of Thebes and his imprisonment of Palamon and Arcite. The Miller's 
Tale opens with a newly wedded couple who provide lodgings for a 
young clerk. There is an even closer parallel in the Reeve's Tale, when 
Symkyn, after duping the clerks, John and Aleyn, accepts them as 
house guests for the night. But the wisdom of Theseus in jailing the 
last disruptive power of Thebes is contrasted with John the carpen­
ter's foolishly harboring the cause of his undoing in the same "narwe 
cage" in which he guards his Alisoun; the same lack of foresight, 
compounded by proud self-reliance in Symkyn's case, causes the mil­
ler to house the enemies he has bested in his own bedroom. Even the 
Cook's Tale promises a similar situation: 
Anon he sente his bed and his array

Unto a compeer of his owene sort,

That lovede dys, and revel, and disport,

And hadde a wyf that heeld for contenance

A shoppe, and swyved for hir sustenance.

(I [A] 4418-22) 
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The stories after the Knight's Tale differ in their approach to this 
beginning: the possibilities they examine descend from the rightful 
exercise of authority by Theseus through the ignorant hysteria of 
John to the pride of Symkyn. The reign of Theseus expresses honest, 
intelligent efforts to control life or, if not to control, at least to under­
stand its providential workings. But the old carpenter with the "wylde 
and yong" wife helps in the work which undoes him and is unable to 
punish the man who cuckolds him, this task, ironically, being per­
formed by his wife's other suitor. Still, John's ignorance is pitiable, 
and his crime, "that he lovede moore than his lyf," earns him some 
sympathy from us when he is made ridiculous before his neighbors. 
Symkyn, on the other hand, is a thief, and his initial conquest over the 
clerks is accomplished by deceit. Not only is he unable to avenge the 
clerks' swyving, but "Thise clerkes beete hym weel and leye hym lye." 
The "poetic justice" the Reeve points out with great relish provokes a 
readier audience response, because there is nothing sympathetic 
about the proud Symkyn and his wife, the parson's proud daughter. 
An exemplum which is intimately related to these problems of mar­
riage and the administration of justice within that institution is the 
story of Mars and Venus caught in adultery. Within the Knight's Tale 
itself, Mars and Venus may be principally the opposed representatives 
of two incompatible types of temperament, the irascible and the 
passionate. Within the Canterbury collection as a whole there are 
echoes of the adulterous union of the god of war and the goddess of 
love, a romantic alliance for which the pair was certainly more famous 
than as the champions of Palamon and Arcite. In the Knight's Tale 
itself, Arcite invokes Mars as lover: 
Whan that thow usedest for beautee 
Of faire, yonge, fresshe Venus free, 
And haddest hire in armes at thy wille— 
(I [A] 2385-87) 
but recalls the end to this adulterous affair, with the lovers trapped by 
Vulcan "in his las." Saturn's call for a reconciliation between the war­
ring pair some hundred lines later has an ironic ring, in the light of 
Arcite's recollection of their adultery; Chaucer might also have in­
tended an allusion to the matter of Thebes, in which the adulterous 
union produced one of the great plagues of the house of Cadmus, the 
necklace given to Venus's love-child Harmonia by Vulcan.9 On at least 
two other occasions, Chaucer treats the Mars-Venus love affair: first, 
in the Wife of Bath's horoscope,10 and second, in the "Complaint of 
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Mars,"11 which, in the manner of the Ovide moralise, presents an 
elaborate astrological treatment of the encounter between a courtly 
knight and his lady. It is possible that the exemplum is echoed as well 
in the Miller's Tale love triangle of John the craftsman, his young and 
uncontrollable wife, and her courtly, able suitor.12 
The attraction of this exemplum for Chaucer is obvious. It came to 
him treated in many sources and with a variety of meanings. Within 
the Canterbury collection, the manner in which Chaucer manipulates 
this story suggests his method in the larger problem of dealing with 
his many tales of marriage and human relationships. All the possible 
dimensions of the tale, with due respect, or at least humorous atten­
tion, to everyone's point of view, are explored, not for the sake of 
choosing among them, but rather in the hopes that from all of them 
some reasonable conclusions may be drawn about principles and prac­
tice. The one interpretation which Chaucer chooses to present only 
implicitly is the standard moralization, which stressed the dire conse­
quences of sin through the figures of the chains of vicious habit pre­
venting the sinner's escape from his fault.13 Although such a 
moralization might be implied in the career of such incorrigible pur­
suers of their private vices as the Pardoner or the Wife of Bath, still it 
is never stated. Chaucer can rely on his audience to know this allegori­
zation of the chains which bind man habitually to his sins. 
Rather, Chaucer stresses perspectives on the story suggested by its 
affinities to the basic love situation and to the principal interpretations 
of courtly love poetry and of the fabliau. That is, there is a love 
triangle, in which an undesirable husband is faced with a lover for his 
wife. In courtly treatments the worth of the lover is offered as proof 
that his claims to the woman are superior to her husband's. "Who 
regneth now in blysse but Venus,/That hath thys worthy knyght in 
governaunce?" ("The Complaint of Mars," lines 43^14). On the other 
hand, fabliau traditions tend to stress, first, the wife's crafty ability to 
dupe her husband and, second, the uncontrollable drive for sexual 
fulfillment. It is to explain her cupidity that the Wife of Bath men­
tions her astrological profile: 
Venus me yaf my lust, my likerousnesse, 
And Mars yaf me my sturdy hardynesse; 
Myn ascendent was Taur, and Mars therinne. 
(Ill [D] 611-13) 
In much the same way, in the Miller's Tale, the passionate nature of 
Alisoun is explained in a series of animal allusions, which, particularly 
in the figure of the caged bird, suggest the unnatural constraint of 
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marriage on sexual desire.14 From both these traditions, which stress 
the rights of the lovers regardless of the marital claims of the wronged 
husband, Chaucer creates the exemplum of Mars and Venus, which is 
suggested by a number of direct allusions and implicit parallels 
throughout the collection. Within the nature group, the story is an apt 
figure for a wholly unspiritual treatment of the sordid problem of 
adultery. Although it is an incident which concerns the gods entirely, 
it is a story which lends itself readily to treatment as an all-too-human 
situation.15 The lovers meet with no special exercise of divine powers 
and are caught by Vulcan's skill, rather than by divine might. As the 
result of exposure, Mars and Venus continue their affair openly, with 
Vulcan powerless to act. 
By casting special light on the Mars-Venus exemplum, we reveal 
within the Knight's Tale seeds for the discontent to come. Mars and 
Venus signal always the ever-present danger that marriage will be 
undone by discontent, mismanagement, or chance—including the 
appearance of an ideal lover. When Saturn calls on Mars and Venus 
to be reconciled, particularly in the context of the story of Thebes, 
there is a suggestion that we have come full circle, and that the cycle 
will begin again, a new society to be faced with disruptive forces, 
within and without. They are a troublesome discordant note sounding 
against the harmony of wedded bliss forecast by Theseus at the story's 
close. Finally, the figure of Mars and Venus caught in adultery is 
taken up by the remaining stories of the first fragment, repeated and 
elaborated, in a manner which we shall see below characterizes 
Chaucer's method in linking the tales within each of the groups we 
have classified under the headings natural, magical, moral, and 
spiritual. Within the stately harmony of the Knight's Tale, even the 
disruptive clash of Mars and Venus may be restrained; but when we 
pass outside the reign of Theseus, disorder intrudes more and more 
insistently in human affairs. 
The Miller's Tale is an elaborate, outrageous, blasphemous rever­
sal of the proprieties established in the Knight's Tale. The young 
woman being protected by John is not his virgin ward but his own 
wild, lusty wife. Neither the virgin modesty of Emelye nor the queenly 
dignity of Hippolyta survives in this willing wife, whose first protesta­
tions against Nicholas's wooing are changed to words of love in the 
space of a few lines: 
This Nicholas gan mercy for to crye, 
And spak so faire, and profred him so faste, 
That she hir love hym graunted atte laste. 
(I [A] 3288-90) 
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There is nothing of the ethereal goddess in Alisoun, whose discrip­
tion is filled with allusions to animals.16 The young men who seek her 
out are both clerks, both accomplished wooers, whose differences to a 
certain measure parallel the differences between Palamon, the fol­
lower of Venus, and Arcite, the follower of Mars. Absalom trusts to 
words of wooing and love gifts to gain Alisoun, whereas Nicholas is a 
schemer intent on winning the game. Their situations, Nicholas in the 
house and Absalom outside, recall the prison of Palamon and the 
exile of Arcite, but Nicholas's situation gives him opportunity, rather 
than preventing him from reaching the object of his lust.17 John is 
duped into constructing the elaborate equipment which frees Alisoun 
for a night with Nicholas; his constructio evokes, by the medieval doc­
trine of concordance, an analogy with the construction by Theseus of 
the pavilion in which the young men will contend for his ward. The 
exchange of insults between Nicholas and Absalom is a vulgar ex­
change in comparison with the stately tournament between Palamon 
and Arcite, especially because Absalom's actions are dictated by re­
venge. The pathetic end of Arcite, his complaint of fate and forgive­
ness of Palamon, offers a significant contrast to Absalom's bitter de­
termination to strike one final blow when it is evident that he may not 
win the girl for himself. 
The tale ends with all the carpenter's pain turned to a public joke. 
"The folk gan laughen at his fantasye;... And turned al his harm 
unto a jape" (I [A] 3840, 3842). The shame of his situation before his 
neighbors is that he thought the flood was coming; but for the story's 
audience, it is his further shame that his wife has deserted him, and 
that the clerk who won her has been punished for his crime not by her 
husband but by another suitor. The problem of poetic justice posed 
by the disposition of Palamon's and Arcite's claims is raised again 
here. Although the judgment of Saturn determines the ends of each 
suitor, it is Theseus's authority which stages their conflict and steps 
forward to offer the human understanding of events. In the Miller's 
Tale, on the other hand, John's authority has no place in the rivalry 
between Nicholas and Absalom. The settling of their claims with 
Nicholas's punishment and Absalom's revenge, much like Palamon's 
defeat and Arcite's victory, ultimately means little to the award of the 
girl's affections, because Nicholas has already won her, and she is 
already married to John. Further, Nicholas is not punished for his 
real crime, adultery, but rather receives the blow intended for Ali­
soun. Thus, all the merely human intentions are lawless, but their 
result is, by providential accident, just, and the Miller's list of the 
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punished makes of them the comic butts which their deeds deserve. 
But we are left without proper authority; the carpenter, made foolish 
by his lodger, is written off: "The man is wood, my leeve brother" (I 
[A] 3848). From such a conclusion there can come no interpretation 
except laughter: 
Whan folk hadde laughen at this nyce cas 
Of Absolon and hende Nicholas, 
Diverse folk diversely they seyde. 
(I [A] 3855-57) 
It is not so cosmic a laughter as that of Troilus; it is not obviously 
Boethian, and it involves diversity of individual judgment, but never­
theless it does answer to the great Boethian meditation of Theseus. It 
affirms, as does he, that the point of a tale is what one does with it, the 
point of an event is how one reacts to it. The common laughter in 
which these diverse interpretations find expression is the comic ars 
vituperandi, an implicit recognition of the normative.18 John the car­
penter is a bad husband and a bad man; that Nicholas promises him 
Noah's vacant realm is Chaucer's ironic indication that he would have 
been a bad ruler. Nevertheless, there is justice. The ceremony of 
accidents which gave not only both Thebans their prayers and Emelye 
a husband but also Theseus the occasion for a noble speech gives here 
each man his due. 
The Reeve, however, has no use for law. His world, more primitive 
even than the law of revenge, is the world of private revenge, person­
ally inflicted. He takes the law into his own hands and thereby 
abolishes it. As both the Miller's Prologue and his tale exemplify the 
theme of unjust intrusion against the law, so the vengeful, quiting 
Reeve, his hero miller whose only law is that millers must steal, and his 
students, who accomplish a private revenge, all exemplify the theme 
of the imposition of unjust law. In this theme the Reeve's Tale brings 
into sharp focus what had been implicit before. The rule of all these 
tales, in a sense, is quiting—an interruption of the order proposed by 
the Host and conducted under the rule of the self-confessed drunk, 
the Miller. His purpose is to offer a "noble tale for the nones, / With 
which I wol now quite the Knyghtes tale" (I [A] 3126-27). The Cook 
also threatens a quiting, with Harry Bailly, though he postpones it (I 
[A] 4356-61). But what the Miller began within the game, as he 
sought to quite the Knight's story, the Reeve and the Cook continue 
outside the game, as they attempt to quite real people. Although the 
Miller slyly argues that the Reeve cannot be insulted by a story of a 
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cuckolded husband without admitting that he is one, still the Reeve, 
who must announce that he is a carpenter to justify his feeling in­
sulted, is determined to apply the story to himself, and to return insult 
for insult.19 The Miller's intention is to answer nobility, a pageant of 
high seriousness with a burlesque of low comedy. But the ars 
vituperandi, or comedy, is as morally serious as tragedy, the ars 
laudandi, and what quites at one level repeats at another. The Reeve, 
mistaking game for earnest, intends to insult the Miller by relating the 
downfall of another miller. 
The series of tales descends. From the high management of The­
ban disorder to the fool undone by prognostications of a supernatural 
disorder which does not happen, we go to the thief undone by the 
arrogance he asserts in presuming his right to steal. The Miller's Tale 
is a rich, complex answer to the Knight's Tale; the Reeve's Tale is a 
vulgarized looking-glass image of the Theseus, Palamon, and Arcite 
struggle.20 The ruler of this tale is a "theef'; his family is a proud wife, 
a willing daughter, the unawarded daughter of the piece, and a babe 
whose innocent cradle is used in the clerks' cunning plan to outwit 
Symkyn. Unlike Theseus, Symkyn does not award his virgin; she is 
stolen from him, and his wife as well. The shrine of Theseus's lists is 
obscenely parodied in the "places" of the beds, where prayers and 
consummations are combined. John and Aleyn are rivals in love, but 
only in the sense that each wishes equally to have his lust assuaged, in 
one bed or another. Hilarious coincidence eventually intervenes to 
expose what has been going on, to unleash chaos for a time, and to 
bring on the moral summary of punishments. 
Aleyn and John are primarily partners in revenge, not lovers. They 
believe in the law of divine compensation: 
For, John, ther is a lawe that says thus, 
That gif a man in a point be agreved, 
That in another he sal be releved. 
(I [A] 4180-82) 
But they take the law into their own hands, using love as a mere 
instrument of a lower and even more lawless purpose. Love, even 
here, has an integrity of its own. Although it is hardly more than sex 
and is being consciously manipulated for vengeful and selfish pur­
poses, love resists Aleyn's reduction of pleasure to a neutral return for 
value lost. Although his purpose is to cheat the miller, Aleyn parts 
with the miller's daughter fondly, and she has been sufficiently moved 
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to enter willingly into the plan to get the better of her father. Symkyn 
has trained her and so must receive his reward. 
Right at the entree of the dore byhynde

Thou shalt a cake of half a busshel fynde

That was ymaked of thyn owene mele,

Which that I heelp my sire for to stele.

(I [A] 4243-46) 
Thus love does justice. Symkyn's cheating costs him not only his 
honor but the fruit of his deceit, and the clerks' revenge has created a 
relationship which resists reduction. In the same way, the Reeve's 
story as a whole exists as something beyond the intended insult of 
Reeve to Miller. The story is welcomed as a pleasant one; the Cook 
cannot contain his delight with it. The Cook, moreover, gives it the 
right moral—the moral which integrates it properly in the series as a 
whole: 
"Ne bryng nat every man into thyn hous";

For herberwynge by nyghte is perilous.

Wei oghte a man avysed for to be

Whom that he broghte into his pryvetee.

(I [A] 4331-34) 
It is all, from Knight's Tale to Cook's Tale, an "argument of herber­
gage."21 Whatever is taken in must be dealt with—be it Theban 
princes or Amazonian princesses, student lodgers, cheated customers, 
or riotous apprentices. The Reeve's story, as story, is not a mere insult 
at all but a piece of nature, an exemplum of the contextio elementorum 
humanorum, which succeeds in exemplifying justice even in the lives of 
unjust men and unreliable authorities. They are practitioners of sin, 
and they are under threat of damnation, but their descent into hell, 
however natural, is nevertheless exemplary, and therefore both true 
and moral. 
The Cook's Tale, the last of the series, is unfinished. Since the me­
dieval rhetoric of endings was not nearly so elaborated as the tech­
nique of beginnings, Chaucer's having simply stopped should cause 
no trouble. We have neither to speculate about what he might have 
done nor to justify the Cook's Tale as we have it as an organically 
integrated fragment. Rather, we simply note that the situation which 
the Cook defines does fit into what has gone before. It repeats the 
pattern of authority figure, awardable woman, and two males. It con­
fronts the authority figure with a problem of disorder in his house­
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hold. It even ends, as we have it, with the establishment of another 
household. Most important, it is a logically appropriate last statement, 
because it deals with the weakest of authority figures, the least signifi­
cant of kinds of households, and the least orderly of awarded woman 
solutions. That the difference between the king's awarding of a ward 
in marriage and the awarding of a prostitute's favors for an hour is 
morally so large as to be taken as a difference in kind should not 
obscure the fact, more important here, that the two acts are structur­
ally in series, and that the one is indeed a degenerate version of the 
other. Authoritative responsibility for the sexual fate of a woman is 
one of the most important arrangements which society makes—the 
exercise of this authority, in a range of its permutations, is an excel­
lent paradigmatic example of authority in general. Chaucer's ex­
tremes are socially realistic—some people, and some acts, are high, 
and some are very low. 
The authority figure is the master of apprentices. As a teacher he is 
a failure; as a master he endures insubordination and embezzlement 
with increasing discomfort, until finally he simply abdicates his re­
sponsibility. Perkyn, his riotous apprentice, is a lover, a skilled servant 
of fortune with his dice, a sometime prisoner (as were Palamon and 
Arcite), a frequenter of triumphant parades,22 and in the end, a suita­
ble member of a menage a trois. Love is no longer something that a 
man wins, but rather something because of which "wel was the 
wenche with hym myghte meete" (I [A] 4374). Family has been re­
duced to parody, and the duty of awarding the virgin has been trans­
formed into the commerce of selling the whore. 
From the first fragment we gain not only the rich and subtle medi­
ations of the interplay between nature and grace, between God's law 
and poetic justice, provided us by the tales, but also a valuable model 
for understanding the manner in which the groups of stories within 
the Canterbury Tales will work with one another. We have observed a 
close thematic unity, which explores the rule of human justice on the 
earth; Chaucer sets this high ideal in the best light in the Knight's Tale, 
where it brings to mind the medieval longing for the Golden Age, and 
in the worst light in the Reeve's Tale and the unfinished tale of the 
Cook, where, as will happen so often on the journey, love is replaced 
by a reverence for money. We have seen that this thematic unity rests 
firmly on an analogical association of the narrative patterns and 
characterizations to be found in the tales: Palamon and Arcite are 
repeated, a little blurred and a little coarse, in Nicholas and Absolom, 
and in the two young clerks who best the Reeve's corrupt miller; the 
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same with Emelye and Theseus, with motifs of imagery and incident, 
with the final resolution of the action, all the things we have set forth 
in this chapter. We have taken note, as well, of the strong sense of 
descending order in the arrangement of the tales, from an ideal 
statement of Chaucer's theme—justice in the natural order of human 
society—to its debasements in the hands of sinful men. These three 
qualities of a story group, its close thematic unity, the binding of the 
tales by analogical association, and a descent in ideals and harmony 
from first tale to last, will all be observed in the other groups of tales 
discussed in the following chapters—the tales of magic, of morality, 
and of interpretation. 
1. The phrase which for Ovid defined natural changes. Of all the tales, the 
Knight's is perhaps the most elaborately and elegantly treated by scholars. We 
are particularly indebted to the following works: Muscatine, Chaucer and the 
French Tradition'; Stokoe, "Structure and Intention"; Joseph, "Chaucerian 
'Game'"; and Leyerle, "The Heart and the Chain." 
2. Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl, Saturn and Melan­
choly (London, 1964), trace the various traditions of the god in astrology, art, 
mythography, and so forth. They find in Chaucer, Gower, and Lydgate 
examples of the double-sided medieval view of the god, but they suggest that 
this is due more to a confusing tradition than to an artistic insight into the 
related aspects of the god's character; in particular, they cite the Knight's Tale 
portrait of Saturn as an example of "the cold, leaden, destructive, planetary 
god" (p. 193). On Saturn as the god of gold and wealth, see pp. 179 ff. 
3. As we have already seen, in discussing the Romance of the Rose, the figure 
of Saturn's Golden Age was associated for the Middle Ages with a time of great 
innocence and freedom from conflict. But the ambiguous merits of its virtues, 
which we would suggest are at work in the Knight's Tale, are ironically 
suggested in the Romance of the Rose, especially by Reason's criticism of natural 
justice. See Romance of the Rose, ed. Dahlberg, pp. 113-15, lines 5555-692. 
4. This is true in Klibansky, Saturn and Melancholy, p. 193. It is true, as well, 
of Alan T. Gaylord's study "The Role of Saturn in the Knight's Tale," Chaucer 
Review 8 (1973): 171-90. Gaylord argues that the tale reflects the dark, 
planetary aspect of Saturn as the representation of people, like Palamon and 
Arcite, who have willfully submitted themselves to fortune. 
5. In book 2 of the Consolation, Lady Philosophy treats the glories of the 
Golden Age in the context of the evils of the present age, ruled by Fortune. 
Man's willingness to believe in the goods of wealth and prestige, and his 
consequent disappointment with turns of Fortune's wheel, are treated in 
prose 5 and 6; with such slavish devotion to things of no importance, Lady 
Philosophy contrasts the wisdom of the Golden Age, when men did not dis­
rupt natural harmony by searching for gold or adventure. She suggests, in 
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fact, that it was the lust for gain which disrupted Paradise: "Heu primus quis 
fuit ille/auri qui pondera tecti/gemmasque latere valentes/pretiosa pericula 
fodit?" (book 2 meter 5). 
6. As we shall see below, the image of old age, connected both with sexual 
potency and with experience as the proof of authority, is developed through­
out the Canterbury Tales. Saturn, too, is a figure of old age, as well as of the old 
times which men both miss and yet know must pass away. Chaucer states that 
Saturn's solution to a problem Jupiter could not solve was based on "his olde 
experience," and offers him as proof that "elde hath greet avantage." But his 
old man's solution, though it tidies up the problem, betrays a lack of sensibility 
for the issues at stake in the problem; it is "agayn his kynde" for Saturn to be 
solving "strif and drede." 
7. Although there will be husbands confronted with suitors for their wives, 
as in the Franklin's Tale, and parents challenged for their virgin children, as in 
the Physician's Tale, the pattern of a man in authority contesting with two 
suitors is nowhere repeated in the Tales. Cf. Stokoe, "Structure and Inten­
tion," passim. 
8. Joseph, "Chaucerian 'Game,'" pp. 84-96, relates the tales of the first 
group through their use of space. He contrasts the Knight's Tale, with its 
sense of confining limitations, and fabliaux, in the contentment they feel in 
small spaces. See, also, the treatment of the contrasting image patterns of 
"links" and "holes" within the first fragment in Leyerle, "The Heart and the 
Chain," pp. 118-21. 
9. Statius tells the story of the cursed necklace in book 2 of the Thebaid, 
lines 269-305. Chaucer alludes to the jewelry, wrought by Vulcan, in the 
"Complaint of Mars," line 245, as the "broche of Thebes," a charm with the 
ability to drive man mad with the desire to possess it. Through this necklace 
Chaucer links the madness of Thebes with love madness, a connection which 
is implicit in the distress of Thebes's last two sons, Palamon and Arcite, in the 
Knight's Tale. 
10. Cf. Walter Clyde Curry, Chaucer and the Medieval Sciences, rev. ed. (New 
York, 1960), pp. 91-118, for the Wife's horoscope. The Wife's discussion of 
her personality, in astrological terms, applies the heavenly motions of the 
planets to her most private parts. "I folwed ay myn inclinacioun / By vertu of my 
constellacioun; / That made me I koude noght withdrawe / My chambre of 
Venus from a good felawe" (III [D] 615-18). Cf. Chaucer's description of 
Mars's entrance into the house of Venus in "Complaint of Mars," lines 50-84. 
11. Edgar S. Laird, in "Astrology and Irony in Chaucer's 'Complaint of 
Mars,'" Chaucer Review 6 (1972): 229-231, considers both the accuracy of 
Chaucer's astrological information and the courtly shape the story is given in 
the poem. Cf. Ovide moralise, vol. 2, book 4, lines 1489-1755, pp. 131-36. 
12. Of course, as we readily admit, the general situation of the elderly 
husband, the young wife, and the suitor is the stuff of a wide variety of 
medieval love traditions, with echoes and associations extending as much to 
Mary, Joseph, and Mary's mysterious suitor as to Mars, Venus, and Vulcan. 
But there are some details of the story which might be attributed to Chaucer's 
knowledge of the story of Mars and Venus, as it was told by Jean de Meun; 
these are details whose conjunction cannot be explained by a common source. 
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Cf. Stith Thompson, "The Miller's Tale," in Sources and Analogues, p. 106. 
Some of these details include the name of Absalom, who occurs as an alterna­
tive lover for Venus in the Romance of the Rose, ed. Dahlberg, p. 238, lines 
13850-74; the smith who aids in the undoing of the lovers—Vulcan was a 
smith; and Alisoun, like Venus, who is identified with birds, mares, and other 
animals which must not be restrained in marriage from pursuing their 
natural drives. 
13. Thomas D. Hill, "La Vielle's Digression on Free Love: A Note on the 
Rhetorical Structure in the Romance of the Rose," Romance Notes 8 (1966): 
112-115, discusses the variety of interpretations given the story. Typical of 
the tradition is Arnulf of Orleans's comment on the story, as told in the 
Metamorphoses by Ovid, which concentrated on the crippling results of the 
passionate involvement; Vulcan's chains become, instead, the representation 
of the lovers' own feelings: "Quae quidem virtus prava consuetudine illiciti 
fervoris quasi cathena constringitur" (Ghisalberti, "Arnolfo," p. 210). On the 
other hand, Ovid, in telling the same story in the Ars Amatoria, book 2, lines 
550-600, emphasizes the lesson that men must not pry too closely into their 
lovers' activities. Jean de Meun picks up this interpretation in the speech of 
the Old Woman. 
14. We are not suggesting here the richly allegorical sense of natural fruit­
fulness which Jean de Meun ironically advocates, through his evocation of 
Alanus de Insulis's Complaint. Rather, we are referring to the earthy wisdom 
of the Decameron, which may well be indebted to the tradition of natural 
fruitfulness growing from Alanus, but which presents a different aspect from 
Jean. For Boccaccio sexual energy is natural, opposed in its vitality and energy 
to the restraint and emptiness of the social conventions, of selecting marriage 
partners, and so on, imposed on its naturally unharnessed power. Without 
appealing to supernatural defenses for the necessity to allow this power to act 
in human life, Boccaccio, rather in the manner of Shakesperean comedy, 
promises that this energy will win out and revivify mankind. 
15. See Allen, Friar as Critic, p. 101, for a reading of the tale in very human 
terms from Giovanni del Virgilio. 
16. Animal imagery unites the two tales and emphasizes the carnal charac­
ter of love. Salutati's definition of the "natural" descent as the passage of the 
spirit into the body is fulfilled in these stories, which reduce the spiritualized 
love-seeking of Palamon and Arcite to bawdy dalliance. The exegetical over­
tones of these images, outlined by R. E. Kaske in "The Canticum Canticorum 
in the Miller's Tale," Studies in Philology 59 (1962): 480-85, only serve to 
underscore that love here is carnal, rather than spiritual. 
17. Joseph, "Chaucerian 'Game'," p. 89, considers this particular signifi­
cance of Nicholas's description as "hende." 
18. The same kind of comedy is implicit in the tale's exegetical echoes, as 
Kaske so well shows in "The Canticum Canticorum in the Miller's Tale," pp. 
479-500. Universally, laughter results from the awareness of incongruity; 
medieval laughter is more moral than ours, and less often simply an expres­
sion of the fact that the one laughing is relieved to distance himself from some 
threatening or absurd situation, because the medieval sense of the congruous, 
and so of incongruity, had a larger and more well defined base in reality. 
136 / A Distinction of Stories 
19. As we saw above, the Reeve's error, unlike that of the quiring critics, is 
to assume that the Miller's story is intended to say something applicable to all 
carpenters and so necessarily to himself. His error is that he cannot see that 
the brunt of the story is not John as carpenter but rather John as the authority 
figure in a marriage. 
20. Glending Olson, in "The Reeve's Tale as a Fabliau," Modern Language 
Quarterly 35 (1974): 230, distinguishes between Chaucer's fidelity to the fab­
liau genre in the Reeve's Tale and the author's elaborate reworking of fabliau 
motifs in other tales, particularly the Merchant's. His suggestion that the 
Merchant's Tale is more than a fabliau applies, we think, to the Miller's Tale as 
well. The evocation of Christian symbols, their interweaving in the fabliau, 
places the Miller's Tale, generically as well as thematically, between the high 
seriousness of the Knight and the low comedy of the Reeve. 
21. E. D. Blodgett, in "Chaucerian Pryvetee and the Opposition to Time," 
Speculum 51 (1976): 493, characterizes the whole of the first fragment as "the 
steady play on the notion of 'pryvetee.'" The opposition of moral precept and 
the secrets that resist it, both in God's perfect knowledge and in man's guilty 
attempts to conceal his sin, it evoked throughout the tales and is linked clearly 
to the effort to understand the conflict between "ernest" and "game" (pp. 
482-83). The theme of "pryvetee" is discussed profitably elsewhere, as well; 
Blodgett provides a helpful summary of this scholarship on the first frag­
ment, pp. 473-93. 
22. This series of tales began with Theseus's triumphal parade; it is fitting 
that in the Cook's Tale we should return to the same motif, reduced now to a 
mere amusement, and the occasion of shirking lawful work and responsibility. 
The ceremonial presence of authority, at first Trajanlike, is now disorder. 
23. Perkyn's running off to see "any ridyng was in Chepe" (I [A] 4377) 
ironically reminds us of the triumphal parade of Theseus, and its evocation of 
Trajan. 
The Tales of Magic 
After the Cook's Tale there is nothing to do but start over. After the 
givenness of intentional social order has been allowed to degenerate 
into a commercial menage a trois, and the duty of awarding a virgin 
has been transformed, by way of providing for a priest's bastard's 
daughter, to procuring for prostitutes, Chaucer turns from an array of 
orders in action to a normative array of disorders as such. These tales, 
which we consider under the rubric of magic, are the most miscel­
laneous in Chaucer's collection, and appropriately so, because disor­
der is infinitely various and miscellaneous. Important here are acts of 
real magic and the kindred deceptions which result from deceitful or 
mistaken appearances. In each case there is something, or someone, 
intrusive and individual, whose particular notion of truth, justice, and 
order is imposed on a situation. In each case also there is a particular 
area of human concern, or a particular part or level of reality, upon 
which disorder intrudes. These three elements—magic, intrusive in­
dividual, and the array of situations intruded upon—not only 
exemplify disorder but also define it. In the General Prologue it was 
both important and most interesting to ask the question, What gen­
eral definition of man is implied by illustrating it in terms of arrays of 
status, learning, and stewarship?; here it is equally instructive to ask 
the question, What can we learn about human order by seeing what 
threatens it, and by seeing what areas of human concern are vulnera­
ble to threat? 
The importance of individualism as the basis of disorder is well 
illustrated by Robert Holkot's interpretation of the Phaeton story. 
After telling how Phaeton took the chariot of the sun and with it 
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brought the world nearly to ruin, he concludes: "Ita contingeret istis 
fatuis et praesumptuosis qui de divina gubernatione murmurant. Sed 
si secundum eos fieret gubernatio pro sua affectione sentiunt, et face-
rent sua fatuitate, ut tota mundi machina solveretur."1 Such ruin, of 
course, is one possible result of skepticism, or of a nominalism run to 
excess. In the chiming slogans of popular rebellion, "When Adam 
delved and Eve span, who was then the gentleman," Chaucer would 
have been only too aware of the dangers which come when one tries to 
"take but degree away." In the tales of magic, Chaucer examines the 
possibilities and, with one exception, finds them wanting. 
It is possible, even here among the magical tales themselves, to find 
an architectonic and contrapuntal order. In the earlier series, from 
Knight's Tale to Cook's Tale, we have a clear and simply linear series, 
through which authorities degenerate but justice (poetic if not legal) 
operates almost to the end. In the magic group coherence is, as might 
be expected, far more complicated. Several principles seem to be 
operating simultaneously, which together generate an order at the 
verbal or storial level which at once echoes an order which ought to be 
operating in the stories but is not, and organizes them into a mutually 
commenting series, in the typological fashion we have already de­
fined. One such principle is the relationship of parody, by which the 
basic point of one story is repeated in another, but at another level. 
Another is the principle of thematic echo—as ordered here, the story 
series will introduce a theme, such as gentilesse, in one story, and 
elaborate a treatment of it in the next. These echoes interlock as well, 
forming a kind of thematic enthymeme. Another is the principle of 
echoed gloss—very often, here as elsewhere, Chaucer will include a 
detail which, to the medieval mind, has a conventional association 
based on some glossing tradition. Then, in the same or the next or a 
following tale, what was first evoked by allusion to an unstated gloss 
will receive explicit treatment. Finally, there is the principle of linear 
series, already established so clearly in the first group of tales. 
The series begins with the Tale of St. Cecilia. Following the critical 
principle announced earlier, of taking prologues seriously as pro­
logues, we should pay particular attention to what the Second Nun 
says by way of introduction, not as a way of understanding her, but as 
Chaucer's way of making a beginning for a series and of introducing 
and justifying the large concerns which that series will exemplify and 
define. In this prologue material there is a good deal of the 
sententious—a good deal of material that would qualify under the 
rubric of accessus as definitiva, probativa, refutativa. The stories which 
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follow, of course, belong to the modus tractandi of exemplorum positiva; 
if we are to receive them as exempla, we must first be told what they 
exemplify. This the prologue does. 
At the outset we are advised to avoid the counsel of the Romance of 
the Rose: 
The ministre and the norice unto vices,

Which that men clepe in Englissh ydelnesse,

That porter of the gate is of delices,

To eschue, and by hire contrarie hire oppresse,

That is to seyn, by leveful bisynesse,

Wei oghten we to doon al oure entente,

Lest that the feend thrugh ydelnesse us hente.

For he that with his thousand cordes slye

Continuelly us waiteth to biclappe,

Whan he may man in ydelnesse espye,

He kan so lightly cache hym in his trappe,

Til that a man be hent right by the lappe,

He nys nat war the feend hath hym in honde.

Wei oghte us werche, and ydelnesse withstonde.

And though men dradden nevere for to dye,

Yet seen men wel by resoun, douteless,

That ydelnesse is roten slogardye,

Of which ther nevere comth ne good n'encrees,

And syn that slouthe hire holdeth in a lees

Oonly to slepe, and for to ete and drynke,

And to devouren al that othere swynke,

And for to putte us fro swich ydelnesse,

That cause is of so greet confusioun,

I have heer doon my feithful bisynesse . . .

(VIII [G] 1-24) 
That is, to tell the story of Saint Cecilia. 
The prologue continues with a lengthy Invocatio ad Mariam, the 
subject of an extensive analysis by Paul Clogan,2 and a translation of 
the etymologizing on Saint Cecilia's name from the Legenda Aurea. 
The Invocatio talks about faith and works, and makes at least this 
storytelling a work of business fit for the kingdom. The etymologizing 
underlines, by elaboration of metaphor, the proper ethical applica­
tion of the story. Taken as a whole, this prologue tells us three very 
important things. First, this series of stories will not be concerned 
fundamentally and sententiously with carnal love—though that, for 
some of them, is their actual subject. Loving and lusty behavior, 
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rather, is exemplary of something of larger significance, in the way 
more nearly defined by the original poems of Alanus than by the 
incorrigibly sex-only orientation of the Romance of the Rose.3 Second, 
and to the same end, this prologue's emphasis on work, on the human 
condition, which Mary is supposed to help, and on the metaphoric 
applications of names, encourages us to take all the stories as exempla 
of consuetudo and credulitas, and that to earthly and ethical signifi­
cances. Third, the prologue is an introduction, by explicit reference, 
to the Friar's Tale ("He nys nat war the feend hath hym in honde") 
and the Pardoner's Tale ("And though men dradden nevere for to 
dye"), as well as to the Tale of St. Cecilia—that is, to the three tales in 
this nine-tale series which deal with a divine intrusion into human 
affairs, rather than a human intrusion into some condition of ethical 
reality. As such, the introduction frames and introduces disorder, as it 
were, in bono, as we shall see. These tales frame the others; together, 
they are a normative array in bono and in malo. Pervasive in them all is 
a sense of what theologians call today "otherness"—one may call it a 
sense of the presence of God, a folktale atmosphere, a sense of ar­
chetype, hauntedness, magic. Under any name this dimension of the 
tales is appropriate to a treatment of the relation between order and 
disorder in a world whose ultimate orderliness is achieved either by 
miracle or after death. 
The Tale of St. Cecilia is, as first in the series, the special and defin­
ing case. The Friar's Tale presents the retributive intrusion of the devil 
into the exploitative world of a wicked summoner; the Pardoner's Tale 
presents the intrusion of death into the order of drunken riot; both 
come to divinely good ends. But both are still, in human terms, both 
disorderly and about disorder. Saint Cecilia, on the other hand, is the 
single limiting case. Only the saint has absolute rights to civil disobedi­
ence; only by virtue (literally) of the grace of God does one have the 
power and the right to oppose one's individual, intrusive, invisibly 
crowned convictions to the good order of normal society. When the 
saint confronts the Roman Empire, it is the empire which eventually 
loses; when the Wife of Bath (and all others like her) wishfully defy 
the right of time to bring an old age, she must herself lose, and by 
losing convict and denounce, however nostalgically and with whatever 
bittersweet and Kittredgean regret, the faerie values and virtues by 
which one pretends, for a time, to swap loathly old age for youth 
again. 
In this normative array of disorder, then, the Tale of St. Cecilia is 
properly first, to remind us that all human arrangements and all 
The Tales of Magic I 141 
ethical generalizations stand under possible correction from miracle 
and revelation, and at the same time to point, by contrast, to the 
futility of all intrusions and all disorders which lack the miracle of 
divine sanction.4 
Chaucer underlines this contrast by parody, in the very next tale. 
Bruce Rosenberg has explained in full and elegant detail the paral­
lelism which at once unites and contrasts these two tales, and so it is 
unnecessary here to do more than reaffirm the irony and underline 
the futility of merely human attempts at metamorphosis, by alchemy 
or magic or any other false power.5 It is, however, appropriate to 
mention that this series of human disorders, descending from and 
introduced by the saint's life, is distinguished from that saint's life, 
and introduced to the pilgrimage, by the most sweatingly violent in­
trusion into the world of the pilgrimage to be found anywhere in the 
links. 
When the Canon's Yeoman intrudes upon the company of the pil­
grimage, the series of disorders which he initiates seems merely mis­
cellaneous but becomes ostentatiously linear when once we wonder 
what kind of order, in each case, is being violated. In alchemy, clearly, 
the fundamental order of elements, of natural substances, is the one 
which the fraudulent Canon seeks to overturn by changing base met­
als into gold and silver. In the Squire's Tale the slightly less fundamen­
tal but still natural barriers between sincerity and treason, between 
one place and another, between health and ill health, and between 
species are to be overcome by the magic horse, mirror, sword, and 
ring. Moreover, the fable of the faithless tercelet has birds aping the 
status of men and begins a discussion of gentilesse which will extend 
over several tales. The fundamental distinction made here is that 
between good behavior or appearance and the intrinsic gentilesse that 
comes from birth or some other absolute. Values, in the absolute 
sense, remain ambiguous. The Franklin's Tale also involves an intru­
sion upon an order of nature, in this case, a rocky coastline, but 
devolves into two more central concerns—the question of sovereignty 
between husband and wife, and the question of the relative gentilesse 
of members of three different status classes, knight, squire, and clerk. 
In the Franklin's Tale, moreover, there are quite pointed discussions 
of magic as false manipulation of appearances, and equally pointed 
assertions, by Dorigen, that her private notion of the world's good is 
more correct than God's. The Wife of Bath continues the discussion 
of sovereignty in marriage but comes to more radical conclusions; 
both her tale and her prologue, moreover, attempt fundamental mis­
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constructions of the value and power of time—or successive history— 
the Wife by adopting experience as authority without accepting the 
old age whose wisdom that experience should produce, the loathly 
lady by being able herself to renew her youth and beauty. The Friar's 
Tale and the Summoner's Tale are both concerned with gifts, and 
with all the proprieties and agreements and relationships which 
result when people give gifts to one another. The fact that in both 
cases the gifts actually given involve elements of disaster should 
not prevent us from seeing through the ironies to the medieval truth, 
that donum or more properly beneficium was a fundamental instru­
ment of social order. The Physician's Tale recounts a violation of the 
responsibility of a judge and governor—the theme of indicium, which 
involves both the labeling of crime and the corresponding responsibil­
ity for the good of dependents, Chaucer underlines in a long initial 
digression. Finally, the Pardoner's Tale returns, inversely, to the be­
ginning. As the saint finds a good end, with a holy virtue which not 
even the Roman Empire can withstand, so the three rioters find their 
bad end, representing as they do no order but the morning drunken­
ness of the tavern. 
The progress here, from Canon's Yeoman's Tale to Pardoner's Tale, is 
from general to particular. From the general order of nature as a 
whole, composed of substances and distances and orders of creatures, 
we move to the smaller question of status, by which human society is 
ordered, and the still smaller question of time and history, by which 
changes occur that lead to wisdom. Still narrower in scope is the 
structure of beneficium, which in the Middle Ages never lost the per­
sonal involvement of individuals who gave and received and were 
therefore related. Narrower still is iudicium, by which the opinion of a 
single individual is received as true—and the British tradition of case 
law, already by Chaucer's time well established, would have under­
lined this individualism even when it was still possible, scholastically 
and philosophically, to believe in universal or natural law. At the same 
time, of course, idealistic notions of office and stewardship, analo­
gous to the doctrine of the king's two bodies, which theoretically pro­
tected sovereignty from mere royal caprice, would have seen this 
individualism as orderly. Beyond this in the Pardoner's Tale is riot, 
chaos, and death. 
Nature, status, history, benefice, and judgment are sociological or 
anthropological factors on the basis of which a coherent understand­
ing of society may be easily formulated; such an understanding, how­
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ever theoretically and abstractly devised, would turn out to fit the 
Middle Ages quite well. In order to realize this fact beyond doubt, it is 
only necessary to see that modern Western society is based on none of 
them, except perhaps judgment, and that of quite a different and less 
sacramental kind. We have in fact transmuted lead into gold, and 
B. F. Skinner at least claims to communicate with pigeons. Our factors, 
corresponding to these, would probably be technology, rank, process, 
contract, and expertise—on the basis of these, our society is very 
different, and very differently ordered, from that of the Middle Ages. 
Thus, Chaucer's intrusive disorders threaten, and in threatening, de­
fine, a medieval set of orders, not a modern one. This is most impor­
tant. Neither order nor disorder is absolute; both may exist in various 
modes, depending on their interrelationships, and on the structure of 
the whole in which they operate. Above a certain level, all perfections 
must be defined by negation; Chaucer's array of disorders is calcu­
lated to define the perfection of his sense of order, and we will miss 
the greater part of his message if we do not keep Firmly and emphat­
ically in mind its difference from our own. 
As we have shown, the intrusive disorders with which Theseus had 
to deal in the Knight's Tale traced to the fact that he had taken under 
his sovereignty an unawarded Amazon virgin and two Theban royal 
cousins. It is therefore most appropriate that the disorders in this 
magic group tend to arise most out of two general problems—the 
problem of awarding some woman (usually a virgin, but once and 
repeatedly a widow) in marriage, and the problem of male fellowship, 
usually for the sake of gold. Death, moreover, is much talked about 
and sometimes experienced in these magic tales. Love, as a source of 
physical life, struggles with death in the tales of the Second Nun, the 
Wife of Bath, the Franklin, and the Squire. In the first two, lovers 
stand under sentence of death, one for a higher and the other for a 
lower standard of love than their society admitted. In the second two, 
death is considered a possible relief from the difficulties of love. Lust 
for gold threatens to kill the souls of the protagonists in the tale of the 
Canon's Yeoman, the Friar, and the Summoner. The two senses of 
death, physical and spiritual, unite in the story of the Pardoner, in 
which avarice leads to violent crime and death.6 In addition to these 
obvious links of plot and character, the stories have in common a 
considerable preoccupation with the imagery of sight and the prob­
lem of perception. 
The tale of Saint Cecilia begins with a version of Emelye's prayer: 
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She nevere cessed, as I writen fynde,

Of hir preyere, and God to love and drede,

Bisekynge hym to kepe hir maydenhede.

(VIII [G] 124-26) 
The result of this prayer is a rather wife-dominated marriage, based 
on an initial, private, secret agreement, obviously evoking the mar­
riage worked out between Arveragus and Dorigen.7 But Cecilia is no 
Amazon, and these arrangements, miraculous and disordering 
though they be in earthly terms, have divine sanction. To the unbap­
tized there is nothing particularly distinguished about Cecilia; for the 
baptized she wears a halo of heavenly roses and is accompanied by a 
heavenly guardian. Cecilia is, in a sense, the true alchemist's stone, for 
she is the material of the earth transmuted into a saint and thus a 
citizen of the heavenly city. Throughout the tale the emphasis is not 
on the violences perpetrated against the Christians, but rather on the 
strength and power of conversion, which has given the Christians 
themselves, whom Rome perceives as merely disorderly, a vision and 
foretaste of heaven. 
The Canon and his yeoman, on the other hand, would not be able 
to see the heavenly crown. The prologue to their tale introduces two 
themes or narrative motifs—intrusion into an existing world, and the 
betrayal of fraternal relationships. The intrusion motif is fundamen­
tal for this group of tales; some variation of the motif of fraternal 
relationship occurs in a great many tales throughout the collection, 
and all relate to that initial fraternal relationship, itself betrayed, de­
fined by the interaction of Palamon and Arcite. The intrusion 
parodies the miraculous one which preceded it; the Canon's 
Yeoman's betrayal of his master both evokes the fraternal dissension 
between Palamon and Arcite and introduces the confidence game 
which will be the object of the tale itself. These two tales, the saint's life 
and the tale of alchemical fraud, make an elegantly balanced pair. 
Rosenberg's explanation of this relationship we have already noted; 
here we should mention his emphasis on sight: "Insight leads Cecile to 
love God; mere physical sight causes the Canon and the priest to love 
the things of this world, and thus they turn away from God."8 Rosen­
berg goes on to identify the bonds of imagery which draw together, 
through common words and descriptions, these two stories of 
heavenly and earthly transformations. As a pair, these two stories 
serve as guideposts to the two types of stories which will follow. In 
one, God creates a kingdom of safety and glory for his virgin brides, 
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preparing for them crowns of glory which mark them out among the 
faithful—there follow other brides and other safeties, more and more 
ironic and disastrous until, for Virginia, her bodily beauty is merely 
bad luck. In the other, the devil brands his dupes with a special kind 
of blindness which makes them see gold where there is none—there 
follow other dupes who see a good business partner where there is 
none and a chance for a pot of gold where there is none. 
In the Squire's Tale we have a kingdom with a perfect king: "So 
excellent a lord in alle thyng./Hym lakked noght that longeth to a 
kyng" (V [F] 15-16). For him the usual disorders which beset society 
are to be solved by magic tools—the horse, the ring, the mirror, and 
the sword. He has an unawarded virgin, a daughter, who is to be won 
(eventually) much as was Emelye. As it stands, the tale is introductory, 
expository, almost eventless.9 The only complete action is the en­
closed tale of the faithless tercelet, which the ring permits Canacee to 
hear, and perhaps be warned by. 
In this tale we might pause at two significant allusions—the incident 
of the knight's riding armed into the banqueting hall, including a 
reference to Gawain, and the description of the faithless tercelet as 
like a snake and a tomb. The first permits one to suppose that 
Chaucer knew the Gawain and the Green Knight; the second, given 
Chaucer's language, seems clearly to relate to Christ's denunciation of 
the scribes and Pharisees in Matthew 23: as "whited sepulchres" and 
"generation of vipers." It is, we believe, generally recognized that 
Chaucer often derived his best ironies from implicit allusion and 
gloss.10 From these we should learn two very important things about 
disorder. 
First, the intrusive, magical knight in Gawain and the Green Knight 
brings disorder, not order, as do his conventional analogues in the 
romance tradition. Gawain and the Green Knight has been variously 
interpreted;11 but all critics would certainly agree that the poem deals 
with an apparently disorderly intruder into an ordered world, who 
brings one member of that world to see that the full truth about 
whatever is true is more complicated and less stable than he had 
thought. The Squire's intrusive magic knight, clearly, teaches rather 
the opposite lesson. To the court of the already perfect king he brings 
a magical icing on the kingly cake—after this, nothing should ever go 
wrong. The ironies are obvious—and once seen in terms of secular 
order and disorder, the gifts of the intrusive knight are a parallel and 
parody of the gifts of God personified in Saint Cecilia and her Chris­
tian fellowship. 
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It is therefore most appropriate that the Squire's developed in­
terpretation of these gifts should be a "lewed" one, full of disagree­
ment and comic pretentiousness, and references to contradictory 
legendary analogues. Chaucer is implicitly telling us what our opinion 
is worth if we wish to be impressed with these marvels. There is no 
need to analyze such obvious comedy in detail. For the sake of illustra­
tion, however, one might note that the word horsly with which the 
commons commend the magic horse, a word that Chaucer possibly 
coined,12 is itself a parody of the human interest in definition. Such 
words as manly, kingly, and queenly are common parlance and indicate 
by their existence a pervasive human interest in the essence of some­
thing admired. But normally and straightly, such words tend to be 
made on the names of things noble, superior, and human—in con­
trast to which this "horsly" seems as incongruous as Eliza Doolittle's 
father in his wedding clothes. 
The relation of the faithless tercelet to the hypocritical scribes and 
Pharisees of the Gospel is clear in Chaucer's introduction of him: 
Right as a serpent hit hym under floures 
Til he may seen his tyme for to byte, 
Right so this god of loves ypocryte 
Dooth so his cerymonyes and obeisaunces, 
And kepeth in semblaunt alle his observaunces 
That sownen into gentillesse of love. 
As in a toumbe is al the faire above, 
And under is the corps, swich as ye woot, 
Swich was this ypocrite, both coold and hoot. 
(V [F] 512-20)13 
According to Hugh of St. Cher, the exegete who most frequendy 
seems to fit Chaucer,14 the Gospel denunciation may be applied to 
"prelati et magistri nostri temporis exterioris nitidi, interius fetidi."15 
For our purposes this connection between the faithless tercelet and 
the scribes and Pharisees, and through them to "praelati et magistri," 
expands the significance of this bird-fable love story to politics in 
general and permits us to relate this hypocrisy and irresponsibility to 
the frauds and crimes of the alchemist and the unjust Apius at least, 
and probably to the appearance-making magician of the Franklin's 
Tale as well. The allusion, that is, permits one to generalize from a tale 
about love to a general insight about true and false responsibility in 
human relationships at large—that is, to see the faithless tercelet as 
representing a specific case of general disorder. 
This love affair of birds also looks forward to the Franklin's Tale: the 
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courtly love posturing through which both relationships are estab­
lished; the falcon's agreement to obey, "kepynge the boundes of my 
worshipe evere" (V [F] 571), balancing Arveragus's agreement to obey 
"save that the name of soveraynetee" (V [F] 751); the departure of 
both males for the sake of honor—all these resemblances link the two 
stories. If the Squire's Tale is first of all an ironic undercutting of the 
magic that overcomes natural and inevitable difficulties, it is in its 
enclosed exemplum about gentilesse, and the rhetorics and hypoc­
risies and relationships within which gentilesse is defined, achieved, 
and betrayed. Gentilesse, of course, is the ground and definition of 
medieval status, the basis of social and even moral distinction. 
It is therefore fitting that prologue material should have to do with 
gentilesse. The Squire's prologue is inconsequential; the Franklin's 
seems to be largely concerned with the relation between rhetoric and 
gentilesse, and with the desirability of learning "gentillesse aright."16 
As the Squire's Tale has already made clear, the fit description of any 
ideal (in this case Canacee) requires 
.. . a rethor excellent 
That koude his colours longynge for that art, 
If he sholde hire discryven every part. 
(V [F] 38-40) 
Though the Squire does not think himself such a rhetor, the Franklin 
admires him as at least well on the way toward it and wishes that his 
own son were the equal of the Squire. That he is not, the Franklin 
blames on gambling (a link with the chaos of both the Cook's Tale and 
the of Pardoner's Tale) and on lack of good example. This, since the 
Franklin is a self-confessed "burel man," and since the Squire has 
presumably the example of his knightly father, is an admission of the 
Franklin's own deficiencies as an exemplary father. The prologue 
material, then, which links the Squire's Tale and the Franklin's Tale, 
relates status or gentilesse to rhetoric, to example, and to family. In 
doing so, the prologue announces the terms of the debate implicit in 
the stories, since the relative merits of birth and breeding, or family 
and example, are explicitly discussed and the necessity of rhetoric is 
equally explicit in Chaucer's skill as a storyteller. 
The importance of rhetoric, both as a verbal technique and as the 
name for a complex focus of human ethical concern, cannot be too 
strongly emphasized. Aristotle's Rhetoric, after all, is in practice a 
manual for the expert manipulation of status differences as this man­
ipulation enhances persuasive communication. Its medieval circula­
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tion in ethical and political contexts rather than in contexts involving 
the verbal arts makes clear the very practical value which medieval 
people placed on such activities.17 Rhetoric, perceived medievally, was 
the prescribed behavior by means of which one constituted one's self a 
certain kind of social person. Rhetorical behavior determined kind, 
because it expressed status; it necessarily determined one's social be­
ing, because it governed all intelligibly decorous communication. 
It is in these terms that we must see the Franklin's Tale—not as the 
deciding tale in Kittredge's marriage group,18 but as a tale in which 
disorderly agreements about sovereignty and disorderly aspirations to 
possession and power come to no bad end largely because people try, 
in further disorderly fashion, to be more genteel than they really are. 
The fact that, in merely human terms, Dorigen and Arveragus have a 
happier marriage than does the Wife of Bath, or the Merchant's 
January and May, or Walter and Griselda, is significant only when 
thrown into relief by a modern determination to see it in the context 
of a marriage group. In isolation the courtliness of their relationship 
is ironic, even a little silly, and the contest in gentilesse is compromised 
by overtones of social climbing. In the context of a group of tales in 
which things are not as they seem—that is, in Ovidian terms, tales of 
magic—the fundamental disorderliness of their attitudes and ar­
rangements becomes more visible. The happy ending is, in its own 
way, as much an ironic accident as is the poetic justice of the Miller's 
Tale or the double twist of the Knight's Tale, whereby each of the rivals 
gets what he prayed for, but no more. What the accident overrules is, 
in fact, the most explicit preference for human desire over what God 
has done in all the Canterbury Tales. The Summoner and the alchemi­
cal Canon are uglier, and the Pardoner's rioters are more blasphe­
mous, but Chaucer's language here in the Franklin's Tale is the most 
clearly theological: 
Eterne God, that thurgh thy purveiaunce

Ledest the world by certein governaunce,

In ydel, as men seyn, ye no thyng make.

But, Lord, thise grisly feendly rokkes blake,

That semen rather a foul confusion

Of werk than any fair creacion

Of swich a parfit wys God and a stable,

Why han ye wroght this werk unresonable?

I woot wel clerkes wol seyn as hem leste,

By argumentz, that al is for the beste,
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. . . this [is] my conclusion.

To clerkes,lete I al disputison.

But wolde God that alle thise rokkes blake

Were sonken into helle for his sake!

(V [F] 865-72, 885-86, 889-92) 
And when Dorigen explains to Averagus her predicament, her lan­
guage explicitly prefers her own judgment above the will of God: 
"This is to muche, and it were Goddes wille" (V [F] 1471).19 
What this theologizing wants, really, is what the intrusive knight 
brings to Cambyuskan—that is, the magical power to overcome all 
naturally imposed obstacles to private desire and private good. To 
Dorigen nature has no purpose except to make her emotionally com­
fortable, and her fundamental and disorderly silliness is betrayed by 
the fact that she expresses her need and love for her husband and his 
safety by an impulsive promise to betray the very relationship with 
him which made her worry in the first place.20 The happy ending of 
this relationship, which evokes that of the Knight's Tale, is as privately 
idyllic as can be desired: 
Arveragus and Dorigen his wyf

In sovereyn blisse leden forth hir lyf.

Nevere eft ne was there angre hem bitwene.

He cherisseth hir as though she were a queene,

And she was to hym trewe for everemoore.

(V [F] 1551-55) 
She is, however, not a queen, and "sovereyn blisse" is, in fact, reserved 
to heaven. The desire for an intrusive miracle, which will overcome 
natural evil, and the desire to pass responsibility, in a pinch, to some­
one else, which are the chief characteristics of Dorigen's sense of the 
order of things, are really appropriate to, and workable for, the saint. 
And in fact, as Donald Howard has shown, there are substantial paral­
lels between this tale and the story of Saint Cecilia. 
The marriage of Cecile and Valerian begins with a vow of chastity . . . just 
as the marriage in the Franklin's Tale has begun with a vow of courtesy and 
mutual concession. The husband, with a lack of resistance probable only in 
hagiography, agrees to baptism and a life of chastity and he joins Cecile in 
the destiny of purity and martyrdom which the angel announces for them. 
The marriage here, unlike any previously mentioned, is the vehicle for 
Christian works.. .. There is a kind of mutuality in their relationship, a 
lack of any noticeable element of "maistrye." This, of course, is strikingly 
like the relationship in the Franklin's Tale, and it points to a crucial con­
trast. The vow in the Franklin's Tale is one of mutual concession; its pur­
pose is the establishment of earthly concord. But the vow of the Second 
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Nun's Tale is a mutual subjugation of both their wills to the will of God, and 
its end is an eternal reward.21 
The parallels redound ironically to reprove the Franklin's Tale's val­
ues, particularly since we should admit that the vows here are not 
really for the establishment of earthly concord but rather attempt the 
creation of a special case of concord, disorderly in its very essence 
because of the contradictory commitments it involves. 
The other significant feature of the Franklin's Tale is the gentilesse 
contest, in which a squire attempts to demonstrate that he is as good as 
a knight, and a clerk that he is as good as a squire. Their mutual 
emulation is a parodic echo of the recognition in the Franklin's pro­
logue that gentilesse depends upon good example; the fact that in 
each case, from knight to squire to clerk, the exercise of gentilesse 
consists of undoing rather than fulfilling the obligation of a plighted 
"truth" further underlines the essential disorderliness of this contest, 
whose only accidental result is an all-around happy ending—apart, we 
must presume, from Aurelius's continued amorous frustration. 
There is, in fact, no personal desire expressed in the whole of the 
tale—neither Arveragus's desire to adore his wife, nor her desire to 
rule him, nor her desire to change nature, nor Aurelius's desire for 
Dorigen and therefore for the help of magic, nor the magician's de­
sire for real pay in exchange for illusory goods, nor anyone's desire 
for equivalent gentilesse, which would not, if allowed free rein, upset 
the totam machinam mundi. And we should not allow the "poetic injus­
tice" of the tale to blind us to what it proposed, however harmlessly, in 
the end.22 
The Franklin, as he ends his tale, invites his audience to judgment: 
"Which was the mooste fre, as thynketh yow?" (V [F] 1622). With this 
invitation he begins a discussion of judgment which will climax with 
the disorderly Apius, who judges wrongly of a beautiful virgin. The 
same invitation is implicit in the Wife ofBath's Tale, covertly addressed 
to the audience.23 In the tales that follow, judgment, and wrong 
judgment at that, becomes more and more obviously the explicit con­
cern within the tales, and the audience is invited, not to judge, but to 
observe judgment being made. That is, the act which the audience is 
overtly invited to perform becomes by gradual and implicating de­
grees the subject of the fiction itself; the posture of the audience is 
gradually absorbed into the series of tales in order to be evaluated by 
the events in those tales. Rhetorically, the audience faces a picture 
which turns out, eventually, to have the faces of the audience on the 
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bodies in the story, after the manner of carnival photographers' 
props. 
The last disorder before final calamity is bad judgment pure, in the 
case of Apius. Before that, however, we have other disorders, which 
arise as bad judgment is applied to specific situations—status, history, 
and beneficium, as we have said. The tale of the Wife of Bath, fifth in 
the series of tales of magic, is a story neglected too often in favor of 
the Wife's own very colorful life history. However, this tale of Ar­
thur's court and the sinful knight who must go on a pilgrimage to 
discover woman's greatest desire is an important commentary on most 
of the major themes of disorder we have noticed. It deals with the 
problem of the unawarded virgin with brutal directness. It asserts, 
even more radically than do the interceding ladies in the Knight's Tale, 
the desire of courtly ladies to assume control over justice—the Arthu­
rian queen and her attendants are the ones who decide the case and 
send the rapist to find "what thyng is it that wommen moost desiren" 
(III [D] 905). It admits, more radically than either Valerian or Ar­
veragus, the sovereignty of woman in marriage. It continues, in 
explicit theoretical terms, the debate over gentilesse. It treats, in most 
miraculous terms, the theme of magical appearance and transforma­
tion.24 It ends with the predictable (and in practice unattainable) per­
fection: "And thus they lyve unto hir lyves ende/In parfit joye" (III 
[D] 1257-58). 
It has been said many times and in many ways that the Wife of 
Bath's tale is a projection, into fiction, of what she desires most—the 
power to be young again, and to have in thrall a husband "meeke, 
yonge, and fressh abedde" (III [D] 1259). Failing this, she desires her 
audience to think of her, aged and somewhat coarse though she is, as 
still charming, attractive, lively, good company, and fun in bed. In this 
at least she has succeeded with a numerous company, of which Kit­
tredge and Curry are only the most famous of many.25 But in the end 
she will come, like Hamlet's ladies, to Yorick's end: "Now get you to 
my lady's chamber and tell her, let her paint an inch thick, to this 
favor she must come—make her laugh at that" (act 5, sc. 1, lines 
212-16). And in pretending that this is not, or should not be, true, the 
Wife of Bath associates herself with the Pardoner's three drunken 
rioters, who wish to kill Death and only find him after the doom of all 
mortals. What the Wife wants is true only in fairy tale, and so she tells 
one, from a time when the realm of England was "fulfild of fayerye" 
(III [D] 859) instead of friars. In so doing, she wishes violated for her 
sake the fundamental order of time or history, which makes experi­
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ence into authority by transmuting it into remembrance and wisdom. 
She wishes the west-to-east motion of the planets to rule the firma­
ment; she refuses the paradox of life through death to which Donne 
gave classic statement in "Good Friday, Riding Westward"; she re­
fuses to see what has always been true, though we have been best 
reminded of it only in modern times by Tolkien, that the Gospel is the 
consummate and defining fairy tale, and that its catastrophe is the 
only happy ending which is finally possible. Thus the Wife desires 
what only Saint Cecilia knows properly how to get, but refuses the 
saint's way of getting it, and such are the charms of her vitality and sex 
that we are, for a moment, distracted into believing her. Her tale, by a 
happy and, we hope, not accidental result of linkages and fragments, 
is the middle tale in this magic group, and tempts us to ignore both 
the first tale and the last—to avoid the necessity of sainthood by deny­
ing, for a time, the death of which the Pardoner warns, instead of 
accepting, as we must, both.26 
But though the Wife's tale is a projection of what she most desires, 
we must not be misled by the dramatic principle into too exclusive a 
focus on her motivations, desires, and biography. Following the 
example of Shakespeare criticism, Chaucer scholars need to tran­
scend Bradley-type concerns. Considered in medieval categories, the 
Wife of Bath's material consists of a vastly overblown prologue and a 
rather short tractatus in narratione; in terms of the fivefold formal 
cause, that is, definitiva, divisive, probativa, refutiva, and exemplorum 
positiva, what we probably have, after the sententious exordium, is a 
section refutiva, the exemplum of autobiography, the exemplum of 
the rapist and the loathly lady, and the enclosed defining sermon on 
gentilesse—rather a mixed bag taken altogether as a discourse instead 
of as a dramatic monologue. But if one takes the Wife's beginning as 
Chaucer's, that all this has to do with "wo that is in mariage," then an 
outline emerges. The first woe of marriage is that it is the end of 
virginity, second that it is the destroyer of peace, third that it is almost 
the pain of death, and fourth that it is not conducive to nobility. It is 
almost a crime against human high spirits to work so homiletic an 
outline on what the Wife of Bath has to say, yet the ironies point this 
way, the habits of medieval literary criticism point this way, and the 
discursive context points this way. We have already seen how disor­
derly the first three of these themes are, relating as they do to Saint 
Cecilia, to the question of marital sovereignty, and to the desire to 
avoid old age and death. The fourth, that is, the question of and 
contest over gentilesse, reaches its proper conclusion here only as 
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we see it fitted into the proper outline and labeled with the proper 
heading. 
Gentilesse, according to conventional opinion, was to be equated 
with virtue,27 not with lineage, or wealth, or any other worldly asset 
which might well be, and often was, possessed by scoundrels. This is 
true enough, both historically and morally. Yet as modern readers 
trying to get our history right, we must remind ourselves that this 
opinion was held in spite of the fact that distinctions of gentility in 
Chaucer's real world were very largely determined by inheritance. 
Organized threats to the security of this system of inheritance were 
put down with considerable violence, and with every appearance, on 
the part of the "gentle" classes, of sincere righteous indignation.28 In 
the light of his situation, thus, Chaucer puts his most elaborate de­
fense of an ethical meritocracy in exactly the right place—in the con­
text of marriages which so far as we know neither have nor desire 
children, and in the mouth of a magical creature from faerie who can 
renew her youth. 
In balance, we have the Franklin's admiration for the gentilesse of 
another man's son, and his concern for the deficiencies of his 
own—we have an emphatic connection between gentilesse and 
rhetoric, and a contest to see who can be the most genteel, by emula­
tive and competitive generosity. All this is probably to be taken as the 
real, by contrast to the loathly lady's ideal. As an ideal, only saints are 
both permissible and assimilable, because their proper environment is 
heaven, and they impose on the world only a sweet example of moral 
suasion. Otherwise, idealism impinges on society as a principle of 
disorder, however well intentioned. It is a mark of Chaucer's genius 
that he puts even gentilesse here, in a tale of magic and in the context 
of all those private and disordering desires which intrusive individuals 
wish to impose on the world. He is too honest to settle only for de­
nouncing easy and obvious evils; he deals as well with those so near 
good as to daunt all but the most precise of moralists. As Pratt has 
shown, this section grew on Chaucer29—the Shipman's Tale, the au­
tobiography, and the tale of the loathly lady were by turns assigned as 
the Wife of Bath's tale; how much poorer and less profound would 
have been our moral profit had the Wife merely concluded, "score it 
upon my taille." Instead, we have the bittersweet and universal desire 
to get without paying the full price what the psalmist described: 
Bless the Lord, O my soul: and let all that is within me 
bless his holy name. 
Bless the Lord, O my soul, and never forget all he hath 
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done for thee. .. . 
Who redeemeth thy life from destruction: who crowneth thee 
with mercy and compassion. 
Who satisfieth thy desire with good things: thy youth shall be 
renewed like the eagle's. 
(Ps. 102: 1-5) 
From this point on, in the magic group, the temptations are smaller. 
There is no human being over forty who ever lived, medieval or 
modern, who has not assented to the desire of the Wife of Bath, and 
only the wisest of them have fully known what price had to be paid to 
do so. The Friar and the Summoner, whose tales deal with disorder­
ings of beneficium, and the Physician, whose tale deals with disorder of 
judgment, more warn than tempt; the Pardoner, in himself and in his 
tale, drives men from sin with horror. 
The Friar's Tale and the Summoner's Tale have been an embarrass­
ment to fragment 3 ever since Kittredge settled lamely for the notion 
of "interlude."30 Clearly Chaucer was setting something up; it is the 
Friar and the Summoner who are allowed to interrupt the Wife and 
who provide the transition from her autobiography to her finally 
assigned tale. And we properly expect friars after faeries, because the 
Wife herself tells us to expect them.31 Yet these tales have nothing to 
do with gentilesse, nor with marriage; the fornication which always 
hovers like a leitmotif in the backgrounds of the Chaucerian regular 
clergy is not really what the tales are about. Tales like this are the test 
of any critical method which seeks unity, because the analysis must 
proceed tale by tale, following the divisions which are the forma 
tractatus, but it must arrange its material for analysis fragment by 
fragment, accepting such relationships as have clearly been estab­
lished. In our reading the Friar's Tale and the Summoner's Tale are 
here because the Wife of Bath's is clearly, on the literal level, about 
magic. It is reassuring to find that, once the fragment as a whole is 
placed in the magic group, it is possible to say such coherent and 
informative things about these two odd tales, as well as about the tale 
of the Wife of Bath. 
The tales of the magic group have to do with deceitful appearances, 
with trickery, with what seems to change and is really the same, with 
intrusive disorder which attacks, and in attacking defines, some aspect 
of order and good. We have already said that these two tales of the 
Friar and the Summoner have to do with beneficium, particularly in its 
disorderly manifestations, and with the place of beneficium in the se­
ries of orders, descending from general to particular, on the basis of 
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which society is constituted. It remains here to show in more detail 
just how the stories treat the theme and how the material of the 
stories, understood discursively, brings to bear upon the theme 
the theological overtones which justified its importance in medieval 
society. 
Beneficium is a social virtue now so thoroughly out of fashion that it 
can hardly be understood, much less justified. Modern economic and 
social ethics define themselves so largely in terms of contract and quid 
pro quo that the rhetoric of patronage is dismissed as degrading, and 
gifts of any substance tend automatically to be seen as bribery. Never­
theless, the notion of donum or beneficium is at the very heart of the 
ordering process of medieval society and therefore should be ex­
pected to appear, in its place, in any serious treatment of social order. 
The basis of the notion of beneficium was a God defined as gracious, 
whose creation and whose sacraments alike were received by men as 
gifts from God, and whose example of liberality was the proper model 
of healthy social behavior. One of the conventional duties of human 
sovereigns, therefore, was to be magnificent, and that magnificence 
includes the giving of gifts. The continual gentrification of commer­
cial wealth, especially in the later Middle Ages, expresses the desire to 
rise from a world of quid pro quo (for which there was little theologi­
cal and sacramental significance) to the world of fiefs in the gift of 
magnate or king. There may in fact have been a good deal of com­
mercial enterprise involved in the transition, but the rhetoric was of 
beneficium. Even salaries paid to retainers, and especially those por­
tions paid in kind, as new clothes for festive occasions, indulge the 
rhetoric of gifts. Though tithes may have been hard to collect, the 
early successes of the friars, the need for such laws as the statute of 
mortmain, and the popularity of cathedral building all testify to the 
fact that gift-giving was an important social structure, regardless of 
how mixed its motivation may have been. In theoretical terms, 
Aegidius Romanus even bases his attack on communism and his de­
fense of private property and unequal distribution of wealth on his 
desire to encourage the virtue of liberality.32 
The relation of the tales of both Friar and Summoner with gifts and 
gift-giving is obvious. Summoners live by bribery, and friars by gifts. 
The Friar's Tale's point has to do with a gift sincerely given—as it 
happens, to a devil. The point of the Summoner's Tale is another 
gift—Thomas's fart. The final episode in the set contains a squire, in a 
feudal setting, earning a gift of "gowne-clooth" (III [D] 2252). These 
gifts, all but the last, are parodies of true beneficium. As do all other 
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disorders in this magic group of tales, they intrude upon order, in this 
case the order of beneficium, which is restored in the action of the lord 
and his squire. But this intrusion is more than literal. It is also parodic, 
and this dimension of parody, which is underlined and reinforced by 
the parodic dimensions of the discussion of devilish bodies, the loca­
tion of friars in hell, glossing, "ars-metrike" (III [D] 2222), and the 
"transubstantial" fart, answers to the fact that beneficium, more obvi­
ously than any of the other orders we have considered in this group, 
has a transcendental dimension. Creation, once made, operates in a 
way which can be taken as simply natural, and status, being intimately 
connected with pride, tends to be exercised in a more secular manner 
the more one is conscious of it at all. Both, of course, have ultimate 
validation from God—but his presence is not in practice necessarily 
insistent. On the other hand, the most important beneficium in medie­
val culture, the Incarnation and its continuance in the Mass, is truly 
divine.33 Of the double nature of the sacramental, of "being divine in 
the world," the genre of parody is structurally, as well as meaning­
fully, appropriate. 
We begin therefore with a prologue which takes the doctrine of the 
Wife of Bath seriously, rejects authorities (as she had in her turn, even 
though she is herself one), and defends game. More serious matters 
are to be left to preaching and clerical pronouncement—and this in 
introduction of what will in fact be a good deal of explicit discussion of 
theological matters and an excessive straining after authority through 
the strategem of gloss. The topos of quiting is mentioned again and 
rejected. In the company there shall be no debate. What all this says, 
of course, is that "yes" will be "no" and "no" will be "yes." The game 
will be to play games with serious matters, as an activity fitting this 
"compaignye" or society which the rule of the Host has constituted. 
If we divide what follows discursively, a diptych pattern emerges 
involving five elements. First, there is a definition—of ecclesiastical 
justice and of the place of summoners in it; then, in parallel, a defini­
tion of friars. Second, a society is constituted as a result—the sum­
moner swears brotherhood with the fiend, and the friar claims his 
privileged relation with Thomas and his wife. Then there is an elabor­
ate discussion of doctrine—on the nature of hellish bodies and their 
function in the world; and of glossing, intercessory prayer, and the sin 
of wrath. Fourth, there is a two-part exemplum, which poses a prob­
lem—the two curses in the Friar's Tale, and the fart and its discussion 
at the Lord's dinner in the Summoner's. Finally, the problems are 
solved. We find out from the Summoner that friars live in hell in the 
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devil's anus; we find out from the lord's squire how to divide a fart. 
Both these solutions, moreover, are made distinctive and separate by 
rubrication. Procedurally and formally, the whole thing could not be 
more obviously something usually left "to prechyng and to scole eek of 
clergye" (III [D] 1277). And the fivefold forma tractandi which medie­
val critics were accustomed to find in their stories and poems is also 
obviously governing: definitiva, divisiva, probativa, refutiva, exemplorum 
positiva. 
What is missing, of course, is the central panel, in bono—the divine 
definition which makes good society possible, the doctrine by which 
that society lives and believes, the actions which that society's history 
and its accumulation of exempla preserve, and the heavenly solution 
which causes all exempla to make sense. Irony is a form of allegory 
here. And the overtones which might be noted in these tales—why the 
devil wears green,34 that devilish appearance and substance resemble 
those of angels, that the hell of the devil's anus parodies the bosom of 
Mary of mercies,35 that this gift of wind blasphemously parodies the 
coming of the Holy Ghost upon the Apostles, with the "sound from 
heaven, as of a violent wind blowing"36—all evoke elements of truth 
and value appropriate to this literally absent but ironically present 
central panel. That these ironic stories are literally about gift-giving, 
then, properly implies that the central fact of the true story is God's 
gracious gift of salvation and his commandment that analogous graces 
be the chief exercise through which earthly hierarchies express them­
selves. 
Incongruities further underline the point. The friar's willingness to 
take seriously the problem of the division of the fart is Chaucer's way 
of labeling him a materialist—a person unable to deal with the 
spiritual (or at least insubstantial) problem, and therefore disqualified 
from appreciating, or participating in, a social institution which prop­
erly is always more than material.37 More important still is the old 
woman's curse against the Summoner. In orthodox terms she cannot 
damn her enemy without his consent; the Summoner effectively 
damns himself by refusing the opportunity to repent.38 Even the fully 
serious and validated cursing of excommunication is of no effect, if it 
does not really correspond to the actual state of grace of the one being 
cursed.39 But cursing and blessing are still a valid and necessary part 
of religion, because mutuality is the essence of it. This widow's cursing 
corresponds, thematically, to beneficium—and no less clearly because 
in malo. Beneficium is always accomplished by the agency of another; it 
always generates a mutuality between two or more people. 
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The allegorical strategy through which much of the meaning of the 
Friar's and Summoner's tales is generated continues in the rest of the 
tales of this magic group. The full meaning of the Physician's Tale, and 
of the judgment which is its theme, is only defined by considerations 
of the medieval glosses which it evokes and the framing exempla of 
the tale—the references to Pygmalion and to Jephthah's daughter. 
Even more, the Pardoner's Tale is allegorical, not just in details, but as a 
whole in the full typological sense defined by biblical exegesis. The 
reason for this larger allegorical presence in the latter tales of the 
magic group is, we think, that in these tales the theme of order being 
treated has become quite particular. In the series as a whole, from 
nature and status to judgment, we are going from general to particu­
lar, from universal to singular. Since, philosophically, singulars can­
not be the basis of certain knowledge, the allegorical strategy 
functions as validation, or, as it were, universalization, of something 
which needs to be both particular and true. 
The Physician's Tale is a true story, a "historial thyng notable; /The 
sentence of it sooth is, out of doute" (VI [C] 156-57). The relationship 
between the true letter and the possibility of further meaning, of true 
sentence, is a commonplace of exegesis and strengthens Chaucer's 
assertion of the value of the tale's sentence. But here, as so often in 
Chaucer, the allegorical overtones which allusions and the investiga­
tion of commentaries make possible are not the end for which the tale 
is meant, but rather reinforcements and amplifications of the literal 
force of the tale itself, and validations of it. 
Most obviously, the tale is an exemplum of the unjust judge. As 
such it addresses a human problem serious at all times, but for 
Chaucer not quite the same problem as it might be now. In his society 
the judicial and the executive functions were not so thoroughly dis­
tinguished as they have since been, and the judge and his functions 
had sacral, or at least theological, overtones, of which secularization 
has since deprived us. In a society with more case law than statute law, 
with a great many matters theroretically decided on the basis of cus­
toms, and with relatively inefficient public administration, the indi­
vidual judge and his personal activity were of great practical impor­
tance. Pierre Bersuire's definition is helpfully comprehensive: 
Nota, quod iudicare idem est quod discernere. Unde de homine sapiente et 
discreto in aliqua arte dicitur quod ipse est homo boni iudicii. Iudicium 
enim nihil aliud est quam discretio inter qualitates et conditiones re­
rum. . . . Quia nomen ergo iudicii importat status iurisdictionem 
negociorum cognitionem, et negociorum diffinitionem, bene patet, quod 
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officium iudicandi debet committi viris autenticis et honestis, viris pruden­
tibus et discretis, viris etiam Deum timentibus et perfectis. ludex enim in 
populo est sicut oculus in corpore, a quo dependet regimen corporis uni­
versi. Nam sicut oculus habet de coloribus iudicare, foveas, et pericula 
precavere et praeiudicare, et cunctis membris aliis de debito regimine 
praevidere, sic vere iudex debet de coloribus idest de personarum con­
ditionibus discernere, reipublicae pericula cognoscere, et omnia membra 
corporis, idest omnes personas suae iurisdictionis debite gubernare.40 
A few details might be singled out for comment. First, judgment is 
grounded in perception; the judge is a person of discernment. His 
discernment has much to do with the crucial element of conditio, with 
which Chaucer was concerned in his General Prologue and which we 
have already related to the consuetudines and credulitates which the 
Averroistic Poetics of Aristotle uses to define the content of poetry. He 
is clearly a ruler as well as an interpreter of statutes. On his personal 
goodness the health of the body politic greatly depends. 
After Dante the classic biblical citation for justice and judgment is 
Wisd. 1:1, "Diligite iustitiam, qui iudicatis terram." Hugh of St. Cher's 
comments on this verse define judges as spiritual men who in judging 
the earth deal with "terrenos, terrena nimis diligentes." He associates 
the activity of judgment with the command in Genesis, given to Adam 
and Eve, to subdue the earth. Finally, he allegorizes: "Diligite ius­
titiam, qui iudicatis terram, idest, qui carnem vestro subditis iudicio, 
ut obediat spiritui, discrete, et cum amore hoc facite, et quod iustum 
est, iumento reddite, scilicet, onus, virgam, et pabulum, Eccl. 33.d. 
Unde Apostolus Rom. 12.a. Rationable obsequium vestrum, nemo 
enim unquam carnem suam odio habuit, sed fovet, et nutrit earn, 
Eph. 5.f."41 
All this corresponds to Apius where he is typical and reproves him 
where he is wicked. He is a governor, as well as a judge, with a great 
deal of discretionary authority. The responsibility which he professes 
to owe to "right," that is, to natural law, to what is true rather than 
merely correct, is thoroughly medieval. 
. .. "Of this, in his absence, 
I may nat yeve diffynytyf sentence. 
Lat do hym calle, and I wol gladly heere; 
Thou shalt have al right, and no wrong heere." 
(VI [C] 171-74) 
In his lust, in his subornation of the witness, in his inability to rule 
himself and his own body, in his desire to alter the "condition" of the 
maid Virginia, knowing that he could never persuade her "for to 
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make hire with hir body synne" (VI [C] 137), he violates definition. In 
his desire to misappropriate his high and spiritual office as a means to 
accomplish, if not legalize, an act of rape, he is a bad judge by medie­
val standards, not only because he is attempting to do an injustice to 
Virginia and Virginius, but also because he has distorted himself, has 
turned upside down the proper relation between his own flesh and his 
proper spiritual wisdom, and so acts in a way which denies, rather 
than affirms, the metaphoric possibilities of his existence as judge 
which allegorically validate and confirm judgment fully accom­
plished.42 
It is these dimensions which the framing exempla, of Pygmalion 
and Jephthah's daughter and of the evocation of the Romance of the 
Rose, emphasize and define. In the first place, though we must admit 
Virginia's beauty, we must also admit from the Romance of the Rose, 
and ultimately from the poem of Alanus, that the chief complaint 
against man was that he was too physical and not sufficiently fecund in 
the spirituality of good works. In addition, the evocation of the Ro­
mance of the Rose gives special importance to the allusion to Pygmalion, 
whose love of his beautiful statue, in the main tradition of commen­
tary, meant either that his wife was frigid or that he was masturbating 
with the statue.43 In neither case, nor in the very promising treatment 
of the Romance of the Rose itself, does Pygmalion's accomplishment 
deserve ideal commendation. 
Bersuire's gloss, in fact, finds for the Pygmalion story a meaning 
very closely analogous to that of Apius: 
Per istum factorem imaginum intelligo predicatores qui animam sciunt 
sculpere, et pingere correctionibus et virtutibus, per istam puellam ebur­
neam intelligo quamlibet sanctimonialem, que eburnea dicitur pro eo quod 
casta frigida ponderosa et honesta esse dicitur. Sed saepe contingit quod 
aliquis bonus pigmaleon, idest aliquis bonus religiosus proponit perpetuo 
nee mulierem nee carnales amplexus appetere et talis convertit se ad imag­
ines eburneas faciendas, idest ad benignas sanctimoniales et matronas in 
castitate et sanctitate informandas, et in moribus spiritualibus sculpendas, 
et accidit quod quandoque unam inter ceteras sibi eligit quam sororem vel 
filiam dicit et earn bono ac casto animo et amore associat et tangit. Sed pro 
certo tandem accidit quod venus dea luxurje idest carnis concupiscentia se 
interponit et ipsam imaginem mortuam convertit in vivam, et ipsam castam 
mulierem facit carnis stimulos sentire et earn mutat de bona in fatuam. 
Ipse enim pigmaleon predicator hoc a venere expetit, et istam mutationem 
appetit. Sic igitur cum more solito ad colloquia redeunt simul se mutatos 
invenit, ita quod ilia que fuerat eburnea, fit carnea et ille qui mulieres 
horrebat, incipit carnis spurciciam appetere. Isti igitur carnales sic se 
mutuo accipiunt, et quandoque filios generant. Non est igitur tutum re­
ligioso cum mulieribus nimiam familiaritatem contrahere vel econverso.44 
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Just as Apius was "caught with beautee of this mayde" Virginia, so the 
predicator of Bersuire's interpretation "incipit carnis spurcicia appe­
tere." But Bersuire's gloss makes explicit what in the Physician's Tale is 
only implicit, and that is the positive duty of right judgment. The 
preacher exhorts the women in his charge to chastity and holiness; the 
judge must love justice as he judges earthly things and people. As 
described, Virginia, this most wondrous of nature's works, exists as an 
occasion for right judgment as well as a temptation to wrong judg­
ment, and Chaucer's digression dealing with the obligation of parents 
and chaperones to rule their charges wisely and well is evidence that 
he considered her so. Apius is guilty of a sin of omission as well as 
commission. 
So, also, in a way, is Virginius. The loss of chastity is a serious 
matter, but the loss of physical chastity by rape, without consent, is 
neither sin nor justification for suicide,45 and Virginius's remedy is 
extreme. In this attempt to preserve the flesh from taint by destroying 
it, he has overmagnified the importance of the flesh.46 Thus he has 
failed to appreciate its relatively lesser, but still true, value. Just as in 
the Manciple's Tale, the spiritual good achieved at the expense of the 
flesh, upon reflection, proves a hollow prize. Virginia's evocation of 
Jephthah's daughter is therefore precisely to the point.47 
Glosses on the story of Jephthah's daughter are generally disap­
proving, and generally because human sacrifice is not considered the 
thing to do. But all angles are considered: Nicholas of Lyra says, for 
instance, "Licet autem illud votum processerit ex devotione, tamen 
factum fuit indiscrete: quia de domo sua primo poterat egredi obviam 
ei canis: qui non est animal immolaticium."48 Hugh of St. Cher cites 
Augustine's suspicion of ulterior motive, "Item dicit Augustinus quod 
votum suum retulit ad uxorem, quam habebat odio, cogitans earn sibi 
occurrere primo, et ita patet, quod mala intentione vovit, ergo malum 
fuit eius votum."49 
For the allegorizations of the story,50 Pierre Bersuire's commentary 
provides a convenient summary. After various applications of the fact 
that Jephthah was a concubine's child, rejected by his family, he comes 
to those applications which include the daughter: 
Exponamus allegorice de Christo, dicamus itaque quod iste Iephthe sig­
nificat Christum, qui revera quasi ex concubina nascitur, pro eo quod ex
Deo patre et virgine matre, quae erat alterius thori et fori generatus
videtur.... Iste igitur quamvis repudiatus a Iudaeis, tamen contra Amon,
idest diabolum, princeps et duxfiliorum Israel, idest fidelium constituitur, 
et pro victoria obtinenda propriam flliam, idest humanitatem Deo patri
immolavit, et ipsa pro salute humani generis et pro victoria mortem 
162 I A Distinction of Stories 
patitur, et Amon et populus suus, idest diabolus et vitia superantur, et filii 
Israel, idest fideles populi liberantur.. .. Vel die quod Iephthe est homo, 
cuius filia est propria caro, quam scilicet Deo debet vovere, et per 
poenitentiam Deo immolandam promittere, ut contra Amon, idest contra 
diabolum et peccata possit obtinere victoriam. Quando igitur contingit 
quod homo victoriam contra vitia vel contra tribulationes habuit, vel quod 
a Deo donum spirituale reportavit, et videt filiam, idest, propriam carnem 
cum tympanis et organis, idest cum delitiis et delectationibus occurrere, et 
sibi in via morum obviare: statim pro certo debet dicere et clamare: Filia 
mea decepisti me, et ipsa decepta es. Decepisti me, dico, vitia suggerendo, 
sed tu ipsa decepta es, per peccatum et poenitentiam promendo. Istam 
igitur statim debet Deo per poenitentiam immolare, et sibi fletum proprie 
virginitatis, idest, compunctionem et virtutum sterilitatem iniungere, et 
tandem virginitate seu sterilitate deplorata, debet earn per charitatem 
comburere, et per laborum fatigationem et poenitentiam Deo sacrificare 
vel offerre.51 
Just as the judge may by analogy be likened to the eyes, which guide 
the body, discern colors, and discriminate dangers, so the social rela­
tionships between father and daughter may be analogous to the rela­
tion of spirit to flesh, whereby the individual keeps his values straight 
and his heart right.52 Ideally, however, the level must be good, though 
God can make good significance of evil events. An earthly beauty 
defined in terms of the kind of beauty Pygmalion made is, when fully 
understood, the kind to which Apius's lust is appropriate; a flesh 
defined by the terms of Jephthah's vow deserves the judgment of 
Virginius and the fate of Virginia. 
We may turn profitably from the story itself to the judgment 
Chaucer's pilgrims make upon its meaning. The Host's interpretation 
is a version of Virginius's attitude—a rejection of the flesh: 
Alias, to deere boughte she beautee!

Wherfore I seye al day that men may see

That yiftes of Fortune and of Nature

Been cause of deeth to many a creature.

Hire beautee was hire deth, I dar wel sayn.

(VI [C] 293-97) 
Nature's achievement, from this limited perspective, is not only vain 
but positively harmful. Better we were all born ugly, and chastity 
would be easier to achieve. 
No one of these many judgments on Virginia's beauty, whether 
coming from within the tale or in its surrounding link material, pro­
vides us with the whole truth, but from these erroneous judgments we 
may gain a sense of the understanding they ironically evoke. Nature's 
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achievement is good, but not supreme; Apius, the judge, exists to 
place on the facts of this world, including people, value labels—good, 
bad, wicked, criminal, liable, innocent. Virginius exists to foster his 
child, and Virginia to be properly loved. And all of this should, when 
retold and remembered, be of some moral use. From beginning to 
end it is a matter of discernment, and discernment is the essence of 
iudicium. The allegorical overtones, which relate personal to social and 
social to personal, and make possible good insight even from bad 
events, tell us what the ideal harmonies are. Iudicium is at once so 
important and so difficult because it is a particular act which makes 
universal claims. When a human being renders sentence, an individu­
al's perception of particulars is the basis for affirming, defining, and 
then applying the universal. It is the duty of a judge to be right—and 
at once his privilege and his awesome responsibility to create right in 
terms of what he decides, even when sometimes what he decides is less 
than perfect. This duty to be right gains complexity, in Chaucer's 
time, from a context in which particulars cannot, by definition, be 
right as objects of true knowledge, and in which universals and the 
possibility of knowing them are far more palpable than for us. It is the 
allegorical overtones, contributed primarily by the allusions which 
surround this simple true story of Roman injustice, which celebrate 
the resonances by which alone particulars may guarantee universals 
and which impose on the judges of Chaucer's audience the obligation 
to discern all of the many truths they perform in their particular 
attention to a cause. 
The Pardoner's Tale is more allegorical still. Some years ago Judson 
Allen argued that it was one of those late medieval poems demanding 
a fully exegetical spiritual sense reading.53 We still think so, but would 
go further, first, by relating the Pardoner's Tale to the structurally 
defined schema of the four levels and, second, by showing how both 
the literal and the allegorical features of the tale are thrown into 
sharper and clearer relief by their having been seen as a part of the 
group of tales to which we have assigned it. We do not intend to offer 
any new interpretation of the tale, or of any of its parts, characters, or 
details. Scholarship on the Pardoner's Tale has been unusually rich, 
and the allegorical overtones defining the old man, the tree, the Par­
doner's complex sterility, and his homiletic effectiveness all have been 
fully and, we think, correctly explained.54 
AH four allegorical levels are present, both in the biblical sense and 
in the structural sense we developed earlier. The actual tale is the 
same for both, of course. Doctrinal overtones are unusually strong, as 
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Robert P. Miller has shown;55 in merely secular terms, the tale has 
about it an abstract or hieratic quality which constantly forces the 
reader to the sense that these characters are typical and not merely 
individual. In addition, the readers cannot avoid some personal in­
volvement. People who behave like these rioters will die—all men 
must die, we know, but the sudden end of the rioters is an insistent 
reminder that the death which is our common fate, and which cannot 
be avoided or postponed, can be hastened. Finally, there is about the 
tale still another dimension, which the tradition would have labeled 
anagogy or eschatology, and which we label prosopopoeia. Others 
might attempt to get at the same quality by referring to "folktale" 
atmosphere. What we mean has been most brilliantly explained, in 
secular terms, by Donald Howard, in an analogy with the work of Jean 
Genet.56 The perversions which Genet's characters enact, Howard 
said, like the perversion which the Pardoner is and recounts, reveal to 
the audience, as it were like the sudden opening of a pit, the potential 
for evil in every one of us. A part of the effect is the power fulness of 
the revelation, a part is the shock of recognition, and a part is the 
almost heart-stopping relief provided by the possibility of aesthetic 
distance. What all this awareness adds up to, we believe, can in medie­
val terms be labeled prosopopoeia—at least for nominalist sen­
sibilities. It is the awareness of the presence, not just of evil people, or 
even evil kinds of people (or good, had it been a different story)—but 
rather of evilness itself, palpable and real. One of the greatest powers 
literature has, in all times, is this power to bring people into the 
presence of universals. It is a power not always present, nor even 
always intended, and sometimes not achieved when intended. One of 
the great burdens of Hardy's fiction, for instance, is that our misfor­
tune is to live in a world without universals, yet the child in Jude, like 
the Pardoner's Old Man, comes very near to being totally transparent 
to that dark underside of the world outside Plato's cave. The dif­
ference between medieval and later literatures at this point is not a 
difference of power, but rather a difference of clarity—there were 
more abstractions, with names, and one could recognize the powers 
when they appeared and give them names. Hence prosopopoeia—a 
very different kind of mental state from the rationalist trick of poetry 
it later became. 
As is universally recognized, both the Pardoner and his tale are 
about death. Here, as in the tale of Saint Cecilia, we are in the pres­
ence of paradox. The sainted martyr, whom the world that kills her 
perceives as mere disorder, is the intrusive, authentic, particular indi­
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vidual who has the right to be disorder in any world which so per­
ceives her. Rome must fall, that there might be a new Rome, and 
ultimately a new Jerusalem. In the context of the tales of the magic 
group, which begins with the Tale of St. Cecilia, it is possible to see just 
what this death in the Pardoner's Tale is about, just how it relates to the 
comprehensive treatment of order and disorder in society. Death is 
the intrusive order, which intrudes upon all the mere arrangements 
of this world, defines them as disorders, and reduces them to peace 
(or hell). Taken in isolation, the Pardoner's exemplum of the three 
rioters who meet death is moral enough. We have a sense of earthy 
riot and deserved punishment. But if we define the Pardoner's Tale as, 
in a sense, that part of saint's life visible to merely mortal eyes, then 
the redeeming ironies become much larger. 
The death of Death is an event whose expectation and achievement 
are central to the faith of Christendom. Saint Cecilia and her co­
religionists were, from the point of view of orthodox pagan Rome, 
no less foolish than the Pardoner's rioters in their insistence that they 
would conquer death. The difference, of course, is that we view Saint 
Cecilia, whether we are personally Christian or not, from the point of 
view of an insider who shares, within the "fiction," her faith. We know 
more than the Romans do and can appreciate the ironic value of their 
postures and their claims to be right. In the same way, but even more 
naively and automatically, we know more than the Pardoner's rioters 
do (because the expectation of death is more universal in human 
experience than in Christian faith) and can appreciate the ironic val­
ues of their postures and their claims to be able to murder Death. 
But—and this is the difference the grouping makes—the ironies are 
enlarged when we see that ultimately the rioters equal the Roman 
empire, that all merely human arrangements are disorder before 
their common end, and common peace, which is death. The rioters 
proposed, in the drunkenness of a morning, to kill death. Rome pro­
posed for one thousand years to be the Eternal City. The end of the 
rioters, though haunted by archetypes, is expected and unsurprising; 
the end of Rome was a cosmic shock, even to such a man of faith as 
Jerome. All mortal things are, by ultimate standards, disorderly, even 
Rome. The cry of the crusader aginst the Albigensians, "Kill them all; 
God will recognize his own," is at one level an unhuman horror, but at 
another the only proper posture of true faith. The end of the rioters 
is a mortal horror, and a seeming disorder at all levels. But the al­
legorical resonance, which was becoming increasingly audible in all 
these last tales and inescapable in the last, redeems that disorder even 
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while it is dying, reminding us that facts do connect, while they last, to 
the truth which neither changes nor dies, whose symbol is the crowns 
of lilies and roses that only faith can see. Of the great ordering struc­
tures into which facts may fit themselves, and from which they derive 
their meaning—sainthood, nature, status, history, beneficium, indicium, 
and death—the last and most difficult is death. But in context we are 
given a double vision of death—as just punishment within the world 
of the rioters and the Pardoner, and as the last and anagogical peace 
from the point of view defined by having seen order in dialectic with 
disorder throughout the series. And we are reminded once again of 
that quality of Chaucer's faith in life which is the central measure of 
his greatness—that ironic, gentle handling of fallible facts which ac­
cepts their failures even while it sees the truth they bring in resonant 
focus. 
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their heart, as Jerome says. Genes. 52. c is addressed to this serpent: You will 
crawl on your chest and belly, because hypocrites do everything to satisfy their 
bellies, and for the sake of vainglory, which is to crawl on the chest.... But to 
him it is also said: You will eat dirt all the days of your life, because hypocrites 
do nothing else except lust after the earthly. Next serpents carry poison on 
their tongue, in the same way all hypocrites are detractors." 
16. For a discussion of the relationship between the two tales, see Joyce E. 
Peterson, "The Finished Fragment: A Reassessment of the Squire's Tale," 
Chaucer Review 5 (1970): 62-74. Charles F. Duncan, in '"A Straw for Your 
Gentillesse': The Gentle Franklin's Interruption of the Squire," Chaucer Re­
view 5 (1970): 161-64, discusses the vexed question of whether Chaucer 
intended the Franklin to interrupt a bad story or, rather, used the interrup­
tion to make the Franklin look ridiculous. He also surveys the scholarship 
on the subject. As Peterson shows, the question of proper speech, and proper 
speech as a demonstration of virtue, as well as of virtuosity, is at stake in 
the two tales. 
17. J. J. Murphy is much impressed with this feature of the Rhetoric's far-
tuna; see his Rhetoric in the Middle Ages (Berkeley, 1974), pp. 92-101. Aristot­
le's Poetics, in the Averroistic version put into Latin circulation by Hermann 
the German, also tended more often to circulate with ethical than with 
grammatical or logical texts. It is therefore improper to distinguish too sharp­
ly the Ciceronian tradition of colors and ornaments from the Aristotelian 
tradition of persuasive postures. Similarly, it is necessary to see Chaucer's 
frequent praise of rhetoric, especially intrusive in this prologue material of 
the Franklin's, as insisting on sound ethical existence as well as on goodness at 
storytelling, and that without being much interested in distinguishing the two. 
The modern convention which takes Chaucer's relations to rhetoric as either 
stylistically immature or as ironic is beside the point. To the modern sensibil­
ity, rhetoric is by definition artificial in a pejorative sense; to the medieval one, 
rhetoric is artificial in a way which helps existence achieve truth. Chaucer's 
irony is directed, not at rhetoric per se, but at failed rhetoric. For amplifica­
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tion of this point, see the review of Murphy's Rhetoric in the Middle Ages in 
Speculum 52 (April 1977): 411-14. 
18. Gertrude M. White, in "The Franklin's Tale: Chaucer and the Critics," 
PMLA 89 (1974): 454-62, provides a survey of criticism; she emphasizes the 
recent critical emphasis on the character of Arveragus. Kaske's article 
"Chaucer's Marriage Group" is both the most cogent and the most enjoyable 
analysis in print of this aspect of Chaucer criticism; in it Arveragus emerges 
very subtly as a ruler more in control de facto than de jure. But the whole 
question takes on a very different complexion if one presumes, as we do, that 
Chaucer's stories are not about particulars but rather use them, exemplum 
fashion, as normative arrays leading to definition. 
19. A. C. Baugh, in Chaucer's Major Poetry (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963), 
p. 482, translates the line "if God allow me to say so" and thus misses the easiest 
construction of the subjunctive. The line might better be read: "This is too 
much [even] if it were the will of God." 
20. Kenneth Kee, in "Illusion and Reality in Chaucer's Franklin's Tale," 
English Studies in Canada 1 (1975): 1-12, speaks of the tale as a discussion of 
magic. He argues, however, that Chaucer's ultimate purpose in depicting 
Dorigen's trust of magic is a refutation of Boethian philosophy, rather than 
an ironic criticism of Dorigen's philosophical misunderstandings. 
21. Donald R. Howard, "The Conclusion of the Marriage Group: Chaucer 
and the Human Condition," Modern Philology 57 (1960): 228-29. 
22. Rhetorically, the strategies of this tale and the Miller's Tale are precisely 
the same. In each case the ending is so arranged as to make the audience able 
safely to entertain the story. The ending of the Miller's Tale permits us to 
enjoy the romping disorders which lead up to it, knowing that the harm they 
do will be punished; the ending of the Franklin's Tale permits us to enjoy the 
sentimental disorders which lead up to it, knowing that no great harm 
will come from them. In both cases comic distance encourages precisely the 
empathy necessary to entertain (in the logical sense) the propositions made in 
the tale and, at the same time, precisely the objectivity necessary to judge 
them. In the same way, pornography ceases to be sordid as soon as it stimu­
lates laughter—that is, the social and distanced judgment which keeps the 
ethical universe in order. 
23. For a full analysis of the significance of the exemplum of Midas in the 
Wife of Bath's Tale, which establishes the central importance of the implicit 
theme of judgment and which shows how the Wife is attempting to manipu­
late the tale rhetorically so as to make herself the object of a favorable judgment, 
see Allen and Gallacher, "Alisoun through the Looking Glass." 
24. In the analogues the choice is between fair by day and foul by night, or 
vice versa. Chaucer's version of the choice, between faithful plainness and 
possibly faithless beauty, underlines the false dilemma between flesh and 
spirit, or carnality and the religious ideal, which the Wife of Bath has been 
posing in order to defend her sex-oriented value system. The ironic juxtapo­
sition of her desire for youth and her confidence in her own experience links 
her with the Old Woman of the Romance of the Rose, and thence to the Ars 
Amatoria, as a woman whose behind-the-scenes knowledge of mores has not 
freed her from love's illusions. Cf. Margaret Schlauch, "The Marital Dilemma 
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in the Wife of Bath's Tale," PMLA 61 (1946), pp. 416-30. William Matthews, 
"The Wife of Bath and All Her Sect," Viator 5 (1974): 413-44, correctly 
identifies the issue of the tale as related to the medieval interest in old age, but 
ends by concluding, with most critics, that the Wife is "unique." Old age, in its 
struggle to maintain itself in authority and to retain its participation in the 
joys of life, was a theme of the first fragment, as well. Here, in light of the 
Pardoner's Tale, we may say that just as virginity is paired with true riches and 
virtue in this second group of tales, so old age is linked with avarice and with 
sexual cupidity. 
25. Owen, in "The Transformation of a Frame Story," p. 134, identifies 
the Wife as one of the three key characters of the poem: "it was the Wife of 
Bath who was to transform the collection into drama." Curry, Medieval Sci­
ences, finds the Wife "so vividly feminine and human," and quotes Kittredge, 
from Chaucer and His Poetry, who called the Wife "one of the most amazing 
characters . . . the brain of man has ever conceived" (p. 91). 
26. We are happy to thank R. A. Shoaf for an archetypal insight which 
adds a last and neatly climactic twist to this whole argument. Writing, in a 
letter, of the separations from the world which human self-consciousness 
causes, and of the encounter with the loathly lady, he says: "The old hag is the 
world and the young knight is you or I and all our self-conscious ideals. But 
the young knight must accept the old hag, and then, only then, does beauty 
happen, the beauty of the world." This of course both modernizes and uni­
versalizes Chaucer's message, and places the miracle in the phenomenological 
world of the acceptance of a transcendence which mortal men can know but 
never absolutely be, rather than in the faerie transformation of the hag her­
self. But this placement gives us immediate possession of the miracle. 
27. Cf. the Parson's Tale: "Now been ther generale signes of gentillesse, as 
eschewynge of vice and ribaudye and servage of synne, in word, in werk, and 
contenaunce;/and usynge vertu, curteisye, and clennesse, and to be liberal, 
that is to seyn, large by mesure; for thilke that passeth mesure is folie and 
synne" (X [I] 464-65). See, also, Dante's Convivio, 4. xx, and G. M. Vogt, 
"Gleanings for the History of a Sentiment: Generositas Virtus, non Sanguis," 
Journal of English and Germanic Philology 24 (1925): 102-23. 
28. The principal spokesman for this righteous indignation must be John 
Gower, who in both the Vox Clamantis and the Mirour de I'omme attacks the 
"common multitude for the lawless destruction in England." Cf. The Works of 
John Gower, ed. G. C. Macaulay (Oxford, 1899), 1: 1-334; (1902) 4: 3-314. In 
Vox, p. 20, Gower contrasts the "serviles rustici" with the "ingenuos et nobiles 
regni," blaming the "serviles" for the trouble. For other documents of the 
Peasants' Revolt, particularly reflecting the dangerous character of the 
lower-class outbreak, see, The Peasants' Revolt of1381, ed. R. B. Dobson (Lon­
don, 1970), pp. 98, 359-61; and R. H. Robbins, Historical Poems of the XIVth 
andXVth Centuries (New York, 1959), "The taxes hath tened us all" (pp. 55-57), 
and "Yit is God a curteis lord" (pp. 57-59). 
29. Robert A. Pratt, "The Order of the Canterbury Tales," pp. 1141 -67, an 
article whose proposals on the evolution of the poem still hold wide influence. 
30. "Chaucer's Discussion of Marriage," in Chaucer Criticism, ed. Schoeck 
and Taylor, p. 138. 
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31. With the same rhetoric, we are led to expect the Pardoner as well, and 
as it turns out, his is the last tale of the magic group. 
32. "Possessiones et res civium deberefnt] esse proprias, et communes, 
proprias quidem quantum ad dominium, communes vero propter virtutem 
liberalitatis. .. . nam quilibet dominans bonis propriis adhibebit debitam di­
ligentiam circa ilia. Expedit autem talia esse communia secundum 
liberalitatem; quia cives inter se debent liberales esse, communicando sibi 
invicem propria bona" (De Regimine Principum [Rome, 1607; rpt. Aalen, Ger­
many, 1967], p. 430). "The possessions and goods of the citizens ought to be 
private, and common, private indeed in the sense of ownership, but common 
for the sake of the virtue of liberality.... For any owner will devote to his own 
goods the care owed them. But it is proper that such things should be com­
mon for the sake of liberality; because the citizens ought to be liberal, by 
giving their own goods to each other reciprocally." "Tertia via ad ostenden­
dum legem Phaleae non esse decentem de aequatione possessionum, sumitur 
ex parte virtutum quas decet habere cives: decet enim ipsos esse liberales et 
temperatos: non ergo bene dictum est quod ad bonum regimen civitatis suf­
ficit cives habere possessiones aequatas, nisi aliquid determinetur de quanti­
tate possessionum illarum; possent enim cives adeo modicas possessiones ha­
bere, quod oporteret eos ita parce vivere quod opera liberalitatis de facili 
exercere non valerent. Rursus habendo possessiones aequatas possent ita 
abundare in eis, et adeo deliciose vivere, quod non contingeret ipsos tem­
peratos esse" (p. 442). "The third way for showing the law of Phalea not to be 
proper, in the equality of possessions, is based on the virtues which it is proper 
that citizens have: for it is appropriate that they should be liberal and temper­
ate: therefore it is not well said that it is enough for the good management of 
a city that the citizens have equal possessions, unless something may be de­
termined concerning the quantity of their possessions, but then citizens might 
have modest possessions so that it might be necessary for them to live simply, 
and they would not be able to exercise the works of liberality easily. On the 
other hand, by having equal possessions they might be able to have them in 
such an abundance and they would live so luxuriously, that it would not be 
necessary for them to be temperate." 
33. The friar's problem resembles the difficulty of the disciples in Matt. 
14:17; they must divide the five loaves and two fishes to distribute to the 
multitude. The spiritual associations suggested would link the tale with the 
Pardoner's, whose description of the robbers' last meal has been discussed 
recently in terms of a parody of the Last Supper and the Mass. See Rodney 
Delasanta, "Sacrament and Sacrifice in the Pardoner's Tale," Annuale 
Mediaevale 14 (1973): 43-52. 
34. D. W. Robertson, Jr., "Why the Devil Wears Green," Modern Language 
Notes 69 (1954): 470-72. 
35. John V. Fleming, "The Summoner's Prologue: An Iconographic 
Readjustment," Chaucer Review 2 (1967): 95-107. 
36. Cf. Alan Levitan, "The Parody of Pentecost in Chaucer's Summoner's 
Tale," University of Toronto Quarterly 40 (1970-71): 236-46, and Bernard Levy, 
"Biblical Parody in the Summoner's Tale," Tennessee Studies in Literature 11 
(1966): 45-60. 
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37. Mary Carruthers, "Letter and Gloss in the Friar's and Summoner's 
Tales," Journal of Narrative Technique 2 (1972): 208-14, establishes a helpful 
tie between the two tales through their common emphasis on glossing. She 
shows that both the tellers and the characters in their tales suffer from an 
inability to perceive the allegorical dimensions of language and experience. 
38. It is, after all, the Summoner who has struck a bargain with the devil to 
work as his business partner and who refuses to draw back, even when he 
learns that his companion is a devil (III [D] 1395-1405, 1447-60). 
39. "Not all excommunications imposed in the middle ages . .  . were neces­
sarily valid; . .  . perhaps the person had not been guilty of mortal sin" 
(F. Donald Logan, Excommunication in the Secular Arm in Medieval England 
[Toronto, 1968], p. 15). "injusta autem excommunicatio caritatem alicui au­
ferre non potest, cum sit de maximis bonis, quae non possent alicui invito 
auferri" (Thomas Aquinas, In 4 de Sententiarum, Opera Omnia, vol. 10 [Lon­
don, 1873], Dist. 18, Qu. 2, 2. sol. 1, p. 534). "Unjust excommunication cannot 
take charity away from someone, since it is among the greatest goods, which 
cannot be taken away from a person unwilling." 
40. Pierre Bersuire, Dictionarii seu repertorii moralis .. . pars secunda (Venice, 
1589), p. 352, s.v. "Iudicare." Bersuire gives a detailed analysis of the real and 
ideal behavior of judges, including a number of exempla. "Note that to judge 
is the same thing as to make distinctions. Wherefore concerning the wise and 
discreet man in any field it is said that he is a man of good judgment. For 
judgment is nothing else than discretion among the qualities and conditions 
of things.... Therefore, since the name of judge indicates authority of status, 
understanding of affairs, and determination of affairs, it is very apparent that 
the duty of judging ought to be committed to upright and honest men, pru­
dent and discreet men, also God-fearing and perfect men. For the judge in 
society is as the eye in the body, on which the health of the entire body 
depends. For just as the eye must judge concerning colors, to forewarn and 
forejudge pits and dangers, and to foresee for all the other members to­
gether, concerning the proper guidance, thus truly the judge ought to distin­
guish concerning colors, that is, concerning the conditions of people, to know 
the dangers to the republic, and to govern all members of the body, that is, all 
the persons of his jurisdiction, rightly." 
41. Opera Omnia, vol. 3, fol. 139r. "Love justice, you who judge the earth, 
that is, who submit flesh to your judgment, that it should obey the spirit; do 
this discreetly and with love. Give the ass what is just, that is, a burden, the 
rod, and fodder, Eccl. 33.d. Whence the Apostle, Rom. 12.a. Your reasonable 
service, for no one ever hated his own flesh, but cherishes and nourishes it, 
Eph. 5.f." 
42. Peter G. Beidler, "The Pairing of the Franklin's Tale and the Physi­
cian's Tale," Chaucer Review 3 (1969): 275-79. 
43. Both Arnulf and Giovanni del Virgilio offer the explanation that Pyg­
malion had conceived a love for a statue of his own making. "Re vera Pigmal­
ion mirabilis artifex eburneam fecit statuam cuius amorem concipiens ea cepit 
abuti ad modum vere mulieris" (in Ghisalberti, "Arnolfo," p. 223): "What 
happened was that Pygmalion, a marvelous craftsman, made an ivory statue, 
fell in love with it, and began to abuse it as if it were a true woman." Cf. 
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Ghisalberti, "Giovanni," p. 91, where Giovanni adds an alternative explana­
tion: " . .  . ideo aliter potest dici quod Pigmalion habebat quamdam uxorem 
pulcherrimam ut ebur. Sed erat immobilis id est sine blanditiis, et nesciebat 
operari sicut alie in coitu et ideo dicebatur esse statua"; " . .  . otherwise it can 
be said that Pygmalion had a certain wife as beautiful as ivory. But she was 
frigid, that is, without seductiveness, and did not know how to behave as 
others do in sex and therefore she was said to be a statue." 
44. Pierre Bersuire, Ovidius Moralizatus: Reductorium moral Liber XC, cap. 
ii-xv, Werkmateriaal (2) (Utrecht, 1962), p. 152. "Through this maker of 
images I understand preachers who know how to sculpt the soul, and to 
adorn it with corrections and virtues. Through this ivory girl I understand 
some holy woman, who is said to be ivory, through which she is called chaste, 
cold, dignified and honest. But often it happens that some good Pygmalion, 
that is, some good religious man, promises always to seek neither woman nor 
carnal embraces, and such a man devotes himself to making ivory images, that 
is, to teaching holy women and matrons in chastity and sanctity and for 
molding them in spiritual practices. And it happens that he may choose one 
from among them for himself, whom he calls sister or daughter, and he is 
with her and touches her with a good and chaste spirit and with love. But 
certainly it happens that Venus the goddess of lechery, that is, the lust of the 
flesh, intrudes and converts the dead image into life, and makes the chaste 
woman feel the stirrings of the flesh and changes her from a good person into 
a fool. For, Pygmalion himself, the preacher, seeks this from Venus, and 
desires this change. Thus, when as they were accustomed, they return to their 
conversions immediately, he finds both of them changed, with the result that 
she who was ivory has become fleshly and he who feared women, begins to 
desire the pollutions of the flesh. Therefore, these carnal beings receive each 
other mutually and generate children. So, it is not safe for a religious man to 
contract too great a familiarity with women or vice versa." 
45. Augustine, in discussing the life of the Roman matron Lucretia, con­
trasts her suicide with the lives of Christian women who had endured the 
same evil as she had when she was forced to submit to rape. Augustine judges 
her suicide to be murder: "Non hoc fecerunt feminae Christianae, quae 
passae simila vivunt tamen nee in se ultrae sunt crimen alienum, ne aliorum 
sceleribus adderent sua, si, quoniam hostes in eis concupiscendo stupra com­
miserant, illae in se ipsis homicidia erubescendo committerent" (P.L. 41, col. 
34, bk. 1, chap. 19, De Civitate Dei Libri, Corpus Christianorum Series 
Latina, 47:21 "Christian women who suffered rape did not do such a thing; 
they lived and did not revenge upon themselves the crime of another, lest 
they add their own sin to that of others by murdering themselves for shame 
because lusting enemies committed rape upon them." 
46. Ibid. Augustine suggests that Lucretia, although she knew herself that 
she was innocent, attached too much signficance to a bodily defilement and so 
took her life. 
47. Richard Hoffman, in "Jephthah's Daughter and Chaucer's Virginia," 
Chaucer Review 2 (1967-68): 20-31, makes the point that Jephthah's daughter 
died wasting her virginity, whereas Virginia died to save hers. But the real 
point of the story is not chastity but judgment; it is the two judgments of the 
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flesh—that is, of a beautiful young woman as a potential sex object and, 
alternatively, as a piece of property not to be soiled—which are exemplarily 
wrong, and postures about virginity per se are not centrally relevant. 
48. Biblia Sacra, cum glosa ordinaria .. . etpostilla Nicolai Lyrani, vol. 2 (Lyons, 
1520), fol. 46v. "Though the vow may well have proceeded out of devotion, 
nevertheless it was made indiscreetly, because there might have come first out 
of the house to meet him a dog, which is not an animal suitable for sacrifice." 
49. Opera Omnia, vol. 1, fol. 206v. "Augustine said that the vow referred 
to his wife, whom he hated, thinking she would meet him first, and so it is 
clear that he vowed with bad intention, therefore his vow was bad." 
50. Allegorizations, in bono, do not, however, justify the literal act. The 
Glosa's lengthy discussion is very clear at this point: "Vel per scientes ergo, vel 
per nescientes significationem futurorum spiritus domini propheticis tem­
poribus operatus est, nee ideo peccata eorum non fuerunt peccata, quia deus 
qui et malis bene utitur usus est eis ad significanda que voluit. Si ergo pec­
catum non fuit cuiuslibet necis humane: vel etiam paricidale sacrificium vel 
vovere vel reddere: quia magnum aliquid et spirituale significavit: frustra 
deus talia prohibuit: et se odisse dicit: quia et ilia que fieri iussit ad sig­
nificationem spiritualium rerum referuntur, sed humana deo sacrificia non 
placuerunt: quando non pro iusticia quisque recte vivit vel peccare non vult, 
interimitur: sed homo ab homine tanquam electa hostia more pecoris im­
molatur. Si autem dicet aliquis: quia pecorum victime iam usitate ad sig­
nificationem licet relate minus faciebat intentos ad sacramentum magnum 
christi et ecclesie requirendum: propterea deus re insigni et inopinata volens 
animos hominum excitare: eo magis quod sibi talia sacrificia offerri vetuerat: 
curavit sibi aliquid offerendum, in quo ipsa admiratio magnam gigneret ques­
tionem: et questio exigeret studium ad perscrutandum mysterium: pie vero 
scrutans mens hominis altitudinem prophetie velut hamo piscem christum de 
profundo scripturarum levaret. Huic rationi non obsistimus. Sed alia questio 
est de animo voventis, alia de providentia dei" Biblia Sacra, fol. 47r). "There­
fore, the spirit of the lord worked in prophetic times, either through those 
knowing, or those not knowing, the significance of future things; their sins 
were not sins, because God, who uses evil things for good, used them to 
signify the things he wished. If therefore the sin was not of some murder of a 
person: either the father's sacrifice, the vow or the return, because it signified 
something great and spiritual, then in vain God prohibited such things. Yet 
he says he hates them: those things which he ordered to be done refer to the 
sense of spiritual things, but human sacrifices did not please the Lord. It is 
unjust when someone who has lived rightly and does not wish to sin, is killed, 
but a man is sacrificed by another as a chosen victim in the manner of a beast. 
If someone says: since it is permitted in this account to use the accustomed 
animal as sacrifice, it made us less intent on requiring the great sacrifice of 
Christ and the church. For that reason, God, wishing to excite the spirits of 
men, with an unexpected and notable event, especially because he had pro­
hibited such sacrifices to be offered to him, arranged that something be 
offered to him, in which this wonder might raise a great question, and the 
question might require study to penetrate the mystery. But the mind of man, 
piously searching the heights of the Prophets, might as he raised a fish with a 
hook raise Christ from the depths of the Scriptures. We are not opposed to 
The Tales of Magic I 175 
this argument. But the soul of the man promising is one question, and the 
providence of God another." 
51. Reductorium morale super totam Bibliam (Cologne, 1631), p. 88. "We may 
expound this allegorically concerning Christ. So, we may say this Jephthah 
signifies Christ, who truly is born as from a concubine, since he seemed to 
come from God as father and a virgin as mother, who was of another place 
and bed... . Although he was repudiated by the Judeans, nevertheless, he is 
made prince and leader of the sons of Israel, that is, of the faithful, against 
Amon, that is, the devil. For the sake of obtaining victory he sacrificed his own 
daughter, that is, his humanity to God the Father, and she suffers death for 
the sake of the health of the human race and for victory, and Amon and his 
people, that is, the devil and vices, are overcome, and the children of Israel, 
that is, the faithful people, are liberated.... Or say that Jephthah is a man, 
whose daughter is his own flesh, which he ought to offer to God, and to 
promise to be immolated for the sake of penance to God, so that against 
Amon, that is, against the devil and sins, he is able to obtain victory. So, when 
it happens that a man had victory over vices or tribulations, or brought back 
from God a spiritual gift, and he sees his daughter, that is, his own flesh, to 
come toward him on the road of practice with drums and pipes, that is, to 
come with pleasures and tempting things, he ought to say and cry out im­
mediately: My daughter, you have deceived me, and you have been deceived 
yourself. You have deceived me, I say, by offering vices, but you have been 
deceived yourself by bringing forth sin and repentance. He should sacrifice 
her to the Lord immediately as a penance, and bringing forth tears for his 
own virginity, that is, for the shame and the sterility of his virtues, neverthe­
less, his virginity or sterility having been deplored, he ought to burn her for 
charity, and to offer or sacrifice to God for the sake of penance and through 
the fatigue of labor." 
52. Throughout this group of tales, the emphasis on right judgment has 
been coupled with images related to sight: Cecilia's crown seen only by the 
believer, the Wife's loathly lady with her options of fair by day or night, the 
magic mirror in the Squire's Tale, Dorigen's hated rocks, and so on. There is a 
corresponding image from the senses that appears in the third and fourth 
groups of tales, particularly in the tales of interpretation: images of the 
tongue and speech. See below, chaps. 6 and 7. 
53. Allen, The Friar as Critic, pp. 135-36. 
54. The best of these studies is Robert P. Miller, "Chaucer's Pardoner, the 
Spiritual Eunuch, and the Pardoner's Tale," Speculum 30 (1955): 180-99. 
55. Ibid.; cf. Delasanta, "Sacrament and Sacrifice in the Pardoner's Tale," 
pp. 43-52; and Robert E. Nichols, Jr., "The Pardoner's Ale and Cake," PMLA 
82 (1967): 498-504. E. R. Amoils, "Fruitfulness and Sterility in the Physician's 
and Pardoner's Tales," English Studies in Africa 17 (1974): 17-37, links the 
tales of fragment VI as a diptych of physical death redeemed by spiritual 
values and spiritual death reinforced by murder; in this he provides us with a 
pattern of ending the magic group which recalls and reinforces, although on 
a lower scale of perfection, the grouping of tales with which we began, the 
Second Nun's and Canon's Yeoman's. 
56. Donald Howard, "The Pardoner: Actor and Martyr," read to the meet­
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ing of the Medieval Academy, 11 May 1974, Kalamazoo, Michigan. Those 
privileged to hear Howard's paper performed will never forget how power­
fully the moral effect of the Pardoner's Tale was reenacted. Our report is based 
on memory, and so may well be an extrapolation of Howard's doctrine. We 
are confident that it is at least fair to its moral effect. Cf. Howard, The Idea of 
the Canterbury Tales, pp. 339-70. 
6 
The Moral Group 
Chaucer's third group of tales the Ovidian distinctio labels moral. In 
the distinctio of descent into hell, the moral descent is simply the 
descent into vice. In this category, combining both traditions, we have 
all those human arrangements of order capable of being labeled good 
or bad. It corresponds to, and is defined by, the third section of the 
Knight's Tale, which is full of catalogues of typical human actions— 
most of them calamitous. But it is also the most formal of the parts of 
the Knight's Tale, and it is this paradoxical combination of general 
formality and particular calamity which defines medieval ethics. In 
this section Theseus builds his grand stadium, and the three princi­
pals offer themselves at the shrines of Venus, Mars, and Diana. 
It would seem, at first glance, that our four-part order is faulty 
here. Section three of the Knight's Tale is superficially more magical 
than any of the others, with its atmosphere of pagan shrines—and, to 
modern eyes at least, the easiest and most obvious division of the tale 
into natural, magical, moral, and spiritual would seem to take parts 
one and two as natural, part three as magical, the actual tournament 
of part four as moral, and the Boethian speech and its circumstances 
as spiritual. But properly understood, it is the disguises of part two, 
and not the prayers of part three, which best fit the medieval category 
of magic. And part three, properly understood, is the best definition 
of the moral. 
In part three of the Knight's Tale, human intentionality reaches its 
highest level of control of its world. This intentionality may be virtu­
ous, or it may be vicious. What the powers invoked in this part actually 
do, or patronize, is for the most part quite bad. But the framing 
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postures are wholly good.1 Here Theseus does the best that he can do 
to build a world, a perfect circular microcosm, in which the events that 
accumulate as human history can be defined and controlled. Combat 
here can be moral—combat, like beasts in the forest, was not immoral 
so much as amoral. The prayers which occur within this microcosm, 
shrine by shrine, are an array of particular intentionalities each of 
which attempts to plan the world in ideal fashion. Nothing really 
happens in the section, but everything is planned. Such action as there 
is occurs in catalog and betrays the vice and evil of which humanity is 
capable, even (or perhaps especially) within the ethical frame. This 
section is, in sum, the most ceremonial, the most iconographic, the 
most hieratic, the most pageantlike in the whole of the Knight's Tale. 
All this is the ideal to which medieval morality aspires. For modern 
critics, accustomed to the rhetoric if not the practice of situational 
ethics, the medieval ideal requires a considerable adjustment of sensi­
bility. It is not simply that medieval standards of ethics were norma­
tive rather than situational—they were, but they were more. Huizinga 
well describes the heightening of decorum, of form, which was in­
volved.2 This heightening, this formality, more than anything else, is 
the quality which both justifies and explains the medieval association 
between literature and ethics. Actions are more than mere acts— 
they are acts which can be associated with, possessed by, their parti­
cular daemon—Mars, Venus, Diana, or Saturn. Human beings 
enter into these patterns of action by means of prayer—that is, by 
means of the words of intentionality—in a setting which, as a shrine, 
physically confirms the association between act and definition. 
The tales which constitute the moral group are the Man of Law's 
Tale, the Clerk's Tale, the Merchant's Tale, the Manciple's Tale, and the 
Shipman's Tale. Each of them is the story of an attempt at ordering—at 
constructing a microcosm within which the world can be defined and 
history can be controlled. Each of them involves human intentional­
ity; in most, this intentionality is expressed formally in the words of 
some vow. In none of them is the action, either intended or accom­
plished or both, wholly admirable, but all of them record the 
achievement of some kind of stasis—an acceptable orderly arrange­
ment of human affairs, which one must trust to structure the future 
bearably, if not virtuously or wholly comfortably. Further, they are, 
like the tales in the previous groups considered, arranged in descend­
ing order, both in terms of the sociopolitical status of the principal 
characters and in terms of the quality of moral achievement which is 
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defined. Finally, all these tales, for reasons which touch at the essence 
of Chaucer's art, have to do with marriage. 
The traditional marriage group—Clerk's Tale, Wife of Bath's Tale, 
Franklin's Tale, Merchant's Tale, with the Friar's TaleSummoner's Tale 
interlude (and with the Squire's Tale awkwardly hanging about)— 
seems to us not helpfully labeled, because looking at the tales this way 
tells us not about marriage but about marriages, and ignores the fact 
that if one is simply considering tales about marriages, there are a 
large number of others to be included. The schema of husband-wife­
attacker, in fact, can be applied to most of Chaucer's tales, and after 
only minor transformations to all of them except the final sermon. We 
shall eventually try to show just why it is that tales involving some 
actual reference to marriage were so central a part of Chaucer's 
strategy of social definition in the Canterbury Tales as a whole. 
Here, however, we wish to use an array of tales of marriages as a 
normative array of something else—that is, of intentional structures 
designed to achieve, or exist as, order. Some marriages are structures 
to which, or within which, things happen. Others are structures 
created for the sake of making something else happen. In the first 
category, marriages are simply parts of life and history—things are 
always happening. The second category, however, is quite different; 
the intentional event is an event defined, caused, and determined by 
its final cause, and secondarily by its formal cause. Material cause is 
relatively unimportant, and efficient causality may even be defied. 
The feature of this moral group of tales, which is also our marriage 
group, which gives it coherence is intentionality, or final cause. Each 
tale involves an arrangement (a marriage, or in one case the canceling 
of a marriage) brought into being for the sake of generating greater 
order, stability, and satisfaction than had existed before. The plot of 
each tale is the gradual definition and accomplishment of this ar­
rangement; each story ends with the arrangement in existence. 
The order of the tales is from high to low, greatest to least, most to 
least admirable. Here as in the other groups Chaucer has put his best 
exemplum first and then gradually trails off. In the Man of Law's Tale 
the marriage of Constance is intended to extend the boundaries of 
empire and of Christendom. It fails, but Providence arranges that a 
second marriage will accomplish the intentions originally frustrated. 
In the Clerk's Tale a sovereign marquis is persuaded to marry for the 
sake of perpetuating his line and his rule, and does so. In the Mer­
chant's Tale a knight persuades himself to marry in order to legitimize 
180 / A Distinction of Stories 
his access to sex, and succeeds in legitimizing the sexual morality for 
which his life really stood. In the Manciple's Tale a married bachelor 
kills his wife in punishment for adultery, and succeeds only in proving 
that ignorance was bliss. In the Shipman's Tale a merchant treats his 
marriage as an extension of his business, and succeeds in making it so. 
The tales are of marriages, but the normative array is of orders, for 
whose definition Chaucer found marriages exactly suitable. The first 
order is of empire, the second of sovereign realm, the third of family, 
the fourth of person, and the fifth of property—once again a de­
scending series, from general to particular, from the universal of 
imperial society to the particular of an accident of a single person. 
The difference between this array and the first one—Knight's Tale to 
Cook's Tale— is that in the first group the focus of attention was nar­
rowly on authorities, and the kinds of law and order those authorities 
generate. Here the focus is on what surrounds, generates, and results 
from authorities—on the one hand, the intentionalities because of 
which people enter into social orders (representatively, the social 
order of marriage), and on the other hand, the resonances and 
analogies for total order which those intended and created orders 
generate. Thus, in the Knight's Tale, Theseus, already married and 
king of Athens, with his order already established and defined, must 
deal with an intrusive test personified by Palamon, Arcite, and 
Emelye. In the Man of Law's Tale, on the other hand, a marriage is 
intended which will, it is hoped, create a new order. The plot of the 
story is the history of the adventures and trials of this intention, rather 
than of the order which it will eventually accomplish. 
In a second way these tales are also in descending order—that is, in 
terms of the activity of God (or the pagan gods). It would seem that in 
this group Chaucer is playing games, both seriously and comically, 
with the notion of the divine presence. In the Man of Law's Tale the 
providentially assisting Christian God is fully and powerfully present. 
In the Clerk's Tale we have a man functioning as God, with his godlike 
activity clearly underlined by allusions to Job. In the Merchant's Tale 
there are pagan gods, with real powers, working in a kind of parody 
of Providence to give the tale its outcome. In the Manciple's Tale we 
have a pagan god without powers, acting merely as a bachelor. In the 
Shipman's Tale there is no god at all. The rhetoric of the tales, in turn, 
both underlines and complicates the point. As Chauncey Wood has so 
well shown, there is a great difference between the simple, committed 
faith of Constance and the Man of Law's disaster-preoccupied and 
loudly expressed desire that God act as a kind of omnipotent body­
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guard.3 In fact, the Man of Law so overdoes his prayers as almost to 
transform these adventures of sweet Constance into the perils of 
Pauline. Thus, the providential guiding of history is comically under­
cut even while its successful and wholly proper course is narrated. On 
the other hand, Walter's sadism is protected, by careful allusion both 
to the fallibility of the human condition and the testing of Job, from 
ever being comic, in spite of the fact that his pretentious exercise of 
his right to test his wife is very little more justifiable than the Miller's 
carpenter's promised sovereignty over the drowned world as a second 
Noah. The gods in the Merchant's Tale are radically humanized into a 
standard argumentative married couple, and the game they play on 
January and May evokes the irresponsible and at times sadistic pres­
ence of the gods in the Metamorphoses. But the richly allusive texture 
of the tale,4 with irony and allegory undercutting the letter and each 
other, constitutes a level of seriousness which prevents our settling for 
either the Merchant's misanthropy or January's pathos as the point of 
the tale. Apollo, in the Manciple's Tale, is even more humanized; when 
we see him sunk in remorse for rash and foolish action, an ironic 
dimension is imposed on the wisdom he represents. And in the 
merely commercial world of the Shipman's Tale, it is gold, not God, 
which can protect from the evil chances of Fortune. The Shipman's 
Tale, in fact, is a precise inverse of the Man of Law's Tale in this matter 
of Fortune and Providence—the merchant, with gold, must look out 
for himself: 
And therfore have I greet necessitee 
Upon thi% queynte5 world t'avyse me; 
For everemoore we moote stonde in drede 
Of hap and fortune in oure chapmanhede. 
(VII 235-38 [B2 1425-28]) 
The character, extent, and manner of involvement with some kind of 
divine will which these tales exhibit is, of course, an indicator of moral 
value. The fact that, beyond the first tale especially, the divine pres­
ence has something wrong with it fits with the fact that the array of 
moral values and orders being presented is a human one merely— 
even though the outcome of the Man of Law's Tale is a happy part of 
Heilsgeschichte, it is clear that the narrator goes beyond the bounds of 
faith and pure religion in demanding it so selfishly for his heroine. 
In all this Chaucer's ultimate point, delivered as always in a com­
plex, ironic way, is that divine sanction and protection are always 
desirable but not always available. When they are available they may 
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be compromised by wrong attitudes. When they seem available they 
may in fact be merely something human, projected on the tran­
scendent. They may be mere natural chaos, or something out of the 
psychomachia of temperaments and humors (which allegory per­
ceived under the names of pagan gods),6 wrongly perceived for the 
moment as orderly and providential. Man always likes to believe that 
what he does bears some relation to the will of God; the games 
Chaucer plays with what is really going on as the context of that desire 
show how much of delusion there may be in faith. We cannot know, of 
course, one way or the other—faith is always prudent, but it is equally 
prudent to keep always a little irony in reserve. 
These stories, however, are not about faith. Faith, and the divine 
powers which faith evokes, are present in the tales, as is the irony 
which protects faith from the full consequences of being mistaken, 
but both faith and irony are accidents rather than essence here. What 
the tales are about is order—order intended and order accomplished. 
In the best sense, these tales are worldly. They are, therefore, appro­
priately much concerned with two important aspects of worldly life 
and worldly order—vows, or promises, and property. Both these 
themes are made more emphatic still by their prominent introduction 
in the prologue material which serves to introduce the whole group. 
A vow, or promise, is a form of words which describes the future 
and commits the speaker to perform actions which will make that 
particular description of the future come true. In the medieval ex­
perience there were three kinds of act which, by their very common­
ness, would particularly define the act of vowing or promising. These 
were the vow of holy orders, the pledge made to one's feudal over­
lord, and the vow of marriage. Of these, the most common, and the 
most accessible to experience at all levels of society, was marriage. For 
this reason, if no other, marriage would have been the most suitable 
vehicle for Chaucer's analysis of the human order that results from 
intentional creation of structure.7 
It is most important to notice that the act of vowing has a connec­
tion with the act of storytelling. A vow is a story in the future tense 
whose claims on reality complement and balance those made by an 
ordinary story, or exemplum, which exists in the past tense as a moral 
and prudential influence on the present and the future. The present, 
the sphere of moral action and existence, is thus surrounded by 
words, which enclose, define, evaluate, and guide it, and, as it exists 
through time, are also narrative. These stories, as they grow out of 
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vows, thus enact the verbal quality appropriate to the real moral 
world, as well as the fictive ones of Chaucer's Canterbury collection, 
and celebrate the fact that real human orders arise out of the power of 
words to make commitments which pattern and order the real world. 
In all these stories the primary vow is the wedding vow, which intends 
and describes the order being created, whose history the past tense 
story will preserve as an example for other vows and other stories. 
Thus the foresight of the right vow and the memory of the right story 
surround the intelligence of the present and make possible that pru­
dence whose parts are these acts of past, present, and future. But this 
primary vow exists in the presence of other vows—to do murder, to 
obey one's sovereign husband, to interfere with January and May, to 
keep secrets—which compromise and comment, as we shall see, on 
the primary vow of marriage which generates the context of order. 
The theme of property ends with sexual bookkeeping and the in­
vitation to "score it upon my taille" (VII 416 [B2 1606]). It begins, in 
most complex fashion, with Chaucer's prologue—the "wordes of the 
Hoost to the compaignye" and the "prologue" properly so called. 
This, as was the Second Nun's Prologue, should be taken as an intro­
duction to the whole group. In the Second Nun's Prologue, we were 
warned against the Romance of the Rose, and especially against Idle­
ness, and exhorted to that good work which consists of making and 
understanding words. Idleness, there, seemed to imply the loss of full 
significance or full dimension, as in the Romance of the Rose Idleness 
tempts one to diminish love to its merely sexual literalness. In the 
introductory material to the Man of Law's Tale, we are once again 
warned against idleness, but now in the context of the speedy passage 
of time. One must "bewaillen tyme moore than gold in cofre" (II [B1] 
26) because, unlike property, it can never be recovered once it is past. 
Implicitly, what we are being warned against is the idleness that re­
frains from any action at all (rather than against acting, but acting 
idly)—that is, we are being warned against wasting history, or not 
making any. The fit destiny of man and woman is to fill time with 
acted exempla, worthy "to drawen to memorie"—idleness is a waste of 
that property in time more valuable than gold. 
There follows a seemingly miscellaneous, dramatic passage in 
which the Man of Law honors his promise, complains that Chaucer 
has told all the good stories, disclaims literary ability, and indulges an 
apostrophe denouncing poverty. But all this ceases to be miscella­
neous as soon as we see it in relation to the whole of the group, and to 
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the example and precedent of the third part of the Knight's Tale. All 
of it, from beginning to end, is about property, and subtly expands 
the time-gold translatio with which we began. 
In the first place, the Man of Law has made a promise—to obey the 
Host by telling a story. Such a vow, he admits, is a debt. A story, then, 
is property, to be paid over in satisfaction of the debt. But Chaucer 
owns—that is, has told—all the good stories. There follows a list, 
remarkably similar when one thinks about it, to the catalogues in the 
third part of the Knight's Tale. By an analogy not at all unfair to the 
storyteller, Chaucer is the patron, or daemon, or divinity of his stories, 
and they are his property.8 In contrast, the Man of Law is very poor, 
with only his prose "hawebake." It is a bad state to be in, and so the 
Man of Law complains of it, but translates his condition out of the 
literary and back into economic terms: "O hateful harm, condicion of 
poverte!" (II [B1] 99). Far better it is to be a rich merchant, a man 
whose figurative dice always roll winning numbers. Such people seek 
to become landed. Finally, they know the "estaat of regnes" and are 
"fadres of tidynges / And tales, bothe of pees and of debaat." From 
financial property we return to tales, to literary property. It is from 
such people, rich in money and in lore, that the Man of Law gets his 
tale. 
Three of these tales, in fact, are merchant's tales—the Man of Law's 
at second hand, the tale of January and May at first hand, and the 
Shiftman's Tale in actual subject matter. This dialectic, whereby the 
content of the frame is eventually absorbed into, and becomes a part 
of, the level of story, matches the dialectic of judgment operating 
from the Wife of Bath's Tale to the Physician's Tale by which an audi­
ence reaction in the Wife's tale is absorbed and becomes the subject 
matter of the Physician's Tale. But all of them are about 
"tidynges... of pees and of debaat." More important still, they all 
have to do, explicitly or by analogy, with the "estaat of regnes"—with 
that "commune profyt" which is true commonwealth and which is 
precisely defined (since literature is ethics) by the seesawing translatio 
of story into property and property into story. 
The tale of Constance itself is the third in the framing series of 
incipit tales which are the carmen perpetuum of this medieval 
Metamorphoses. With Christianity established as the religion of the em­
pire, the sacred and the secular are at least normatively and theoreti­
cally in harmony, and the conflict will properly be with the borders. 
Constance herself is largely sweet and passive—more so than in 
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Chaucer's source—we think because ideally in Christian society even­
tualities are more given than striven for and achieved. "Take no 
thought for the morrow" is an exhortation more to serenity than to 
mere passivity; still, whatever achievements of holiness and even 
sainthood there are tend to come upon people who were doing some­
thing else, and often something else wholly ordinary and daily. Even 
the large transitions of history are often more visible to hindsight than 
to observation; the Renaissance is the only age that ever called itself 
anything other than "moderna tempora"; and expansions of Chris­
tendom such as the one of which Constance was the instrument tend 
always to happen in a way which should encourage us to view with 
irony even the best laid plans of men. 
This is not to say that Constance's adventures lack significance in 
themselves. Most important, there are two of everything—two mar­
riages, two different pagan realms (and at opposite edges of the em­
pire), two mothers-in-law,9 two sexual assaulters, two sea voyages, two 
framing episodes with her father. This doubleness forces us to realize, 
at the very outset, that the difference between success and failure in 
human arrangements does not depend as much on the shape and 
character of what is done or planned as on the quality and character 
of the divine intention involved. Constance's imperial father had in 
mind, when he married his daughter off to the sultan, exactly the 
result which Providence eventually accomplished. But the emperor is 
not God, and his plans do not necessarily work out, at least not the 
first time. At the same time, this doubleness reminds us that there is 
an analogical energy at work in the world between divine and human 
levels, and that what eventually receives divine approval and prov­
idential help must be, in shape and character, appropriate to that 
divine preoccupation. At the highest and most general level of mean­
ing, therefore, this doubleness reminds us, first, that allegory is not 
identity, and second, that an event must in a sense await its interpreta­
tion. The emperor cannot be God, cannot literally assert for himself 
divine prerogatives and divine actions, but he is nevertheless obli­
gated to act in analogy with God, in some way he will never, at the 
time, understand.10 
A second feature of the Man of Law's Tale most important for its 
meaning is that the Man of Law is not "good at parties" but is good at 
pathos.11 In the Knight's Tale, as has been shown, the use of the 
rhetorical strategy of occupatio contributes greatly to the richness and 
elaborateness of the ceremonial, tapestrylike quality of the tale.12 The 
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more the Knight protests that there is not time to tell, the more rich 
description he heaps up. The Man of Law, on the other hand, uses 
occupatio to avoid descriptions of ceremony: 
Me list nat of the chaf, ne of the stree, 
Maken so long a tale as of the corn. 
What sholde I tellen of the roialtee 
At mariage, or which cours goth biforn; 
Who bloweth in a trumpe or in an horn? 
The fruyt of every tale is for to seye: 
They ete, and drynke, and daunce, and synge, and pleye. 
(II [B1] 701-7) 
Or again: 
The day goth faste, I wol no lenger lette. 
This glade folk to dyner they hem sette; 
In joye and blisse at mete I lete hem dwelle 
A thousand foold wel moore than I kan telle. 
(II [B1] 1117-20) 
At the same time, the tale is full of effective rendering of pathos; 
Chaucer never achieved a greater or more telling comparison than 
one he gives to the Man of Law in description of Constance: 
Have ye nat seyn somtyme a pale face, 
Among a prees, of hym that hath be lad 
Toward his deeth, wher as hym gat no grace, 
And swich a colour in his face hath had, 
Men myghte knowe his face that was bistad, 
Amonges alle the faces in that route? 
So stant Custance, and looketh hire aboute. 
(II [B1] 645-51) 
In poetic effects as well as in vivid characters, there is in Chaucer's 
work God's plenty. But it is not enough to notice that these effects are 
indeed masterfully achieved—one must go further and notice where 
they are put, and to what effect. The dramatic principle, which is 
pleased to assign these effects to the Man of Law and to account for 
them by projecting from his imagined character their efficient cause, 
makes it possible to say interesting things about a hypothetical medie­
val lawyer but prevents us from asking and answering more interest­
ing questions about Chaucer's art. It is true, after all, that he wrote 
everybody's speeches, and if it is true, as we believe, that morally and 
doctrinally the Canterbury pilgrims are the result of their tales, and 
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not the other way around, then one accounts for the nature and 
distribution of Chaucer's "beauties" in terms of the larger coherence 
of tale with tale. 
The tapestrylike quality of the Knight's Tale, which has been well 
enough noted as a merely aesthetic virtue and as evidence of "medie­
valism," is in fact precisely the right quality for a tale of definition as 
we have defined it. The whole enterprise of the Knight's Tale is, as it 
were, to persuade the inevitable emergent disorders of this world to 
accept the shrine-bounded stadium of Theseus as the fit circumstance 
of their resolution and to persuade the hearers and readers of the tale 
that a successful progress from existence to understanding—from an 
order intruded upon by Palamon and Arcite to an ending made ac­
ceptable by having read Boethius—is to be achieved only by the cere­
monialization of facts, or (in Chaucer's terms) the assimilation of ear­
nest into game. Therefore, at the level of answerable style, the rude 
facts of this Theban rivalry must be contained within the ceremony of 
a verbal occupatio whose dense and hurried pressure achieves their 
verbal ceremonialization. 
The tale of Constance, on the other hand, exists at the level of a fact 
searching for, and still not confident of, its definition. Constance's 
father intends that the bounds of Christendom shall be enlarged, but 
he is not God and cannot make Providence his puppet. Rather, Provi­
dence, definition, the perfection of what will be is hidden and must be 
aspired to by people who can in fact see only the chaos and not the 
shrine-bound stadium. The Knight's Tale contains the reconciliation of 
fact and definition; the Man of Law's Tale contains facts in search of 
definitive affirmation. Therefore necessarily their visible aspect must 
be pathetic; likewise, ceremony must therefore necessarily be hidden, 
unreachable, unachievable. Chaucer's orchestration of effects is thus 
program music—we can know why he is good at this, here, and that, 
there, only after we have learned what the program is. Then every­
thing is clear. 
In terms of the precedent of the Knight's Tale, then, the Man of 
Law's Tale reproduces in larger and more foreground detail what the 
catalogues of human conditions associated with Mars, Venus, Diana, 
and Saturn listed. When Saturn says 
Myn is the drenchyng in the see so wan;

Myn is the prison in the derke cote;

Myn is the stranglyng and hangyng by the throte,

And myne be the maladyes colde, 
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The derke tresons, and the castes olde; 
My lookyng is the fader of pestilence. 
(I [A] 2456-58, 2467-69) 
his words are followed by the providential promise, echoing the 
promise of Apocalypse that "God shall wipe away all tears from their 
eyes" (Apoc. 21:4): 
Now weep namoore, I shal doon diligence

That Palamon, that is thyn owene knyght,

Shal have his lady, as thou hast him hight.

Weep now namoore, I wol thy lust fulfille. 
(I [A] 2470-72, 2478) 
In the context of the Knight's Tale, the calamities of life are contained 
within their daemonic supervision; in the Man of Law's Tale they are 
forced for a time to stand alone, unsupported even by daemon, let 
alone the Christian God of Providence, and are therefore necessarily 
pathetic. 
All this is literally appropriate to Christendom, where life must be 
by faith and not by sight. There are, in the church, ceremonies and 
securities, but they are tentative, provisional, and ad interim. The 
revelation of the opus restaurationis, which is and will be the career of 
the church, is ultimately eschatological, and the shrine-girt stadium in 
which everything will be clear is only in heaven. "We see now through 
a mirror in an obscure manner, but then face to face" (1 Cor. 13:12). 
To be good at pathos and incapable of celebration is, sub specie aeter­
nitatis, to be precisely qualified to describe the visible part of the 
present life of the church, of Christendom, in history. It is a pro­
visional order, capable of using the full resources of merely mortal 
intentionality but at the same time incomplete, because we do not now 
see face to face. Since in the Man of Law's Tale we have as subject the 
extension of Christendom, we appropriately see it only literally, but 
with the Knight's Tale resonating in the analogical background to reas­
sure us that all this pathos will not be in vain and to predict the happy 
ending. 
The Clerk's Tale is about an earthly kingdom. As it stands it deals 
with an implausibly monstrous man and an implausibly obedient wife, 
the marquis and marquise of Saluzzo. At the level of psychological 
realism, Talbot Donaldson makes more sense of the tale than any 
other critic we know when he says that constancy, not patience, is 
Griselda's virtue—"of her own volition she has made constancy to him 
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supreme.... While Walter remains the visible symbol of the vow 
Griselda made him, it seems less Walter than the vow itself—her own 
vow, to which Griselda remains unflinchingly constant.13 It is this 
quality of strength in Griselda—a strength so indomitable in its very 
meekness as to be an awesome self-assertion—which fascinates stu­
dents who universally find her acceptance of the happy ending im­
plausible. But in this they, and Donaldson, are wrong. He says of 
Griselda that it "is not human to go on loving a monster."14 But of 
course it is, and has been ever since the first husband came home 
drunk and beat his wife. 
The Clerk's Tale, as all critics know, is a naturalized version of a 
generic folktale motif, Beauty and the Beast, which generates an array 
of plots extending from the Cupid and Psyche myth to the story of the 
princess who marries a frog in order to break the enchantment and 
make her frog a prince again. In all versions, whether the ending is 
happy or not, a woman is asked to accomplish the ordeal of loving and 
obeying a repulsive, sadistic, unintelligible, supernatural, sometimes 
invisible, or otherwise impossible consort. Eventually, if faithfulness is 
perfect (or almost perfect), it is rewarded by having the monstrous 
consort transformed into an ideal lover or husband. It is impossible to 
know how much Chaucer knew of the folktale roots of his story.15 But 
it is even more impossible to believe that he could have been ignorant 
of the profound truth of human nature which it expresses. The mar­
riage vow, for better or for worse, and even more because it evokes 
the faithful saving love of Christ, presumes a radically and stubbornly 
persistent redemptive power. Wives, and husbands too, who truly 
marry commit themselves to a faithfulness strong enough to redeem 
and transform a monster and are perhaps most radically glorified in 
this world when that is the ordeal they are given. 
We need to remember, though, that there is not one vow, but three. 
Walter vows to God a devotion which Chaucer makes a precise equiva­
lent of Griselda's to Walter;16 and Walter imposes on his people, 
before he chooses a wife, the same vow again. These vows reflect the 
triple duty of the sovereign, as defined by Aegidius Romanus, to rule 
wisely himself, his family, and his realm.17 Self-rule, of course, is the 
very opposite of autonomous self-assertion; rather, it is a cultivation 
of virtue which is the earthly expression of one's subservience and 
service to God. The story begins, therefore, with the levels announced 
and sorted out. In trusting God, Walter implicitly puts himself in the 
place of Constance—a member of the visible world, dependent upon 
the invisible workings of the providence of God to provide a meaning­
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ful outcome in the opus restaurationis. It is his place to be, as marquis, 
merely human, while God, who has divine use for human actions, 
provides the allegory. 
In the Man of Law's Tale, the action of the plot really does expand 
Christendom; the doubleness consists first in the two parallel actions, 
one of which fails and one of which succeeds, and then in the pathetic 
predicament of people who must necessarily see this opus restaurationis 
as a processs in time rather than as an ordered and eschatalogical 
whole. In the normal career of the human sovereign, however, the 
doubleness usually consists of the fact that earthly events have a 
heavenly allegory—the king's practical and daily acts of rule may be 
devotionally and allegorically compared to the activity of God in 
Christ, for both the spiritual correction of the king and the spiritual 
edification of him and of his people. The lesson of the Man of Law's 
Tale is that this doubleness must be accepted.18 
But Walter does not accept this advice. He is compulsively anxious 
to play God—as it were, to force the divine level into identity with the 
human level, rather than to accept it as the analogy that it is and must 
be. Instead of being the sovereign who is a figure of God, he wishes 
literally to perform the acts of God—though in terms of the compari­
son with the Job story, what he actually performs are the acts of the 
devil. Instead of expanding Christendom by the faithful performance 
of earthly life, he wishes to expand the scope of earthly sovereignty to 
include, literally, heaven.19 
In thus wishing and thus doing, Walter is unfaithful to the pattern 
of the three vows with which his story began and unfaithful to the 
ideal of justice which, as sovereign, he was obligated to serve. William 
Peraldus's definition is instructive: 
Quia virtute iustitiae reddimus unicuique quod debemus, dividetur iustitia 
secundum ea quae debemus, et quibus debemus. 
Notandum ergo quod quaedam debemus omnibus, ut dilectionem, ver­
itatem et fidem: quaedam vero non omnibus et inter ea aliquid debemus 
superiori, aliquid inferiori, aliquid pari. Item aliquid speciale debemus 
nobis specialiter coniunctis, ut parentibus, et patriae benevolis, quod de­
bitum solvit pietas, prout Macrobius et Tullius de ea loquuntur. Item de­
bemus aliquid his qui beneficia conferunt: scilicet gratiam, de qua loquitur 
Tullius. Et aliquid his qui mala inferunt: scilicet vindicationem, de qua 
idem loquitur. Et aliquid etiam his qui mala ferunt vel sustinent, scilicet 
misericordiam.20 
Peraldus goes on to define, as a part of the office of "latria," which we 
owe to God and only to God, a kind of committed obedience. "Ter­
tium est vitam nostram Deo committere. Qui enim agnoscit per fidem 
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se habere vitam suam a Deo, vult illam ei offerre, et oratione, et 
obsequiis impetrat earn a Deo dirigi. Tob. 4. Omni tempore benedic 
Dominum, et pete ab eo ut vias tuas dirigat, et omnia consilia tua in 
ipso permaneant."21 It is not at all clear that Griselda's vow of obedi­
ence, or that of the people, is overdone, though in the absolute sense, 
of course, it is ultimately appropriate only to God. However, Walter is 
clearly in the wrong by not performing his debt of "dilectio, veritas, et 
fides"—he is harsh rather than cherishing, deceitful rather than true, 
and faithful only in the sense of technical chastity. 
Throughout Peraldus's discussion of justice, which is of course one 
of the supreme obligations of the sovereign, there runs most strongly 
the notion of what is due—the actions and relations which are de­
manded by the very nature and definition of the entities (usually 
people) involved. We are dealing with definitions and types, not cases: 
normative procedure at its most normative. The pressure of the me­
dieval conviction that stories are about consuetudines and credulitates, 
rather than things obvious to sense, is very strong here. Equally 
strong, in the story, is the magnificent and indeed iconic perfection of 
Griselda's constancy—real women are not like that, though in the 
divine economy of God in which people are tested and tried as if by 
fire, women and men are expected to be like that, and do indeed 
sometimes measure up. Therefore, because of the heavy pressure of 
abstraction, of the perfection of the typical, of the consuetudo which is 
definition, Walter's compulsive playing of God is an imitation made 
all the more outrageous, all the more absolute and absolutely preten­
tious, by the perfection of the response to it. 
The outrage, as we have said, is that Walter's actions intend literally, 
rather than analogically and allegorically, to be godlike actions. In this 
dimension, what the story is about is the abuse of allegory by virtue of 
the refusal of doubleness—by virtue of an absolute and outrageous 
demand for unity, singleness, and unequivocal existence. It is an 
abuse which the doubleness of the Man of Law's Tale warns against; it 
is an abuse which the tales following will compound in various ways, as 
we shall see; and it is an abuse which gains special meaning because it 
is committed in the context of marriage, as well as in the context of 
sovereignty. 
We have repeatedly claimed that allegory is, in the later Middle 
Ages, a principle of structure rather than, or more significantly than, 
a linguistic strategy of reference. It is in the Clerk's Tale, more than 
anywhere else in Chaucer, that this medieval structural principle is 
most blatantly and obviously violated.22 This is true, we think, because 
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it is in the merely human moral order represented by this combina­
tion of a sovereign in his realm and a husband in his marriage that 
there is the greatest human temptation to feel self-sufficient and 
complete, to refuse or ignore the analogies, and at the same time the 
greatest opportunity for devotion or insight to develop an awareness 
of the analogies. The love of Christ for the church should be present 
to the marriage bed; the sovereign love of God for his Creation 
should be present to the functions of the king. That they so often are 
is cause of the human sense that these earthy human functions are 
both supremely important and superbly meaningful. But when one 
wishes to have the importance and the meaning, without the humility 
to keep in mind their ultimate basis, one has the all too easy and 
natural sin of which Walter's playing God is type and emblem, so 
radically that one must know, not only that it is perverse, but also what 
is the norm of doubleness which it violates. The Clerk's Tale, then, 
represents the moral order of the merely human, evil or lacking only 
when it fails to remember that it is derivative and not absolute, and 
even then capable of being the context of great individual moral 
achievement. 
Walter is a monster, irredeemably. Yet the tale is not monstrous— 
or at least it is tantalizingly close to being acceptable. Therein lies its 
fascination. Just as the Man of Law's Tale takes a feature of the third 
part of the Knight's Tale, the pathos of the human condition 
catalogues, and makes that pathos the theme and essence of the whole 
tale, so the Clerk's Tale takes a part of the Man of Law's Tale. When 
Constance bears Alla's child, the messenger and the constable con­
demn it (with its mother) to possible death, and with every appearance 
and conviction of having acted on Alla's instructions. Given Griselda's 
absolute and absolutely kept promise not to complain or even ques­
tion, it would take only the smallest of adjustments of the plot of the 
Clerk's Tale to transform Walter's monstrous test into an innocent act 
of some sort, which his wife unquestioningly misconstrued as a mur­
der. The motif "father rejects innocent child," which in the Man of 
Law's Tale really is an occasion of Job-like endurance of testing, be­
comes in the Clerk's Tale the horror it is only because we have Walter's 
motivations explained to us. The Clerk's Tale permits the horrid mis­
take of the Man ofLaw's Tale to come true, precisely in order to rid the 
story of the need for the operation of Providence, to reduce the moral 
order involved to the merely human by the smallest possible change, 
so as to preserve for that merely human moral order as much of the 
absolute character appropriate to definitional paradigms as possible. 
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The result can perhaps be best defined, briefly, by calling it an exactly 
medieval equivalent of surrealism. It has the same haunting, troubl­
ing quality of overdefinition, of more meaningfulness than meaning, 
which must accrue to a story which claims to be the act of God while it 
admits that it is not God. 
What are we to make of it? Essentially, that we cannot accept any 
moral order which insists on unifying all levels of allegory into its 
literal self. Moral questions depend for their answers not only on the 
nature of the act involved but also, and perhaps even more impor­
tantly, on the nature of the structures, and the structures of struc­
tures, which surround and condition and interpret (or fail to inter­
pret) that act. This is the statement that the Clerk's Tale makes, partly 
because it is the tale it is, and partly because we have seen it as a tale 
that comes immediately after the Man ofLaw's Tale, the third member 
of a descending enthymeme of tales whose initial proposition is part 
three of the Knight's Tale. 
But this tale, uniquely in Chaucer's collection, has an Envoi, which 
has been on medieval authority labeled as Chaucer's. Dramatically it 
belongs to the Clerk, but this fact is irrelevant. We are not reading on 
dramatic principles. In fact, it belongs to Chaucer, and the medieval 
scribal label properly recognizes the fact that here the author, 
Chaucer himself, has added something, and speaks from behind his 
puppet show in his own voice. In the tale Chaucer has not been 
allusive. Beyond some obvious "ox stall" underlinings of Griselda's 
identification with Christ, and some quotations from Job which repeat 
the tale's point and its overt ostensible moralization, the verbal texture 
of the Clerk's Tale is spare, lean, literal, and direct. Such a style is 
absolutely appropriate, because the point of the tale is to claim (per­
versely, as it happens, but the style is still answerable) that life can be 
thus spare, simple, unified, and absolute. But with the Envoi the 
Chaucerian wit becomes more ostentatiously complex. In the Envoi 
Chaucer reverts to his favorite ironic technique, a richly allusive 
statement contradicted or complicated by external commentary. 
The tale begins with Petrarch dead, and "nayled in his cheste" (IV 
[E] 29); the Envoi begins with Griselda dead, along with her patience. 
In both cases there is a related quality—Petrarch's rhetoric, which 
illumines (as does Lanyan's philosophy and law), and Griselda's pa­
tience. Presumably abstractions can die as well as people—the reality 
of the consuetudo is no more. Therefore, since the old world is dead, 
we must welcome the new. Follow Echo; answer back. The medieval 
glosses on Echo repeat and complicate the theme and advice of the 
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Clerk's Tale marvelously and, when taken with the text, predict and 
advise the following tales. 
Literally, Echo is one who answers back, and therefore by example 
advises wives to be like the Wife of Bath rather than Griselda. One of 
Bersuire's glosses says the same thing: "Vel die quod tales echo sunt 
quedam litigiose et brigose mulieres vel etiam quidam servitores 
queruli qui ultimum verbum semper volunt habere: et ad omnia que 
dicuntur a maritis atque dominis respondere. Etsi ab eis reprehen­
duntur semper murmurant. Contra illud leviti. xix. Non eris 
criminator aut susurro in populis."23 Chaucer's reference to the camel 
is also appropriate, because he is a strong beast and swift, and able to 
carry heavy burdens—at the same time a camel will refuse a load that 
is too heavy or a trip that is too long.24 The tiger is notable chiefly in 
the bestiaries for being swift and for being deceivable by a hunter with 
a mirror.25 
Other glosses, however, rather contradict the real implications of 
what Chaucer says. In addition to representing "litigiose et brigose 
mulieres," Echo may also mean a good reputation: "Per Echo hominis 
bonam famam, que arrogantem amaret et benedicendo extolleret nisi 
ipse se cunctis preferendo bonam famam contempneret. Quia igitur 
contempta fuit, latuit nichil boni dicendo de eo."26 Or Echo may mean 
flatterers: "Die quod echo significat adulatores qui et montes, idest 
prelatos: silvas idest religiosos: flumina idest seculares et delicatos 
frequentant et circa ipsos resonant et clamant. Si enim contingat 
aliquid ab aliquo dici statim solent ad verba ipsius respondere: et 
verbum eius tanquam benedictum replicare."27 The camel is alle­
gorically an exemplum of patient endurance of penance: "Sic pro 
certo veri patientes debent esse agiles, per obedientiae velocitatem, 
onera poenitentiae et praelia adversitatis sustinere, per patientiam, et 
firmitatem. Unde ad Gal. 6. Unusquisque onus suum portabit. Et ideo 
quando magister Cameli, idest, prelatus vel sacerdos, vel etiam 
quando Deus indicit, iniungit et immittit aliquod opus poenitentiae, 
laboris vel adversitatis, statim nos debemus incurvari per humilitatem, 
obedientiam et subiectionem, et genua flectere, per gratiarum ac­
tionem."28 Thus, to follow the example of Echo, and to be like the 
camel, means to answer back and be stubborn. But these examples 
also advise us to be like Griselda, careful for the bona fama of our 
Walters, even to the point of flattery. In the camel we are allegorically 
exhorted to-the precise patient endurance of testing which the Envoi 
says is no longer possible or necessary. Thus Chaucer contradicts 
himself, if we are learned enough to know the glosses and see the 
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irony. If we see the irony, then we can accept Petrarch's allegorization, 
and Griselda's death does not mean the death of patience as well. If 
we know only that Echo is "litigiosa et brigosa," then we are led to 
Leviticus 19:16: "Non eris criminator aut susurro in populis," a verse 
which predicts the actual recommendation of the Manciple's Tale. If 
we accept the merely literal recommendation of the Envoi, always to 
answer back, we will have the gift of ready answer that Persephone 
gives to May in the Merchant's Tale. If we are like Echo, who "evere 
answereth at the countretaille," then we are prepared to deal with 
tallies, and with the wife's answer in the Shipman's Tale: "Score it upon 
my taille." Taking all levels together, Griselda's example is both de­
nied and affirmed, and all the following tales are predicted. In a 
world defined by a man who acts as if he were God, real truth tends to 
be obscure. 
The Merchant's Tale accepts Chaucer's advice: always have an an­
swer. It picks up and makes absolute a detail from the Clerk's Tale, just 
as the Clerk's Tale had done from the Man ofLaw's Tale and the Man of 
Law's Tale from the Knight's Tale. Walter's proposed January-May 
marriage to his own daughter, which is of course pure pretense, be­
comes in the Merchant's Tale the serious basis of the narrative. And the 
complex irony of Chaucer's Envoi, with its literal statements con­
tradicted by the glosses which come with allusions and comparisons, is 
the basic strategy of the whole of the Merchant's Tale. 
We have said that the Man of Law's Tale represents the moral order 
of imperial Christendom, which properly exists, ad interim huius 
mundi, in a state of pathos out of which providence eventually works 
good ends. The Clerk's Tale represents the moral order of any earthly 
realm, which sees itself as absolute and so misappropriates to itself 
divine functions, but which nevertheless can be the context of superb 
moral achievement. The Merchant's Tale represents the moral order 
of any merely human marriage. 
Properly, marriage is not a good in isolation. In the full dispensa­
tion of Providence, marriage exists for the sake of engendering chil­
dren, for the sake of avoidance of sin, and for the sake of figuring the 
divine truths and relationships which centuries of biblical authority 
and human devotion had related to it. Necessarily, therefore, 
January's narrowly sexual reasons for marriage are wrong primarily 
(discounting his advanced age) because they are incomplete. 
Avoidance of sin is but one-third, and the least third at that, of the full 
meaning. To affirm the part as, and instead of, the whole is to make 
one's self liable to the ironies generated by the whole's inevitable 
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presence; like the Romance of the Rose, the Merchant's Tale is allegori­
cally haunted by what is missing.29 
The tale is haunted as well by the true version of what is literally 
there. Reduced to outline, the Merchant's Tale is about an old man who 
accepts his wife as innocent after he has seen visual evidence of what 
seems to be her sexual relation with a man in a tree. The most famous 
old cuckold in the medieval tradition is Joseph; the most famous 
apparently guilty but acceptably innocent young maiden is Mary.30 
The man in the tree is Satan, if we can accept the testimony of the 
Biblia Pauperum.31 On the other hand, Christ was also in a tree,32 and 
since Mary is pregnant, and May only in danger of being so, the 
substitution of child for lover is plausible. Nicholas of Lyra comments 
extensively on Joseph's predicament; one bit is an especially telling 
parallel with May's pagan goddess-given ability to talk her way out of 
difficulty: "Sed queritur hie quare maria non dixit ei divinum se­
cretum. Est dicendum quod talia non sunt revelanda: nisi quantum se 
extendit voluntas divina. et ideo beata virgo tacuit: tenens firmiter 
quod sicut istud secretum fuerat revelatum sancte eligabet: ut habetur 
Luce primo: sic revelaretur aliis competenti tempore ex beneplacito 
divine voluntatis. Similiter queritur quare ioseph non petivit ab ea? 
Dicendum quod pro nihilo petisset: quia ipsi marie pro se dicenti non 
credidisset: et iterum ex divina dispensatione hoc factum est, ut per 
revelationem angeli ipse ioseph sic certificaretur quod de cetero nullo 
modo dubitare posset."33 A husband (or an espoused husband) has a 
right to be doubtful, in such a case as this; the irony is intensified as, in 
the Merchant's Tale, May herself is made the medium of the divine 
certification. In thus being able to answer back, she takes the advice of 
Chaucer's Envoi and at the same time accomplishes, by morally blind­
ing her husband as his real sight is restored, precisely the same de­
tachment from allegorical validity which the tale's assertion of sex-
for-its-own-sake marriage has already generated. 
Morally, "Per ioseph cogitantem dimittere mariam: qui certificatus 
de mysterio per angelum accepit earn ut dominam: significatur homo 
dubitans in fide vel moribus qui per predicatorem vel confessorem 
bonum in fide solidatur: et subiicit se ei in illis que fidei sunt or­
thodoxe."34 January has a great deal of good advice given him, before 
he marries, in moribus bonis, but he will not take it. His marriage is an 
example of the literal contradiction of what Joseph's marriage morally 
means. 
This neat ironic layering of gloss upon event is, as we have said, the 
strategy of the tale. So much has been obvious for a long time, espe­
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daily from Emerson Brown's work. Our point, in adding to this rich 
texture a gloss or two from Nicholas of Lyra, is not simply to note that 
the ironies are there, but rather to claim that their presence is a 
comment upon allegoricalness of a certain sort, and at the place in this 
descending enthymeme of merely moral orders where that comment 
has most point. 
The merely human marriage is what the Wife of Bath defends— 
"Whos lyf and al hire secte," says Chaucer's Clerk, may "God mayn­
tene" (IV [E] 1171). It is intrinsic to the nature of marriage, and 
especially good marriage, to be preoccupying. The Wife of Bath 
wants husbands who are good in bed. Sovereigns wish to expand their 
sovereignty, even at the expense of God; lovers, even married ones, 
wish simply to be left alone.35 But to be thus left alone is ultimately to 
have nothing but the predicament of the flesh—this is why the Wife 
regrets her pith; this is why the sweating Lover of the Romance of the 
Rose has aged so much in his staff-assisted pilgrimage; this is why 
January's slack skin and badly shaven whiskers are so repulsive; this is 
why Chaucer forces on his audience in the Merchant's Tale the half-
fascinated, half-sick repulsive point of view of the voyeur; this is why 
the gods who rule in this new Eden of the second fall are pagan gods, 
and from hell at that. The flesh is necessary, and good. The predica­
ment of the flesh, however, is by definition, and because of the Incar­
nation, self-imposed, unnecessary, escapable. The hovering allegories 
of the Merchant's Tale, which its literal sense constantly contradicts and 
rejects, are a persistent reminder to the predicament of the flesh that 
it is unnecessary, and that the whole truth of January's marriage, or of 
any marriage, as an ideally intended moral order of use in this tem­
porary world, is larger than January knows. Because January refuses 
to know, the allegories hover ironically; because what he refuses is in 
fact true, they must be present. 
The Manciple's Tale and the Shipman's Tale elaborate this predica­
ment of the flesh. If marriage is merely carnal, then adultery is its 
normal complication—the eternal triangle is profoundly grounded in 
human nature. Two reactions to adultery are possible—outraged 
condemnation and acceptance. The Manciple's Tale has for its matter 
January's wrath, the Shipman's Tale the blindness which May's ready 
answer imposes on him. Neither order is very good, but we are in a 
descending series, and lower than the Merchant's Tale is at best far 
from ideal. 
The Manciple's Tale is really two tales and three discursive essays. 
The first part is a narrative of the Manciple's prudent reconciliation 
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with the hung-over and drunken Cook, to prevent the Manciple's 
embezzlements from being found out. The second part is an essay 
dealing with the relationship between a creature and its nature or 
definition. The third part is another essay, which deals with the rela­
tionship between a thing and its right name.36 The fourth part is the 
tale of Apollo and his crow. Finally, there is an essay on the tongue, 
warning us against too much talk. Four of these five have to do with 
the kind of order an individual generates, or tries to generate, around 
himself to make himself comfortable in the world. The Manciple ob­
viously has an interest in the continued benign intoxication of a po­
tential witness against him. The examples of the caged bird, the cat, 
and the she-wolf would seem to argue that lower impulses, being 
natural, must find indulgence.37 Apollo, who is comfortably married, 
destroys his wife and his situation in defense of principle, and con­
cludes bitterly that he was wrong. The essay on the custody of the 
tongue then generalizes, advising against any talk which might cause 
mischief. 
In order to see what is the true sum of this miscellany, we must 
reconcile the tale of Apollo to its context. In the descending en­
thymeme of tales of marriage, this is a tale which values definitions so 
far above facts as to be willing to destroy the facts for the sake of 
definition. This may seem a strange way of describing what he does, 
but it is deliberately done in order to find a place for what might be 
called philosophical idealism, or, in modern terms, utopianism, in this 
descending series of human moralities by which the world is pro­
visionally ordered. Robertson's willingness to give up the Wife of Bath 
for the abstract name of a grotesque is the critical equivalent of this 
idealism,38 and the too easy acceptance of the Parson's condemnation 
of all that has gone before him is, we suppose, the devotional. Both 
are ultimately destructive, both of life and of definition. To say, as 
Apollo does by implication, that it is better to have a dead wife than an 
unfaithful one is to destroy the marriage along with the wife and be 
left with nothing. His solution was manifestly unsatisfactory and was 
instantly repented of. As a god, Apollo is a failure—and precisely the 
kind of failure to define, by his existence, the influence of idealism 
upon human morality.39 He is supposed to be the god of wisdom, but 
he is in fact a mere bachelor, without powers or numen,40 whose 
providential working in the world begins in jealous rage and ends in 
disaster. We are far removed from the providential God who guarded 
Constance, and even from the lesser gods who gave to January and 
May (and Damian) what they needed to make a bad situation livable. 
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It is gratifying to have idealism so far down. We have seen that one 
of the ruling strategies of this moral group of tales is the evocation, in 
an array of ways, of some kind of allegorical resonance, overtone, 
assertion, or relationship. In the Man of Law's Tale the allegorical or 
providential dimension was hidden behind pathos, but eventually, by 
the power of God, was made part of the literal. Walter acted as if 
godlikeness could be made literally his merely by behaving like God. 
January, May, and Damian are pleased to pretend that there is noth­
ing but the flesh, accepting its carnality, and are reproved by the 
ironies which their unintentionally resonating actions evoke. Apollo, 
still lower, would pretend that mere flesh can be perfect, and gets 
nothing. And the merchant and his wife, in the Shipman's Tale, 
mistake the metaphor of the marriage debt for something literal, 
equate sex and gold, and get the kind of love which results from that 
equation. 
Apollo's foolishness is surrounded by a context which interprets 
and corrects it. Chaucer's discussion of the propriety of the word 
lemman, and his suggestion that the name of thief is equally applicable 
to Alexander as to a petty outlaw, speak directly to the problem of the 
relation between words and things—the relation which Apollo so 
foolishly and destructively tried to make perfectly pure. The problem 
Chaucer specifically addresses here is the problem of the correct 
name, in two opposite senses. First, can a word be used which carries 
with it a moral evaluation as well as a definite meaning—can one "talk 
dirty" about dirty things? Second, can a word be expanded beyond its 
normal usage to expose a truth usually ignored—can we call an em­
peror a thief when his legitimizing force is nothing but a very large 
army? The questions seem obvious to the point of triviality, but they 
are not. First of all, the word lemman is not, in fact, a dirty word, since 
it can be used in perfectly straightforward fashion in religious con­
texts.41 Second, the Alexander story, which was enormously popu­
lar,42 tended normally to be told as a story recounted to Alexander 
himself, to make the point that Alexander would reward a culprit with 
a brave and ready answer. Chaucer's point would seem to be that one 
can handle things by using words, but not without admitting that the 
way between "is slider." The claims which a nominalist would make 
for words would be high claims, but not at all absolute ones. 
The same kind of comment is appropriate to the essay on the na­
ture of birds, cats, and she-wolves. The very fact that the examples 
echo the Romance of the Rose should put us on our guard. Even though 
the nature of birds is to eat worms, and of cats to chase mice, such low 
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lusts are not absolute, because birds and cats are not absolute. One 
must ask of Nature, whose gift these natures are, not only what they 
are but also what they mean, since no single thing can be taken in 
isolation. Such a question, of course, is ultimately beyond Nature's 
competence. 
Therefore we begin with a Manciple who uses wine to make himself 
friends of the Mammon of unrighteousness, lest true but inconven­
ient words about his own history be spoken. And we end with the 
exhortation to tell nothing, lest we tell too much. Such a philosophy of 
language is a poor one, but it is the best response that life can make of 
the ironies of the Manciple's Tale. There Apollo, unwise in action 
though the god of wisdom, has a concept of marriage which leads him 
to kill his wife. Since concepts are empty words unless they attach to 
the world, and since the murder which Apollo's notion justifies de­
stroys his marriedness along with his wife, his conceptual use of lan­
guage empties his language of reference and nullifies his ideal. Si­
lence is indeed better than this.43 
The action of the Shipman's Tale begins with a double vow: on the 
part of Don John, "That nevere in my lyf, for lief ne looth, / Ne shal I 
of no conseil yow biwrey" (VII 132-33 [B2 1322-23]), to which the 
merchant's wife responds: "Ne shal I nevere, for to goon to helle,/ 
Biwreye a word of thyng that ye me telle" (VII 137-38 [B2 1327-28]). 
Both vows assent to the final advice of the Manciple's Tale. Secrets will 
not be told; cuckolded husbands will never be given a chance to kill in 
haste and repent at leisure. From this promising beginning the tale 
goes on to make absolute the result of the Merchant's Tale—a stable 
arrangement for probable further adulteries, with the wife in com­
mand and fully aware of the commercial value of her principal assets. 
Priest John is a member of the merchant's household—a familiar, 
an honorary cousin, who gives good tips to the servants and causes no 
comment when he visits in the merchant's house while the merchant is 
away. He is, in fact, such a familiar that the merchant is embarrassed 
to have given him the impression of wanting to have his money back. 
And the merchant's wife shares with him the secrets of her 
"privitee"—that her husband is not good in bed. The whole arrange­
ment, in fact, is liberated enough to be modern instead of medieval. 
The only household in the whole of the Canterbury Tales to compare 
with it is that of the Cook's Tale, where sex was actually sold, rather 
than simply used in payment of debt. This is a world in which there 
are no gods, no powers except gold (and its sexual equivalent). As a 
moral order it is the most pragmatic, the most merely human in the 
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series. Beyond this point one cannot go and still be orderly, or main­
tain even the pretense of morality. 
The irony of the tale involves one metaphor and two puns, whose 
use defines the verbal potential of this kind of order. The metaphor is 
that of the debitum, or marriage debt; the two puns are of "cosynage" 
and of "taillynge." The metaphor of the marriage debt is a sufficiently 
arid-seemingjustification for sex, but in rational terms it fits very well. 
Like marriage, a debt is created by a vow or a promise, it involves 
something physical or material, and it creates a relationship between 
two people in which the major concern of the debtor is for the satis­
faction of the creditor. The only adjustment which marriage makes is 
that the status of debtor tends to be maximized, for both parties, and 
the status of creditor is ignored, or at least not encouraged. Once past 
the commercial overtones of the word, one must admit that a 
metaphor which encourages each member of a marriage to be primar­
ily concerned for the satisfaction of the other is a good and noble 
thing, not to be condemned out of hand because celibate moralists 
may have made it joyless and repulsive.44 
But the connection with money does linger; this metaphor, like all 
metaphors, is subject to abuse. What the characters in the Shiftman's 
Tale do is take the metaphor literally. Sex can be bought, as Priest 
John buys it; once bought and sold, it can, and indeed must, be a 
currency capable of satisfying debt: 
Ye han more slakkere dettours than am I!

For I wol paye yow wel and redily

Fro day to day, and if so be I faille,

I am youre wyf; score it upon my taille,

By God, I wil nat paye yow but abedde! 
(VII 413-16, 424 [B2 1603-6, 1614]) 
So much is obvious, and has been often noted. What is important to 
see, however, is what happens to language when people try to pass off 
this kind of order as moral. Puns become perverse, or threatening, 
rather than clues to the secret harmony of the universe. "Cosynage" 
equates the bond of family, in which one should be able to feel most 
secure, with precisely that kind of fraud by trickery which especially 
depends upon and exploits the feeling of being secure. If sex is 
merely "taillynge," then the woman who suggests the arrangement 
has reduced herself to mere flesh, or she has dignified bookkeeping 
by calling it orgasmic—and, indeed, her husband does seem to be 
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better in bed when he has just been triumphant in the market. When 
the moral order is nothing but the flesh, and arrangements for its 
comfort, then words lose all power to save. When facts try to get along 
without the truth, they find that language will not only permit them to 
do so but will even encourage them, and will by the tricks that only 
language can play—puns and metaphors—make the situation worse. 
A part of the wife's triumph is the possibility of the pun. Without it 
she still may have talked her husband into reasonable good cheer 
about her clothing bills, but her larger audience would have been less 
satisfied. Language gives her a connection—accidental, untrue, 
degrading—which she uses, and in using, accepts. 
Hell, says Charles Williams, is imprecise. So is sin. And so in real life 
are the intricate arrangements we make to cover the tracks of our sins 
and our mistakes. The very fact that in fiction always, and even some­
times in life, words will go along with these intricate imprecisions, 
through metaphors and puns, in ways which have about them a qual­
ity of wit, adds a dimension of Tightness to the wrong and begins to 
redeem it. When, in the beginning of the story, we are told of the 
troubles husbands have with their wives' expenditures on clothing, we 
smile in recognition. When Priest John giggles at his risque language, 
we smile again. And when the possibility of this tallying knits up this 
feast, and makes an end, our satisfaction is as much with the moral 
power of words to be neat as it is laughter at the immoral power of 
people to keep their original private little worlds going, more or less 
in order, for a while. 
The moral group, then, is a group of marriages. Chaucer chose this 
particular human experience as the paradigm for particular morality 
because marriage so perfectly combines the particularity of the flesh 
with the narrative intentionality of the vow—that is, because it com­
bines words with things; and because marriage, of all human institu­
tions, best admits to allegorical or analogous or typical resonances 
without surrendering its existence as a daily set of facts which unify 
two people with past and future, constituting social history. His 
examples occur in descending order; we have called the series an 
enthymeme both because of that figure's connection with rhetoric and 
because of the fact that in series a detail from one story becomes the 
whole of the next. Throughout, there is one game being played with 
the presence and power of God, or his pagan substitute; another is 
played with what may be most generally called allegory—that is, the 
resonant relation, positive or ironic, between the facts of a story and 
the truth which the story might exemplify. Both these games are 
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right, at this place in Chaucer's Canterbury collection, because it is 
private moralities which have the most ambiguous, or dubious, rela­
tion to God, and because the test which these particular assertions of 
order demand by wishing to be true is the test of allegory. That all of 
them, except the Man of Law's Tale, are found wanting should be no 
surprise; only Saturn was right, and no shrine was built to him. Lesser 
daemons may make their promises, but none will come true unless 
Saturn wills it. Men may make their marriages, playing God or play­
ing pimp, as the case may be, but we only discover what it all means 
after it is all over, Constance has come home, and she finds that God 
has a use for the fact that Alia loves her truly still. 
1. The termframe comes from Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on 
the Organization of Experience (Cambridge, Mass., 1974). In using it we do not 
intend to import into the analysis of Chaucer a sociological anachronism. But 
if we discount the phenomenological dimensions of Goffman's analysis, the 
notion of the framed event—the event whose shape and significance depend 
largely (or even partially) on the assumptions or truth systems of the actors 
and audience (if any)—nicely defines medieval morality. The medieval frame, 
of course, was ontologically grounded. 
2. The Waning of the Middle Ages, passim. 
3. Chauncey Wood, "The Man of Law as Interpreter," Traditio 23 (1967): 
149-90. 
4. Explained in helpful detail by Emerson Brown, Jr., in a series of articles: 
"The Merchant's Tale: Why Is May Called 'Mayus'?" Chaucer Review 2 (1967): 
273-77; "The Merchant's Tale, Januarie's 'Unlikely Elde,'" NeuphilologischeMit­
teilungen 74 (1973): 92-106; "The Merchant's Tale: Why Was Januarie Born of 
Pavye?", Neuphilologische Mitteilungen 71 (1970): 654-58; "Hortus Incon­
clusus: The Significance of Priapus, and Pyramus and Thisbe, in the Mer­
chant's Tale," Chaucer Review 4 (1969): 31-40. See below, note 30. 
5. If we may trust the pun established in the Miller's Tale and the Wife of 
Bath's Tale, then the Merchant speaks more truly than he knows, because the 
"queynte world" for whose good order he is concerned will to his loss come to 
include the world of "queynte." 
6. Thus, in the Ovide moralise, the romance of Mars and Venus is discussed 
as a conjunction of planets, which govern the "colerique" and "pasibile" 
temperaments (2:131 lines 1489-96). This relation between emotions and 
temperaments, and the stars, for the Middle Ages is explored in Curry, Me­
dieval Sciences. 
7. See below, in the Epilogue, for a fuller treatment of this dimension of 
marriage imagery and the intimate connection between Chaucer's under­
standing of human marriage and the power of story. 
8. Of Chaucer the narrator E. Talbot Donaldson remarks, "It is almost as if 
the Creator were watching with loving sympathy and humorous appreciation 
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the solemn endeavors of His creatures to understand the situation in which 
He has placed them" (Chaucer's Poetry: An Anthology for the Modern Reader [New 
York, 1958], p. 944). 
9. Emelye's two potential mothers-in-law, if we take the easiest implication 
of Chaucer's pedigree for Palamon and Arcite—" . . . of the blood roial / Of 
Thebes, and of sustren two yborn" (I [A] 1018-19)—were Antigone and 
Ismene. The disorder that intricately and incestuously ravaged Thebes has 
now been pushed back to far distant borders. Emelye is almost as passive as 
Constance. Theseus's project in making his ward's marriage is like the em­
peror's in sending Constance to the sultan, in that he has succeeded in con­
solidating his border states, Amazonia and Thebes, much as the emperor 
hoped to Christianize the pagan realms and eventually succeeds in doing so in 
his daughter's second marriage. Constance's adventures are alternate. 
10. This lesson, that allegory cannot be identity, is of course the one that 
Walter, in the tale immediately following, violates—as we shall see, with in­
teresting consequences for the enterprise of interpretation. 
11. Thomas H. Bestul, "The Man of Law's Tale and the Rhetorical Foun­
dations of Chaucerian Pathos," Chaucer Review 9 (1975): 216-26, makes the 
valuable point that the Man of Law may not be skilled in the rhetoric of 
display, but reveals a talent for the medieval art of evoking pathos. 
12. R. K. Root calls the tale "a splendidly pictured tapestry" (quoted by 
Muscatine, Chaucer and the French Tradition, p. 176). The nonsequential 
character of the Knight's Tale is also stressed by Muscatine in his own treat­
ment of the poem, which he finds more appropriately understood as a "poetic 
pageant" than as a story organized around plot and character development 
(p. 181). 
13. Donaldson, Chaucer's Poetry, 2d ed., p. 1082. 
14. Ibid., p. 1081. 
15. The problem of the folktale origins of the tale is treated, with a helpful 
bibliography, by J. Burke Severs in The Literary Relationships of Chaucer's Clerk's 
Tale (New Haven, 1942), pp. 4-6. Severs discusses the various types of folktale 
traditions which have been offered as suggesting key elements in the tale, 
including the Cupid and Psyche tales and those of the Calumniated Wife and 
the Intended Bride. Severs concludes, along with W. A. Cate, "The Problem 
of the Origin of the Griselda Story," Studies in Philology 29 (1932): 399, that 
the story "is derived from a special development of Cupid and Psyche 
folktales." The Griselda story is not entirely faithful to the Cupid-Psyche 
pattern because Griselda never fails in her duty to her husband, whereas 
Psyche does and must win back his love. See Margaret Schlauch's discussion of 
the tests which Psyche traditionally must undergo before winning Cupid back, 
in Chaucer's Constance and Accused Queens (New York, 1927), p. 54. Stith 
Thompson classifies the Griselda story among the tales of wives tested by 
husbands who feign illness, and so forth, in order to prove their brides' 
worth; see his Motif-Index of Folk-Literature (Bloomington, Ind., 1955), 3:415. 
One crucial element of the story, that is, the presumption of Walter's efforts 
to play God, could be due, at least in part, to the story's folktale backgrounds, 
in which the actions of the superhuman character are not explained or ac­
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counted for but only serve as the impetus for action. At the same time, stories 
of the tested wife sometimes deal explicitly with this question of why the test 
should be conducted at all. Don Juan Manuel, in El Conde Lucanor, an early 
fourteenth-century Spanish story collection, tells a story analogous to the 
Taming of the Shrew, but without the shrew as an excuse for the harsh treat­
ment. The husband explains that after testing his wife in examples of arbi­
trary demands on her obedience, he could have confidence in her judgment 
at all times. From the number of folktale analogues catalogued by Cate, it 
seems likely that Chaucer could have known the story in other forms. At any 
rate, he seems aware of the dual aspect of Walter's character as both man and 
God. 
16. "I truste in Goddes bountee, and therfore / My mariage and myn es­
taat and reste/I hym bitake; he may doon as hym leste" (IV [E] 159-61). The 
Latin of the source is less open-ended a commitment: "Illi ego et status et 
matrimonii mei sortes, sperans de sua solita pietate, commiserim; ipse michi 
inveniet quod quied mee sit expediens ac saluti" (Bryan and Dempster, 
Sources and Analogues, p. 300). 
17. This definition was documented in connection with our discussion of 
the Knight's Tale. 
18. Robert Kaske, in his article "Chaucer's Marriage Group," draws a simi­
lar conclusion as an explanation for the various tensions between literal story 
and allegorical meaning established within the tale. 
19. Walter's usurpation of the place and activity of God has been often 
enough noted. See especially Jordan, Chaucer and the Shape of Creation, p. 198, 
and the scholarship that Jordan cites. 
20. William Peraldus, Summa virtutum ac vitiorum (Lyons, 1668), p. 302. 
"Since by the virtue of justice we give back to everyone what we owe, justice is 
divided according to those things which we owe, and to whom we own them. 
Therefore it should be understood that we owe certain things to everyone, as 
affection, truthfulness, and faithfulness: but certain things we do not owe to 
everyone and among them we owe something to someone superior, to some­
one below us, and something else to an equal. Next we owe something special 
to our relations and friends, as to our relatives and to our countrymen, which 
debt is paid by dutiful conduct, as Macrobius and Cicero say concerning it. 
Next we owe something to those who give benefits, that is, thanks, about 
which Cicero speaks. And something to those who try to do evil, that is, 
defense, about which Cicero also speaks. And something also to those who 
endure or suffer evil, that is, mercy." 
21. Ibid., p. 305. "The third is to commit our life to God. For one who 
knows through faith that he has his life from God, wishes to offer it to him, 
and by prayer and supplications brings about that it is directed by God. Tob. 
4. Bless God all the time, and desire of him to direct your ways, and that all 
your counsels may abide in him." 
22. If reference may be made to the analogous claims made about Gawain 
and the Green Knight in The Friar as Critic (pp. 145-49), one might say that 
Walter, throughout the tale, has the status of the Green Knight when he first 
comes to Arthur's court. It is as if the Green Knight had come, made his 
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challenge, lost his head to Gawain's stroke, and had then said, putting his 
head back on, "All right, boys, I was only kidding, to see if you were really 
brave. Now where's my chair?" 
23. Ovidius moralizatus, p. 71. "Or say that these are Echo: certain litigious 
and quarrelsome women, or also certain complaining servants, who always 
wish to have the last word, and answer back to whatever their husbands or 
lords say, and if they are reproved by them always grumble. Against them 
[see] Lev. 19: Do not be a detractor or whisperer among the people." 
24. In T. H. White's The Book of Beasts (New York, 1954), a translation 
from a medieval Latin bestiary, camels are described as beasts both swift and 
strong, although they "cannot be given loads beyond what is fitting, nor are 
the latter willing to do more than the accustomed distances" (p. 80). Isidore of 
Seville, Etymologiarum 12.1, gives the standard explanation of the camel's 
name, based on a Greek word meaning humble, because the camel kneels to 
accept its burdens. See also Florence McCulloch, Medieval Latin and French 
Bestiaries (Chapel Hill, 1960), who cites a probable origin for the majority of 
the camel's traits in Pliny Historia naturalis 8. 18 (p. 102). 
25. White, Book of Beasts, pp. 12-13: "Tigris the Tiger gets his name from 
his speedy pace.. . . When he perceives that the mother is close, he throws 
down a glass ball, and she, taken in by her own reflection, assumes that the 
image of herself in the glass is her little one." 
26. Ghisalberti, "Arnolfo," p. 209. "Echo means a man's good reputation, 
which should love the proud [Narcissus] and extol him with blessing lest he 
prefer himself above all and have contempt for good reputation. Because she 
was held in contempt, she hid, saying nothing good of him." 
27. Bersuire, Ovidius moralizatus, p. 72. Echo's wanderings through the 
mountains and forests and along the riverbanks are allegorized as the follow­
ing of the flatterer after all classes of people in society, the prelates and 
religious and secular individuals. Echo is described as repeating back their 
words. 
28. Bersuire, Reductorium morale, p. 643. "Thus, certainly, the truly patient 
ought to be agile in the quickness to obey and should sustain the burdens of 
penance and the attacks of the enemy with patience and steadfastness. 
Whence Galatians, 6, 'Each one will bear his own burden.' And so when the 
master of the camel, that is, the prelate or priest, or also when God names, 
enjoins, and sends some work of penance, work, or trouble, immediately we 
must bow down through humility, obedience, and submissiveness, and bend 
our knees, through the action of grace." The allegorization that accounts for 
the camel's unwillingness to bear unreasonable burdens is directed to the 
edification of the ruler, not to permitting the subject to answer back: "Verum­
tamen magister Cameli, idest praelatus non debet plus debito imponere vel 
iniungere, alioquin Camelus, idest subditus forsitan non impleret, immo 
totum reiiceret, et nihil de impositis perficeret, et sic gravius delinqueret, et 
peccaret" (p. 643). "Nevertheless the master of the Camel, that is, a prelate, 
ought not to impose or enjoin as an obligation something too difficult, lest the 
Camel, that is, the penitent, by chance should not do it, on the contrary reject 
it entirely, doing none of the things required, and thus fail and sin even more 
gravely." 
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29. Philosophically, an isolated particular must always be ironic, since it 
cannot be the basis of true knowledge, which is of universals, whether it insists 
on its particularity or not. But the irony is a redeeming one, which delivers us 
from the necessity of a thoroughgoing skepticism. For an opposing view, 
which takes Chaucer's arrays of particulars and alternatives as skeptical, see 
Sheila Delany, Chaucer's House of Fame. 
30. This relation between January-May and Joseph-Mary is discussed 
briefly by Emerson Brown in "Biblical Women in the Merchant's Tale: 
Feminism, Antifeminism, and Beyond," Viator 5 (1974): 387^112. Brown 
offers a suggestion valuable for the Merchant's Tale, and for the other tales as 
well, when he remarks that, "Perhaps the time has come to move beyond 
arguing whether the Merchant's Tale is either 'dark' or 'mirthful'" (p. 411). 
That is, judgments based on "dramatic" questions of mood and self-revelation 
have tended to distract attention from the stories as stories. Brown's article 
should also be consulted for a summary of critical opinions on the tale. The 
burden of Brown's argument on the tale's meaning is that the allegorical 
overtones of the tale establish equations between May and Mary, and January 
and some diabolical or otherwise evil figure, in order to undercut the nar­
rator's misogyny and give some overtone of Boethian hope to an otherwise 
pessimistic narrative by promising that alternative, and purer patterns of life, 
could obtain. This is certainly true, and one must always try to say something 
about the divine order of things in the midst of human circumstances, how­
ever sordid. At the same time, it should be possible to use the same technique 
of allegorical irony, plus the allegorical structuring which this book defines, to 
let the Merchant tell us something about marriage as well, and the intentional 
earthly order of which it is a part—sub specie aeternitatis, of course, but still 
real and necessary on its own. 
31. Ibid., p. 403: "The connection between the Virgin and the woman of 
Genesis 3:15 is unmistakeable in the first illustration of the Biblia Pauperum. 
This commonly presents the beginning of New Testament history with a 
central picture of the Annunciation. To the left of this is an illustration of 
Genesis 3:15, often with the woman in a tree, trampling the head of the 
serpent coiled about the trunk." The position of the snake in the tree is 
further testified to by the plate on p. 10 of Biblia Pauperum: The Esztergom 
Blockbook of Forty Leaves (Corvina Press, 1967). In parallel with the central 
panel of Christ's temptation in the desert is the right-hand depiction of Adam 
and Eve eating the forbidden fruit, while Satan, coiled about the tree trunk, 
looks on. Cf. also p. 25 of the Biblia Pauperum, when Christ on the cross is 
linked with the episode of Exodus 7:9, the plague of serpents. In the illustra­
tion a snake is elevated on a branched rod, while on the ground below snakes 
devour the Egyptians. The identification of the figure in the tree as a snake, 
with whom the woman Eve makes her sinful agreement to the detriment of 
her husband, Adam, suggests obviously the parallel between Damian and the 
snake, a parallelism which is supported by the Merchant's Tale itself (Brown, 
p. 406). On the other hand, if the parallel is to suggest Christ, Mary, and Joseph, 
then the figure of the snake must, in some sense, be connected with January, 
and through him to Joseph. Brown, p. 406 n, suggests the possible double 
association of January with both Adam and the snake. The possibility that the 
man in the tree is God, and that the snake is either coiled at the tree's base or 
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standing beside it, making his arrangements with Eve, is suggested by the 
plate, taken from a Dresden manuscript and presented on p. ii of the Biblia 
Pauperum, in which God looks down from the tree on Eve and the snake. 
January's posture in the tale, "He stoupeth doun, and on his bak she stood" 
(IV [E] 2348), might well have been suggested by the curving figure of the 
snake. 
32. For a discussion of this tradition, which relates the child in the tree of 
the fall to the Christ in the tree of the cross, and which stems ultimately from 
the Gospel of Nicodemus, see Esther Casier Quinn, The Quest ofSethfor the Oil 
of Life (Chicago, 1962). 
33. Biblia sacra, cum glosa ordinaria et expositione lyre litterali et morali, vol. 5 
(Basel, 1498), fol. a7v-a8r. "But it might be asked here why Mary did not tell 
him the divine secret. It must be said that such things are not to be revealed, 
except as much as the divine will permits. And for that reason the holy virgin 
was silent, believing firmly that, just as the secret had been revealed to St. 
Elizabeth, as it is told in Luke 1, so it would be revealed to others at the right 
time from the goodness of the divine will. Similarly it might be asked why 
Joseph did not ask her? He would have asked in vain, because he would not 
have believed Mary speaking for herself. And so it was done through the 
divine dispensation, so that through the revelation of an angel, Joseph was 
assured that he would not be able to doubt concerning these things in any 
way." 
34. Ibid., fol. a8v. "By Joseph, who was thinking of putting Mary away but 
accepted her as wife when the angel convinced him of the miracle, is signified 
a man who, doubting about faith or morals, is confirmed in the faith by a 
preacher or a good confessor, and submits himself to him in matters pertain­
ing to orthodox faith." 
35. This desire to place one's moral choices outside the judgment of God 
or man is connected with the theme of "pryvytee," man's secret knowledge or 
inner convictions, which we considered in the first fragment. The connection 
is especially clear in the story of January and his private garden, in the Mer­
chant's Tale. 
36. Harwood, "Language and the Real," pp. 268-79, which raises the same 
question of defending poetry as accurate reportage which we considered in 
chap. 2 with regard to the General Prologue, Miller's Prologue, and Retrac­
tion. 
37. George Economou, "Chaucer's Use of the Bird in the Cage Image in 
the Canterbury Tales" Philological Quarterly 54 (1975): 679-84. 
38. Robertson says of the Wife that she is the "literary personification of 
rampant 'femininity' or carnality" {Preface to Chaucer, p. 321). 
39. The entire collection, in fact, turns on the testing of an ideal—that 
married people live happily ever after—against the harsh, perhaps the harsh­
est, tests. 
40. Except to effect the transformation of the crow. But Chaucer's lan­
guage radically obscures the miraculous dimension of that transformation 
and describes the metamorphosis as if it were merely physical aggression: 
The Moral Group I 209 
And to the crowe he stirte, and that anon,

And pulled his white fetheres everychon,

And made hym blak, and refte hym al his song,

And eek his speche, and out at dore hym slong

Unto the devel.

(X [H] 303-7) 
41. For instance, in "A prayer of the Five Wounds" Jesus is the lemman: 
"Ihesu cryst, myn leman swete." In "Christ Pleads with His Sweet Leman" the 
term is applied to the other member of the relationship: "Lo! lemman swete, 
now may bou se" (Religious Lyrics of the XlVth Century, ed. Carleton Brown 
[Oxford, 1957], nos. 52, 78). 
42. George Cary, in his Medieval Alexander, ed. D. J. A. Ross (Cambridge, 
1956), examines the medieval treatment of an episode in Alexander's career 
which had been for the authors of antiquity a serious mark against him, an 
instance of a foolish mismanagement of the emperor's high trust. Cary 
suggest that in Chaucer, on the contrary, as in most medieval treatments, the 
story reflects the emperor's courage rather than his error (p. 252). 
43. Chaucer's Apollo becomes still more ironic when we note that Chaucer 
has neglected to mention Aesculapius, the child who resulted from this rela­
tionship. Bersuire's interpretation establishes the parallel with politics to 
which medieval marriage was so amenable: "Recte tales corvi sunt adulatores 
et verborum relatores: qui soli idest dominis suis semper nituntur referre 
adulteria quae committunt concubinae eius idest mala que committunt subditi 
eius: et hoc ut eis placeant: et gratiam ab eis obtineant. Sed quandoque fit 
quod tales relatores poenam portant: unde premium reportare crediderant. 
Nam quando homines vident propter malam relationem et informationem 
talium se male egisse ipsos odiunt et quandoque ipsos puniunt: et nigros id est 
viles et pauperes faciunt" (Ovidius moralizatus, pp. 54-55). "Rightly such crows 
are flatterers and tellers of tales: to him, that is, to their masters they always 
attempt to reveal the adulteries which their concubines commit, that, is the 
evils which their subordinates do. They do it to please their master, and 
obtain favor from them. But it sometimes happens that such tale-tellers carry 
sorrow, where they had believed to receive a reward. For when men see that 
on account of the bad report and information of such creatures they have 
done evil themselves, then men hate them and punish them, and make them 
black, that is, cast down and poor." 
44. Albert H. Silverman, "Sex and Money in Chaucer's Shipman's Tale," 
Philological Quarterly 32 (1953): 329-36. 

The Varieties 
of Interpretation 
The final group of tales we have called the interpretation group. It is 
the group which corresponds to the last section of the Knight's Tale, in 
which Arcite wins and dies, Palamon loses and wins, and Theseus 
makes the Boethian application. This group, therefore, is particularly 
focused upon outcomes—upon what happens in the end—and upon 
what one must make of them. The first tale here, as in the past two 
groups, is a saint's life—the story of a largely passive innocent, endur­
ing inexplicable or unjustifiable dangers and trials which only make 
sense afterwards. Constance witnesses by her life; Cecilia and the 
clergeoun witness by their deaths; but this difference, essentially, is 
insignificant. What matters is that all their lives involve the enduring 
of worldly events in expectation of an end directly involving, and only 
made explicable by, the will and nature of God.1 
The problem, of course, is that ordinary human beings do not live 
and think, clearly and consciously, sub specie aeternitatis. The will 
and nature of God are often hidden behind events and can only be 
seen by the eyes of informed faith, which can interpret seemingly 
random, meaningless, calamitous, or fortuitous events as the results 
of Providence. And more often than not, that informed faith offers 
no really developed interpretation. Job is the paradigm. 
To walk by faith and not by sight is often to persist in faithful 
behavior even when it seems imprudent or even absurd to do so, 
blindly trusting that it is the right kind of behavior even when it seems 
most wrong. From the point of view of the visibilities of this world, 
Egeus is right: 
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"Right so ther lyvede never man," he seyde, 
"In al this world, that som tyme he ne deyde. 
This world nys but a thurghfare ful of wo, 
And we been pilgrymes, passynge to and fro. 
Deeth is an ende of every worldly soore." 
(I [A] 2845-19) 
And Theseus, though he professes to believe in the order that the 
First Mover arranges in his "faire cheyne of love" (I [A] 2991), must in 
the end make "vertu of necessittee" (I [A] 3042). 
For both Theseus and Boethius, belief in order is something 
philosophically achieved and affirmed, as it were, in the teeth of the 
facts. The Consolation of Philosophy uses particular facts of 
experience—of suns and stars, of clouds and storms and unstable 
ocean—as epistemological metaphors, but the perfect good is beyond 
facts. For the medieval Christian all this is true too, yet the Incarna­
tion forces a certain adjustment, and nominalism imposes at least a 
slightly different style. The relation between facts and truth, between 
any given event and its full meaning, is always slippery, even when the 
Incarnation guarantees that the truth has a use for the flesh, and the 
doctrine of personal salvation guarantees that particulars have an 
absolute right to existence. The precedent of the Knight's Tale and the 
Prioress's Tale, taken together as a definition, would seem to tell us that 
as long as we remain puzzled by events, the Boethian posture, which 
simply affirms the orderly good, is the right one; and that when we 
find an event intelligible, it will be an event in the life of a saint. Either 
one sees the crown of roses and lilies on Cecilia's head or one does 
not. There would seem to be no middle ground. 
But of course there is. One finds the middle ground, in the context 
of the unintelligibilities of life, by telling stories about them.2 The 
means by which we understand what the stories mean and how to use 
them is the subject of the whole of this book, and we shall not, at this 
point, explain that. Rather, we believe that in the interpretation group 
Chaucer presents an array of tales suggesting an array of interpreta­
tive postures, all but one more or less wrong, and all related by the 
usual Chaucerian irony to the answer. The saint's life, first of all, 
recommends an attitude toward life which cannot be, in the Christian 
present of Chaucer's culture within which the tales exist, deliberately 
adopted. Sainthood is something given, not aspired to; in fact, the 
vanity of aspiring to it is the very pride which guarantees that it will 
not be achieved. Sainthood, in the Christian society, is the interpreta­
tion which overtakes life while it is busy doing something else.3 The 
The Varieties of Interpretation I 213 
little clergeoun, in his innocent and heedless devotion to the Virgin, 
exercised without thought of danger from the Jews,4 becomes an 
existence out of harmony with his compromised and fallible world 
and is, from the point of view of that world, destroyed. But the truth 
is larger than that world knew—though it should have known—and 
the miraculous fate of the little clergeoun reminds them. The finest 
and best interpretation is the one provided by God, which intrudes 
into the world the divine order which the human order all too often 
misinterprets as miracle. The human order is, for the nonce, set right, 
and understanding is cultivated thereafter by telling the story of the 
saint.5 Telling the story does not necessarily make it easier to under­
stand any other given vicissitude of life, but at least it encourages us to 
think that understanding will be given, perhaps even miraculously, in 
the final outcome. 
It is when we decide that this meaning is not enough that we get 
into trouble. Both the consolation of philosophy and the consolation 
of sainthood are extreme cases, and though we may and must in 
ordinary times appreciate them for their high purity and remember 
them for the glory they shed around the ordinary events between 
birth and death, we are tempted to ask for meanings more locally 
applicable. And so we tell other stories and seek for other, less de­
manding paradigms. 
In the Thopas, the Melibeus, the Monk's tragedies, the Nun's Priest's 
Tale, and the Parson's sermon, we have Chaucer's analysis of what 
happens to us when we do tell stories. The Thopas is a parody of 
popular romance; the Melibeus is a collection of proverbs, loosely 
hung on an allegory; the Monk's tragedies are exempla de casibus; the 
Nun's Priest's Tale is both a beast fable and (rhetorically) an epic. All of 
them, as well as the Parson's sermon, are popular genres—one might 
even say that here we have all but one of the genres which in fact were 
most prized by medieval people below the aristocracy, without a repu­
tation for cultivation to keep up.6 All of them except the Thopas (and 
that for good reason, as we shall see) were genres explicitly associated 
with moralizing interpretation. And all of them are, in their various 
ways, excellently done.7 
In the saint's life, as we have said, the act of interpretation is easy, 
direct, and obvious, but the lesson one learns is so general as to func­
tion more as comfort or inspiration than as moral guidance. The 
following tales attempt this moral guidance more directly but fail. 
Their failures, however, are themselves instructive because they re­
lease the usual Chaucerian irony, and in recommending various re­
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ductionist or pseudoabsolute interpretations, they warn us that the 
right way to be instructed is through acceptance of stories. The Thopas 
and the Melibeus, which must be taken as a matched pair, attempt to 
isolate sentence from solace, and present each separately. The Monk, 
the only pilgrim to imitate Chaucer by telling a set of stories, fails 
because his array is not normative but merely miscellaneous. The 
Nun's Priest's Tale, the subtlest and best of the lot, invites a bad, reduc­
tionist allegory. The Parson's Tale, worst of all, breaks the frame, 
rejects story, and tries to address itself directly to the pilgrims (and to 
us) in penitential generalizations which reject the flesh, reject em­
bodiedness, reject, ultimately, the structures of society in whose pat­
terns we accept definition.8 
The Thopas is a metrical romance, or, rather, a parody of one. As a 
genre medieval romance was the particular vehicle of two values—the 
value of idealism and the value of adventure. The world of romance 
was one whose business was love and battle, carried on by good 
knights whose purpose was to become better knights—if possible ideal 
ones. In addition, the action of romance tended to be adventure in the 
radical sense—arising out of situations that just happened to happen. 
Arthur's delaying the feast until the adventure appeared is a ritualiza­
tion of this quality; a knight's riding miscellaneously over terrain dif­
ferentiated only by the fountains, bridges, trees, and castles where 
adventures happen is its typical form. In these two ways—that it is the 
vehicle for the celebration of ideals and that its action is given, rather 
than caused or arranged—the romance is a secular equivalent of the 
saint's life and is therefore generically appropriate as Chaucer's sec­
ond tale of interpretation. 
In the sentence-solace doublet, the Thopas is solace. It is for this 
reason, we think, that Chaucer chose for this position not just ro­
mance but parody of romance. Properly, sentence arises out of solace; 
the two are inseparable, different effects of the same form of words. 
Solace, which includes a range of human experiences from enter­
tainment to the feeling of being comforted or consoled, is in essence 
the state of mind or personality which arises from the recognition of 
something in the universe that is in some way right. Recognition, of 
course, includes glad assent—to experience "solaas" is to be glad that 
one has done or heard or read (and solace usually comes to an audi­
ence of some sort) something transfigured by the quality of its truth.9 
Medieval stories tend so often to be moralized, or to end with a bless­
ing, or to include much discursively sententious material, or to digress 
into parallel exempla, because the decorum of medieval words em­
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phasizes so much this component of truth. The chief pleasure of an 
analogizing mind is that analogies can be made, can be seen; the chief 
pleasure of a civilization that believed in providential justice was being 
permitted to see, in either story or in life, that a given turn of events 
did in fact harmonize with the definitions by which ideal justice is 
known. Thus medieval stories please by neatness, as modern ones 
often please by evocative open-endedness. 
Solace, then, consists in the recognition that the story to which one 
is attending has a sentence—exists in parallel to the truth. But the 
Thopas is pure solace. And therefore it must be a parody, because 
parody generates the experience of pure parallel, emptied of direct 
sententious reference. For the experience to work, of course, one 
must know the genre, and preferably the text, being parodied, be­
cause the delight of the thing arises out of one's constant awarenss of 
allusions that at once fit and distort. Given this knowledge, parody has 
a double effect; seeing the original genre (in this case, romance) in the 
ridiculous guise of parody, one can detect in it elements of real weak­
ness which serious presentation would have obscured, without neces­
sarily being given the normative sentence justifying the judgment. At 
the same time, the internal consistency and verbal exuberance of the 
parody itself generates an experience of decorum, of verbal intention, 
which is normative in form, even though without content. A Flemish 
wrestler knight is a contradiction in terms, three ways; furious pricking 
leads merely to a nap; a ride into faerie leads to postponed adven­
ture because Thopas has neglected to bring his armor—these and 
other parodic elements are obvious, and obviously wrong. We know 
they are wrong because we have attended to other romances. At the 
same time, these comic assertions have the manner of serious romances 
and demand, poetically, to be taken as seriously as all other things of 
the same manner. The result is laughter—the laughter shared by a 
poet and an audience who have in common the perception that every­
thing has gone wrong, and that they know it. To have this know­
ledge—to be in on the secret, to be thus right when everything has 
gone wrong—is as pure as solace can be. 
The Melibeus is the other half of the equation. In the context of the 
other Canterbury Tales, it is hardly a tale at all. Rather, as befits some­
thing sententious, it is a vast collection of sapiential lore attached to a 
rudimentary narrative outline. Of all the tales, it is the one least 
adapted by Chaucer;10 aside from a sentence or two, and the cru­
cial assignment of the name Sophie to the wounded daughter of 
Melibeus, Chaucer's most significant contribution to the tale is the 
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context in which he put it and, by so putting it, asserted that it be­
longed. Its significance as a thing by itself is neither simple nor obvi­
ous, though once pointed out it is convincing enough, as Strohm and 
Owen have shown.11 Our concern here, however, is with that meaning 
only as it illuminates the tale as one of a series, placed not in associa­
tion with the Man of Law12 but as a doublet with the Thopas, "di­
minished [in] its impact as overt morality."13 
So placed, what the Melibeus does is define, in a remarkably subtle 
way, the value and clarity of sapiential lore as a practical interpreta­
tion of, and guide to, ordinary human actions. Chaucer's interest in 
this material is only natural. In the later Middle Ages, sapiential mate­
rial received increasing attention, as Beryl Smalley has shown.14 After 
the twelfth century popes tended to be canon lawyers. Books on the 
virtues and vices proliferated. Dante's great Commedia is only the no­
blest evidence of a general interest in precise moral values and detailed 
moral guidance. All these tendencies added up to an increased inter­
est in this life and an increased use for materials in the area of what 
can reasonably be called worldly wisdom. Such popularity must from 
time to time have been thought overdone—for one medieval reader 
there were "so manye bokes & tretees of vyces and vertues and of 
dyuerse doctrynes, bat bis schort lyfe schalle rabere haue anende of 
anye manne banne he maye owbere studye hem or rede hem."15 
Chaucer's subtle and often ironic treatment of other medieval con­
ventions requires us to expect, or at least suspect, subtlety here—and 
that a subtlety at the expense of conventional wisdom. 
The plot of the Melibeus is simplicity itself: the household of 
Melibeus is attacked by enemies and his daughter is wounded. His 
wife then talks him out of revenge and helps him achieve a reconcil­
iation with his enemies. In the course of the tale, we are given an 
explicit allegorization: Melibeus, the drinker of honey, that is, the 
enjoyer of temporal pleasures, has sinned, and the three enemies of 
mankind, the world, the flesh, and the devil, have attacked him 
through the windows of his body, that is, through his senses. Thus, it 
would seem, the end of the literal tale must allegorically recommend 
that one reconcile himself, at the spiritual level, to the world, the flesh, 
and the devil—a manifest absurdity. Chaucer gives some comfort to 
this absurdity in naming Melibeus's daughter Sophie, or wisdom. 
Clearly, Melibeus's enemies do not attack his household because 
Sophie is already wounded, but rather in order (among other things) 
to wound his wisdom.16 If he is to reconcile himself to the enemies 
who wounded his wisdom, then the rules of one-to-one personifica­
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don allegory would require that this reconciliation signify an accommo­
dation with the forces of evil. 
Strohm opposes this absurdity by arguing that the reconciliation 
which Prudence advises properly signifies that Christian resignation 
which refuses vengeance and leaves it to the grace of God to cope with 
one's spiritual enemies. Owen, developing this interpretation, shows 
that the Melibeus is not conventional personification allegory but 
something rather more figural. In these terms, the story of Melibeus 
has its own integrity, and Prudence's vastly proverbial peacemaking 
may be perfectly appropriate. That these events correspond, up to a 
point, to an allegorical description of Melibeus's spiritual condition 
need not require a one-to-one equivalent ending. One must always 
oppose the world, the flesh, and the devil, whether by spiritual com­
bat or by the resignation that trusts God's grace; one must also love 
one's enemies. Success in the first fosters success in the second; the 
two are parallel, but not necessary congruent. What Chaucer seems to 
be telling us is that sententious wisdom can counsel right action and 
right attitude, but not when understood in an overliteral way. If the 
allegory is simple, direct, and one-to-one, it creaks, and leads to bad 
advice; if the figures give good advice, it is only on the basis of resig­
nation, trust in grace, and a very subtle and insightful interpretation. 
What one wants out of proverbs, of course, is both—something 
simple, direct, easily understood, and also profitable. This desire the 
tale of Melibeus pretends to satisfy—and misleads, at least, the Host. 
But it is ultimately a desire which neither language nor reality can 
satisfy. The connection between universals and particulars—in this 
case, between proverbs and their application—is at once necessary 
and impossible, at once obvious and incredibly complex. There is no 
rule but charity which particulars can perfectly trust, and that trust is 
possible only because it is, in medieval terms, dogmatically guaran­
teed. Such a rule, like the pardon which Piers Plowman tore, is dif­
ficult to apply. On the other hand, any particular proverb which 
seems to talk generally about particulars must always admit of excep­
tions. The truth, like the law, proceeds case by case, and when sen­
tence is imposed, there is almost always, even in the best of worlds, a 
bit of imposition involved. What one can trust is the combination of 
sentence and "solaas"—a particular, or better, an array of particulars, 
that is, stories which please by being right, from which one can 
analogize to one's own story without having to go too trustingly 
through generalization. By separating sentence and "solaas," and by 
letting both his Host and his persona misjudge what he has done, 
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Chaucer emphasizes the impossibility of the separation; and at the 
same time, by putting these examples so close to his paradigmatic 
saint's life, he has shown how high and plausible is the temptation to 
try to make it.17 
The Monk gets right at least that the truth is in story. But the array 
of tragedies which he tells is not normative; it is not even, as he 
admits, properly ordered.18 The arrangement of the Monk's collec­
tion has already been sufficiently analyzed,19 and there is no need 
here to repeat that analysis. The Knight's judgment is much to the 
point: 
"I seye for me, it is a greet disese, 
Whereas men han been in greet welthe and ese, 
To heeren of hire sodeyn fal, alias! 
And the contrarie is joye and greet solas, 
As whan a man hath been in povre estaat, 
And clymbeth up and wexeth fortunat, 
And there abideth in prosperitee. 
Swich thyng is gladsom, as it thynketh me, 
And of swich thyng were goodly for to telle." 
(VII 2771-79 [B2 3961-69]) 
And the Host's judgment underlines the game plan of the whole: 
"Swich talkyng is nat worth a boterflye,/For therinne is ther no de-
sport ne game" (VII 2790-91 [B2 3980-81]).20 
It is true that collections de casibus were popular in the Middle Ages 
and are a valid, though negative and backwards, way of talking about 
the ultimate importance of heaven and the life to come. It is also true 
that one possible way to deal with the eternal potential of man's life is 
to meditate de contemptu mundi. But neither way is Chaucer's. He 
knows that this life is provisional, certainly—he could have learned as 
much from the death of his friends at the hands of the Merciless 
Parliament, if not from less firsthand history. At the same time this 
life is something for whose good order one can and should be prop­
erly concerned, and the Incarnation, if not the doctrine of creation, 
assures that if properly ordered it is true. Even failed orders have an 
ironic power to be true. The interpretation which the Monk invites is 
that life does not make sense. It is an interpretation to which many 
medieval readers would have assented. In Chaucer's series of in­
terpretations, it is lower than the Melibeus, because it offers no guid­
ance at all for this life; it is still lower than the Thopas, because it offers 
no "solaas"; it is still more below the tale of the little clergeoun, whose 
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real life was interpreted as good and true by an intrusive miracle of 
the Virgin. 
The Monk himself exists as a contradiction of his tale, exactly ap­
propriate to it. In both the general prologue and the prologue of the 
tale, the Monk is presented as an excellently appropriate human stud. 
If he would engender children, our heirs would not be "so sklendre/ 
And feble that they may nat wel engendre" (VII 1957-58 [B2 
3147^18]). This antinomy between the unfortunate death which over­
takes all and the devout engendering which conquers death and keeps 
the human race alive is the one which in Chaucer's tradition is more 
blatantly defined by the Romance of the Rose. It is a false antinomy, but 
it is one made necessary if either of its sides is affirmed. A purely 
sexual set of values leads to meaningless death, and meaningless 
death encourages merely sexual vitality. One partial view deserves the 
other, and neither permits a correct interpretation and acceptance of 
this life. To put both, as Chaucer does, in the fragment that extends 
from the Prioress's Tale through the Nun's Priest's Tale tells us what 
those partial views are worth, as soon as we see that the tales, in series, 
are for each other a set of interlocked glosses. 
The Nun's Priest's Tale is one of the most complex in the whole of 
Chaucer's collection. In part this complexity derives from the fact that 
the tale is so well written—the sheer verbal and parodic virtuosity of 
Chaucer's art, his easy ability to do everything at the same time, and 
everything right, is perennially fascinating. Even more, however, the 
tale is complex because there has been so much doubt as to how to 
take it—that is, as to what its proper interpretation should be. 
This controversy over interpretation was at its height not many 
years ago but seems now somewhat abated, we think because the 
enterprise of interpretation itself was shown to be one of the objects of 
Chaucer's irony.21 Some points made then need to be repeated here. 
First of all, it is obvious that Chaucer invites interpretation: "Taketh 
the fruyt, and lat the chaf be stille" (VII 3443 [B2 4633]). As his 
language and his allusion to the Bible make clear, Chaucer instructs 
his readers to allegorize according to the modes defined by the fruit 
and chaff, husk and kernel, integumentum and sententia method as 
defined in the great tradition from Augustine's De Doctrina Christiana 
through Hugh's Didascalicon and as later recommended by Robert­
son. Chaucer permits—even encourages—a certain confusion be­
tween the literal allegory of the poets and the spiritual allegory of 
the theologians, which itself leads to the contradictory willingness to 
want a Christian allegorical meaning (which must be based on the 
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exegetical procedure which prizes the letter) and the willingness to 
treat the letter as discardable chaff (which is based on the reductionist 
hermeneutic of the allegory of the poets).22 What he recommends has 
led to the indulgence of much modern learning in showing that 
Chauntecleer is an allegory—usually of Christ or of the Christian 
preacher. But the clues that permit one to interpret Chauntecleer as 
Christ or as the preacher, though they are in the text, are also under­
cut by other details, so that every attempt to allegorize is explicitly 
made unprofitable or meaningless by a contradictory part of the lit­
eral story. Thus Chauntecleer both must and cannot be allegorical. 
What Chaucer is telling us here, negatively, about interpretation is 
that reductionist interpretation is perverse. He denies that one must 
see the world only in order to see through it, discard it, leave it 
behind. By giving us an incredibly attractive beast fable—a genre 
conventionally moralized—and by giving us an explicit invitation to 
reductionist moralization which, when tried, does not work, Chaucer 
leaves us with the attractive beast fable and implicitly tells us that that 
is what should be able to satisfy us. The fruit, as Talbot Donaldson so 
wisely observed, "is its chaff."23 Therefore the world, and the stories 
we tell about the world, must be taken as valuable, not discardable, as 
something acceptable and in some manner good and true, not as mere 
means to truth. In this series of stories of interpretation, the next to 
last and next to most perverse form of interpretation is the allegorical 
reductionism which tells a story only in order to reject it. The only 
thing which can be worse, as we shall see, is to reject story without 
telling one, as the Parson does. 
If we do not reject or reduce the Nun's Priest's Tale, but accept its 
chaff as its fruit and its folly as our truth, what we get is a beast fable 
that is also a mock epic. Here, properly more than anywhere else in 
Chaucer's work, the full dimensions of his art come into focus, and we 
learn fully and clearly, even if with some dependence on irony, what it 
means to be in story. We are all Chauntecleers, in our various ways, 
and the power of story to make this equation between chickens and 
people not only true and instructive but also enjoyable, also a cause of 
"solaas," is, we think, Chaucer's point. Two disparities are here 
bridged, even while they are accepted and displayed—the disparity 
between chickens and men, and the disparity between chickens (and 
implicitly men as well) and the words of epic atmosphere and high 
style, appropriate to noble deeds. These disparities are at least analo­
gous to, and probably even examples of, the fundamental disparity of 
Chaucer's time—that persistent yet redeemable disparity between 
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particulars and the nominalist words which gave to particulars their 
meaning, definition, and truth. Therefore, to display before us a 
chicken, in whose case and in whose story these disparities are ac­
cepted at maximum strength, even made the occasion of exuberant 
verbal revel, and to use irony and the true allegory of structure to 
overcome these disparities, is to give hope also to men, who in their 
own stories confront the same disparities and seek the same victory. 
In confronting the problem of the relation between words and 
things, we transcend the medieval context. This is a universal prob­
lem, which every age solves, or fails to solve, or refuses to face, in its 
own way. The late medieval attempt at solution is, we think, more 
nearly successful than most, and Chaucer's Canterbury collection of 
tales, more profoundly than any other long poem except perhaps the 
Commedia, is the celebration and the embodiment of that attempt. But 
since the problem is universal, and since the Nun's Priest's Tale is 
Chaucer's extreme or test case, it is necessary here to pursue some 
larger-than-usual comparisons, in order to make the distinctive me­
dieval character of Chaucer's project and his achievement completely 
clear. 
Chaucer's mock epic chickens are instructively framed by two other 
great poems, also mock epics, from two other ages very different from 
the medieval and very different from each other—the classical 
Metamorphoses of Ovid and the neoclassical Rape of the Lock of Pope. In 
the Metamorphoses of Ovid, when Apollo chases frantically after 
Daphne, or when Juno dispels the suspicious clouds to find an embar­
rassed Jupiter with an inexplicable cow, the result, according to 
Brooks Otis, is mock epic. "The epic style of life simply cannot main­
tain itself under erotic stress.... Love is not 'funny' per se, but divine 
majesty is not set up to include love."24 He comments later, "Ovid 
knew well enough that though one may archaize the modern,.. . one 
cannot modernize the archaic without making it ridiculous."25 
Geoffrey Tillotson, in his introduction to the Rape of the Lock, would 
probably call this technique burlesque—it is Dido speaking "like a 
fishwife." His definition of mock epic is rather the reverse of Otis's—it 
is a "trivial subject comically exalted by the epic manner, or, con­
versely, an exalted manner comically degraded by a trivial subject."26 
Either way, the essential disparity is between manner and matter, and 
the effect depends upon one's seeing the disparity as absolute, as 
impossible of reconciliation. But both modes, subject exalted and 
manner degraded, would seem to fit Otis's category of archaizing the 
modern, which he apparently thought could be seriously done. 
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Tillotson goes on to beg a central question—the question of the 
relation between words and things—in order to define the ironies of 
mock epic as both unredeeming and irredeemable. "The triumph of 
the mock-heroic," he says, "is not its mockery of a literary form. The 
mock heroic poets laugh at the epic form but also at men. . . . Poets 
mock at the literary form for carrying the contemporary 'low' human 
material, but they mock more severely at the material for being so 
unworthy of the form."27 He thus solves the problem of whose ox is 
gored by concluding both, but one far worse than the other. It is a 
conclusion which Pope's mode of art and the literary and philosophi­
cal assumptions of his age make seem wholly natural. But it is not the 
proper medieval conclusion. 
On the face of it, it seems obvious enough that epic conventions, 
when used to describe a high society haircut, will make that haircut 
look silly. But there is no a priori reason for presuming that this 
disparity, or any other, will necessarily be left absolute and reproving. 
If low behavior, as in the Metamorphoses, mocks an epic character, then 
the disparity is contained within the action; if epic manner in word 
and metaphor mocks the low actions of the people it describes, then 
the disparity is between form and content, or words and things. In 
neither case is the mockery inevitable, however. Washing feet is a low 
action, but there is no mockery when Christ does it;28 the baseness of 
Milton's Satan and the childishness of the Earl of Bridgewater's vaca­
tioning children are concealed, not mocked, by Milton's exalted 
language—and whatever ironies affect Satan or whatever sincere 
praises affect the children are generated not by the disparity itself but 
by realities beyond it. How then can we be sure we are supposed to 
laugh at Belinda, or at Chauntecleer, or at Apollo? High language 
might as well redeem its subject as mock it. And once we know we are 
to laugh, how can we be sure which end of the combination is norma­
tive and which is mocked? 
The initial disparities in the Metamorphoses are disparities between a 
character (specifically, a god) and his behavior—proper gods do not 
fall in love like men and chase girls. The disparities of the Rape of the 
Lock, on the other hand, tend to be metaphoric: when "awful Beauty 
puts on all its arms,"29 what is actually being put on is perfume and 
jewelry and all the other things which make real women fully decor­
ous triumphs of art as well as of nature. The epic level thus exists as 
metaphoric vehicle; the subject matter is the perfectly consistent (if 
slightly immoral) behavior of the coquette—it functions as tenor. The 
point of the combination is that it does not work—the too obvious 
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reality of the coquette intrudes upon what is demanded of it as tenor, 
and the result is mockery. 
Such metaphors, however, do not always mock. When the same 
combination of consistent action and high metaphoric manner is 
made in the Metamorphoses, the result is often high seriousness. Even 
the miraculous metamorphoses which come to many of Ovid's charac­
ters are extensions of metaphor. Niobe, in the midst of her 
slaughtered family, rigid with grief, bloodless, pale of face, with her 
tongue in the stillness past lamenting, is imperceptibly real stone.30 
The headlong flight of Procne and Philomena is suddenly and with­
out transition a real one with real wings. Io, once more a woman and 
afraid to speak for fear of mooing,31 recalls a predicament funny only 
because we see it in the context of the ridiculous antics of the gods. 
When Actaeon is torn by his own hounds, his real condition is an 
overwhelming reminder that metaphors implying the frailty of man 
have some basis in reality more profound than the disparity between 
man and the form of a deer.32 In these metamorphoses the "barrier 
between species"33 is indecorously leaped, but the result is not neces­
sarily mockery. It is rather often apotheosis like the hack epic epithet 
"wingage of oars," suddenly real in the flight of Dante's angel ship, 
coming from Tiber beach to Purgatory; metaphor is the deep truth 
rather than the mocking ornamental container. 
Belinda is mocked by her metaphors; Chauntecleer, and through 
him mankind, is somehow redeemed by his. The predicament of the 
eighteenth century was that literary oxen will usually gore real ones; 
the glory of the Middle Ages and, in a different way, of classical times 
is that both will join together under the yoke of reality. Perhaps better 
than any other late medieval poem, the Nun's Priest's Tale makes clear 
the reason why. Fortunately, the Nun's Priest's Tale exists in a neoclas­
sical version. Dryden translated it into his own couplets, expanding 
slightly and adding a new moral; in the process he totally changed the 
character of the poem. In Chaucer's version the chickens are chick­
ens, in spite of all the rhetoric, learning, and high atmosphere. Dry-
den, on the other hand, does all he can to reduce the chicken level to 
mere metaphor, and gives us real people described as if they were 
chickens. This is a distinction difficult to make theoretically, but abso­
lutely crucial to the argument. In a sense, both Chaucer's and Dry-
den's Chauntecleers are metaphors. But in Chaucer's case the whole 
story, which is consistently about chickens, can be taken as analogous 
to some whole story about a man—there are, implicitly and (in the 
structural sense) allegorically, two stories, independent of each other 
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and both real, one of which is evoked by the other. In Dryden's case 
there is just one story, a story about foolish people who are made 
even more foolish by the persistent and arbitrary trick of calling them 
chickens. Writing thus is to deny the ontological validity of the com­
parison even as it is made. 
The point should be clearer in examples. Dryden's Chauntecleer, 
for instance, 
. . . had a high Opinion of himself:

Though sickly, slender, and not large of Limb,

Concluding all the World was made for him.34

To be thus bird-legged loses all its point on a real bird and must 
therefore apply to a man. Again, Chauntecleer's father, according to 
Dryden's fox, was 
A Peer deserving such a Son, as you: 
He, with your Lady-Mother (whom Heaven rest) 
Has often grac'd my House, and been my Guest.35 
Chaucer's point, that the father and mother "han in myn hous ybeen 
to my greet ese" (VII 3297 [B2 4487]), correctly implies that real 
chickens visit foxes only once. Again, Chauncer's Chauntecleer simply 
had "sevene heenes for to doon al his pleasaunce, / Whiche were his 
sustres and his paramours" (VII 2866-67 [B2 4056-57]). Dryden di­
gresses to justify this behavior by the example of Ptolomeys and other 
royal lines, and expands mention of Chauntecleer's sexual prowess 
with the entirely human explanation that Pertelote 
Resolved the passive doctrine to fulfil

Tho' loath: And let him work his wicked will.

At Board and Bed was affable and kind,

According as their Marriage Vow did bind,

And as the Churches Precept had enjoined.36

Again, when Chaucer says, "For thilke tyme, as I have under­
stonde, / Beestes and briddes koude speke and synge" (VII 2880-81 
[B2 4070-71]), we have the impression of a time ancient in myth 
and magic. When Dryden, on the other hand, says, "For in Days 
of Yore, the Birds of Parts were bred to Speak, and Sing, and learn 
the libral Arts," we think no further back than the education of the 
Renaissance man. 
The result of these differences is a difference of moral. Dryden's is 
clear, direct, and predictable—the epic atmosphere condemns its con­
tent and teaches us to beware of the examples it contains. Dryden has 
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fallen into Chaucer's trap; he wishes to take the morality, take "the 
fruyt, and lat the chaff be stille." Given his version of the poem, he is 
right, because he has transformed Chaucer's subtlety into something 
admittedly witty and delightful, but much simpler. Chaucer's moral, 
on the other hand, finds value in the folly itself. As ironies accumulate 
rhetoric is mocked, learning is mocked, even the procedures of bibli­
cal allegory are mocked. But chickens are not mocked, and all the 
mockery adds up to no real condemnation. Rather, it is a part— 
necessary, but only as a part—of the definition of the world. 
Essentially, the Nun's Priest's Tale is a beast fable. Far more pro­
foundly than Dryden, whose bird metaphors are merely local and 
verbal, Chaucer's tale asserts that beast fables are both possible and 
true—that is, there is a real connection between chickens and foxes, 
on the one hand, and people, on the other, which makes it morally 
valuable for the one to attend to the adventures of the other. Sub 
specie aeternitatis, merely human heroism is a folly, but a good folly, 
because it may lead to story in this world and wisdom in the next, and 
both are very important. From the point of view of man, chicken-
heroism is a folly, but a good folly, because it generates both story and 
insight. Man can only see himself whole by looking through analogy 
down the great chain of being. The Nun's Priest's Tale, then, contains 
man, distanced, visible, whole, under the species of a chicken. In 
writing it, and in putting it in this fragment so preoccupied with 
stories of interpretation, Chaucer reminds us once again of the true 
subject of his Canterbury collection—man, not God; human order in 
this life, not that heretical preoccupation with salvation before which 
this life is a distraction rather than an instrument. 
The Nun's Priest's Tale, therefore, teaches us in a way how to inter­
pret all the stories. Like the tale of Chauntecleer, they all demand to 
be accepted, not reduced, heard as stories, not as the husk of al­
legories or the too easy platforms of oversimplifying generalizations. 
As stories they contain behavior capable of existing in parallel—like 
the beast fable, they exist to be analogous—to each other, and to all 
stories, most importantly including our own stories, which are their 
nonreductive tropology, as they are ours. This mortal life of ours is 
surrounded, as was Chaucer's, with both the security of words and the 
threat of Fortune's wheel. Rhetoric, learning, allegory, and high sen­
tence are the words with which we buttress our lives; what eventually 
actually happens is the result over which those words have no final 
power. That Chauntecleer and Pertelote are learned and heroic is at 
once their glory and their foolishness, and both must be accepted. 
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Analogously, the game we call life, which death and salvation will use 
as an instrument of preparation even though they make it appear to 
be a folly, is both glorious and foolish, and must always be played as 
both. This is the highest and best point of Chaucer's habitual ironic 
pose—that it is a commitment to life which is at once real and not 
absolute, and which can see good and truth in what he already knows 
is (for its actors) provisional, because of those actors and their acts he 
can make, or analogize, a story. 
There is no need to pause long over the Parson's Tale. Once one 
grants what it is, one can see many virtues in it. That use of life which 
one might call Augustinian, which survives in Catholic Jansenism and 
in various rigorous and self-denying fundamentalisms of protes­
tantism, finds in the Parson's Tale what one can without irony call 
happy expression. Connoisseurship of sermons still survives in some 
Western cultures, even into this last third of the twentieth century, 
and public fascination with confessions of political sins during the 
Nixon presidency, almost as if the television were the confessional and 
the public were a vast collective priest, proves that even twentieth-
century people can be fascinated with the process by which one finds 
out precisely how much his deeds are worth. The eloquent analysis 
and denunciation of sin, though now more frequently heard from 
political than religious pulpits, makes delightful hearing both for the 
Pharisees whose superiority seems confirmed as others are blackened 
and for the sinner whose repentance demonstrates that he is impor­
tant enough for the direct attention of God himself. The penitential 
exhibitions of modern Spain, in particular, obviously give the partici­
pants a good deal of temporal as well as spiritual satisfaction. All these 
survivals, in this secular age, of the peculiar attitudes which would 
have made the Parson's Tale admired should convince us that there is 
no reason to resort to the "boring tales for boring people" argument 
as a justification for the presence of this treatise in Chaucer's Canter­
bury collection. As a treatise on penance and the seven sins, it is 
effective, well organized, competently and occasionally eloquently ex­
pressed, and doctrinally reasonable.37 People did, and do, believe, 
and believe they should believe, these things. 
Chaucer is another matter. England has been described as a natur­
ally Pelagian country. The Bradwardine to whom Chaucer ironically 
refers in the Nun's Priest's Tale devoted very considerable theological 
energies to denouncing as Pelagians many of the important theolo­
gians of his day—the generation just before Chaucer.38 No label will 
perfectly fit Chaucer, but the label of Pelagian is certainly helpful 
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here because it helps one to see how the Parson's Tale might have been 
included, not as the absolute truth with which to end the pilgrimage, 
but as a party document, excellent of its kind, but partisan, to be 
received ironically rather than straightforwardly. 
As a tale of interpretation the Parson's Tale is certainly last, lowest, 
and least. It denounces tale-telling without telling one. It attempts to 
break the frame of tellers and tale by imposing teller values on, or in, 
the tale. Worse than the quiters, who tell good tales and then misap­
propriate them to ulterior and limited uses, the Parson's Tale exists as 
an actual surrender to that misappropriation. It is an attempt to apply 
generalizations directly to particulars, rather than indirectly through 
the principle of analogy and normative array, which the tales up to 
this point have established. So, of all the interpretations, it is the 
worst. 
Fortunately, for so radical a point there is external as well as inter­
nal evidence.39 Chaucer's largest single contribution to the borrow­
ings which make up the Parson's Tale is the text with which it begins: 
"State super vias, et videte, et interrogate de viis antiquis que sit vita 
bona, et ambulate in ea; et invenietis refrigerium animabus vestris, 
etc." (Jeremiah 6:16; "Stand on the ways, and see, and ask for the old 
ways which is the good way, and walk in it, and you will find rest for 
your souls"). But the Parson's application of this text to penance oc­
curs in only one traceable context of medieval exegesis, and there with 
radically different spirit. And the Bible commentary which might well 
be described for Chaucer's day as the latest and best variorum, the 
compilation supervised by Hugh of St. Cher between 1230 and 1235, 
explicitly denies the Parson's application.40 Explaining the "old 
paths," viis antiquis, Hugh says: "Antiquis/quia ut dicitur vulgariter: 
Antiqua via melior est, et securior. Contra ilia, qui semper adinven­
tiones vanas in poenitentia, vel in religione adinvenerunt, et fabricant 
novas Religiones."41 He goes on to explain himself, possibly with some 
topical sensitivity to the new orders of friars, by distinguishing be­
tween a real innovation and an innovation such as holy poverty which 
simply restores an ancient custom of the saints. But there is nothing in 
this explanation which would qualify or mitigate his disapproval of 
"adinventiones vanas in poenitentia." 
The way which leads to refrigerium for Hugh is not penance; one 
goes rather "per rectam viam, scilicet, per viam fidei, et charitatis" 
("by the right way, that is, by the way of faith and charity"). This is a 
cliche, of course, and yet the tone is different. Here is no contemptus 
mundi. In fact, "cum viam invenit, consolationem recepit propter 
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spem veniendi cito ad finem, quasi, bene erit vobis, et veniet vobis 
prosperitas, et temporalis, et spiritualis."42 Temporal and spiritual 
prosperity indeed. The tone is positive, not negative. The earthly 
pilgrimage, if it be one on which good stories are both told and acted, 
and acted in order to be told, is continuous with the heavenly, and not 
its rival. It is all one way, this way of faith and charity, which has a 
proper use for heaven, of course, but also, and most importantly, a 
proper use of earth. 
In Hugh's reproof we have Chaucer's subject: "Bene erit vobis, et 
veniet vobis prosperitas, et temporalis, et spiritualis." ("It will be well 
with you, and there shall come to you prosperity, both temporal and 
spiritual.") Chaucer's subject is the prosperity of the world, as it is 
capable of being the ground and exemplum of the true. He is there­
fore constantly exhibiting to us the particulars of this world's pros­
perity, or lack of it, with a gently ironic affection which accords to 
each its worth, and only its worth, knowing that a sufficient and a 
sufficiently well chosen array will indeed be normative and will permit 
us to find light as well as empathy in the ironies Chaucer shares with 
us. Of this light the only fit interpreter is God, as and if he intrudes 
into someone's story with the news that it is the story of a saint. 
Beyond this, all interpretations are at once provisional and necessary. 
We must seek to understand, as well as do, and at the same time we 
must accept the fact that the decorum of our doings is more likely to 
be good for the truth than the decorum of our interpretations, if only 
because of the greater commitment necessarily involved. We may, 
however, seek refuge in mere amusement, hoping that lack of action 
may permit lack of outcome and therefore lack of calamity. But the 
Host will disapprove of our vulgarity. We may take refuge in the 
conventional wisdom of conservative sententiousness. We may decide 
that death means that the world makes no sense at all. We may feel so 
guilty about our follies that we allegorize them away, and so lose all 
profit from them. Or we may reject the whole show, with the Parson. 
And we will be wrong. But had we been so wrong in medieval En­
gland, we would at least have had the hope that Master Geoffrey 
would have heard of our wrong, and would have told its story and 
made it right, and worthy to "drawen to memorie." 
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Epilogue

A search for the unity of the Canterbury Tales is by no means an 
unfamiliar occurrence in twentieth century Chaucer studies. The stat­
ure of the poem has seemed to many readers, as well as ourselves, to 
justify the hope that in addition to all its other excellences of wit and 
characterization the Canterbury Tales, albeit unfinished, is outstanding 
in organization and thematic coherence as well. But whereas other 
researchers have concentrated on the pilgrims and their journey, we 
have preferred to search among the tales themselves for the unifying 
qualities that relate the stories one to another in ways that harmonize 
the entire collection. An examination of medieval literary criticism, 
particularly the commentary tradition of Ovid's Metamorphoses, and of 
medieval love allegory, especially Dante's Commedia, has provided 
evidence that techniques of order and arrangement based on analogi­
cal associations between story elements were available to Chaucer. 
Our examination of the Canterbury Tales in the light of this medieval 
literary precedent reveals this type of association within the work. The 
arrangement of tales used in our reading, while not demonstrably 
Chaucer's own, does throw into sharp relief the patterns of connec­
tion present in the tales. These patterns are the mortar, as it were, to 
bind the blocks of story Chaucer was assembling for his grand design. 
Although our reading has focused on a general theme of the collec­
tion, that is, the formation of a good human community, primarily we 
have concentrated on a principle of structural rather than thematic 
unity. The patterns of relationship uniting the tales not only produce 
a well-ordered collection, however, but yield a coherent, ethical 
statement as well. The variety of the poem is not miscellaneous but 
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harmonious. Chaucer adduces so many contradictory human tes­
timonies about life, especially conflicting evaluations of love in the 
family, in the confidence that a broad and purposeful sampling of 
human experience will yield insights, reducing confusion to order 
and understanding. In these final pages, a few of the thematic ele­
ments of the poem illuminated by our method of structural interpre­
tation will be discussed. The ideas about poetry and marriage, as 
subjects of the Canterbury Tales, which are presented here, are the 
direct and necessary outcome of our approach to the work as an 
ordered collection of exemplary stories. 
It may seem a bit dangerous to suggest that Chaucer, valued today 
as the supreme ironist and tolerant humorist, is supplying an ethical 
judgment on his fellow men. In addition, our structural argument 
which supports this conclusion is liable to arouse opposition because it 
appears to limit Chaucer's innovation by arguing that his poetry is, in 
some ways, dependent on cultural tradition. A balance must be struck 
between our recognition of Chaucer's creative genius and his vital 
role, one he eagerly sought, as a transmitter of Western culture. The 
wealth and variety of the tradition available to Chaucer, and his own 
powerful reworking of it, forbid any reduction of his ethical poetry to 
axiomatic moralizing and guarantee an originality in itself much 
greater than the inventiveness often praised in his work as its highest 
merit. 
To say that the Canterbury Tales is ethical and exemplary is not to 
suggest that Chaucer is repeating or embroidering formulas of right 
and wrong. He chose to speak ethically in stories, and he warns his 
readers repeatedly of the dangers involved in leaping too lightly from 
exemplum to moral. Chaucer makes story's interaction with life one 
of his subjects, especially in the prologues; he counsels great care in 
relating story to life, not because he supposes that the stories are an 
evil influence but rather because their precious import can so easily be 
lost in the transfer from fictional exemplum to man's particular ex­
perience. The poem is ethical because it supposes that a proper open­
ness to the text awakens the reader to his responsibility to act ethically, 
to relate the poem creatively to his own life as a source of ethical 
insights. The Canterbury Tales illuminates and orders life; that is its 
ethical character. 
The question of Chaucer's indebtedness to tradition is slightly more 
complex. First, Chaucer's development of the story collection, in its 
selection and manipulation of exemplary narrative units, is as ex­
traordinary in his age as critics have long recognized his technique 
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with the frame to be. Our emphasis on medieval parallels to various 
elements of Chaucer's technique was not intended to detract from this 
originality; rather, it seemed necessary to examine the backgrounds 
of poetry employing exemplary narrative units in order to justify a 
reconsideration of the story collection, a genre whose qualities had 
been firmly codified in other terms within Chaucer scholarship. While 
recognizing the work's originality, it is essential as well to appreciate 
Chaucer's evident pride in the time's traditions of expressive language 
and his desire to preserve and advance, rather than contradict and 
remove, the techniques and ideas available to him from his culture. 
The optimistic vision Chaucer presents of the blending of word and 
deed, of vow and fulfillment, of good action and its exemplary pres­
ervation in memory, springs from a culture which was rich in voices 
proclaiming the sacramental power of the word. The Canterbury Tales 
is rooted in an atmosphere of confidence in a harmonious creation 
and, in fact, affirms that this harmony is accessible to man through a 
proof of Chaucer's own making. 
The starting point for this harmony is love in marriage. Chaucer is 
not alone among the great medieval love poets in broadening his 
studies of love to a consideration of the place that loving couples 
occupy within the larger frameworks of society and creation. Like 
Dante and Jean de Meun, Chaucer does not abandon love as a focal 
point when he expands his gaze to encompass all of human society, 
but rather seeks to reconcile the qualities of private love with the love 
which, according to philosophers and theologians, harmonized the 
universe and regulated the affairs of God and man. The Canterbury 
Tales stands out among the poet's works as an attempt to draw to­
gether all of life into a harmony based on love. The work is notable 
among late medieval allegories, also, in that Chaucer chooses to speak 
specifically about love in marriage; although by no means the only 
medieval love poet to speak of married love, Chaucer is the only one 
of the three poets we have been discussing together throughout this 
study—that is, Chaucer himself, Dante, and Jean de Meun—to make 
the love he uses as a principle of universal harmonies the love to be 
found in the marriage relationship. 
The Canterbury Tales has been identified as marriage poetry in vari­
ous ways. On the one hand, there are allegorical interpretations which 
neglect Chaucer's realistic observation and appreciation of the con­
crete diversity of human relationships. On the other hand, emphasis 
on the personalities and quarrels of the pilgrims has reduced 
Chaucer's metaphorical expansions on the idea of marriage to a one­
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dimensional argument about the marriage debt. The married couple 
is the focal point of Chaucer's investigation, around which both al­
legorical analogies and the practical realities of everyday experience 
are arranged. In all this patterning, Chaucer never loses sight of real 
marriage; it is central because he perceives it to be both literally the 
building block of the human community he would set in order and 
metaphorically the widest reaching and most richly developed symbol 
he could employ to name all that human relationships involve. The 
allegory of marriage presented in the Canterbury Tales develops its 
image of the married state within these defining limits to ensure that 
neither the commonsense understanding of the union nor the deep­
er, spiritual harmonies it represents is absent from the final synthesis. 
Chaucer defines love anew within the context of marriage. The 
questions of social responsibility and moral accountability which mar­
riage raises frequently are presented by medieval love poets as threats 
to true love. Chaucer, far from placing love at war with these consid­
erations, insists that love can and must permeate all aspects of the 
marriage relationship. The love which may sustain a couple in all of 
life's tasks and against blows of chance differs from the love of court­
ship, precisely because both partners have moved from the state of 
desiring an unpossessed and unknown experience of union to the 
reality of partnership. 
The defining instances of human relationship which Chaucer col­
lects in the Canterbury Tales all reflect on marriage, precisely because 
of the nature of marriage as a permanent, abiding unit with an essen­
tial function in larger orders of social and cosmic harmony. Around 
the married couple Chaucer arranges other relevant examples of 
union—the marriage of Christ and the soul, of a priest and his con­
gregation, of a lord and his country—along with several concrete 
instances of loving and unloving arrangements contracted within and 
outside of marriage. The difficulties man and woman encounter in 
establishing and then maintaining their relationships involve clashes 
between promises and temptations, between illusions and experience, 
between ideals and practice; these conflicts are played out within indi­
vidual tales and also serve as the connecting points between various 
tales, as they present diverging testimony about married life and its 
trials. From even the most satisfactory of resolutions Chaucer coun­
sels at most a cautious selectivity in accepting any one element of the 
marriage as paramount; from the least satisfactory he draws the truth 
that all elements of the relationship may be used for ill but each 
remains essential to the whole. 
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With marriage rather than love only as his subject, Chaucer treats 
the figures of man and woman precisely as they function within such 
an abiding, socially integrated relationship. What this means for 
woman has been discussed a good deal, because Chaucer has been so 
highly regarded for the female characters in the Canterbury Tales; 
what is often absent from this praise, however, is an appreciation of all 
the aspects of the wife which Chaucer enumerates. Essentially, the 
married woman commands the respect and admiration, the reverence 
and worship, which were her due in the poetry of the love of court­
ship. Arveragus and Dorigen propose to continue loving one another 
in the same fashion they had known before marriage. Within mar­
riage, Valerian follows the path from human love to divine through 
the guidance of woman that was set forth in much poetry of the love 
quest. In addition to these testimonies to a continuity of emotional 
and spiritual attachment between courtship and marriage, Chaucer 
presents woman as lover in her own right and, especially, as an eager 
participant in the mutual pleasures of sexual love; the many roving 
wives encountered in the collection represent the reality of woman's 
role, as not only the object of desire but also an independent self with 
needs and desires to be realized. Chaucer's passive heroines, like Con­
stance and Griselda, and the martyred children, like Virginia and the 
litel clergeon, prompt the reflection that what a wife may contribute 
as inspiration and as active partner in marriage requires a husband 
lover whose partnership frees a woman to love fully and to be fruitful 
both in children and in good works. 
Perhaps more significant than Chaucer's profound sensitivity to 
woman's role in marriage is the balancing insight he brings to the role 
of the husband. The poem has received much less attention on this 
subject, and yet it is more in his assertion of the dignity of man's love 
in marriage than in his view of woman that Chaucer stands out among 
medieval poets. The poetry of his age had canonized the aspirations 
of man in courtship; it had gone on to couple with this a deepening 
appreciation of the spiritual fruits of this purifying aspiration. What is 
rare before Chaucer, although by no means absent altogether, is the 
praise of the husband, too, as true lover. In this Chaucer forshadows 
the Renaissance, with its schema of intimately related natural, human, 
and divine planes within which man's God-ordained task is to perfect 
himself in his humanness and to minister as governor to God's crea­
tion. In some tales the husband seems in large measure a prolonga­
tion of the knightly wooer or the idealizing dreamer in service to his 
lady. Even in these stories, however, marriage brings with it the trans­
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formation from the task of seeking love to the work of preserving it. 
In the fabliaux primarily, in the figure of the failed husband, Chaucer 
ironically evokes the promise of the true male role in marriage. He 
draws together the metaphor of Christ's union with his church and 
the outrageous errors of lecherous old men and their amorous, un­
faithful wives, because he would blame the men not for sexual desire, 
precisely, but rather for the selfishness and unloving greed which lie 
behind their pursuit of a wife. Behind January, for example, a failed 
Adam and a failed Christ, hovers the model of a true husband, a 
paterfamilias and husbander of the family garden whose direction is 
taken from love, presented in she metaphor of the nurturing, sup­
porting love of Christ for his church. The figure of the husband does 
not reflect primarily the lessons of the church's teaching on male 
superiority or authority in the partnership, or the mutual exchanges 
of the marriage debt—these aspects of marriage wisdom are present 
in the collection, usually with a rather doubtful eye to their efficiency 
or correctness—but rather is modeled on the figure of Christ as hus­
band and lover which emerges from medieval spirituality. This appli­
cation of the spiritual marriage to human marriage, although justified 
in some measure by the commentary tradition of the Song of Songs 
imagery which Chaucer introduces in the fabliaux, yet is primarily 
Chaucer's own in its effort to discover the spiritual dignity of the love 
known in marriage. Thus, in the role of the husband, Chaucer draws 
both on the lessons of secular poetry's aggrandizement of the male 
desire for love and on the spiritual tradition which suggests the possi­
bility of channeling this desire into the new role of a husband now 
called on to preserve and maintain love in marriage. 
Chaucer presents marriage as both the living heart and the fullest 
image of the good human community. He promises that within it man 
encounters the most profound range of meanings to be discovered in 
existence, meanings which not only enrich his private experience but 
also serve as a guide to his appropriate actions as member of society. 
When marriage is less than it might be, Chaucer points primarily to 
the failure of the partners to contract a true marriage or their inability 
to remain faithful to their promises. For Chaucer the vow is a predic­
tion that reveals to man in advance the nature of the relationship he is 
entering; the promise is, moreover, the best protection the relation­
ship has against collapse. The tie between the vow and married life is 
not a simple identity. As Chaucer shows repeatedly, even the most 
zealously loving couples find themselves precipitated against the black 
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rocks. The word of the promise, like the word of a story, exists as a 
metaphor for life and must be creatively applied as life unfolds. 
The allegorical tie between promise and deed, present in so many 
of the tales of faltering marriages, is in small an image of the relation­
ship between language and life on all levels and especially between 
Chaucer's own writing and its audience. Real associations between 
elements of creation make verbal analogies not only possible but deep­
ly revelatory. At the same time, allegorical statement is perceived 
always as a complex parallelism which can elucidate but not reduce 
life. Within individual tales particular marriages are surrounded by 
allegorical parallels underscoring the general significance of the 
struggles the particular couple endures. Between tales the same sort 
of reverberation is established. And on the final and deepest level, 
Chaucer looks to his readers to bring the experience of the poem and 
their own lives into meaningful parallel. 
In some respects Chaucer's use of allegory resembles the poetic 
strategies to be found in other late medieval love poetry; a considera­
tion of some similarities between the Canterbury Tales and the love 
allegories of Dante and Jean de Meun will be helpful in measuring the 
originality of the method in Chaucer's work. All three writers display 
a reverence for expressive language and a confidence in their ability 
to communicate effectively, through language, important insights on 
the human condition. All are innovative practitioners of the new ver­
nacular literature and eager defenders of its dignity; interestingly, 
though, an essential part of their innovation as vernacular poets is the 
determination to transfer the Latin cultural heritage into a new lan­
guage, for a new readership. At the same time that they advance the 
cause of the vernacular against the Latin tradition, they are also con­
cerned to defend the integrity of the poetry of this tradition against 
the encroachments of dialectic. They affirm that a specifically analog­
ical process of understanding, coupled with an eloquent appeal to 
man's conviction, remains a powerful and efficacious method of ex­
pression and communication. They practice their art under the guid­
ance of a tradition of rhetorical literature founded in the classical 
poets but enriched as well by philosophers and moralists within the 
Christian tradition. 
Three markedly different works emerge from this common back­
ground, and they testify strongly to the need in modern research to 
replace the long-standing assumption of a unitary medieval literary 
theory and to open research into the evolution of the many currents 
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of rhetorical expression present during the period, especially in the 
years 1150-1400. The three poets being examined here exemplify 
very well the range of possibilities for allegorical poetry during the 
Middle Ages. In the Romance of the Rose, a vernacular dream vision is 
continued under the rubric of philosophical poetry presenting quests 
after knowledge, especially the knowledge of the harmony of crea­
tion. Jean de Meun, writing during the thirteenth century, deliber­
ately returns to models of rhetorical poetry especially identified with 
the School of Chartres; in adapting Latin culture to the vernacular, he 
challenges his time's prevailing interest in dialectic as the most effec­
tive linguistic tool of expression, and proposes as an alternative the 
rhetorical method of learning from previous literary works and 
adapting their insights and techniques to new human problems. Jean 
illuminates the essential nature of love by contrasting its meaning 
within the secular tradition of love poetry with the natural and cosmic 
significance it held in the works of Boethius and Alan of Lille. In the 
Commedia poetry again is made new under the inspiration of ancient 
and medieval examples, and its subject is the interrelationship of per­
sonal love and cosmic love. Here, however, the source of expression 
and the lessons of love's deeper significance come from specifically 
Christian, biblical, and theological sources rather than from philoso­
phy. In Chaucer a great change occurs, in that his focus moves from 
the love quest, which provides narrative continuity in both the Ro­
mance and the Commedia, to a panorama of life. Whereas both Jean 
and Dante link the lover's quest to poetic forms in which a hero 
receives instructions and performs a series of tasks, Chaucer chooses 
as his model an epic of many stories, many heroes: the Metamorphoses. 
Chaucer links this model to a contemporary literary phenomenon, the 
multiplicity of stories he finds in all genres and types of writing which 
take as their primary focus the relationship of man and wife. Tapping 
the philosophical and Christian sources of wisdom his predecessors 
had consulted, he reached farther than they in attempting his own 
harmony of this wisdom with love, both idealized and in its full, con­
crete, various reality. 
The task of making insight fresh and relevant goes hand in hand 
with the task of reworking the traditions of expressive language in 
order to embody these insights effectively. Chaucer extends his com­
mand of language not only into the provinces of God's own words in 
the Bible but also to the most humble human utterances, in order to 
find just the right way to reach the truth of life and then reveal it to 
mankind. Unless the truth speaks, it cannot shape the lives of his 
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listeners, and those lives are his most significant goal, for in them, in 
the private dramas of a thousand households, Chaucer discovers the 
true substance of human society. 
For Chaucer the fundamental human entity is a married couple 
whose vows have conquered the tragic human condition of iso­
lation, both physical and spiritual, and have given man and woman 
a territory in which to work and to dream. Chaucer does not suggest 
that life's difficulties are ended with a promise of marriage; rather, he 
perceives that man, by nature, is incomplete, and that a commitment 
to marriage begins a life of commitment to completion, through 
communicating and sharing with all of creation and ultimately with 
the Creator. Chaucer discovered in the human institution of marriage 
a paradigm of life which would enable man to touch both heaven and 
earth in his every conscious choice and willed action. The otherness of 
things lies within man's understanding and reach when that otherness 
is acknowledged as the necessary complement to human nature's in­
adequacies. Any society or community is plagued by the very dif­
ferences among its members, which make their cooperation and 
union such a desirable goal. Man, for whom it is not good to be alone, 
has the power in his life-giving words to make lasting contact with 
things outside himself, with people and with ideas. Chaucer offers 
the description of such a way of life in the Canterbury Tales. It is a 
world rich in permutations on the essential human fact of making 
contact. There are false starts and poor finishes, there are grandiose 
schemes which collapse and modest suggestions which gain unex­
pected success. There is even the Knight, who in his life and tale is 
that rare object, a good man. In its pleasing wholeness, which defies 
the mundane fact of Chaucer's death, the Canterbury Tales holds the 
whole of the human condition, which may be failed by some of its 
participants, but which in itself offers hope for every man. 
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In undertaking a reading of the tales based 
on medieval notions of story (which were 
ethical) and literary arrangements (which 
were logical, discursive, and rhetorical), Allen 
and Moritz determine for every tale its logical 
place in a single coherent argument, and thus 
move considerably beyond those studies of 
the wholeness of Chaucer's collection that 
make much of beginning and of ending, and 
settle for a miscellany in between. As the pres­
ent authors present it, the argument of the 
tales demonstrates conclusively that Chaucer 
possessed a remarkably shrewd understand­
ing, not only of human nature, but also of 
that structured social cosmos in which medie­
val man saw literary decorum and moral 
truth as the same thing. 
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